Development of failure frequency, shelter and escape models for dense phase carbon dioxide pipelines by Lyons, Christopher John
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Development of Failure Frequency, Shelter and Escape Models 
for Dense Phase Carbon Dioxide Pipelines 
 
 
Christopher John Lyons 
 
 
Thesis Submitted for the Qualification of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Newcastle University, School of Marine Science and Technology  
November 2015 
 
 
  
 
 
 iii 
 
Abstract 
 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is recognised as one of a suite of solutions 
required to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into the atmosphere and 
prevent catastrophic global climate change. In CCS schemes, CO2 is captured 
from large scale industrial emitters and transported, predominantly by pipeline, 
to geological sites, such as depleted oil or gas fields or saline aquifers, where it 
is injected into the rock formation for storage. 
 
The requirement to develop a robust Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
methodology for high pressure CO2 pipelines has been recognised as critical to 
the implementation of CCS. Consequently, failure frequency and consequence 
models are required that are appropriate for high pressure CO2 pipelines. This 
thesis addresses key components from both the failure frequency and 
consequence parts of the QRA methodology development. 
 
On the failure frequency side, a predictive model to estimate the failure 
frequency of a high pressure CO2 pipeline due to third party external 
interference has been developed. The model has been validated for the design 
requirements of high pressure CO2 pipelines by showing that it is applicable to 
thick wall linepipe. Additional validation has been provided through comparison 
between model predictions, historical data and the existing industry standard 
failure frequency model, FFREQ. 
 
On the consequences side, models have been developed to describe the 
impact of CO2 on people sheltering inside buildings and those attempting to 
escape on foot, during a pipeline release event. The models have been coupled 
to the results of a dispersion analysis from a pipeline release under different 
environmental conditions to demonstrate how the consequence data required 
for input into the QRA can be determined. In each model both constant and 
changing external concentrations of CO2 have been considered and the toxic 
effects on people predicted. It has been shown that the models can be used to 
calculate safe distances in the event of a CO2 pipeline release. 
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Nomenclature 
 
A   - Fracture area of a 2/3 Charpy specimen 
Ah   - Normalised hole area 
ܣଵ  - Area of rectangle which demarcates flaw 
ܣଶ  - Full load bearing area containing flaw 
a  - Weibull distribution parameter (Hazard Analysis/FFREQ) 
am  - Depth of micro-crack 
b  - Weibull distribution parameter (Hazard Analysis/FFREQ) 
C  - Constant in micro-crack determined from fit to experimental data 
ܥௗ  - Discharge coefficient of opening in building envelope 
Cp  - Surface pressure coefficient 
Cpb  - Surface pressure coefficient back face of building 
Cpf  - Surface pressure coefficient front face of building 
Cv   - 2/3 Charpy v-notch upper shelf impact energy 
ܥ௩௙௨௟௟  - Lower bound Charpy v-notch impact energy, full size specimen 
c   - Half axial defect length 
2c   - Axial defect length 
ܿ௘௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ - External volume concentration of CO2 
ܿ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ - Internal volume concentration of CO2 
ܿ௢  - Concentration (non-specific) 
D  - Pipeline external diameter 
ܦ௢  - Toxic dose 
 2 
 
DOC   - Depth of cover factor 
d   - Depth of gouge 
݀௖௥௜௧  - Critical gouge depth 
݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெ - Critical gouge depth based upon an infinitely long gouge 
݂݀  - Pipeline design factor 
݀݋ݏ݁  - CO2 toxic dose 
E   - Young’s modulus 
F  - Cumulative density function 
Fcrit  - Critical dent force 
Fdent   - Dent force 
f  - Probability density function 
ௗ݂  - Combined gouge depth probability density function 
ி݂೏೐೙೟  - Dent force probability density function 
௚݂ௗௗ  - Gouged dent gouge depth probability density function 
௚݂ௗଶ௖  - Gouged dent gouge length probability density function 
௚݂ଶ௖  - Gouge length probability density function 
ு݂  - Dent depth probability density function  
fw   - Area correction term for a defect in a curved shell 
ଶ݂௖  - Combined gouge length probability density function 
ఏ݂  - Correction term in stress intensity factor for elliptical flaws 
ffHDleak  - Historical data component leak failure frequency 
݂ ு݂஽௟௘௔௞௖௛௔௜௡ - Chain trencher leak failure frequency 
݂ ு݂஽௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ - Historical data component rupture failure frequency 
 3 
 
݂ ு݂஽௥௨௣௧௨௥௘௖௛௔௜௡ - Chain trencher rupture failure frequency 
ffleak   - Leak failure frequency 
ffrupture  - Rupture failure frequency 
ffSRleak  - Structural reliability component leak failure frequency  
ffSRrupture - Structural reliability component rupture failure frequency  
ffSRtotal  - Structural reliability component total failure frequency 
fftotal  - Total failure frequency 
ܩଵ  - Function in the bending stress intensity factor 
ܩଶ  - Function in the bending stress intensity factor 
݃  - Correction term in stress intensity factor for elliptical flaws 
݃௔  - Acceleration due to gravity 
H   - Depth of dent in an unpressurised pipeline 
ܪ௕  - Function in the bending stress intensity factor 
ܪ௖௥௜௧  - Critical dent depth in an unpressurised pipeline 
HP   - Depth of dent in a pressurised pipeline 
HPcrit  - Critical dent depth in a pressurised pipeline 
ܪଵ  - Function in the bending stress intensity factor 
ܪଶ  - Function in the bending stress intensity factor 
hb  - Height of building in shelter model 
ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ݁ - Overall Incident-Rate for third party external interference 
ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ ௚݁௢௨௚௘ - Incident-Rate for gouges 
ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ ௚݁௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧ - Incident-Rate for gouged dents  
i  - Counting index 
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j  - Yield criterion constant 
KI   - Stress intensity factor 
KIC   - Material fracture toughness 
KIp   - Primary stress intensity factor 
KIs   - Secondary stress intensity factor 
Kr  - Fracture ratio 
ܭ௧  - Notch stress concentration factor 
K1   - Empirical constant (British Gas Dent Gouge Fracture Model) 
K2  - Empirical constant (British Gas Dent Gouge Fracture Model) 
k  - Integration limit 
km  - Stress magnification factor due to misalignment 
kt   - Stress concentration factor 
ktb,   - Bending stress concentration factor 
ktm,   - Membrane stress concentration factor 
ܮ  - Excavator tooth length 
Lcrit   - Critical defect length for rupture 
Lr  - Load ratio 
ܮ௥௠௔௫  - Cut off point for load ratio 
l  - Integration limit 
lb  - Length of building in shelter model 
ܯ   - Folias factor / Bulging Correction Factor 
Mb   - Bending stress magnification factor 
ܯ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ - Mass of air/CO2 within the building 
 5 
 
Mkb,   - Stress intensity magnification factor 
Mkm,   - Stress intensity magnification factor 
Mm   - Membrane stress magnification factor 
MP  - Function used in the part-wall NG-18 equation 
ܯௌ௜  - Function in the reference stress for a part-wall defect 
MT  - Stress magnification factor 
ܯ்௜  - Function in the reference stress for a through-wall defect 
ܯଵ  - Function in the membrane stress intensity factor 
ܯଶ  - Function in the membrane stress intensity factor 
ܯଷ  - Function in the membrane stress intensity factor 
݉௔௜௥  - Molar mass of air 
݉஼ைమ  - Molar mass of CO2 
min  - Mass of air/CO2 entering the building 
n  - Hardening index 
݊௢  - Toxic Index 
P   - Internal operating pressure 
௔ܲ௧௠௢௦  - Atmospheric pressure 
௘ܲ௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ - External pressure on building face 
Pgdrupture  - Probability of a gouged dent rupture (Monte Carlo method) 
Pgouge   - Probability of failure for gouges 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ - Probability that mechanical damage will be a gouge 
Pgougeddent - Probability of failure for gouged dents 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ - Probability that mechanical damage will be a gouged dent 
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௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞ - Leak probability of failure for a gouged dent 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ - Rupture probability of failure for a gouged dent 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௧௢௧௔௟ - Total probability of failure for a gouged dent 
Pgougeleak - Leak probability of failure for a gouge 
Pgougerupture - Rupture probability of failure for a gouge 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௧௢௧௔௟ - Total probability of failure for a gouge 
Pgrupture   - Probability of a gouge rupture (Monte Carlo method) 
௜ܲ௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ - Internal pressure on building face 
Pleak  - Overall probability of failure for leaks 
Preference  - Atmospheric pressure at top of building 
Prupture  - Overall probability of failure for ruptures 
Ptotal  - Overall total probability of failure 
௪ܲ௜௡ௗ  - Dynamic pressure due to wind flow 
Px  - Probability 
ܲᇱ  - Unknown pressure 
∆ܲ  - Pressure difference across and opening in building envelope 
݌ݎ݋ܾ݅ݐ  - Probit value 
ܳ  - Ventilation flow rate 
ܳ௜௡  - Ventilation flow rate into the building 
ܳ௢௨௧  - Ventilation flow rate out of the building 
ݍ  - Function in the bending stress intensity factor 
R   - External pipeline radius 
ܴௗ  - Combined gouge depth reliability function 
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ܴி  - Dent force reliability function 
ܴ௚ௗ  - Gouge depth reliability function 
ܴ௚ௗௗ  - Gouged dent gouge depth reliability function 
ܴு  - Dent depth reliability function 
ܴூ  - Ideal gas constant 
Rx  - Reliability function 
Res  - Function in definition of dent force 
ݎ  - Radius at point of interest 
ݎ௜  - Internal shell radius 
rm   - Average pipe radius 
ݎ଴  - External shell radius 
ݎ௥  - Radius of root of gouge 
ܵ௥  - Plastic collapse ratio 
SCF   - Stress concentration factor for micro-crack 
ݏ  - Distance travelled by escaping person 
ܶ  - Temperature (non-specific) 
௘ܶ௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ - External temperature  
௜ܶ௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ - Internal temperature 
t	  - Pipeline wall thickness (Chapters 2 to 8); time (Chapters 9 to 10) 
Uwind  - Wind Speed 
u  - Integration variable 
௕ܸ௨௜௟ௗ௜௡௚ - Total volume of building 
∆ ஼ܸைమ௜௡ - Volume of CO2 flowing in to the building in dt 
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∆ ஼ܸைమ௢௨௧ - Volume of CO2 flowing out of the building in dt 
ν  - Flow stress constant 
ݒ௣  - Velocity of escaping person 
W  - Length of a typical pipe spool 
௢ܹ  - Width of opening in building envelope 
wb  - Width of building in shelter model 
wghr   - Probability of a hole size range for gouges 
wg൐110  - Probability of a hole size greater than 110 mm for gouges 
wgdhr   - Probability of a hole size range for gouged dents 
wgd൐110  - Probability of hole size greater than 110 mm for gouged dents 
X   - Parameter representing defect size in the stress intensity factor 
X_Fpress  - Uncertainty factor in PIPIN for plastic collapse leak / rupture 
X_Ki_gdr  - Uncertainty factor in PIPIN for brittle fracture leak / rupture 
X_Ki_gid  - Uncertainty factor in PIPIN for brittle fracture gouged dent 
X_Krfail  - Uncertainty factor in PIPIN for fracture assessment curve 
X_Lrcut  - Uncertainty factor upper limit plastic collapse of gouge (PIPIN) 
X_Pcf   - Uncertainty factor in PIPIN for brittle fracture gouged dent 
X_Scoll - Uncertainty factor in PIPIN for plastic collapse gouged dent 
X_Sfail  - Uncertainty factor in PIPIN for plastic collapse gouge 
x  - Random variable 
x1  - Example value of random variable 
Y  - Stress intensity factor correction 
Y1  - Stress intensity magnification factor 
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Y2   - Stress intensity magnification factor 
ሺܻߪሻ௉  - Primary component of stress intensity factor 
ሺܻߪሻௌ  - Secondary component of stress intensity factor 
z  - Function in definition of plasticity correction factor 
ݖ௛  - Height above ground level subtracted from building height 
ݖ଴  - Height of neutral pressure level 
α   - Weibull distribution parameter 
ߙ′′  - Function in the reference stress for a part-wall defect 
β   - Weibull distribution parameter 
γ   - Constant in micro-crack determined from fit to experimental data 
δr  - Fracture Ratio defined using CTOD parameters 
ߞ  - Constant in the secondary stress components 
ߠ  - Parametric angle to identify position along an elliptic flaw front 
μ  - Constant in micro-crack determined from fit to experimental data 
ߤௗ  - Lognormal distribution parameter 
ߦ  - Constant in the secondary stress components 
ρ   - Plasticity correction factor 
ߩ௔௜௥  - Air density (non-specific) 
ߩ௘௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ - External density 
ߩ௥௘௙௘௥௘௡௖௘ - Air density at top of building 
ρ1  - Function in definition of plasticity correction factor 
ߩ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ - Internal density 
ߪ  - Stress state in the pipe wall 
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σb   - Primary bending stress 
ߪ௕௉  - Primary bending stress component 
ߪ௕ௌ  - Secondary bending stress component 
ߪௗ  - Lognormal distribution parameter 
ߪு  - Circumferential hoop stress in the pipe wall 
ߪ௜  - Hoop stress at internal pipe wall 
σm   - Primary membrane stress 
ߪ௠௉   - Primary membrane stress component 
ߪ௠ௌ   - Secondary membrane stress component 
ߪ଴  - Hoop stress at external pipe wall 
ߪ௥௘௙  - Reference stress 
ߪ௎  - Ultimate tensile strength 
σY   - Yield strength of the pipe steel 
ߪ  - Flow Stress 
ߪ෤  - Plastic collapse stress  
Φ  - Function in the secondary stress components 
∅  - Correction term in stress intensity factor for elliptical flaws 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Research indicates that climate change is a serious and urgent issue (Stern, 
2006; IPCC, 2014). An increase in global temperatures could have a 
devastating effect on the Earth’s ecosystems, causing extreme weather events, 
sea levels to rise, an increase in disease and the extinction of many plant and 
animal species. The climate is changing as a result of the increasing production 
of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2); a direct consequence of 
the reliance on fossil fuels by humans. The atmospheric concentration of these 
gases is slowly rising above the level at which they can be removed from the 
environment naturally through vegetation and porous rocks. At current 
estimates, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere could 
treble over the next century (Race, 2007). The effect of this on the climate 
would be an increase in the average global temperature of over 5 degrees 
Celsius (Stern, 2006). 
 
In order to prevent future negative effects of climate change, the concentration 
of CO2 in the atmosphere needs to be stabilised to a level which can be 
naturally regulated. It is therefore imperative that the emission of greenhouse 
gases to the atmosphere is reduced. Unfortunately, the continued use of fossil 
fuels by developing nations to provide energy for growth and development is 
inevitable, due to their cost and flexibility (CCSA, 2015). There is a motivation 
therefore, to develop new technology which can provide a balance between the 
increasing use of fossil fuels and the required reduction in emissions. The use 
of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) schemes is one such possibility for this. 
 
CCS can be applied to any large industrial sources of CO2, including those 
associated with the steel and chemical industries; it is not exclusive to fossil fuel 
power plants. Furthermore, in some industries CCS is the only available option 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by the required amount. In a CCS 
scheme the CO2 produced from the burning of fossil fuels is collected at its 
source. Following this, the gas is transported to an appropriate storage site 
such as a saline aquifer or depleted oil well. Finally, the CO2 is injected into the 
rock formation at the storage site to contain it and prevent it from escaping to 
the atmosphere. Suitable storage sites are expected to retain the CO2 either 
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indefinitely or for timescales which are geologically significant. Alternatively, the 
captured CO2 can be used to assist in the extraction of further fossil fuels, for 
example as part of Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR). In the UK, depleted oil and 
gas reservoirs located in the North Sea may represent potentially suitable 
storage sites. 
 
Research in the CCS field has seen carbon capture technology mature to the 
point of viability and the potential storage sites accepted as fit for purpose 
(Downie, 2007). The successful implementation of CCS schemes as a means of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions is therefore dependent upon a establishing 
a method for the safe and efficient transportation of CO2 from its source to its 
storage point. An important point to note with regards to this is that CO2 is both 
toxic and an asphyxiant and could therefore cause harm to people in the event 
of an accidental release.  
 
Pure CO2 is colourless, odourless and non-flammable. The triple point of CO2 is 
at a temperature of -56°C and a pressure of 5 barg. In the vicinity of this point 
CO2 can exist as either solid, liquid or a gas. The critical point of CO2 is at a 
temperature of 31°C and a pressure of 74 barg. At temperature and pressure 
values higher than these CO2 exists as a supercritical fluid. If the pressure is 
above the critical pressure but the temperature below the critical temperature, 
CO2 exists as a liquid with the property of increasing density with decreasing 
temperature. This form of CO2 is known as a dense phase liquid. The most 
efficient method for the transportation for CO2 is via pipeline in the dense 
phase.  This is because in the dense phase CO2 has the density of a liquid but 
the viscosity and compressibility of a gas (Downie, 2007). 
 
Before CO2 is transported by pipeline a compressor station is used to transform 
the gas into the dense phase. An appropriate safety margin above the critical 
pressure must be applied in order to ensure that pipeline flow remains in the 
dense phase throughout transportation. For pure CO2, the pressure required 
would therefore be approximately 100 barg. CO2 captured from power plants or 
other sources however will not be pure and can contain impurities such as 
sulphur and nitrogen oxides or hydrogen. The presence of impurities in the 
captured CO2 will affect critical temperature and pressure and may mean that a 
 13 
 
transportation pipeline must have an operating pressure of up to 200 barg to 
ensure single phase flow. 
 
In the UK the operation of high pressure pipelines is controlled according to the 
Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) (Anon., 1996). The PSRs state that the risks 
associated with a pipeline must be “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP). 
Pipeline operators generally demonstrate that risks are ALARP by ensuring that 
their pipeline complies with relevant design codes. The pipeline design codes 
used in the UK are TD/1 (Anon., 2009), for natural gas pipelines; and PD-8010 
(Anon., 2015a) for all other high pressure pipelines. These codes contain 
design requirements which ensure pipeline integrity is maintained, thereby 
imposing a high level of safety. Alternatively, if the requirements given in the 
codes are not definitive or particular conditions apply which are not covered 
under code guidance the pipeline risks can be made ALARP through the use of 
a procedure known as a quantified risk assessment (QRA) (Race, 2007; 
Barnett, 2014; Cooper, 2014). 
 
For a pipeline carrying dense phase CO2 in the UK, the relevant design code to 
apply in order to ensure compliance with the PSRs should be PD-8010. 
However, in this code the maximum allowable operating stress in the pipeline 
and the minimum allowable distance between the pipeline and any occupied 
buildings near to the pipeline route must be defined by the product being 
transported. PD-8010 was originally written to be applied to products which 
pose a thermal hazard and therefore there is currently no hazard category 
included in the code for dense phase CO2. The code can therefore not be 
currently applied to the design of dense phase CO2 pipelines. In order to ensure 
the safe design, construction and operation of a dense phase CO2 pipeline as 
part of a CCS scheme in the UK a QRA approach would therefore be required 
(Barnett, 2014; Cooper, 2014). 
 
To address and resolve key issues relating to the transport of dense phase CO2 
by pipeline, National Grid, in collaboration with various UK universities and 
engineering companies, has completed a detailed research programme known 
as COOLTRANS (CO2Liquid pipeline TRANSportation). The programme 
included extensive experimental testing and the development of theoretical 
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models to describe dense phase CO2 behaviour. One of the aims of the 
COOLTRANS programme was the development of a comprehensive QRA 
methodology for application to dense phase CO2 pipelines (Barnett, 2014; 
Cooper, 2014). 
 
The purpose of a pipeline QRA is to determine the risks posed by the failure of 
the pipeline to people located nearby. The procedure involves the identification 
of hazard scenarios and considers both the probability of failure and the 
consequences of failure in order to calculate values for the individual and 
societal risk due to the pipeline. In general a QRA procedure covers the 
following steps: 
 
i) Identify hazards 
ii) Identify failure causes 
iii) Calculate the frequency of failure for each cause 
iv) Evaluate the consequences of failure 
v) Calculate the individual and societal risk a specific locations along the 
pipeline 
vi) Assess the tolerability of the calculated risks by comparison with 
recognised criteria 
 
Identifying hazards for a QRA involves consideration of the pipeline geometry, 
material and operating conditions; the surrounding infrastructure and 
environment along the potential pipeline route; and appropriate meteorological 
data such as wind speed, direction and atmospheric conditions. In terms of 
failure causes, pipeline failure can occur due to numerous different mechanisms 
including, third party external interference, corrosion, material or construction 
defects, natural events and operational error; all of which must be considered 
as part of the assessment (Goodfellow, 2006).  
 
The calculation of failure frequency and evaluation of the consequences of 
failure in the QRA process generally involve the use of theoretical models which 
are tailored to each individual case. Failure frequency is determined by 
assessing the probability of failure for each failure cause. Values are obtained 
either from relevant operational data or models based on structural reliability 
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methods. For the consequences of failure, models describing the product 
outflow and dispersion within the environment are required. For oil and natural 
gas pipelines, the hazards following pipeline failure are largely thermal and 
therefore the consequence models must consider the probability of ignition and 
thermal radiation effects. The behaviour of humans in the event of a pipeline 
failure is also an important consideration to model as part of the failure 
consequences and must consider the potential for escape and shelter from 
hazards. For failure consequences the various possible scenarios are drawn out 
logically in the form of an event tree in order to determine overall probabilities. 
 
Individual risk is the probability per year of an individual, who is present year 
round at a specific location along the pipeline route, becoming a casualty. The 
individual risk is calculated by applying a risk sum for the failure frequency and 
consequences over all potential incidents which could occur. This is applied 
over the total length of the pipeline which could cause harm to the individual, 
the “interaction length”. The individual risk is presented as the risk level along a 
transect perpendicular to the pipeline. Societal risk is the relationship between 
the frequency of an incident and the total number of potential casualties which 
could occur as a result of that incident. To calculate the societal risk of a 
pipeline at a specific location, the frequency of each incident along with the 
associated number of casualties for that incident is calculated. This is 
performed for all potential incidents which could occur producing a number of 
frequency-casualty pairs. Using the frequency-casualty pairs an “F-N” curve can 
be constructed showing the frequency of N or more casualties per year against 
N. This provides a measure of the societal risk. The calculated individual and 
societal risk levels are assessed against published risk criteria in order to 
determine if they are tolerable. Acceptable risk levels in the UK are set by the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (Anon., 1992; Anon., 1993; Anon., 2001b; 
Goodfellow, 2006). 
 
In terms of developing a QRA methodology for dense phase CO2 pipelines, the 
basic structure of the above procedure was appropriate; however the individual 
models used to calculate risk values required revision. The hazards and 
behaviour of dense phase CO2 differ from those of oil and natural gas which 
has implications for both the frequency and consequences aspects of a QRA. 
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New models had to be developed for the QRA process in order to address 
these differences and provide accurate measures of risk for a dense phase CO2 
pipeline.  
 
This thesis considers the development of three individual models to be used as 
part of the QRA methodology for dense phase CO2 pipelines. The models 
address different aspects from both the failure frequency and consequences 
side of the QRA process. More specifically the models relate to: the frequency 
of pipeline failure due to third party external interference; the shelter provided by 
buildings in the event of a dense phase CO2 pipeline failure; and the potential 
for escape on foot in the event of a dense phase CO2 pipeline failure. 
 
As noted above, pipeline failure can occur due to numerous different 
mechanisms including third party external interference, corrosion, material or 
construction defects, natural events and operational error. For a dense phase 
CO2 pipeline material and construction defects can be addressed through 
material specifications, quality assurance and inspection; natural events can be 
addressed by choosing a pipeline route to avoid problematic locations or 
through surveillance and operational response; and operational errors can be 
addressed through staff training and applying rigorous operational procedures. 
External corrosion can be addressed through a suitable external pipeline 
coating and an operational cathodic protection system; and internal corrosion 
can be addressed by the product specification of the CO2. The most significant 
cause of failure influencing the residual risk posed by a dense phase CO2 
pipeline is therefore third party external interference. This damage cause may 
be random, and is typically outside the direct control of the operator (Barnett, 
2014; Cooper, 2014). 
 
For oil and natural gas pipelines, the frequency of pipeline failure due to third 
party external interference is calculated using models based upon structural 
reliability methods. These models combine semi-empirical pipeline failure 
models with historical operational damage data. The high pressure design 
requirement for a dense phase CO2 pipeline however, may necessitate the use 
of thick wall linepipe in pipeline construction, potentially with wall thickness 
dimensions outside the limits of operational experience for oil and natural gas. 
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Consequently, the reliance of the current failure frequency models on empirical 
data and semi-empirical relations suggested their application to dense phase 
CO2 pipelines may be inappropriate. 
 
This thesis presents the development of an external interference failure 
frequency model which is appropriate for application to dense phase CO2 
pipelines. The development of the model has considered the applicability of 
semi-empirical failure models to thick wall linepipe, advancements in damage 
modelling and contemporary operational data. Validation of the model is 
provided through comparison between model predictions, historical operational 
data and the existing industry standard failure frequency model, FFREQ. 
 
In terms of the consequences of failure, the behaviour of dense phase CO2 in 
the event of a pipeline failure is significantly different to that of oil or natural gas. 
The CO2 will decompress, expand to atmospheric pressure and then disperse 
as a gas which is heavier than air at atmospheric pressure, in accordance with 
the environmental conditions at the location. A change of phase from liquid to 
gas will occur as a result of the decompression and expansion; and the 
temperature of the CO2 will decrease. New models were therefore required in 
order to describe the outflow and dispersion of the released CO2 as part of a 
QRA methodology for dense phase CO2 pipelines. The chances of finding 
shelter or escape in the event of a pipeline failure will also be affected by the 
different hazards and behaviour of CO2 compared to oil or natural gas. The 
ingress of CO2 into occupied buildings must be considered, in addition to the 
ability to escape from a released CO2 cloud. 
 
This thesis presents the development of models to describe the impact of CO2 
on people sheltering inside buildings and those attempting to escape on foot 
during a pipeline release event. The models have been coupled to the results of 
a dispersion analysis from a pipeline release under different environmental 
conditions to demonstrate how the consequence data required for input into the 
QRA can be determined. In each model both constant and changing external 
concentrations of CO2 has been considered and the toxic effects on people 
predicted. 
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The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of external 
interference failure frequency models currently in use for oil and natural gas 
pipelines; Chapter 3 presents a review of the pipeline failure models and 
historical operational data sources which can potentially be used to construct 
failure frequency models; Chapter 4 details a study intended to provide a 
validation of the applicability of specific pipeline failure models, the NG-18 
equations, to thick wall pipelines; Chapter 5 explains the first four stages in the 
development of the external interference failure frequency model for dense 
phase CO2 pipelines; Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the historical 
operational damage data used in the failure frequency model; Chapter 7 
explains the final two stages in the development of the failure frequency model; 
Chapter 8 provides validation of the failure frequency model and details an 
analysis of the trends observed when the model is applied to different pipeline 
scenarios; Chapter 9 explains the development of the “shelter” model, 
considering the ingress of CO2 into a building surrounded by an environment 
with a high CO2 concentration; Finally, Chapter 10 explains the development of 
the “escape” model, considering escape on foot from a moving cloud of CO2. 
Conclusions and recommendations for further work are provided in Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 2. Review of Failure Frequency Models 
 
Chapter 2 to Chapter 8 of this thesis present the development of a model which 
can be used to calculate the failure frequency due to third party external 
interference, for a dense phase CO2 pipeline.  
 
For oil and gas pipelines, the frequency of pipeline failure due to third party 
external interference has traditionally been calculated using models based upon 
probabilistic, structural reliability methods. Structural reliability methods are 
applied by combining the following: 
 
 Limit state functions, the mathematical models which define the 
conditions for failure; 
 Probability distributions based around selected random variables; 
 A mathematical technique to calculate the probability of failure (e.g. 
Numerical Integration, Monte Carlo, First Order Reliability Methods). 
 
For pipelines the limit state functions are based on semi-empirical fracture 
mechanics failure models; and the probability distributions are based on 
pipeline damage and derived from historical operational data. The failure 
probability is converted into a failure frequency to take into account the 
regularity of third party external interference damage. The various models 
currently in use within the oil and natural gas pipeline industry differ in their 
subtleties; however all are based upon a methodology originally developed by 
British Gas in the 1980s. 
 
To calculate pipeline failure frequency for dense phase CO2 pipelines it would 
be desirable to extend the use of the current pipeline failure frequency 
methodology. The methodology has been employed for over 25 years, and as a 
result is tried, tested and well understood. 
 
The transport of dense phase CO2 by pipeline however requires operational 
pressures in excess of the CO2 triple point; potentially up to 200 barg when 
incorporating an appropriate margin to ensure single phase flow. This high 
design pressure requirement necessitates the use of thick wall linepipe in 
 20 
 
pipeline construction, potentially with wall thickness dimensions outside of the 
limits of current operational experience. Consequently, the reliance of the failure 
frequency methodology on empirical data and semi-empirical relations suggests 
its application to dense phase CO2 pipelines may be inappropriate.  
 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the failure frequency methodology and the 
existing models derived from it to assess their applicability to dense phase CO2 
pipelines. An overview of the models is given in order to explain their structure 
and to highlight the similarities and differences between each model. 
 
2.1 External Interference Damage 
 
External interference of a pipeline by a third party can result in mechanical 
damage to that pipeline. Mechanical damage is caused by a foreign object, 
such as earth moving or farming equipment, striking a pipeline. 
 
2.1.1 Damage Forms and Pipeline Failure 
 
Mechanical damage to a pipeline can occur in the form of either: 
 
 Dents;  
 Gouges (including spalling and cracks);  
 Combinations of dents and gouges (gouged dents);  
 Punctures (and broken/severed pipes). 
 
A dent is a deformation in the wall of the pipeline. The normal cylindrical shape 
of the pipe is permanently changed as a result of being plastically deformed. 
Dents can be described as smooth or kinked depending on the shape of the 
deformation. A dent which is not associated with a metal loss defect is known 
as a plain dent. A dent will cause an area of local stress concentration. 
 
A gouge is a defect which is defined by a loss of metal from the pipe wall 
resulting in a local reduction of the wall thickness. The metal is typically scraped 
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away for example, by the tooth of an excavator bucket. Spalling is a form of 
gouging in which small fragments of metal are chipped away from the pipe. 
Gouges also cause an area of local stress concentration in the pipe wall. 
Gouges can be characterised by their orientation, which is determined by the 
angle with which their length (the largest dimension of the defect parallel to the 
surface of the pipe) makes with respect to the pipe axis. In assessment terms 
gouges in pipelines are treated as crack-like defects. Consequently, for the 
purposes of this work the definition of a gouge caused by external interference 
also includes cracking in the pipe wall.  
 
Gouged dent is a term used to describe defects which are a combination of both 
a dent defect and a gouge defect. This form of mechanical damage is 
considered to be more severe than an equivalent dent or gouge occurring in 
isolation. 
 
Gouges and gouged dents which do not completely penetrate the pipe wall are 
known as part-wall defects. If part-wall damage is severe enough then the 
affected section of pipe is no longer able to tolerate the stresses produced 
during normal pipeline operation and the pipe will fail. The severity of the part-
wall damage can be determined using fracture mechanics failure equations. 
 
If however, the pipe is struck with sufficient force in the initial incident; or subject 
to drilling operations in-error; there can be a direct breach of the pipe wall, 
which will also result in a failure. This type of damage is known as a puncture. A 
typical puncture is effectively a gouge or gouged dent with a depth equal to the 
pipe wall thickness. 
 
It is important to make a distinction between the failure of severe part-wall 
defects and through-wall punctures. Both types of failure result from external 
interference damage and in both cases the failures are instantaneous. For part-
wall damage however, the failure occurs as a result of a reduction in the load 
the pipe structure can tolerate; whereas for punctures the failure is due to a hole 
in the pipe wall created by the offending foreign object, limited simply by the 
pipe wall thickness. It should be noted that although “puncture” is used as 
defined as above in the context of this work, the term may also refer to incidents 
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in which a pipe has been completely severed, leaving two open pipe ends. The 
reason for this is that the historical operational data and the original 
documentation relating to the development of the failure frequency methodology 
are non-specific with regards to the definition of a puncture. This however, has 
been avoided where possible. 
 
It should be noted that third party external interference can also result in 
damage to branches and fittings on the pipeline. Failure can occur if these 
attachments are severely damaged or completely severed from the pipe. 
Damage to fittings is only considered in two of the models based upon the 
pipeline failure frequency methodology, using values for failure frequency 
derived from historical operational data. The other models described in this 
review do not consider damage to fittings when calculating pipeline failure 
frequency. 
 
2.1.2 Leak / Rupture 
 
Regardless of method, the failure of a pipeline will result in what is known as a 
through-wall defect. From a risk assessment point of view, the most important 
factor in pipeline failure is whether the failure will occur as a leak or as a 
rupture. A leak is defined as a failure which is stable, (i.e. there is no increase in 
the size of the through-wall defect). A rupture is defined as a failure which is 
unstable (i.e. there is an increase in the size of the through-wall defect). It 
should be noted that a severed pipe is considered to be a rupture failure. A 
rupture is significantly worse than a leak in consequence terms. 
 
2.1.3 Model Considerations 
 
As noted above the majority of the failure frequency models detailed for this 
review do not consider pipeline failure from damage to branches and fittings. 
Further assumptions of note made by the models are as follows: 
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 The failure of part-wall defects is considered to occur only due to axially 
orientated defects. This is due to the choice of fracture mechanics failure 
models used to formulate limit states in the failure frequency models. The 
equations were selected due to the fact that axially orientated defects are 
more severe than equivalent defects with other orientations. In a pipeline 
the maximum operational stress acts in the circumferential “hoop” 
direction, which is exactly perpendicular to an axially orientated defect 
(Cosham, 2001a; Cosham, 2002). Conversely, through-wall puncture 
failures are limited by the pipeline wall thickness and therefore their 
orientation is irrelevant. 
 The failure of part-wall defects is considered to occur only due to static 
internal pressure loading. Axial loading, in-plane bending loading and 
time-varying internal pressure loading are not considered by the models 
(Cosham, 2001a; Cosham, 2002). 
 The failure of plain dent damage is not considered. Documentation 
relating to the development original British Gas methodology notes that 
the risk of failure for dents up to 24% of the pipeline diameter is 
negligible, justifying their exclusion from the model (Corder, 1986). 
Experimental data reviewed in the Pipeline Defect Assessment Manual 
(PDAM) showed that the burst strength, due to static internal pressure, of 
pipes with plain dents is not less than that of undented pipe provided the 
dent is smaller than 10% of the pipeline diameter. However, plain dents 
on welds and kinked dents could potentially have a lower burst strength 
than undented pipe (Cosham, 2001b). 
 
2.2 The British Gas ERS Hazard Analysis Model 
 
A model to calculate pipeline failure frequency due to third party external 
interference was developed at the British Gas Engineering Research Station 
(ERS) in the 1980s. The model uses a combination of structural reliability 
methods and trends derived from historical operational data in order to calculate 
a value for failure frequency. The model was originally implemented in the form 
of a computer program known as “Hazard Analysis”. In the Hazard Analysis 
model a failure frequency is calculated for a user defined pipeline based upon 
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its diameter, wall thickness, operating pressure, steel grade, fracture toughness 
and area type (Matthews, 1984; Corder, 1985b; Corder, 1985a; Corder, 1986). 
 
2.2.1 Structural Reliability Component 
 
The structural reliability based component of the Hazard Analysis model 
considers the failure of part-wall damage and through-wall punctures. In this 
part of the model, pipeline failure is considered to occur via one of three 
damage failure mechanisms: 
 
 Failure of a gouge or 
 Failure of a gouged dent 
 Direct breach of the pipe wall 
 
As noted by the general failure frequency model assumptions detailed in section 
2.1.3, the Hazard Analysis model does not consider failure due to plain dents, 
dented welds and kinked dents. Given mechanical damage has occurred to the 
pipeline, it is assumed that this damage must take the form of either a gouge, or 
a gouged dent only. The pipeline failure frequency is therefore dependent on: 
 
 The frequency with which a pipeline is subject to a gouge; 
 The frequency with which a pipeline is subject to a gouged dent; 
 The probability of failure of a gouge; 
 The probability of failure of a gouged dent. 
 
Additionally, the model considers that pipeline failure will result in either a leak 
or a rupture. Each failure mechanism is therefore subdivided into leak and 
rupture. As noted in section 2.1.2, the consequences of a rupture are more 
severe than those of a leak due to a larger and more rapid release of potentially 
harmful pipeline product. Failure consequences however, are not considered by 
the model. 
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2.2.1.1 Incident-Rates 
 
The frequency with which a pipeline is subject to a gouge or gouged dent is 
known as an Incident-Rate. In the Hazard Analysis model the Incident-Rates for 
gouges and gouged dents are based upon an analysis of the ERS Fault 
Database. 
 
The ERS Fault Database was a database maintained by British Gas 
encompassing all of the transmission pipelines in the onshore gas transmission 
system in the UK. The database recorded details of all known pipeline faults 
and failures which were subject to an excavation and on-site assessment, 
dating back to 1962. The database was eventually merged into the United 
Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators Association (UKOPA) Fault Database 
(Cosham, 2007). Both the ERS and UKOPA Fault Databases were/are subject 
to an annual update to include new data. 
 
An Incident-Rate value is derived from the number of third party external 
interference mechanical damage incidents and a value for operational 
exposure. A pipeline’s operational exposure (in km.yr) is calculated from its 
length (in km) and the amount of time it has been in operation (in years): 
 
Operational Exposure = Length of Pipeline x Duration Pipeline has been in 
Operation 
 
In order to calculate a value for Incident-Rate, the total number of mechanical 
damage incidents of a certain type recorded historically; and the total 
operational exposure of all pipelines affected by that type of mechanical 
damage are required. Incident-Rate (per km.yr) is given by: 
 
Incident-Rate = Total Number of Incidents/Total Operational Exposure 
 
In the Hazard Analysis model four different Incident-Rates are used. In addition 
to the different values required for gouges and gouged dents, the Incident-
Rates are also split depending on whether the land through which a pipeline is 
routed is rural (R-type) or suburban (S-type). Documentation relating to the 
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development of the Hazard Analysis model notes that different machinery 
operating in different area types produced different damage profiles. This was 
the motivation for the use of separate values (Matthews, 1984).  
 
Example: In the ERS Fault Database in 1985 the number of gouges in R-type 
areas was 148. The total operational exposure of pipelines in R-type areas up 
to that point in time was 196,676 km.yr (converted from 122,209 mile.yr). The 
Incident-Rate for gouges in R-type areas was therefore calculated to be: 
 
148/196676 = 7.53 x 10-4 per km.yr 
 
The Incident-Rates used in the Hazard Analysis model (converted from per 
mile.yr in the original documentation) are given in Table 2.1: 
 
Area Type Damage Type Incident-Rate (per km.yr) 
Rural Gouge 7.53 x 10
-4
Gouged Dent 1.38 x 10-4
Suburban Gouge 2.90 x 10
-3
Gouged Dent 8.22 x 10-4
Table 2.1: Hazard Analysis Model Incident-Rates 
 
2.2.1.2 Limit State Functions 
 
The probability of failure of gouge or gouged dent and whether a defect will fail 
as a leak or a rupture are determined by limit state functions and probability 
distributions of random variables.  
 
The limit state functions used in the Hazard Analysis model define the 
conditions for failure in terms of the size of the defect, the pipeline geometry, 
and the material properties of the linepipe steel. They are based upon empirical 
or semi-empirical fracture mechanics failure models for the failure of defects in 
linepipe. 
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In order to determine whether damage will fail as a leak or rupture, a critical 
defect length is defined. The critical defect length is defined using the flow 
stress dependent form of the through-wall NG-18 equation, for an axially 
orientated through-wall slit subject to static internal pressure loading. Further 
details on the through-wall NG-18 equations are given in section 3.1.1.1. The 
flow stress dependent form is preferred over the toughness dependent form due 
to the high toughness of modern pipe steels. Failure is more likely to occur due 
to plastic collapse rather than brittle fracture: 
 
ߪு ൌ ܯିଵߪ         (2.1) 
 
σH is the circumferential hoop stress in the pipe wall at failure (in Nmm-2). M is 
known as the Folias factor and this is introduced in order to take account of the 
bulging which occurs when a defect is present in a pressurised pipeline. 	ߪ is a 
quantity known as the flow stress, this is a measure of the stress at which 
unconstrained plastic flow occurs (in Nmm-2). 
 
In the Hazard Analysis model the Folias factor is defined as: 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.3125 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
  for   ଶ௖√ோ௧ ൑ 2   (2.2) 
          
ܯ ൌ 0.6 ൅ 0.45 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ  for  
ଶ௖
√ோ௧ ൐ 2   (2.3)1 
 
Where 2c is the axial defect length (in mm), R is the external pipeline radius (in 
mm) and t the pipeline wall thickness (in mm). Further details on the Folias 
factor are given in section 3.1.1.2. 
 
The flow stress is an empirical term which can take many different values. In the 
Hazard Analysis model it is been defined as: 
 
                                            
1 Note this equation was rearranged from the original text written as:  
Lcrit	ൌ	ሺM‐0.6ሻ√Rt/0.45	on a typewriter and is therefore ambiguous as to whether 
the “/0.45” portion is included in the square root. It has been assumed here that 
the square root applies only to “ܴݐ”.  
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ߪത ൌ 1.15ߪ௒         (2.4) 
 
Where σY is the yield strength (in Nmm-2) of the pipe steel (often approximated 
to the specified minimum yield strength (SMYS), in the absence of material test 
data). The flow stress was defined in this way in order to be consistent with the 
British Gas Dent-Gouge Fracture Model (BGDGFM) (equation (2.10)). Further 
details on the flow stress are given in section 3.1.1.3. 
 
The circumferential hoop stress (in Nmm-2) in the pipeline is calculated from the 
internal operating pressure, P (in barg); the pipeline external diameter, D (in 
mm); and the pipeline wall thickness, t (in mm); using Barlow’s formula: 
 
ߪு ൌ ௉஽ଶ଴௧         (2.5) 
 
A critical defect length for rupture (in mm) is defined by rearranging equation 
(2.1) and substituting into equation (2.2) and (2.3), replacing 2c with Lcrit: 
 
ܮ௖௥௜௧ ൌ ට3.2ܴݐ ൤ቀ ఙഥఙಹቁ
ଶ െ 1൨ for ܯ ൑ 1.5     (2.6) 
        
ܮ௖௥௜௧ ൌ
൤൬ ഑ഥ഑ಹ൰ି଴.଺൨√ோ௧
଴.ସହ   for ܯ ൐ 1.5     (2.7) 
 
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) are the limit state function for leak / rupture. Defects 
with an axial length longer than the critical length, for the specified operating 
conditions, are predicted to fail as a rupture. Defects with an axial length shorter 
or equal to the critical length are predicted to fail as a leak. Note that the limit 
state equation for leak / rupture is applied to both gouge and gouged dent 
defects, where 2c represents either the gouge length or the gouged dent gouge 
length, respectively. From equation (2.1) the information required to determine 
whether a pipeline defect will leak or rupture is the pipe geometry, operating 
and material parameters and the gouge length or gouged dent gouge length. 
 
The failure stress (in Nmm-2) of a part-wall gouge is given by the flow stress 
dependent form of the part-wall NG-18 equation, for an axially orientated gouge 
 29 
 
subject to static internal pressure loading. Further details on the part-wall NG-18 
equations are given in section 3.1.1.1 The flow stress dependent form is 
preferred over the toughness dependent form due to the high toughness of 
modern pipe steels. Failure is more likely to occur due to plastic collapse rather 
than brittle fracture: 
 
ߪு ൌ ߪത ቂ1 െ ௗ௧ቃ ቂ1 െ
ௗ
௧ ቀ
ଵ
ெቁቃ
ିଵ
      (2.8) 
 
Where 	ߪ, σH, M and t	are defined as above and d	is the depth of the gouge (in 
mm). By rearranging equation (2.8) a critical defect depth (in mm) can be 
defined as: 
 
݀௖௥௜௧ ൌ ݐ ቂ1 െ ఙಹఙഥ ቃ ቂ1 െ
ఙಹ
ఙഥ ቀ
ଵ
ெቁቃ
ିଵ
      (2.9) 
 
Equation (2.9) is the limit state function for part-wall gouge failure. Gouges 
deeper than the critical depth, for the specified operating conditions, are 
predicted to fail. The information required to determine whether a gouge will fail 
is the pipe geometry, operating and material parameters and the gouge depth. 
 
The failure stress of a part-wall gouged dent is given by the BGDGFM, for an 
axially orientated gouge at the base of a dent, subject to static internal pressure 
loading. The BGDGFM assumes that part-wall gouged dent failure occurs due 
to a combination of brittle fracture and plastic collapse. Further details on the 
BGDGFM are given in section 3.1.2.1: 
 
ఙಹ
ఙ෥ ൌ
ଶ
గ cosିଵ	 ൤exp	െ ൜113
ଵ.ହగா
ఙ෥మ஺ௗ ቂ ଵܻ ቀ1 െ
ଵ.଼ு
ଶோ ቁ ൅ ଶܻ ቀ10.2
ோ
௧
ு
ଶோቁቃ
ିଶ exp ቂ୪୬ሺ଴.଻ଷ଼஼ೡሻି௄భ௄మ ቃൠ൨ (2.10) 
 
Where E is Young’s modulus (in Nmm-2), A is the fracture area of a 2/3 Charpy 
specimen (in mm2), d is the depth of the gouge (in mm), H is the depth of the 
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dent (in mm) and Cv is the 2/3 Charpy v-notch upper shelf impact energy (in J). 
ߪ෤ (in Nmm-2), Y1, Y2, K1 and K22, are defined as: 
 
ߪ෤ ൌ 1.15ߪ௒ ቀ1 െ ௗ௧ቁ        (2.11) 
ଵܻ ൌ 1.12 െ 0.23 ቀௗ௧ቁ ൅ 10.6 ቀ
ௗ
௧ቁ
ଶ െ 21.7 ቀௗ௧ቁ
ଷ ൅ 30.4 ቀௗ௧ቁ
ସ
  (2.12) 
 
ଶܻ ൌ 1.12 െ 1.39 ቀௗ௧ቁ ൅ 7.32 ቀ
ௗ
௧ቁ
ଶ െ 13.1 ቀௗ௧ቁ
ଷ ൅ 14.0 ቀௗ௧ቁ
ସ
  (2.13) 
 
ܭଵ ൌ 1.9         (2.14) 
 
ܭଶ ൌ 0.57         (2.15) 
 
By rearranging equation (2.10) a dent depth (in mm) which is predicted to cause 
failure can be defined as: 
 
ܪ௖௥௜௧ ൌ
ଶோ൮ඩ
౛౮౦൤ౢ౤ሺబ.ళయఴ಴ೡሻష಼భ಼మ ൨
ౢ౤ቀ౩౛ౙቂഏ഑ಹమ഑෥ ቃቁቆబ.బబఴఴఱ
഑෥మಲ೏
భ.ఱഏಶቇೊభమ
ିଵ൲
ଵ଴.ଶቀೊమೊభቁቀ
ೃ
೟ቁିଵ.଼
     (2.16) 
 
Equation (2.16) is the limit state function for gouged dent failure. Documentation 
relating to the development of the Hazard Analysis model notes that values of 
2.049 and 0.534 should be used for K1 and K2 respectively in equation (2.16). 
The reason given for this is that the BGDGFM is semi-empirical and based on a 
linear regression of the ୪୬ሺ଴.଻ଷଷ஼ೡି௄భሻ௄మ  term. The subject of the equation is 
changed in going from (2.10) to (2.16) and this requires a new regression to be 
performed, resulting in new values for the constants. Note that equations (2.10) 
through (2.16) have been converted to SI units from imperial units which were 
used in the Hazard Analysis model and documentation. 
 
                                            
2 Note that K1 and K2 as given by equations (2.14) and (2.15) are not 
dimensionless and have dimensions of ftlbf. Further information is given in 
section 3.1.2.1. 
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From equation (2.16) a dent of depth Hcrit is predicted to cause a failure when it 
occurs in conjunction with a gouge of depth d for the specified operating 
conditions. From equation (2.10) the information required to determine whether 
a gouged dent will fail is the pipe geometry, operating and material parameters, 
the gouged dent dent depth and the gouged dent gouge depth. It should be 
noted that the length of the gouge is not included in the BGDGFM. 
 
Through-wall punctures do not require a definition of a failure stress since the 
failure occurs due to the creation of a hole in the pipe wall. In the structural 
reliability component of the Hazard Analysis model it is implied that a through-
wall puncture has occurred if the gouge depth of a gouge or gouged dent 
defect, d, is in excess of the pipe wall thickness, t. 
 
2.2.1.3 Probability Distributions 
 
The Hazard Analysis model uses six random variables in calculation of the 
probability of failure of a gouge or a gouged dent. These are variables which 
appear in the limit state functions described in the previous section and whose 
values are random, based upon probability distributions. The random variables 
used in the Hazard Analysis model alongside the limit state functions in which 
they appear are shown in Table 2.2: 
 
Random Variable Limit State Function 
Gouge Length Leak / Rupture & Gouge Failure 
Gouged Dent Gouge Length Leak / Rupture 
Gouge Depth in R-Type Areas Gouge Failure 
Gouge Depth in S-Type Areas Gouge Failure 
Gouged Dent Gouge Depth Gouged Dent Failure 
Gouged Dent Dent Depth Gouged Dent Failure 
Table 2.2: Hazard Analysis Model Random Variables 
 
All of the other variables in the limit state functions were assumed to be 
deterministic quantities. Six separate Weibull cumulative probability distributions 
were derived to describe the six random variables. The Weibull distributions 
were fitted using the maximum likelihood method. Weibull distributions were 
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chosen due to their versatility, allowing a wide variety of physical quantities to 
be accurately represented (Matthews, 1984). The Weibull distributions were 
based upon an analysis of pipeline damage data for gouges and gouged dents, 
contained in the ERS Fault Database.  
 
As for Incident-Rate, the intent was to split the probability distributions between 
R-type and S-type areas due to evidence suggesting different machinery 
operating in different area types produced different damage profiles (Matthews, 
1984). Unfortunately, there was insufficient data available in the ERS database 
to allow useable R-type and S-type distributions to be derived for both damage 
forms. Only gouge defects provided enough data to enable the distinction to be 
made. Furthermore, it was observed on derivation that the Weibull distributions 
for gouge length in R-type and S-type areas were almost identical. A decision 
was therefore made to merge the gouge length data sets, leaving gouge depth 
as the only variable with separate probability distributions for R-type and S-type 
areas. 
 
Documentation relating to the development of the Hazard Analysis model notes 
that data from puncture damage was included in the derivation of the Weibull 
distributions. The damage was classified as a gouge or gouged dent with a 
depth equal to the wall thickness of the pipeline and was treated as an extreme 
form of part-wall damage. Exceptions to this were punctures caused by drilling 
operations in-error, which were excluded as it was suggested that this type of 
puncture cannot be viewed as typical gouge or gouged dent damage (Corder, 
1985b). 
 
It should be noted that although separate random variables are used for R-type 
area gouge depth and S-type area gouge depth, the same limit state function, 
equation (2.9), is applied to both. Also note that although the limit state function 
for gouged dent failure does not include the length of the gouge a random 
variable for this quantity is still required in order to apply the limit state function 
for leak / rupture for the gouged dent case. 
 
A Weibull probability density function describing a random variable x has the 
form: 
 33 
 
 
݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ఈఉഀ ݔఈିଵ exp ቂെ ቀ
௫
ఉቁ
ఈቃ      (2.17) 
 
Where α and β are distribution parameters. Integrating the probability density 
function, with respect to the random variable between two limits, k and l, will 
give the probability that the value of a sample of the random variable x lies 
between k and l: 
 
௫ܲሺ݇ ൑ ݔ ൑ ݈ሻ ൌ ׬ ݂ሺݔሻ݀ݔ௟௞        (2.18) 
 
In general terms, the definition of a cumulative probability density function is 
given by: 
 
ܨሺݔሻ ൌ ׬ ݂ሺݑሻ݀ݑ௫ିஶ         (2.19) 
 
Assuming that the value of x can be anything from ‐∞ to ൅∞. (note that the 
Weibull distribution in particular is not defined for x ൏	0). The value of the 
cumulative probability distribution at any specific value of x (for example, x1) can 
therefore be interpreted as the probability that the value of a sample of x will be 
less than or equal to x1. Given that: 
 
௫ܲሺെ∞ ൑ ݔ ൑ ∞ሻ ൌ 1       (2.20) 
 
Then the function: 
 
ܴ௫ሺݔሻ ൌ 1 െ ܨሺݔሻ        (2.21) 
 
Can be interpreted as the probability that the value of a sample of x will be 
greater than any specific value of x (for example x1). 
 
In terms of the Hazard Analysis model, the derivation of cumulative distribution 
functions for each of the six damage variables and the use of equation (2.21) 
allows the probability of gouge or gouged dent damage of a certain size or 
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greater to be calculated, in the incidence of a random occurrence of gouge or 
gouged dent damage. 
 
The Weibull cumulative probability distribution has the form: 
 
ܨሺݔሻ ൌ 1 െ exp ቂെ ቀ௫ఉቁ
ఈቃ       (2.22) 
 
The parameters defining the cumulative probability distributions derived for the 
Hazard Analysis model are summarised in Table 2.3 (Matthews, 1984). From 
equation (2.21), the gouge length distributions are shown in Figure 2.1, the 
gouge depth distributions in Figure 2.2 and the dent depth distribution in Figure 
2.3. 
 
Random Variable Distribution Type α β (mm) 
Gouge Length Weibull 0.810 161.063 
Gouge Dent Gouge Length Weibull 0.952 103.059 
Gouge Depth in R-Type Areas Weibull 0.926 1.460 
Gouge Depth in S-Type Areas Weibull 0.869 1.184 
Gouged Dent Gouge Depth Weibull 0.790 1.078 
Gouged Dent Dent Depth Weibull 1.078 7.064 
Table 2.3: Hazard Analysis Model Weibull Parameters3 
 
                                            
3 Note that the Weibull parameters have been converted from those originally 
reported using the relations ܽ ൌ ଵఉഀ and ܾ ൌ ߙ and converting the parameter β 
from inches to mm. 
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Figure 2.1: Hazard Analysis Model Gouge Length Distributions 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Hazard Analysis Model Gouge Depth Distributions 
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Figure 2.3: Hazard Analysis Model Dent Depth Distribution 
 
2.2.1.4 Probability of Failure of a Gouge and a Gouged Dent 
 
The probability and frequency of failure for gouge and gouged dent damage in 
the Hazard Analysis model are calculated using numerical integration with the 
trapezium rule (Matthews, 1984; Corder, 1985a). 
 
From the limit state function for gouge failure (equation (2.9)), and section 
2.2.1.3, the total probability of failure for gouges can be expressed as: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻܴ௚ௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿଵଷଽ଻଴      (2.23) 
 
Where the subscripts g2c and gd denote the use of the gouge length and gouge 
depth Weibull parameters respectively. The use of R-type or S-type Weibull 
parameters for gouge depth is user-defined and depends upon the area type of 
the particular pipeline under consideration. The value of dcrit in equation (2.23) 
is dependent on the gouge length, 2c (from equation (2.9)). The gouge length 
Weibull distribution was truncated at 1397 mm (converted from 55” in the 
original documentation), fixing the upper limit of the integral. The reason for this 
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was to remain consistent with previous work, the details of which are 
unavailable. 
 
Note that failures due to through-wall puncture are incorporated through the use 
of the function Rdg (equation (2.21)). Whilst dcrit corresponds to the critical depth 
for part-wall gouges, the function Rdg gives the probability of a gouge of depth 
dcrit and greater and therefore includes gouges of depth in excess of the pipe 
wall thickness, t. 
 
Equation (2.23) can be split into a probability of a leak, Pgougeleak, and a 
probability of a rupture, Pgougerupture, using the critical length determined by the 
limit state function for leak / rupture (equations (2.6) and (2.7)): 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻܴ௚ௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿ௅೎ೝ೔೟଴      (2.24) 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻܴ௚ௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿଵଷଽ଻௅೎ೝ೔೟     (2.25) 
 
From the limit state function for gouged dent failure (equation (2.16)), and 
section 2.2.1.3, the total probability of failure for gouged dents, with a gouge of 
depth, d, and a dent of depth, Hcrit, can be expressed as: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ௗଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻ ቂ׬ ௚݂ௗௗሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ௗ೎ೝ೔೟଴ ቃ ݀2ܿ
ଵଷଽ଻
଴  (2.26) 
 
Where the subscripts gd2c, gdd and H denote the use of the gouged dent gouge 
length, gouged dent gouge depth and gouged dent dent depth Weibull 
parameters respectively. The value of Hcrit in equation (2.26) is dependent on d 
and calculated using equation (2.16). Note that despite the fact equation (2.26) 
describes gouged dent failure, the limit state function for gouge failure is used in 
the equation to calculate the value of dcrit in the second integral. Documentation 
relating to the development of the Hazard Analysis model indicates that dcrit was 
used as the integral limit as this would represent the depth at which a gouge 
would fail without the presence of a dent (Corder, 1985a). It is therefore implied 
that deeper gouge depths (including through-wall punctures) are covered by the 
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probability of failure for gouges, equation (2.23)4. The value of dcrit is dependent 
on the gouge length (taken to be the gouged dent gouge length in this case), 2c. 
The upper limit of the second integral in equation (2.26) therefore changes 
depending on the value of 2c in the first integral. As with gouge damage, the 
gouged dent gouge length Weibull distribution was truncated at 1397 mm 
(converted from 55” in the original documentation), fixing the upper limit of the 
first integral. 
 
In order to determine the probability of a gouged dent failing as a leak and a 
gouged dent failing as a rupture, equation (2.26) can be split in a similar way to 
equations (2.23), (2.24) and (2.25): 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ௗଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻ ቂ׬ ௚݂ௗௗሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ௗ೎ೝ೔೟଴ ቃ ݀2ܿ
௅೎ೝ೔೟
଴  (2.27) 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ௗଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻ ቂ׬ ௚݂ௗௗሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ௗ೎ೝ೔೟଴ ቃ ݀2ܿ
ଵଷଽ଻
௅೎ೝ೔೟  (2.28) 
 
The critical length of the gouged dent gouge in equation (2.27) and (2.28) is the 
same as that for the gouge failures described by equations (2.24) and (2.25), as 
calculated by the limit state function for leak / rupture, equations (2.6) and (2.7). 
 
2.2.1.5 Failure Frequency 
 
The leak, rupture and total failure frequency (per km.yr), ffSRleak, ffSRrupture and 
ffSRtotal respectively, of a pipeline due to gouge and gouged dent damage in the 
structural reliability component of the Hazard Analysis model are calculated by 
combining the results of Sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.4: 
 
݂ ௌ݂ோ௟௘௔௞ ൌ ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ݁௚௢௨௚௘. ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞ ൅ ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ݁௚௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧. ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞  (2.29) 
 
݂ ௌ݂ோ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ ௚݁௢௨௚௘. ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൅ ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ ௚݁௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧. ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘  (2.30) 
 
                                            
4 In actuality, gouged dent gouges with depths deeper than dcrit must also be 
counted. The Cosham model described in section 2.6 addresses this oversight. 
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݂ ௌ݂ோ௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ݂ ௌ݂ோ௟௘௔௞ ൅ ݂ ௌ݂ோ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘      (2.31) 
 
Where IncidentRategouge and IncidentRategougeddent are Incident-Rates for gouges 
and gouged dents from Table 2.1 respectively. The use of R-type or S-type 
Incident-Rates depends on the area type of the particular pipeline under 
consideration. 
 
2.2.1.6 Hole Size 
 
Documentation relating to the development of the Hazard Analysis model notes 
that the consequences of pipeline failure are strongly dependent upon the size 
of the breach in the pipeline wall (Corder, 1986). For this reason, a relationship 
to calculate hole size was incorporated into the structural reliability failure 
frequency calculation in the model.  
 
The hole size relationship was based upon work performed by Baum and 
Butterfield (Butterfield, 1979) into the rates of pipeline depressurisation following 
the failure of subcritical damage. The area of the hole in the pipeline was found 
to be related to the initial length of the defect. In the Hazard Analysis model the 
Baum and Butterfield relationship can be used to split the failure frequency for 
leaks down further, into different hole size diameter ranges of (converted from 
inches in the original documentation): 
 
 0 – 25.4 mm; 
 25.4 – 76.2 mm; 
 76.2 – 152.4 mm. 
 
Note that the hole size relationship is only used to split the leak failure 
frequency and not the rupture failure frequency. The exact form of the hole size 
relationship used in the Hazard Analysis model is not stated in the 
documentation. 
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2.2.2 Historical Data Component 
 
The historical data component of the Hazard Analysis model considers through-
wall damage only. In this part of the model a value for failure frequency is 
determined for failures resulting from damage to branches and fittings on the 
pipeline. The failure frequency is determined directly from historical operational 
data for failures of this type contained in the ERS Fault Database. It should be 
noted that through-wall damage from punctures, as described in section 2.1.1 
are not addressed in the historical data component of the model. As explained 
in section 2.2.1.3, punctures are treated as an extreme form of part-wall 
damage in the Hazard Analysis model and the historical operational data 
relating to them is included in the derivation of Weibull distributions for the 
structural reliability component of the model only. Exceptions to this are 
punctures caused by drilling operations in-error (noted as hot tap in-error in the 
documentation). Having been excluded from the structural reliability component 
of the model, this type of puncture is included in the failure data used by the 
historical data component. 
 
Documentation relating to the development of the Hazard Analysis model notes 
that failure resulting from damage to branches and fittings or hot tap in-error is 
strongly dependent on the pipeline wall thickness (Corder, 1986). Relationships 
giving failure frequency as a function of wall thickness were derived from the 
historical operational failure data for R-type and S-type areas. These 
relationships are used to determine the failure frequency due to the historical 
data component for the particular pipeline under consideration. Curves showing 
the relationships between failure frequency and wall thickness are presented in 
Figure 2.4 (converted from failures per mile.yr versus inches in the original 
documentation). It should be noted that no failure frequency values for the 
historical data component which resulted in a pipeline rupture are quoted in the 
documentation. The distributions derived are therefore assumed to give the 
failure frequency for leaks only. 
 
In a similar way to the structural reliability component, a hole size relationship is 
also included in the historical data component of the model. This can be used to 
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split the leak failure frequency for the historical data component down into the 
same hole size ranges listed in section 2.2.1.6. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Leak Failure Frequency for Historical Data Component in R-
Type and S-Type Areas in the Hazard Analysis Model 
 
2.2.3 Overall Failure Frequency 
 
In the Hazard Analysis model the overall leak, rupture and total failure 
frequency, ffleak, ffrupture and fftotal respectively, for the particular pipeline under 
consideration are calculated by combining the results from the structural 
reliability component and the historical data component: 
 
݂ ௟݂௘௔௞ ൌ ݂ ௌ݂ோ௟௘௔௞ ൅ ݂ ு݂஽௟௘௔௞       (2.32) 
 
݂ ௥݂௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ݂ ௌ݂ோ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘        (2.33) 
 
݂ ௧݂௢௧௔௟ ൌ ݂ ௟݂௘௔௞ ൅ ݂ ௥݂௨௣௧௨௥௘        (2.34) 
 
Where ffHDleak is the failure frequency from the historical data component of the 
model, determined using the relationships described in section 2.2.2. The use of 
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the R-type or S-type relationship depends on the area type of the pipeline. Note 
that equation (2.33) is assumed on the basis that historical data component 
failure frequencies for ruptures were not quoted in the documentation. 
 
2.3 The FFREQ Model 
 
FFREQ is the current industry standard model to calculate pipeline failure 
frequency due to third party external interference and the model recommended 
for use by UKOPA. It exists in the form of a software package. The model was 
developed at the British Gas ERS sometime between August 1986 and April 
1993, as an update to the Hazard Analysis model described in section 2.2 
(Corder, 1993; Corder, 1995a). Access to the software can be obtained through 
UKOPA from DNV-GL, who are responsible for making updates to the model. 
 
FFREQ is an updated version of the Hazard Analysis model and a summary 
paper published in 1995 (Corder, 1995a) indicates that the overall structure of 
the two models is identical. As with Hazard Analysis, FFREQ uses the 
combination of a structural reliability component and a historical data 
component in order to calculate a value for failure frequency. It is known 
however, that certain modifications and augmentations were made to the failure 
frequency calculation methodology used in Hazard Analysis in order to produce 
FFREQ. Indeed the FFREQ software offers a number of options to which no 
reference was made in documentation relating to Hazard Analysis. 
Unfortunately, documentation relating to the structure and development of 
FFREQ is sparse and the source code for the model is not available. It is 
therefore not possible to determine the exact changes made between Hazard 
Analysis and FFREQ; and to give a complete review of the FFREQ model. 
 
This section will describe what is known about the differences between FFREQ 
and the Hazard Analysis model, based upon the available information. 
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2.3.1 FFREQ Incident-Rates 
 
The Incident-Rates used in the structural reliability component of FFREQ are 
given in Table 2.4. The values are taken from the FFREQ.dat file used by the 
software (Wild, 1993). It is assumed that the units used in FFREQ.dat are per 
mile.yr, this is because some of the Weibull distribution parameter values which 
are also given in FFREQ.dat are retained from the Hazard Analysis model (see 
section 2.3.6), and the Hazard Analysis model uses imperial units. The values 
have therefore been converted to per km.yr in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4 shows that for each area type, FFREQ includes one Incident-Rate for 
gouges and four Incident-Rates for gouged dents. This is in contrast to the 
Hazard analysis model which uses a single Incident-Rate for each damage 
type. Multiple Incident-Rates for gouged dent damage are used in the FFREQ 
model as part of an additional algorithm to address dent resistance. Further 
details on the FFREQ dent resistance algorithm are given in section 2.3.5. A 
memo (Acton, 2011) from GLND regarding probability distributions and Incident-
Rates in FFREQ indicates that the different gouged dent rates are applied to 
different wall thickness ranges5: 
 
 0 – 5 mm; 
 5 – 10 mm; 
 10 – 15 mm; 
 >15 mm. 
 
It should be noted that the Incident-Rates for gouges in FFREQ are slightly 
different to those used in the Hazard Analysis model. It is assumed that the 
rates are updated values, derived from a later version of the ERS Fault 
Database containing additional data. 
 
                                            
5 Note that certain wording in the FFREQ programmer’s guide suggests the 
gouged dent Incident-Rates shown in Table 2.4  should in fact be applied to 
different crack length ranges, rather than wall thickness ranges. This implication 
is assumed to be incorrect due to a lack of supportive evidence. 
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Area Type Damage Type Incident-Rate (per km.yr) 
Rural 
Gouge 7.02 x 10-4
Gouged Dent (1) 6.41 x 10-4
Gouged Dent (2) 2.05 x 10-4
Gouged Dent (3) 9.51 x 10-5 
Gouged Dent (4) 4.72 x 10-5
Suburban 
Gouge 2.70 x 10-3
Gouged Dent (1) 3.81 x 10-3
Gouged Dent (2) 1.22 x 10-3
Gouged Dent (3) 5.64 x 10-4
Gouged Dent (4) 2.79 x 10-4
Table 2.4: FFREQ Model Incident-Rates 
 
2.3.2 Depth of Cover 
 
In addition to the updated values of Incident-Rate, FFREQ also includes an 
optional facility to take into account the pipeline depth of cover. The FFREQ 
user’s guide (Corder, 1993) notes that historically, pipelines which are buried 
deeply are less prone to damage than those with less cover, justifying the 
introduction of a specific algorithm. 
 
If the depth of cover analysis is chosen by the user, a depth of cover value (in 
m) must be entered as part of the model input data. The algorithm takes into 
account the depth of cover by applying a modifying factor to the appropriate 
Incident-Rates in the structural reliability component of FFREQ. The modifying 
factors were derived from historical operational data contained in the ERS Fault 
Database by relating the number of pipeline damage incidents to the depth of 
cover (Corder, 1993). The modifying factors for depth of cover used in FFREQ 
are shown graphically in Figure 2.5 (Wild, 1993). 
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Figure 2.5: Depth of Cover Factors in FFREQ 
 
Figure 2.5 shows that the modifying factor has a value of 1 when the depth of 
cover is 1.31 m. This represents the average depth of cover for all of the 
pipelines considered in the ERS Fault Database at the time FFREQ was 
developed. It follows logically that if the depth of cover analysis is omitted, the 
assumption is that the particular pipeline under consideration is buried with a 
depth of 1.31 m. 
 
2.3.3 Sleeve Analysis 
 
Another optional algorithm included in FFREQ is that of a sleeve analysis. 
Sleeves are used to provide an additional layer of protection for pipelines at 
road crossings, or to allow pipeline construction closer to areas of a high 
population density. 
 
If a sleeve analysis is chosen by the user, a sleeve thickness value (in mm) 
must be entered as part of the input data. The algorithm takes into account the 
extra protection from the sleeve by using a value for wall thickness in the 
FFREQ structural reliability component of the pipe and the sleeve combined. 
Additionally a different Incident-Rate, specific to sleeves, is applied in place of 
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the standard Incident-Rates. The sleeve Incident-Rate was derived from 
historical operational data contained in the ERS Fault Database for damage 
incidents to sleeves (Corder, 1993). The sleeve Incident-Rate used in FFREQ is 
given in Table 2.5: 
 
Damage Type Incident-Rate (per km.yr) 
Sleeve Damage 1.70 x 10-3
Table 2.5: FFREQ Sleeve Analysis Incident-Rate 
 
The FFREQ programmer’s guide (Wild, 1994) indicates that a further calculation 
is performed using the sleeve’s external diameter in order to determine the 
proportion of the circumference of the pipe which could be damaged if the 
sleeve was penetrated by third party external interference. However, the details 
of this calculation and its application are unknown. 
 
2.3.4 FFREQ Folias Factor 
 
In FFREQ a different expression for the Folias factor is used in the structural 
reliability component of the model. The alternative two term expression 
applicable to long defects is used in place of that given by equations (2.2) and 
(2.3) (Wild, 1994; Corder, 1995a): 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.26 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
        (2.35) 
 
Further details on the Folias factor are given in section 3.1.1.2. 
 
2.3.5 FFREQ Dent Resistance 
 
The structural reliability component of FFREQ includes an algorithm to take into 
account the resistance of pipes to denting. The algorithm was implemented as it 
was acknowledged that different parameters would affect the susceptibility of a 
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pipeline to denting. For example, a thin pipeline can be dented more easily than 
a thick pipeline. 
 
The FFREQ user’s guide (Corder, 1993) indicates that the algorithm acts by: 
 
 Relating the number of dent incidents to the wall thickness of the 
pipeline; 
 Using a model to determine the probability that the machinery damaging 
the pipeline is capable of generating sufficient force to cause a dent 
which would lead to failure.  
 
The first point above is addressed through the use of the multiple gouged dent 
Incident-Rates detailed in Table 2.4. The FFREQ programmer’s guide (Wild, 
1994) notes that the second point is addressed through the use of a relationship 
between dent depth and dent force; and a probability distribution for impact 
force of machines in use in the United Kingdom. A dent depth / dent force 
relationship derived by Spiekhout is used in the procedure, however this was 
modified by Corder and Fedorov. Unfortunately the form of the dent depth / dent 
force relationship is not stated. The FFREQ user’s guide only references an 
internal ERS memo detailing a semi-empirical model for dent resistance in 
pipelines, from the 15th June 1992. 
 
In the algorithm, the dent size required to cause a failure is calculated using the 
limit state function for gouged dent failure (equation (2.16)). Following this the 
force required to cause such a dent is calculated using the dent depth / dent 
force relationship. The machine force probability distribution is then used to 
calculate the probability of that force.  
 
2.3.6 FFREQ Probability Distributions 
 
The parameters defining the cumulative probability distributions used in FFREQ 
are summarised in Table 2.6. The values are taken from the FFREQ.dat file 
used by the software (Wild, 1993). As with the Hazard Analysis model, Weibull 
distributions were chosen to represent the necessary random variables.  
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Random Variable Distribution Type α
β (mm for non-
highlighted 
cases) 
Gouge Length Weibull 0.810 161.063 
“Length” Weibull 0.905 117.866 
Gouge Depth in R-Type Areas Weibull 0.926 1.460 
Gouge Depth in S-Type Areas Weibull 0.869 1.184 
“Gouge” Weibull 1.216 21.339 
“Dent” Weibull 0.735 12.422 
Table 2.6: FFREQ Model Weibull Parameters6 
 
In Table 2.6 “Length”, “Gouge” and “Dent” refer to the Weibull distributions used 
to calculate the probability of failure for gouged dents. The “Length”, “Gouge” 
and “Dent” labels are taken directly as written in the FFREQ.dat file. In the 
Hazard Analysis model (Table 2.3), the gouged dent distributions represent 
gouged dent gouge length, gouged dent gouge depth and gouged dent dent 
depth. In FFREQ however, the specific definition and application of the 
distributions is not clear from the available documentation.  
 
The memo from GLND on probability distributions and Incident-Rates (Acton, 
2011) states that the distributions refer to gouged dent dent length (“Length”), 
gouged dent dent depth in S-type areas (“Gouge”) and gouged dent dent depth 
in R-type areas (“Dent”). These definitions are also implied by the FFREQ 
programmer’s guide (Wild, 1994) through labelling and variable names. In 
contradiction however, the available information regarding the FFREQ dent 
resistance algorithm (section 2.3.5) suggests that in FFREQ an impact force 
probability distribution is required, which would replace the gouged dent dent 
depth distribution. Furthermore, the limit state functions used in FFREQ are the 
same as those used in the Hazard Analysis model (Corder, 1993; Wild, 1994; 
Corder, 1995a) meaning the use of gouged dent gouge length and gouged dent 
gouge depth distributions is required; with the dent length distribution being 
redundant.  
                                            
6 Note that the Weibull parameters have been converted from those originally 
reported using the relations ܽ ൌ ଵఉഀ and ܾ ൌ ߙ . The conversions are assumed to 
be the same as those in Table 2.3 due to the FFREQ’s similarity to the Hazard 
Analysis model. The parameter β has been converted from inches to mm apart 
from the highlighted cases, for which the units are not clear. In these cases the 
parameters are presented exactly as given in the FFREQ.dat file. 
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The equations used to calculate the probability of failure for gouged dents in 
FFREQ will be different to those used in the Hazard Analysis model (equations 
(2.26), (2.27) and (2.28)) due to the inclusion of the dent resistance algorithm. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to state the equations due to the ambiguity 
surrounding the gouged dent Weibull distributions and their application. 
 
It is noted that the Weibull parameters used for gouges are the same as those 
used in the Hazard Analysis model. This suggests that an updated analysis 
using a later version of the ERS Fault Database was not performed with regards 
to distribution fitting when FFREQ was developed, in contrast to the values of 
Incident-Rate. 
 
2.3.7 FFREQ Historical Data Component 
 
The historical data component of FFREQ is very similar to that of the Hazard 
Analysis model. Relationships giving the frequency of through-wall damage as a 
function of wall thickness were derived from historical operational data 
contained in the ERS Fault Database. The relationships consider only failures 
resulting from damage to branches and fittings; and from drilling operations in-
error (Corder, 1993). 
 
Unfortunately, the relationships and values for the historical data failure 
frequency used in FFREQ are not known. It is therefore unclear whether the 
relationships were updated from those used in the Hazard Analysis model (and 
illustrated in Figure 2.4) via analysis of a later version of the ERS Fault 
Database. The FFREQ programmer’s guide (Wild, 1994) however, indicates the 
existence of a designated variable in the historical data component for pipeline 
rupture. As no such values are quoted in the documentation relating to the 
development of the Hazard Analysis model, it is therefore likely that updated 
relationships were derived for FFREQ. 
 
In addition to through-wall failure frequencies for branches, fittings and drilling 
operations in-error, FFREQ also includes an optional algorithm to determine the 
through-wall failure frequency due to chain trencher machines. The FFREQ 
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user’s guide (Corder, 1993) indicates that chain trenchers pose a serious threat 
to pipeline integrity as they are able to excavate trenches up to a depth of three 
metres and can cut through pipelines with a repeated gouging action. The 
algorithm was introduced due to the increasing use of chain trenchers in 
farming activity. 
 
For the chain trencher algorithm, failure frequencies were also derived from 
historical operational data contained in the ERS Fault Database. This data was 
modified to take into account trench depth. In comparison with the Hazard 
Analysis model, it is not known if the chain trencher failure data from the ERS 
Fault Database was previously included in the analysis to derive Weibull 
probability distributions for the structural reliability component of the model; or in 
the historical data component failure frequencies. The damage description in 
the FFREQ user’s guide as “repeated gouging”; and the fact that the damage 
affects the pipeline itself, rather than branches or fittings suggests the former. 
However, the Weibull probability distributions for gouge damage did not change 
between the Hazard Analysis model and FFREQ which perhaps suggests the 
latter. 
 
In addition to a failure frequency value derived from historical operational data, 
the FFREQ programmer’s guide indicates that separate calculations are 
performed in order to determine if the failure following impact with a chain 
trencher will occur as a leak or rupture. The calculations are based upon the 
chain trencher angle of attack; the pipeline geometry and operating conditions; 
and the extent of the damage. The details of the calculations are unknown. 
 
It is therefore assumed that in calculating the overall leak and rupture failure 
frequency for FFREQ, equations (2.32) and (2.33) are replaced with: 
 
݂ ௟݂௘௔௞ ൌ ݂ ௌ݂ோ௟௘௔௞ ൅ ݂ ு݂஽௟௘௔௞ ൅ ሺ݂ ு݂஽௟௘௔௞௖௛௔௜௡ሻ     (2.36) 
 
݂ ௥݂௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ݂ ௌ݂ோ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൅ ݂ ு݂஽௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൅ ൫݂ ு݂஽௥௨௣௧௨௥௘௖௛௔௜௡൯  (2.37) 
 
Where ffHDrupture is the failure frequency for ruptures from the historical data 
component which does not appear in the Hazard Analysis model and ffHDleakchain 
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and ffHDrupturechain are the optional chain trencher failure frequencies for leak and 
rupture respectively. 
 
2.3.8 FFREQ Other Considerations 
 
In addition to the elements described above FFREQ also includes two other 
considerations which are either of less significance or not directly relevant to 
this work. This section provides a brief description of each. 
 
2.3.8.1 Maximum and Minimum Wall Thickness 
 
FFREQ includes an optional facility to take into account the potential maximum 
and minimum wall thickness for the particular pipeline under consideration. If 
this option is chosen the type of welding (longitudinally submerged arc welded 
(LSAW), spiral, seamless or electric resistance welded (ERW)) used on the 
pipeline must be entered by the user as part of the input data. In the model, the 
weld type is used to select a particular set of over and under tolerances, which 
are then applied to the nominal pipeline wall thickness in order to calculate the 
potential maximum and minimum values. Separate failure frequencies are 
calculated using the maximum and minimum wall thickness in addition to those 
calculated using the nominal. In this way a failure frequency range is produced, 
which is dependent on the weld type. As this facility effectively amounts to 
simply a change in the wall thickness used to calculate failure frequency it is not 
considered to be a significant addition to the FFREQ model. 
 
2.3.8.2 Ground Movement 
 
FFREQ also includes an optional facility to determine the failure frequency due 
to ground movement. Upper and lower bound leak and rupture failure 
frequencies can be produced and depend on whether the pipeline is located in 
an R-type or an S-type area. The values were derived from historical 
operational data for ground movement failures. Although ground movement is a 
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potential failure mechanism for pipelines, it is not classed as third party external 
interference and therefore the algorithm is not relevant to this work. 
 
2.4 The PIPIN Model 
 
PIPIN is the model used by the HSE to determine failure frequencies for a user 
defined pipeline for the four largest causes of failure (construction defects, 
natural events, corrosion and third party external interference). The model was 
developed for the HSE by W.S. Atkins in the late 1990s (HSE, 2003). The PIPIN 
model exists in the form of a computer program which has been updated 
several times since its initial development, including a complete rewrite by the 
Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) in 2009 to solve stability issues (Chaplin, 
2012). The model is currently under revision for further reissue (Chaplin, 2013). 
 
Certain elements of the PIPIN model are based upon the pipeline failure 
frequency methodology developed by British Gas and used in the Hazard 
Analysis model. However, due to differences in application; changes to the 
methodology; and updated statistics, the PIPIN and Hazard Analysis models 
appear notably different to each other. This section will outline the differences 
between PIPIN and the Hazard Analysis model, with emphasis on the aspects 
which are most relevant to this work. The version of PIPIN addressed here is 
the 2009 update, which is the most recent at the time of writing. 
 
As with the Hazard Analysis model, PIPIN consists of a structural reliability 
component and a historical data component. In PIPIN however, these two 
components are completely distinct and produce failure frequency values 
relating to different causes. Failure frequencies for construction defects, natural 
events and corrosion are determined using the historical data component. The 
structural reliability component of PIPIN is directly analogous to the structural 
reliability component of the Hazard Analysis model and is used to calculate the 
failure frequencies for third party external interference. 
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2.4.1 PIPIN Structural Reliability Component 
 
2.4.1.1 PIPIN Incident-Rates 
 
The Incident-Rates used in the structural reliability component of PIPIN are 
given in Table 2.7 (Chaplin, 2013). The Incident-Rates have been inferred to be 
based upon an analysis of the 2000 UKOPA Fault Database, however this is 
not explicitly stated in the available documentation. The UKOPA Fault Database 
covers approximately 23,000 km of gas and liquid pipelines (both operating and 
decommissioned) in the UK. Details of all known pipeline faults and failures 
which were subject to an excavation and on-site assessment are included, 
dating back to 1962.  The database includes records from various pipe 
operators, however over 85 percent of the pipelines are former British Gas 
pipelines (Cosham, 2007). Consequently, the database includes all of the data 
originally contained in the ERS Fault Database. 
 
PIPIN was originally developed to provide failure frequencies for pipelines 
located in rural areas only. Consequently, the Incident-Rates specified in PIPIN 
are for R-type areas only. In 2003 the use of PIPIN was extended to include 
pipelines in suburban areas. To incorporate this change, an additional factor 
was added to the PIPIN model which allowed Incident-Rates for pipelines 
located in S-type areas to be derived from the rates for R-type areas. The factor 
was derived from a review carried out by W.S. Atkins, using data obtained from 
B.G. Transco (HSE, 2003). 
 
If assessment of a pipeline located in an S-type area is required, the Incident-
Rates given in Table 2.7 are multiplied by a factor approximately equal to 47 
before being applied. 
 
 
 
                                            
7 The exact value was not available in the documentation. 
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Area Type Damage Type Incident-Rate (per km.yr) 
Rural Gouge 1.29 x 10
-3
Gouged Dent 2.07 x 10-4
Table 2.7: PIPIN Model Incident-Rates 
 
2.4.1.2 PIPIN Depth of Cover 
 
PIPIN includes an optional facility to take into account the pipeline depth of 
cover. The PIPIN depth of cover analysis works in exactly the same way as the 
equivalent analysis in the FFREQ model, by applying a modifying factor to the 
Incident-Rates in the structural reliability component. The modifying factors 
originate from a table supplied by B.G. Transco, which was extrapolated via 
regression analysis to include factors for low depth of cover (HSE, 2003). The 
modifying factors for depth of cover used in PIPIN are shown graphically in 
Figure 2.6. For comparison the equivalent factors from FFREQ are also shown. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Depth of Cover Factors in PIPIN and FFREQ 
 
Figure 2.6 shows that the depth of cover factors in PIPIN and FFREQ are very 
similar above 1.1 m depth of cover; below this point the factors diverge. A large 
 55 
 
degree of similarity between the two data sets would be expected as both 
originate from the same source (B.G. Transco was a successor company to 
British Gas). Documentation relating to development of PIPIN notes that the 
table of factors was obtained from B.G. Transco in 1997 (HSE, 2003), whereas 
FFREQ was developed in 1993. The divergence between the two data sets 
below 1.1 m may suggest that further analysis was carried out in the intervening 
period. Note that the PIPIN factors below 0.9 m depth of cover are extrapolated 
values, derived from a regression on the other points. 
 
2.4.1.3 PIPIN Limit State Functions 
 
The structural reliability component of PIPIN is based upon the pipeline failure 
frequency methodology developed by British Gas and used in the Hazard 
Analysis model. In defining limit state equations for the model however, the 
methodology has been modified to incorporate elements of an British Energy 
R6 rev. 3 assessment procedure (Anon., 1986; Anon., 2001a; Chaplin, 2012). 
Supplementary uncertainty factors have also been introduced to each limit state 
function in order to represent the uncertainty in modelling pipeline failure. Each 
factor is assumed to be a random variable, with an associated probability 
distribution. 
 
In the Hazard Analysis model, whether severe gouge or gouged dent damage 
will fail as a leak or rupture is assumed to be controlled by plastic collapse. This 
is implied by the use of the flow stress dependent through-wall NG-18 equation 
in the model (equation (2.1)). In PIPIN, the limit state function for leak / rupture 
is defined using the R6 rev. 3 assessment procedure; this introduces a brittle 
fracture component to the failure.  
 
In order to determine whether severe gouge or gouged dent damage will fail as 
a leak or rupture, quantities for both plastic collapse and brittle fracture are 
defined. The plastic collapse quantity, the load ratio, Lr, is defined as: 
 
ܮ௥ ൌ ெఙಹఙೊ.௑_ி௣௥௘௦௦         (2.38) 
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Where X_Fpress is an uncertainty factor. In the structural reliability component of 
PIPIN the Folias factor is defined using the original two term expression only 
applicable to short defects: 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.40 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
        (2.39) 
 
Further details on the Folias factor are given in section 3.1.1.2. The brittle 
fracture quantity, the fracture ratio, Kr, is defined as: 
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ௄಺௄಺಴         (2.40) 
 
Where KIC is the fracture toughness (in MPa√m) defined by: 
 
ܭூ஼ ൌ ටଵ଴଴଴஼ೡா஺         (2.41)8 
 
And KI	is the stress intensity factor (in MPa√m): 
 
ܭூ ൌ ߪுܯට గ௖ଵ଴଴଴ . ܺ_ܭ݅_݃݀ݎ       (2.42) 
 
Where c (in mm) is half the axial defect length (the full axial length is 
represented by 2c, as in the Hazard Analysis model) and X_Ki_gdr is an 
uncertainty factor. 
 
The defect is predicted to fail as a rupture if the values of the load ratio and 
fracture ratio are such that the R6 rev. 3 fracture assessment curve is 
exceeded:  
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ሺ1 െ 0.14ܮ௥ଶሻሼ0.3 ൅ 0.7 expሺെ0.65ܮ௥଺ሻሽ. ܺ_ܭݎ݂݈ܽ݅   (2.43) 
 
                                            
8 Note that in equation (2.41) E is measured in units of GPa. 
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Where X_Krfail is an uncertainty factor. Or if the value of load ratio exceeds the 
upper limit for plastic collapse: 
 
ܮ௥ ൌ ఙഥఙೊ . ܺ_ܮݎܿݑݐ        (2.44) 
 
Where X_Lrcut is an uncertainty factor. In PIPIN the flow stress is defined as the 
average of the yield and tensile strength (in Nmm-2) (often approximated to the 
specified minimum ultimate tensile strength (SMUTS), in the absence of 
material test data): 
 
ߪത ൌ ఙೊାఙೆଶ          (2.45) 
 
It can be seen that if the brittle fracture component of the limit state function is 
ignored (i.e. failure occurs only by plastic collapse) then defect rupture is 
determined by equations (2.38) and (2.44) which can be combined to give: 
 
ߪு ൌ ܯିଵߪ. ܺ_ܨ݌ݎ݁ݏݏ. ܺ_ܮݎܿݑݐ	       (2.46) 
 
Which is the flow stress dependent through-wall NG-18 equation (equation 
(2.1)), i.e. for a purely plastic collapse failure the limit state function for leak / 
rupture in PIPIN reduces to that of the Hazard Analysis model (allowing for the 
additional uncertainty factors and differences in the Folias factor and flow 
stress). 
 
For part-wall gouge failure, PIPIN and the Hazard Analysis model are very 
similar. The failure of a gouge in PIPIN is assumed to be controlled entirely by 
plastic collapse, with the failure stress given by the flow stress dependent part-
wall NG-18 equation. The limit state function for gouge failure in PIPIN is 
therefore almost identical to that used in the Hazard Analysis model9. The only 
differences lie in the definition of the Folias factor and flow stress (given by 
                                            
9 The limit state function in equation (2.47) is written in terms of a limiting stress. 
The limit state equation in the Hazard Analysis model is written in terms of a 
critical defect depth (equation (2.9)). The two equations however are essentially 
identical. 
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equations (2.39) and (2.45)) and the presence of uncertainty factors. The failure 
stress of a gouge in PIPIN is given by: 
 
ߪு ൌ ߪത ቂ1 െ ௗ௧ቃ ቂ1 െ
ௗ
௧ ቀ
ଵ
ெቁቃ
ିଵ . ܺ_݂݈ܵܽ݅. ܺ_ܮݎܿݑݐ    (2.47) 
 
Where X_Sfail and X_Lrcut are uncertainty factors. X_Lrcut is the same 
uncertainty factor used in equation (2.44). 
 
For part-wall gouged dent failure, the limit state function in PIPIN is again 
defined using the R6 rev. 3 assessment procedure. Failure is therefore 
assumed to occur due to a combination of brittle fracture and plastic collapse. 
This is consistent with the Hazard Analysis model in which gouged dent failure 
is determined using the BGDGFM. 
 
In this case the plastic collapse load ratio, Lr, is defined as: 
 
ܮ௥ ൌ ఙಹఙೊ.ቀଵି೏೟ቁ.௑_ௌ௖௢௟௟         (2.48) 
 
Where X_Scoll is an uncertainty factor. The brittle fracture ratio, Kr, is defined as: 
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ௄಺೛ା௄಺ೞ௄಺಴ ൅ ߩ. ܺ_݂ܲܿ       (2.49) 
 
Where KIp and KIs are the primary and secondary stress intensity factors (in 
MPa√m), ρ is the plasticity correction factor and X_Pcf is an uncertainty factor. 
The fracture toughness, KIC, is defined by equation (2.41). 
 
PIPIN assumes that a micro-crack exists at the base of the gouge in the gouged 
dent. The depth of the micro-crack, am (in mm), is calculated using an 
expression taken from a paper by Linkens (Linkens, 1997; Chaplin, 2012): 
 
ܽ௠ ൌ ఙಹுାଵସ଼଴଺.ସ଼ହସ଻଴.଴         (2.50) 
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Taking this into consideration, the primary and secondary stress intensity 
factors in equation (2.49) are defined as: 
 
ܭூ௣ ൌ ଵܻܵܥܨ. ߪ௠ටగ௔೘ଵ଴଴଴       (2.51) 
 
ܭூ௦ ൌ ଶܻܵܥܨ. ߪ௕ටగ௔೘ଵ଴଴଴       (2.52) 
 
In equations (2.51) and (2.52), SCF is a stress concentration factor for the micro-
crack which is assumed to have a value of 3; Y1 and Y2 are given by: 
 
ଵܻ ൌ ൬1.12 െ 0.23 ቀ௔೘௧ ቁ ൅ 10.6 ቀ
௔೘
௧ ቁ
ଶ െ 21.7 ቀ௔೘௧ ቁ
ଷ ൅ 30.4 ቀ௔೘௧ ቁ
ସ൰ . ܺ_ܭ݅_݃݅݀  (2.53) 
 
ଶܻ ൌ ൬1.12 െ 1.39 ቀ௔೘௧ ቁ ൅ 7.32 ቀ
௔೘
௧ ቁ
ଶ െ 13.1 ቀ௔೘௧ ቁ
ଷ ൅ 14.0 ቀ௔೘௧ ቁ
ସ൰ . ܺ_ܭ݅_݃݅݀  (2.54) 
 
Where X_Ki_gid is an uncertainty factor; σm and σb in equations (2.51) and (2.52) 
are the membrane and bending stress (in Nmm-2) due to the dent respectively. 
σm and σb are given by: 
 
ߪ௠ ൌ ߪு ቀ1 െ ଵ.଼ுଶோ ቁ        (2.55) 
 
ߪ௕ ൌ ߪு ቀ10.2 ோ௧
ு
ଶோቁ        (2.56) 
 
The plasticity correction factor in equation (2.49) is calculated as follows: 
 
If ܮ௥ 	൑ 	0.8	 	 ߩ	 ൌ 	ߩଵ	 	 	 	 	 	 (2.57) 
 
If 0.8	 ൏ 	 ܮ௥ 	൏ 	1.05	 ߩ	 ൌ 	4ߩଵሺ1.05	–	ܮ௥ሻ	 	 	 	 	 (2.58) 
 
If ܮ௥ 	൒ 	1.05	 	 ߩ	 ൌ 	0		 	 	 	 	 	 (2.59) 
 
Where ρ1 is defined: 
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If ݖ	 ൑ 	4.0 ߩଵሺݖሻ ൌ 0.1ݖ଴.଻ଵସ െ 0.007ݖଶ ൅ 0.00003ݖହ   (2.60) 
 
If ݖ ൐ 4.0 ߩଵሺ4ሻ ൌ 0.188      (2.61) 
 
And z is defined: 
 
ݖ ൌ ௄಺ೞ௄಺೛ ௅ೝ൘
         (2.62) 
 
As with the leak / rupture limit state function, a gouged dent is predicted to fail if 
the values of the load ratio and fracture ratio are such that the R6 rev. 3 fracture 
assessment curve (equation (2.43)) is exceeded; or if the value of the load ratio 
exceeds the upper limit for plastic collapse (equation (2.44)). 
 
A visual comparison between the equations used for the gouged dent limit state 
function in PIPIN and the BGDGFM reveals many similarities between the two. 
An assessment similar to that shown in section 4.2.2 can be used to show that 
both are based upon the Dugdale strip-yield model. Furthermore, the dent 
stress intensity factors are identical in both models. PIPIN differs from the 
BGDGFM in its use of additional variables such as the plasticity correction 
factor, which is taken directly from the R6 assessment code; and micro-
cracking. In addition, different expressions for the flow stress and the Charpy 
fracture toughness correlation are used and uncertainty factors are included. 
 
In a similar way to FFREQ, PIPIN includes additional functionality to take into 
account the resistance of pipes to denting. In PIPIN the probability of failure of a 
gouged dent is determined from the force required to cause the dent, rather 
than the dent depth. The dent force is incorporated into the limit state function 
defined by equations (2.48) to (2.62) through the use of an expression which 
relates it to dent depth: 
 
ܪ ൌ ቀ ி೏೐೙೟଴.ସଽ√ோ௘௦ቁ
ଶ.ଷ଼
        (2.63) 
 
Where Fdent is the dent force (in kN) and Res (in N1/2mm) is defined as: 
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ܴ݁ݏ ൌ ඥ80ߪ௒ݐ ቀݐ ൅ ଴.଻௉஽ଵ଴ఙೆቁ       (2.64) 
 
Equations (2.63) and (2.64) represent the mean value of the semi-empirical, 
dynamic dent force relationship as reported by Corder and Chatain (Corder, 
1995b) if an assumption of 80 mm for the excavator tooth length is made. 
 
As with the Hazard Analysis model in the structural reliability component of 
PIPIN it is implied that a through-wall puncture has occurred if the gouge depth 
of a gouge or gouged dent defect, d, is in excess of the pipe wall thickness, t. 
 
2.4.1.4 PIPIN Probability Distributions 
 
In PIPIN all of the independent variables and uncertainty factors which appear 
in the limit state functions described in section 2.4.1.3 are represented as 
random variables. In total there are 16 random variables used in the calculation 
of the probability of failure of a gouge or a gouged dent. In this way, PIPIN 
differs from the Hazard Analysis model which uses random variables to 
describe only the dimensions of the damage, keeping all other quantities 
deterministic. The 16 random variables in PIPIN are described using Weibull, 
Normal or Lognormal probability distributions. Table 2.8 shows the distribution 
type for each variable in the model (Chaplin, 2012). The random variables used 
for the pipeline geometry and material properties of the linepipe steel represent 
the small amount of variation in these “fixed” quantities which would be 
observed in practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
 
Random Variable Distribution 
Gouge Length Weibull 
Gouged Dent Gouge Length Weibull 
Gouge Depth Weibull 
Gouged Dent Gouge Depth Weibull 
Dent Force Weibull 
Pipe Radius Normal 
Pipe Wall Thickness Normal 
Operating Pressure Normal 
Yield Strength (SMYS) Lognormal 
Ultimate Tensile Strength (SMUTS) Normal 
2/3 Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy Lognormal 
X_Scoll	 Lognormal 
X_Lrcut	 Lognormal 
X_ki_gid	 Lognormal 
X_Krfail	 Lognormal 
X_Pcf	 Normal 
Table 2.8: PIPIN Model Random Variables 
 
The probability distributions for damage dimensions were based upon an 
analysis of pipeline damage data for gouges and gouged dents, contained in 
the 2000 UKOPA Fault Database. The exact origin of the distributions for the 
pipe parameters and uncertainty factors is unknown. It is likely however that the 
pipe geometry and material property distributions were derived from mill 
certificate tolerances as published when failure frequency prediction models 
have been applied to specific projects (Espiner, 1996b; Owen, 1996; Edwards, 
1998; Hay, 1998; Anon., 2005). It is noted that this data is pipeline specific, and 
varies with the pipe manufacturing method and age. 
 
It is unclear how data regarding punctures and failure from damage to branches 
and fittings from the UKOPA Fault Database was treated in the derivation of the 
damage dimension distributions for PIPIN. In the Hazard Analysis model, 
conventional puncture data was included in distribution derivation, with failures 
due to damage to branches and fittings; and punctures due to drilling operations 
in-error being excluded. The Hazard Analysis model however includes a 
separate failure frequency for damaged braches and fittings; and drill punctures 
as part of its historical data component, an aspect which has no direct analogue 
in PIPIN. Given that gouges with a depth exceeding the pipe wall thickness are 
treated as punctures in PIPIN (section 2.4.1.3), it is reasonable to assume that 
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conventional puncture data was included in the derivations. A satisfactory 
conclusion regarding the branches and fittings failures; and drill puncture data 
however, cannot be made. 
 
Note that only one distribution is used for gouge depth in PIPIN. As explained in 
section 2.4.1.1 PIPIN was originally developed to provide failure frequencies for 
pipelines located in rural areas only. The separate distributions for S-type and 
R-type areas used in the Hazard Analysis model were therefore not derived. 
This aspect of the model was not updated when PIPIN’s use was extended to 
include pipelines located in suburban areas. It is not known whether data from 
both S-type and R-type areas in UKOPA Fault Database was included in the 
derivation of the PIPIN gouge depth distribution. 
 
Table 2.9 summarises the parameters defining the probability distributions for 
the damage dimensions derived for PIPIN (Chaplin, 2013). The distribution 
parameters for the remaining variables and uncertainty factors are unknown. 
 
Random Variable Distribution Type α β (mm, or kN for Dent Force) 
Gouge Length Weibull 0.840 183.407 
Gouge Dent Gouge Length Weibull 0.902 236.991 
Gouge Depth Weibull 0.630 0.736 
Gouged Dent Gouge Depth Weibull 1.211 1.289 
Dent Force Weibull 2.125 110.203 
Table 2.9: PIPIN Model Weibull Parameters 
2.4.1.5 PIPIN Probability of Failure of a Gouge and Gouged Dent 
 
The probability and frequency of failure for gouges and gouged dents in PIPIN 
are calculated using the Monte Carlo method (Chaplin, 2012). The Monte Carlo 
method is more appropriate for PIPIN than the numerical integration used in the 
Hazard Analysis model due to the increase in the number of random variables 
in the model. 
 
The Monte Carlo method is used to calculate the probability of failure for 
gouges, Pgouge, by: 
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 Randomly sampling each of the variables stated in Table 2.8 relevant to 
gouge damage according to their respective probability distributions. 
 Using the resulting combination of values as input to the gouge limit state 
equation defined in section 2.4.1.3 to determine if a failure would occur. 
 
The above steps are iterated and a probability of failure value is calculated by 
dividing the number of iterations in which a failure is predicted by the total 
number of iterations. The process is continued until the probability of failure for 
a gouge converges to a single value. The probability of failure for gouged dents, 
Pgougeddent, using the gouged dent limit state equation, is calculated separately in 
the same way. 
 
A similar process is also used to calculate values for the probability of a leak 
and the probability of a rupture based upon the leak / rupture limit state function. 
In the Hazard Analysis model, the probability of a leak or a rupture is 
determined entirely by the leak / rupture limit state function. In PIPIN however, 
an additional definition of rupture is imposed which is based upon hole size. 
PIPIN requires that all stable leaks with a hole size diameter greater than 110 
mm are classified as ruptures. 
 
In order to calculate overall leak and rupture probabilities an algorithm to 
calculate the probability of different hole sizes is required. PIPIN divides hole 
size diameter into ranges for which different probabilities are calculated: 
 
 0 – 25 mm; 
 25 – 75 mm; 
 75 – 110 mm; 
 > 110 mm. 
 
Values for the first three ranges correspond to leak probabilities with the last 
assumed to represent a rupture probability. By using an expression relating the 
area of the hole in the pipeline to the length of the defect the probabilities can 
be determined from the gouge length and gouged dent gouge length Weibull 
distributions in Table 2.9. The hole size relationship was based upon work 
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performed by Baum and Butterfield in a similar way to the hole size relationship 
in the Hazard Analysis model (Butterfield, 1979; Chaplin, 2012). The 
relationship is given by: 
 
2ܿ ൌ √ܦݐ ቀ ஺೓଻.ହସ଼	௫	ଵ଴షరቁ
భ
య.ళబల       (2.65) 
 
Where Ah is the normalised hole area (the hole area divided by the pipeline’s 
internal cross-sectional area, expressed as a percentage). 
 
The overall probability for a gouge and a gouged dent failing as a rupture are 
therefore calculated from: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘. ௚ܲ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൅ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘. ݓ݃வଵଵ଴. ൫1 െ ௚ܲ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘൯ (2.66) 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧. ௚ܲௗ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൅ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧. ݓ݃݀வଵଵ଴. ൫1 െ ௚ܲௗ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘൯  (2.67) 
 
Where Pgrupture  and Pgdrupture are the probability of a gouge and gouged dent 
rupture calculated according to the Monte Carlo method for the leak / rupture 
limit state equation for gouge damage and gouged dent damage respectively; 
and wg൐110 and wdg൐110 are the probability of a hole size greater than 110 mm 
in diameter according to equation (2.65) and the gouge length and gouged dent 
gouge length Weibull distributions respectively. 
 
In a similar way the probability for a gouge and gouged dent failing as a leak, 
with one of the three leak hole sizes are calculated from: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞௜ ൌ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘. ݓ݃௛௥௜. ൫1 െ ௚ܲ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘൯    (2.68) 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞௜ ൌ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧. ݓ݃݀௛௥௜. ൫1 െ ௚ܲௗ௥௨௣௧௨௥௘൯   (2.69) 
 
݅ ൌ 1,2,3  
 
Where wghr and wgdhr are the probabilities of a certain hole size range 
according to equation (2.65) and the gouge length and gouged dent gouge 
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length Weibull distributions respectively. The index i is used to represent the 
three different hole size ranges. 
 
2.4.1.6 PIPIN Failure Frequency 
 
In PIPIN separate failure frequencies are given for each of the three leak hole 
sizes from section 2.4.1.5, ݂ ௟݂௘௔௞௜, ݅ ൌ 1,2,3 and for ruptures, ݂ ௥݂௨௣௧௨௥௘. The 
failure frequencies are calculated using: 
 
݂ ௟݂௘௔௞௜ ൌ ܦܱܥ. ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ ௚݁௢௨௚௘. ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞௜ ൅ ܦܱܥ. ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ ௚݁௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧. ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞௜   (2.70) 
 
݅ ൌ 1,2,3  
 
݂ ௥݂௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ܦܱܥ. ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ݁௚௢௨௚௘. ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൅ ܦܱܥ. ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ ௚݁௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧. ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ (2.71) 
 
Where IncidentRategouge and IncidentRategougeddent are Incident-Rates for gouges 
and gouged dents from Table 2.7 respectively; and DOC is the optional depth of 
cover factor in accordance with section 2.4.1.2. Note that if the pipeline is 
located in an S-type area, the Incident-Rate values from Table 2.7 are multiplied 
by a factor of 4 before equations (2.70) and (2.71) are calculated. 
 
Given that the historical data component of PIPIN does not consider third party 
external interference the failure frequencies calculated by equations (2.70) and 
(2.71) are considered to be the overall final failure frequencies values for that 
particular failure cause. 
 
2.4.2 PIPIN Historical Data Component 
 
As noted in section 2.4 the historical data component of PIPIN is used to 
determine failure frequencies from construction defects, natural events and 
corrosion (HSE, 2003). Although these are potential failure mechanisms for 
pipelines, this work is concerned only with third party external interference. The 
historical data component of PIPIN is therefore not relevant to the current study. 
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2.5 The PIE Model 
 
The PIE model was developed by Pipeline Integrity Engineers (PIE) in 2006 
(Lyons, 2006; Haswell, 2008; Lyons, 2008) as a reproduction of the failure 
frequency methodology from the Hazard Analysis model. The model was 
developed for UKOPA in order to investigate and understand the impact of 
pipeline parameters on failure frequency due to external interference, and to 
understand the significance of the damage data recorded in the UKOPA 
pipeline Fault Database. It exists in the form of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. 
 
In the 20 year period since the development of the Hazard Analysis model, 
FFREQ had been widely adopted within the pipeline industry to calculate third 
party external interference failure frequencies for QRA. The reliance on FFREQ 
however raised concern, given the somewhat opaque nature of the model. 
Users did not have access to the FFREQ source code and could only enter 
input and receive output. This was compounded by the lack of definitive 
documentation as to the exact content of the model. Overall there was a need 
for greater transparency to the process. It was also felt that since FFREQ was 
developed in 1993, there now existed over 10 years of additional operational 
data, which could be used to provide an updated and more accurate probability 
distributions and Incident-Rates for the model. 
 
The PIE model was developed using the original documentation relating to the 
development of the Hazard Analysis model in addition to the 2005 UKOPA Fault 
Database. Although the model was an attempt to directly reproduce the Hazard 
Analysis model with updated operational data, it is somewhat simplified in 
comparison. In particular, the model does not include an historical data 
component meaning the output failure frequencies are derived entirely from 
structural reliability methods. This section outlines other differences which exist 
between the PIE model and the structural reliability component of the Hazard 
Analysis model. 
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2.5.1 PIE Model Incident-Rates 
 
Only one Incident-Rate is included in the PIE model and this is given in Table 
2.10. The Incident-Rate in the PIE model makes no distinction between gouges 
and gouged dents, instead representing an overall frequency for which a 
pipeline is subject to mechanical damage.  
 
The Incident-Rate is based upon an analysis of the 2005 UKOPA Fault 
Database. It should be noted that unlike the Hazard Analysis model, the PIE 
model does not take into account pipeline area type. Consequently the value for 
Incident-Rate includes damage to pipelines located in both R-type and S-type 
areas. In the 2005 database the total number of mechanical damage incidents 
was 556 and the total operational exposure up to that point in time was 654,732 
km.yr (Lyons, 2006).  
 
Incident-Rate (per km.yr) 
8.49 x 10-4 
Table 2.10: PIE Model Incident-Rate 
 
Given that the PIE model Incident-Rate represents only the overall frequency 
for which a pipeline is subject to mechanical damage, additional factors must be 
applied in order to provide appropriate damage specific rates for use in the 
failure frequency calculation. The factors give the probability that a mechanical 
damage incident will manifest as either a gouge or a gouged dent. The factors 
were also derived from the 2005 UKOPA Fault Database by considering the 
total number of mechanical damage incidents and the fractional split between 
gouge and gouged dent. The factors are given in Table 2.11. 
 
Damage Type Symbol Probability 
Gouge Pgougedamage 0.82 
Gouged Dent Pgougeddentdamage 0.18 
Table 2.11: Probability that Mechanical Damage will be a Gouge or a 
Gouged Dent 
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2.5.2 PIE Model Folias Factor 
 
For the most part, the limit state functions used in the PIE model are identical to 
those used in the structural reliability component of the Hazard Analysis model. 
The only difference lies in the definition of the Folias factor. In a similar way to 
FFREQ, the PIE model uses the alternative two term expression, applicable to 
longer defects and given by equation (2.35). Further details on the Folias factor 
are given in section 3.1.1.2.  
 
The use of a different Folias factor leads to a different expression for the critical 
defect length for rupture in the PIE model: 
 
ܮ௖௥௜௧ ൌ ට ோ௧଴.ଶ଺ ൤ቀ
ఙഥ
ఙಹቁ
ଶ െ 1൨        (2.72) 
 
Equation (2.72) replaces equations (2.6) and (2.7) as the limit state function for 
leak / rupture for the PIE model10. 
 
2.5.3 PIE Model Probability Distributions 
 
In the PIE model the use of random variables is simplified in comparison to the 
Hazard Analysis model. As noted in section 2.5.1., the model does not take into 
account pipeline area type. The separation of gouge depth into separate 
random variables for R-type and S-type areas was therefore not performed for 
the PIE model. More significantly, the PIE model makes no distinction between 
gouge and gouged dent damage in terms of the gouge length and gouge depth. 
Only one variable is included for each dimension, ignoring the damage type. 
Overall, the PIE model uses only three random variables to calculate the 
probability of failure (Lyons, 2006; Lyons, 2008), compared to six in the Hazard 
Analysis model.  
 
                                            
10 Note that although the limit state function for part-wall gouge failure will also 
change, given that it contains the Folias factor, the form of the equation remains 
the same. All that is required is simply a substitution for the value of M. 
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For gouge depth and gouge length, the single variable included in the PIE 
model is used to represent each quantity for both damage types. One variable 
must therefore be used in different limit state functions. Table 2.12 shows the 
random variables included in the PIE model alongside the limit state functions in 
which they are used: 
 
Random Variable Limit State Function 
Gouge Length Leak / Rupture & Gouge Failure 
Gouge Depth Gouge Failure & Gouged Dent Failure 
Dent Depth Gouged Dent Failure 
Table 2.12: PIE Model Random Variables 
 
As with the Hazard Analysis model, Weibull distributions were chosen to 
represent the variables. The Weibull distributions were based upon an analysis 
of pipeline damage data for gouges and gouged dents contained in the 2005 
UKOPA Fault Database. In line with the reduced number of variables, the 
distributions for gouge length and gouge depth were derived using data sets 
which incorporated both gouge and gouged dent data; and all three distributions 
included data from both R-type and S-type areas. The Weibull distributions 
were fitted using the maximum likelihood method. The variables used and the 
parameters defining their Weibull distributions are summarised in Table 2.13 
(Lyons, 2006). The distributions are shown in Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8 and Figure 
2.9: 
 
Random Variable Distribution Type α β (mm) 
Gouge Length Weibull 0.6 120.851 
Gouge Depth Weibull 0.889 1.442 
Dent Depth Weibull 0.69 6.202 
Table 2.13: PIE Model Weibull Parameters 
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Figure 2.7: PIE Model Gouge Length Distribution 
 
 
Figure 2.8: PIE Model Gouge Depth Distribution 
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Figure 2.9: PIE Model Dent Depth Distribution 
 
The data sets used to derive the Weibull distributions given in Table 2.13 
included puncture data from the UKOPA Fault Database. It should be noted 
however, that this data also included punctures which were caused by drilling 
operations in-error and failures as a result of damage to branches and fittings. 
In the Hazard Analysis model, data from the latter two categories was 
acknowledged to be the result of a different failure mechanism and was only 
included in the historical data component of the model. 
 
2.5.4 PIE Model Probability of Failure of a Gouge and a Gouged Dent 
 
The probability and frequency of failure for gouge and gouged dent damage in 
the PIE model are calculated using numerical integration with the trapezium rule 
(Lyons, 2006). Due to the reduced number of random variables in the PIE 
model, the expressions for probability of failure are slightly different to those 
from the Hazard Analysis model. 
 
The total probability of failure for gouges can be expressed as: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿଵଷଽ଻଴      (2.73) 
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Where the subscripts 2c and d denote the use of the gouge length and gouge 
depth Weibull parameters respectively. As with the Hazard Analysis model the 
value of dcrit in equation (2.73) is dependent on the gouge length, 2c. The gouge 
length Weibull distribution was truncated at 1397 mm, fixing the upper limit of 
the integral in line with the Hazard Analysis model. 
 
Equation (2.73) can be split into a probability of a leak, Pgougeleak, and a 
probability of a rupture, Pgougerupture, using the critical length determined by the 
limit state function for leak / rupture (equation (2.72)): 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿ௅೎ೝ೔೟଴      (2.74) 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿଵଷଽ଻௅೎ೝ೔೟      (2.75) 
 
The total probability of failure for gouged dents can be expressed as: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ௗ೎ೝ೔೟଴ ቃ ݀2ܿ
ଵଷଽ଻
଴   (2.76) 
 
Where the subscripts 2c and d denote the use of the same gouge length and 
gouge depth Weibull parameters as those used in equations (2.73), (2.74) and 
(2.75); and H denotes the use of the dent depth parameters. The value of Hcrit in 
equation (2.76) is again dependent on d and calculated using equation (2.16). 
The value of dcrit is dependent on the gouge length, 2c. As with gouge damage, 
the gouge length Weibull distribution was truncated at 1397 mm, fixing the 
upper limit of the first integral. 
 
In order to determine the probability of a gouged dent failing as a leak and a 
gouged dent failing as a rupture, equation (2.76) can be split in a similar way to 
equations (2.73), (2.74) and (2.75): 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ௗ೎ೝ೔೟଴ ቃ ݀2ܿ
௅೎ೝ೔೟
଴   (2.77) 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ௗ೎ೝ೔೟଴ ቃ ݀2ܿ
ଵଷଽ଻
௅೎ೝ೔೟  (2.78) 
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The critical length of the gouged dent gouge in equation (2.77) and (2.78) is the 
same as that for the gouge failures described by equations (2.74) and (2.75), as 
calculated by the limit state function for leak / rupture, equation (2.72). 
 
2.5.5 PIE Model Failure Frequency 
 
The leak, rupture and total failure frequency, ffleak, ffrupture and fftotal respectively, 
of a pipeline due to gouge and gouged dent damage in the PIE model are 
calculated by combining the results of Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.4: 
 
݂ ௟݂௘௔௞ ൌ ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ݁ ൈ ൫ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞ ൅ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞൯ (2.79) 
 
݂ ௥݂௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ܫ݊ܿ݅݀݁݊ݐܴܽݐ݁ ൈ ൫ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൅ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘൯  (2.80) 
 
݂ ௧݂௢௧௔௟ ൌ ݂ ௟݂௘௔௞ ൅ ݂ ௥݂௨௣௧௨௥௘       (2.81) 
 
Given that the PIE model does not include an historical data component the 
failure frequencies calculated by equations (2.79), (2.80) and (2.81) are 
considered to be the overall final failure frequencies values for third party 
external interference. 
 
It is noted that unlike the structural reliability component of the Hazard Analysis 
model, the PIE model does not include a hole size relationship to separate the 
leak failure frequency into different hole diameter ranges. 
 
2.6 The Andrew Cosham “Reduction Factors” Model 
 
In 2007 UKOPA commissioned A. Cosham of WS Atkins to investigate “risk 
reduction factors” which were included in the pipeline integrity management 
code supplement PD 8010-3 (Anon., 2013). The purpose of the study was to 
determine if the factors, which had been derived from a deterministic parametric 
study, were suitable for use in “screening” risk assessments to estimate the 
pipeline failure frequency due to third party external interference. As part of this 
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study a probabilistic model was developed, hereafter referred to as the 
“Cosham model”, which could be used to calculate the probability of failure of a 
pipeline due to mechanical damage. This model was used to determine 
probabilistic risk reduction factor values which could then be compared with the 
deterministic values included in the code (Cosham, 2007). 
 
The Cosham model is based upon the Hazard Analysis model. The model 
however, does not calculate the pipeline failure frequency as with the other 
models from this review; instead it is concerned only with the probability of 
failure. Additionally, the model does not include an historical data component; 
its output is determined entirely using structural reliability methods. Although the 
Cosham model is based upon the Hazard Analysis model, structurally it is very 
similar to the PIE model. The purpose of this section is therefore to outline the 
differences which exist between the Cosham model and the PIE model, rather 
than with the Hazard Analysis model. 
 
2.6.1 Cosham Model Probability of a Gouge or a Gouged Dent 
 
As noted in section 2.6 the Cosham model does not calculate a failure 
frequency value for the user-defined pipeline; only an overall value for the 
probability of failure of mechanical damage is calculated. Consequently, a value 
for the Incident-Rate is not required in the Cosham model. 
 
The Cosham model calculates an overall probability of failure value by 
considering the individual probabilities of failure of gouge and gouged dent 
damage, in the same way as the PIE model or Hazard Analysis model. An 
overall value is determined by including factors which give the probability that a 
mechanical damage incident will manifest as either a gouge or a gouged dent; 
and allow the individual probabilities to be summed. 
 
The probability factors used in the Cosham model are the same as those used 
in the PIE model, given in Table 2.11 (Cosham, 2007). In the PIE model these 
values are used as multipliers to the Incident-Rate. The factors are based upon 
an analysis of the 2005 UKOPA Fault Database. 
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2.6.2 Cosham Model Limit State Functions 
 
In the Cosham model the basic limit state functions used are almost identical to 
those used in the PIE model. The only difference lies in the values of the 
constants, K1 and K2, included in the limit state function for gouged dent failure. 
In the Cosham model, the limit state function itself is the rearranged form of the 
BGDGFM used in both the PIE and Hazard Analysis models and given by 
equation (2.16). For the PIE and Hazard Analysis models however, updated 
values derived from a linear regression analysis are used for K1 and K2 in 
equation (2.16). In the Cosham model however, the original values from the 
BGDGFM are retained. These are given by equations (2.14) and (2.15). 
 
In a similar way to FFREQ and PIPIN, additional expressions have been 
included in the Cosham model to take into account the behaviour of pipes 
subject to denting. Firstly, the model considers the difference in dent depth 
between pressurised and unpressurised pipelines. When a dent is introduced 
into a pressurised pipeline, the internal pressure of the pipeline will cause a “re-
rounding” effect, reducing the dent depth. Given a set denting force, a dent in 
an unpressurised pipeline would be deeper than a dent in the same pipeline if it 
were pressurised. 
 
The dent depth used in the gouged dent limit state is defined as the dent depth 
in an unpressurised pipeline. The BGDGFM, which is used for the gouged dent 
limit state, is a semi-empirical model formulated using fracture mechanics 
theory and the results of experimental burst tests of gouged dent defects. In the 
burst tests used to calibrate the model, the dent damage was introduced and 
measured with the pipeline at zero pressure (Cosham, 2001a).  
 
The dent depth recorded in the UKOPA Fault Database however, is (in most 
cases) the dent depth measured at pressure and therefore any probability 
distributions derived using dent data from the database will refer to dent 
characteristics at pressure.  
 
The Cosham model acknowledges that the use of the BGDGFM may produce 
non-conservative predictions of the behaviour of damage recorded during 
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operation. In order to correct for this the model includes a relationship which 
was developed by the European Pipeline Research Group (EPRG) to account 
for the “re-rounding” effect of internal pressure (Corder, 1995b). The 
relationship was based upon the results of burst tests and damage resistance 
experiments. The dent depth in an unpressurised pipeline can be related to the 
dent depth in a pressurised pipeline by: 
 
ܪ ൌ 1.43ܪ௉         (2.82) 
 
Where H is the dent depth in the unpressurised pipeline (in mm) and HP is the 
dent depth in the pressurised pipeline (in mm). In the Cosham model a critical 
unpressurised dent depth predicted to cause failure is calculated using equation 
(2.16). This value is then transformed to an equivalent, critical pressurised dent 
depth, HPcrit, using equation (2.82). 
 
Secondly, the Cosham model considers the resistance of pipes to denting11. 
The probability of failure of a gouged dent is determined from the force required 
to cause the dent, rather than the dent depth. The dent force is incorporated 
into the limit state function defined by equation (2.16) and (2.82) through the 
use of an expression which relates it to dent depth: 
 
ܨௗ௘௡௧ ൌ 0.49√ܴ݁ݏܪ௉଴.ସଶ        (2.83) 
 
Where Fdent is the dent force (in kN) and Res	(in N1/2mm) is defined using 
equation (2.64): 
 
ܴ݁ݏ ൌ ඥ80ߪ௒ݐ ቀݐ ൅ ଴.଻௉஽ଵ଴ఙೆቁ  
 
Equations (2.83) and (2.64) represent the mean value of the semi-empirical, 
dynamic dent force relationship as reported by Corder and Chatain (Corder, 
1995b) if an assumption of 80 mm for the excavator tooth length is made. The 
                                            
11 Note that other than the use of the pressurised dent depth in equation (2.83), 
the dent force expressions in the Cosham model are identical to those used in 
PIPIN. 
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report on risk reduction factors indicates that the assumption of an 80 mm tooth 
length is made to be consistent with a paper by Linkens (Linkens, 1998; 
Cosham, 2007). 
 
The critical pressurised dent depth calculated by equations (2.16) and (2.82) is 
transformed into a critical dent force, Fcrit, using equations (2.83) and (2.64) 
before being used to calculate dent force probability. 
 
2.6.3 Cosham Model Probability Distributions 
 
Like the PIE model, the Cosham model includes only three random variables to 
calculate the probability of failure (Cosham, 2007). The model does not take 
into account pipeline area type and it makes no distinction between gouge and 
gouged dent damage in terms of the gouge length and gouge depth.  
Unlike the PIE model however, the Cosham model considers the resistance of 
pipes to denting. A random variable for dent force is therefore included in place 
of the dent depth variable used in the PIE model. Table 2.14 shows the random 
variables included in the Cosham model alongside the limit state functions in 
which they are used: 
 
Random Variable Limit State Function 
Gouge Length Leak / Rupture & Gouge Failure 
Gouge Depth Gouge Failure & Gouged Dent Failure 
Dent Force Gouged Dent Failure 
Table 2.14: Cosham Model Random Variables 
 
In the development of the Cosham model an analysis to derive updated 
probability distributions was not performed. Instead, the model uses 
distributions from previous models. For the gouge length and gouge depth 
variables, the distributions from the PIE model are used. The dent force variable 
uses a Weibull distribution taken from the independent review of the QRA for 
the onshore Corrib Field Development Project conducted by Advantica 
(Cosham, 2007). The origin of the dent force distribution is not clear. It is known 
that it was derived using data from the ERS Fault Database from an unknown 
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year. It is also not known if the data used to derive the distribution included data 
from punctures, punctures which were caused by drilling operations in-error or 
failures as a result of damage to branches and fittings. In the Hazard Analysis 
model, data from the latter two categories was acknowledged to be the result of 
a different failure mechanism and was only included in the historical data 
component of the model. This issue was not addressed by the PIE model, 
which included data from all categories in its distributions. It is not known 
whether the distribution included data from both R-type and S-type areas. The 
variables used and the parameters defining their Weibull distributions are 
summarised in Table 2.15. The dent force distribution is shown in Figure 2.10. 
 
Random Variable Distribution Type α β (mm, or kN for Dent Force) 
Gouge Length Weibull 0.6 120.851 
Gouge Depth Weibull 0.889 1.442 
Dent Force Weibull 2.12 110.2 
Table 2.15: Cosham Model Weibull Parameters 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Cosham Model Dent Force Distribution 
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2.6.4 Cosham Model Probability of Failure of Gouge and a Gouged Dent 
 
In the Cosham model the calculations for the probability of failure for gouge and 
gouged dent damage are very similar to those used in the PIE model. There are 
however certain subtle differences. 
 
Firstly, the Cosham model uses direct integration rather than numerical 
integration to produce its output. Under this method, the truncation of the gouge 
length distribution which is applied in both the PIE and Hazard Analysis models 
is not required. Instead the entire curve can be considered.  
 
Taking this into consideration the total probability of failure for gouges is 
therefore expressed as: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿஶ଴      (2.84) 
 
Where the subscripts are defined as they are for the PIE model. 
 
Equation (2.84) can be split into a probability of a leak, Pgougeleak, and a 
probability of a rupture, Pgougerupture, using the critical length determined by the 
limit state function for leak / rupture (equation (2.72)). Note that for leaks, the 
equation is exactly the same as that used in the PIE model (equation (2.74)): 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿ௅೎ೝ೔೟଴   
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿஶ௅೎ೝ೔೟      (2.85) 
 
In terms of gouged dent failure, the Cosham model uses a dent force 
distribution in place of the dent depth distribution in the PIE model. This 
however is implemented in exactly the same way as dent depth is for the PIE 
model and simply involves the substitution of one cumulative probability 
distribution for another. The Cosham model also makes a slight adjustment to 
the form of the probability of failure calculation. In the Hazard Analysis and PIE 
models the limit of the gouged dent gouge depth integral was set at the critical 
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gouge depth, dcrit. This implied that the probability of failure of gouges with a 
depth greater than the critical gouge depth (including through-wall punctures), 
were included in the calculation for the probability of failure for gouges, 
regardless of whether or not they were associated with a dent. In the Cosham 
model if a gouged dent contains a gouge which is deeper than the critical depth 
then it is counted separately in the gouged dent probability of failure calculation.  
 
Taking the above points into consideration, the total probability of failure for 
gouged dents can be expressed as: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿஶ଴ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ  (2.86) 
 
Where the subscript F denotes the use of the dent force Weibull parameters 
and the other subscripts are as equation (2.84). The value of Fcrit is dependent 
on d and calculated using equations (2.16), (2.82), (2.64) and (2.83). In 
equation (2.86) the second term in the bracket represents the gouged dents 
with a gouge depth large enough to cause failure regardless of the size of the 
dent depth. The limit of the first integral is infinite, in line with equation (2.84). 
Note that the dcritBGDGFM term in equation (2.86) is the critical gouge depth (in 
mm) based upon an infinitely long gouge. The Cosham model acknowledges 
that the BGDGFM, on which the gouged dent limit state function is based, was 
originally derived with the assumption that a gouge located within a dent is of 
infinite length (Cosham, 2001a). This assumption follows from the use of 
experimental ring test data from British Gas to calibrate the model. dcritBGDGFM is 
determined from the gouge limit state function (equation (2.9)): 
 
݀௖௥௜௧ ൌ ݐ ቂ1 െ ఙಹఙഥ ቃ ቂ1 െ
ఙಹ
ఙഥ ቀ
ଵ
ெቁቃ
ିଵ
  
 
Where from equation (2.35): 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.26 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
  
 
Assuming that the gouge length, 2c, is infinite, equation (2.9) reduces to: 
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݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெ ൌ ݐ ቀ1 െ ఙಹఙഥ ቁ        (2.87) 
 
It should be noted that as a consequence of defining dcritBGDGFM in this way, its 
value is no longer dependent on 2c and therefore the bracketed terms in 
equation (2.86) do not take part in the length integral. This is contrary to both 
the PIE and Hazard Analysis models. 
 
In order to determine the probability of a gouged dent failing as a leak and a 
gouged dent failing as a rupture, equation (2.86) can be split in a similar way to 
equations (2.84), (2.74) and (2.85): 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿ௅೎ೝ೔೟଴ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ (2.88) 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿஶ௅೎ೝ೔೟ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ (2.89) 
 
The critical length of the gouged dent gouge in equation (2.88) and (2.89) is the 
same as that for the gouge failures described by equations (2.74) and (2.85), as 
calculated by the limit state function for leak / rupture, equation (2.72). 
 
2.6.5 Cosham Model Failure Probability 
 
A pipeline failure frequency is not calculated by the Cosham model. The leak, 
rupture and total probability of failure, Pleak, Prupture and Ptotal respectively, of a 
pipeline due to gouge and gouged dent damage in the Cosham model are 
calculated by combining the results of Sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.4: 
 
௟ܲ௘௔௞ ൌ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞ ൅ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞   (2.90) 
 
௥ܲ௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൅ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧ௗ௔௠௔௚௘ ௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘  (2.91) 
 
௧ܲ௢௧௔௟ ൌ ௟ܲ௘௔௞ ൅ ௥ܲ௨௣௧௨௥௘       (2.92) 
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Given that the Cosham model does not include an historical data component or 
calculate failure frequencies, the values calculated by equations (2.90), (2.91) 
and (2.92) are considered to be the overall final output from the model. Like the 
PIE model, a hole size relationship to separate the failure frequency into 
different hole diameter ranges is not included in the Cosham model. 
 
2.7 Penspen Damage Distributions Update 
 
The development and publication of the PIE model instigated a discussion 
within UKOPA regarding future recommendations on models to calculate 
pipeline failure frequency due to third party external interference. UKOPA 
ultimately decided that FFREQ would remain the recommended model for use 
in the industry. It was acknowledged however, that updates of the Incident-
Rates and probability distributions used in FFREQ were required to take 
account of more recent operational data; and that these updates should be 
continuous and take place on a regular basis. 
 
In 2010 UKOPA commissioned Penspen to update the probability distributions 
and Incident-Rates for FFREQ (Goodfellow, 2012). This section outlines the 
results of this study and presents the updated rates and distributions. A 
separate failure frequency model is not specifically considered in this section, 
however the importance of using Incident-Rates and probability distributions 
derived from the most up to date data (as of 2010) in an external interference 
failure frequency model warrants its inclusion. 
 
Despite the fact that the motivation for the study was to provide an update to 
FFREQ, the particular probability distributions and Incident-Rate derived by 
Penspen are actually more suited to the simplified nature of the PIE model. This 
is likely to be because of the lack of definitive information relating to the FFREQ 
model combined with the recent publication of the PIE model. 
 
Like the PIE model only one Incident-Rate was derived by Penspen and this is 
given in Table 2.16 (Goodfellow, 2012). The Incident-Rate makes no distinction 
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between gouges and gouged dents, instead representing an overall frequency 
for which a pipeline is subject to mechanical damage. 
 
The Incident-Rate is based upon an analysis of the 2009 UKOPA Fault 
Database (the most up to date version of the database at the time of the study). 
The value derived relates to pipelines located in R-type areas only. In the 2009 
database the corresponding operational exposure was 763,289 km.yr and the 
number of mechanical damage incidents included in the study was 689. 
  
Rural Incident-Rate (per km.yr) 
9.03 x 10-4 
Table 2.16: Penspen Updated Incident-Rate for R-Type Areas 
 
It is noted that no additional factors to provide appropriate damage specific 
Incident-Rates, similar to those used in the PIE model, were derived as part of 
the Penspen study. Given that only one Incident-Rate was derived, such factors 
would be required in order to be consistent with the failure frequency models 
described in this review. 
 
Like the PIE model the Penspen study derived only three random variables to 
calculate the probability of failure (Goodfellow, 2012) gouge length, gouge 
depth and dent depth. The variables do not take into account pipeline area type 
and make no distinction between gouge and gouged dent damage in terms of 
the gouge length and gouge depth. 
 
As with the PIE model, Weibull distributions were chosen to represent the 
variables. The Weibull distributions were based upon an analysis of pipeline 
damage data for gouges and gouged dents contained in the 2009 UKOPA Fault 
Database. In line with the reduced number of variables, it is assumed that the 
distributions for gouge length and gouge depth were derived using data sets 
which incorporated both gouge and gouged dent data; and that all three 
distributions included data from both R-type and S-type areas. The Weibull 
distributions were fitted using both the maximum likelihood and least squares 
methods and a sensitivity study was performed by using both sets of 
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distributions with an unspecified failure frequency model to compare the 
outcomes. The variables used and the final parameters selected defining their 
Weibull distributions are summarised in Table 2.17 (Goodfellow, 2012). 
 
Random Variable Distribution Type α β (mm) 
Gouge Length Weibull 0.573 125.4 
Gouge Depth Weibull 0.674 0.916 
Dent Depth Weibull 1.018 9.382 
Table 2.17: Penspen Updated Weibull Parameters 
 
It is not known if the data sets used to derive the Weibull distributions given in 
Table 2.17 included data from punctures, punctures which were caused by 
drilling operation in-error or failures as a result of damage to branches and 
fittings. In the Hazard Analysis model (and by extension FFREQ), data from the 
latter two categories was acknowledged to be the result of a different failure 
mechanism and was only included in the historical data component of the 
model. This issue was not addressed by the PIE model, which included data 
from all categories in its distributions. 
 
2.8 Failure Frequency Model Discussion 
 
The previous sections have reviewed a number of models which have been 
used within the pipeline industry to calculate the failure frequency (or failure 
probability) due to third party external interference. The review has highlighted 
the similarities and differences between the models. It is noted that all of the 
models considered have the same basic structure which originated with the 
Hazard Analysis model. That is, they are rooted in probabilistic, structural 
reliability methods; use semi-empirical fracture mechanics failure models to 
define limit state functions; and probability distributions based on historical 
operational pipeline damage data. Variation between the models exists in the 
form of additional expressions or factors which have been included in an 
attempt to provide a more accurate description of the damage and failure 
mechanisms in effect. In addition some of the models have augmented their 
structural reliability procedure with additional historical operational data. 
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An important point to note is that the structural reliability methods used in 
Hazard Analysis and the other failure frequency models are not dependent on 
pipeline wall thickness or any other quantity related to the transport of dense 
phase CO2 by pipeline. The methods themselves are non-specific and are used 
for a wide variety of applications throughout engineering. The applicability of a 
structural reliability method to any given situation depends entirely upon the 
applicability of the models and data contained within them. A structural reliability 
based model can be used to calculate the failure frequency for a dense phase 
CO2 pipeline. However, in order to construct such a model using the basic 
structure of the Hazard Analysis model a further review must be undertaken to 
consider the applicability of available pipeline failure models and historical 
operational data to dense phase CO2 pipelines. This review will be addressed in 
the next chapter. The remainder of this section will discuss the failure frequency 
models described above and consider which individual aspects could be 
included in the development of a failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 
pipelines. 
 
The first point of consideration regards the differences between the Hazard 
Analysis and PIE models and the Cosham model in the calculation of the 
probability of failure of a gouge and a gouged dent. The implementation of an 
infinite upper limit in the integrals in the Cosham model would make the most 
sense mathematically rather than applying a cut off of 55 inches. In each of 
these models the gouge length distribution(s) have been derived from historical 
operational data and extend to infinity. The cut-off point suggests that no 
gouges longer than 55 inches will occur which directly contradicts the derived 
distributions, even if gouges longer than this would be extremely unlikely. The 
Cosham model is also more accurate than the Hazard Analysis and PIE models 
when considering failures where the gouge depth exceeds the critical depth. In 
the Hazard Analysis and PIE models this situation is not addressed for gouged 
dent damage, the integral considers gouged dents with a gouge depth up to the 
critical depth only. Documentation relating to the development of the Hazard 
Analysis model attempts to justify this by noting that failure would occur for a 
gouge with a depth greater than the critical depth without the presence of a dent 
and therefore the failures are counted by the integral for gouge failure. 
However, if a gouge occurs in the presence of a dent it should be treated as a 
 87 
 
gouged dent regardless of whether or not failure would occur without the 
presence of the dent. It is also noted that the use of an infinitely long gouge to 
calculate the critical gouge depth in the gouged dent probability of failure in the 
Cosham model is more consistent with the use of the BGDGFM as a limit state 
function. It would therefore be preferable to use this with the BGDGFM in any 
future model. 
 
The separation of Incident-Rate into different values for R-type and S-type 
areas appears to be justified given the differences observed between the two 
sets of Incident-Rates in the Hazard Analysis model. The PIPIN model also 
indicates that a factor of 4 difference exists between the Incident-Rates for the 
two area classes. To distinguish between pipelines located in R-type and S-type 
areas in the failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 pipelines, the 
derivation of a similar factor would therefore be recommended. The Hazard 
Analysis work to separate the gouge and gouged dent random variables into R-
type and S-type areas was well intentioned, however the documentation 
concedes that there was insufficient data to perform this in the desired way. 
Only gouges provided enough data for separate distributions to be derived and 
for this damage type, the distributions for gouge length were found to be almost 
identical. Subsequent models neglected to perform a similar analysis and as a 
result it has not been performed for this work. 
 
The use of additional distributions in PIPIN giving the uncertainty in parameters 
such as the diameter, wall thickness and the limit state functions themselves 
could produce a more realistic representation of failure frequency. This method 
attempts to model the uncertainties which will be present in reality. The 
distributions used however must be realistic and therefore must be derived from 
relevant operational data. The source of the distributions giving uncertainty to 
the limit state functions used in the PIPIN model is not known and an attempt to 
derive such distributions for dense phase CO2 pipelines would be impossible 
given the current lack of operational data. It is likely that the distributions used 
for the design parameters in PIPIN were derived for specific pipeline cases at 
the design stage, where exact operation parameters and manufacturing 
tolerances were well known. Contrastingly, this work is concerned with the 
development of a general failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 
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pipelines, for which there is currently no operational experience and no design 
parameters available. Consequently the use of probability distributions in the 
same way as PIPIN would be speculative at best. It is also likely that 
distributions for design parameters manufactured to certain tolerance limits will 
show little variation and therefore have little effect on the failure frequency 
overall. If the additional distributions from PIPIN are not included in the failure 
frequency model for dense phase CO2 pipelines then the use of numerical 
integration is preferred over Monte-Carlo techniques to perform the probability 
of failure calculations. 
 
In the Hazard Analysis and FFREQ models, the historical data component is 
used to supplement the structural reliability component. It provides additional 
external interference failure frequencies for failures from branches and fittings; 
and drilling operations in-error, which are types of failure outside of the scope of 
those calculated using the limit state functions and probability distributions. It is 
important to include these types of failure in any failure frequency addressing 
third party external interference. In PIPIN, the historical data component does 
not consider external interference at all. The historical data component of the 
Hazard Analysis model has no direct analogue in PIPIN. It is unclear how data 
regarding punctures and failures from branches and fittings was treated when 
probability distributions were derived for PIPIN. It is reasonable to assume that 
conventional puncture data was included in the distributions; however a 
satisfactory conclusion regarding branches and fittings; and drill puncture data 
cannot be made. It is noted however that if PIPIN includes this data in the 
distributions, this would not give an accurate representation of the failure of 
either of these types of damage. A drill puncture is caused by a repeated boring 
action into the pipe wall, the probability of a drill puncture exceeding the pipe 
wall is therefore not the same as the probability of a conventional puncture 
occurring. Branches and fittings failures will not be described by the exact same 
limit state functions as the parent pipe, even if the causes of failure are of the 
same type. Branches and fittings may be of a different size to the parent pipe, 
including them in the standard gouge and gouged dent data will force failures of 
this type to be treated in the same way as standard gouge and gouged dent 
data, which is not correct. The PIE model and the Cosham model lack an 
historical data component. In these cases it is known that the failure data from 
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branches and fittings; and drilling operations in-error was included in the 
derivation of the probability distributions for the structural reliability calculations. 
Failures of those types are therefore not adequately addressed by the models. 
It is not known how the data was treated in the updated Penspen distributions, 
however given the distributions consider only three random variables, they are 
compatible with only the PIE and Cosham models and would therefore suffer 
the same shortcomings. It can be concluded that the only models considered as 
part of this review which address failures from damage to branches and fittings; 
and drilling operations in-error in an appropriate way are the Hazard Analysis 
and FFREQ models. The development of specific failure models for these 
damage types could be considered for future research work and used in the 
structural reliability component of a failure frequency model, as an alternative to 
the use of an historical data component. The use of such models would depend 
on there being sufficient relevant historical operational data available. 
 
The reduced number of random variables in the PIE model; the Cosham model; 
and the updated Penspen distributions, requires investigation. From a statistical 
perspective it must be established whether the populations of gouge length and 
gouged dent gouge length are the same or different and whether the 
populations of gouge depth and gouged dent gouge depth are the same or 
different. In other words, does the presence of a dent affect the size of the 
gouge which would be produced by mechanical damage. The use of larger, 
non-separated data sets would provide more data points from which more 
accurate probability distributions could be derived. Conversely, incorrectly 
assuming the use of one random variable when in fact two distinct variables are 
required could lead to errors in the values of failure frequency calculated. 
 
The additional elements included in the FFREQ, PIPIN and Cosham models 
concerning the behaviour of pipes subject to denting are considered to provide 
improvement to the methodology of the structural reliability component of the 
Hazard Analysis model. These elements should be considered for inclusion into 
a failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 pipelines. Depth of cover is also 
an important consideration; an updated depth of cover factor curve was derived 
in 2012 by GL Noble Denton (GLND) on behalf of UKOPA (Mumby, 2012). This 
updated curve could also be included in the failure frequency model.  
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Chapter 3. Failure Models and Historical Operational Data 
 
In section 2.8 it was noted that the applicability of the existing failure frequency 
models to a given situation depends entirely upon the applicability of the 
pipeline failure models and historical operational data contained within them. In 
order to construct a similar model for dense phase CO2 pipelines based upon 
the same methodology, the constituent failure models and data should be 
applicable to thick wall pipelines.  
 
This chapter presents a review of existing failure models and operational 
pipeline damage databases which could potentially be used in a failure 
frequency model for dense phase CO2 pipelines. The failure models and 
databases are considered from the perspective of their applicability to thick wall 
pipelines. 
 
3.1 Failure Models 
 
In the failure frequency models described in Chapter 2, failure models are used 
to define the limit state functions. Separate limit state functions are required for: 
 
 Leak / rupture 
 Gouge failure 
 Gouged dent failure 
 
Therefore in order to develop a failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 
pipelines, suitable failure models must be included to describe each of these 
three mechanisms. 
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3.1.1 Leak / Rupture and Gouge Models 
 
3.1.1.1 The NG-18 Equations 
 
In the Hazard Analysis model, FFREQ, the PIE model and the Cosham model 
the limit state functions for leak / rupture and gouge failure, were derived from 
the through-wall and part-wall NG-18 equations respectively12. 
 
The NG-18 equations were developed by Battelle in the 1970s (Cosham, 2002). 
Because of the accuracy and simplicity of the NG-18 equations they have 
become accepted as the industry standard for defect assessment and have 
been included as part of defect assessment codes and used extensively since 
their introduction. The equations are semi-empirical and are based upon the 
Dugdale strip-yield model and series of full scale experimental burst tests of 
vessels with through-wall and part-wall defects (Cosham, 2002).        
 
The through-wall NG-18 equation is used to determine, based upon the current 
operating conditions of the pipeline, whether an axially oriented through-wall 
defect in a pipeline will lead to a full-bore rupture or remain as a leak. 
 
The part-wall NG-18 equation is used to determine, based upon the current 
operating conditions of the pipeline, whether an axially oriented part-wall defect 
(for the purposes of this work, a gouge) will progress into a through-wall defect. 
 
Both the through-wall and the part-wall NG-18 equations exist in two forms: 
toughness dependent and flow stress dependent. The toughness dependent 
form of each NG-18 equation is recommended for use in assessing defects 
when the pipeline steel has a low toughness. 
 
The failure of defects in pipelines occurs due to a combination of brittle fracture 
and plastic collapse. The fracture toughness, measured here using the Charpy 
                                            
12 It will be shown by the analysis in section 4.2.2 that the limit state functions in 
PIPIN also originate from the NG-18 equations. 
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v-notch impact energy, is a measure of a material’s resistance to brittle fracture.  
If the pipe steel has a high fracture toughness then the failure of a defect in the 
pipeline is dominated by plastic collapse and the failure stress of the defect is 
independent of the value of the toughness. If however the pipe steel has low 
fracture toughness, the influence of brittle fracture is included in the failure and 
the failure stress of the defect will be sensitive to the value of the toughness. 
 
The toughness dependent forms of the NG-18 equations are applicable over the 
full range of pipe steel toughness. If the toughness is greater than some 
minimum value (suggested to be a 2/3 Charpy v-notch impact energy of 
approximately 21 J (Cosham, 2002)), then the flow stress dependent forms of 
the equations can be used to give a conservative value for the defect failure 
stress. The flow stress dependent forms of the NG-18 equations do not include 
a fracture toughness term. 
 
If the pipe steel toughness is sufficiently high, the failure is controlled entirely by 
plastic collapse. It has been suggested that a failure may become fully ductile if 
the Charpy v-notch impact energy for a full size specimen of pipe steel is 
between 81 J and 102 J (Cosham, 2002). 
 
In the failure frequency models in Chapter 2 the flow stress dependent forms of 
the through-wall and part-wall NG-18 equations are used over the toughness 
dependent form due to the high toughness of modern pipe steels. 
 
The toughness dependent and flow stress dependent forms of the through-wall 
NG-18 equation are as follows: 
 
Toughness dependent 
 
௄಺಴మ గ
଼௖ఙమ ൌ ln sec ቀ
గெఙಹ
ଶఙ ቁ        (3.1) 
 
Flow Stress dependent 
 
ߪு ൌ ܯିଵߪ         (3.2) 
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Where KIC is the material’s fracture toughness (in Nmm-3/2); c is half of the axial 
defect length (in mm); σH is the circumferential hoop stress at failure (in Nmm-2); 
ߪ is the flow stress (in Nmm-2) (see below); and M is the Folias factor (see 
below). 
 
The toughness dependent and flow stress dependent forms of the part-wall 
NG-18 equation are as follows: 
 
Toughness dependent 
 
௄಺಴మ గ
଼௖ఙమ ൌ ln sec ቀ
గெುఙಹ
ଶఙ ቁ       (3.3) 
 
Flow stress dependent 
 
ߪு ൌ ܯ௉ି ଵߪ          (3.4) 
 
Where MP is given by: 
 
ܯ௉ ൌ ቈଵି
೏
೟ቀ
భ
ಾቁ
ଵି೏೟
቉         (3.5) 
 
Where d is the depth of the part-wall defect (in mm), t is the pipeline wall 
thickness (in mm) and M is the Folias factor. 
 
In the toughness dependent forms of both the part-wall and through-wall NG-18 
equations, the material fracture toughness is determined using a correlation 
with the Charpy v-notch energy. This correlation was empirically derived using 
the results of the series of full scale experimental burst tests of vessels with 
through-wall defects. The correlation used is as follows (in metric units): 
 
ܭூ஼ଶ ൌ ܥ௩ ଵ଴଴଴஺ ܧ         (3.6) 
 
Where Cv is the 2/3 Charpy v-notch upper shelf impact energy (in J), A is the 
cross-sectional area (in mm2) of the Charpy specimen, and E is the Young’s 
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Modulus of steel (in Nmm-2). The cross-sectional area of a 2/3 size Charpy 
specimen is 53.33 mm2, Young’s Modulus of steel is 210,000 Nmm-2. 
 
It is noted that in the NG-18 equations the circumferential hoop stress is 
calculated using Barlow’s formula, equation (2.5): 
 
ߪு ൌ ௉஽ଶ଴௧  
 
3.1.1.2 The Folias Factor 
 
The Folias factor in the NG-18 equations described above is a quantity used to 
account for the additional stress concentration due to defect bulging. Bulging is 
caused by the action of the internal pressure of a pipeline on a part-wall or 
through-wall defect. The pipe material surrounding the defect is forced radially 
outwards by the internal pressure and causes the bulging deformation in the 
pipe wall. At the ends of the defect the bulging is resisted by the pipe material 
and this creates a stress concentration (Cosham, 2002). 
 
In reality the Folias factor can only be completely described using an infinite 
series. The factor can be approximated however, using simple expressions. 
Folias’ original approximation of the factor was a two term expression. This 
expression is given by equation (2.39): 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.40 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
  
 
The original two term expression is only applicable to small values of 2ܿ/√ܴݐ; 
strictly, the expression should therefore only be applied to short defects. The 
original two term expression however, is not the only approximation for the 
Folias factor. An alternative two term expression was also derived by Folias and 
this is applicable to longer defects. The expression is given by equation (2.35):  
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.26 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
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The alternative two term expression has been shown to be accurate to within an 
error of 7% (Cosham, 2002).  
 
When developing the NG-18 equations Battelle initially used the original two 
term expression. However they subsequently derived a three term expression to 
use in place of the original. This approximation was shown to be more accurate 
than the original two term expression. The three term expression is also limited 
by defect length and is only valid in the range 0 ൑ 2ܿ/√ܴݐ ൑ 8. The three term 
expression is given by: 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.314 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ െ 0.00084 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ସ
     (3.7) 
 
Where the NG-18 equations have been employed in defect assessment codes 
and failure frequency models both the alternative two term and the three term 
expressions for the Folias factor have been used as alternatives to the original 
two term expression, for example: 
 
 The original two term expression is used in the ASME B31G assessment 
method (Anon., 1991a). It is also used in defect assessment codes such 
as BS 7910 (Anon., 2007b), British Energy R6 (Anon., 2001a) and the 
failure frequency model PIPIN. 
 The alternative two term expression of the Folias factor is used with the 
NG-18 equations in the FFREQ, PIE and Cosham failure frequency 
models. 
 The modified B31G failure assessment method (Kiefner, 1989), uses a 
Folias factor based upon the Battelle three term expression. 
 
As the approximations to the Folias factor are all slightly different, each will give 
slightly different predictions for the failure of part-wall and through wall defects 
when used with the NG-18 equations. PDAM notes that the most accurate 
predictions of part-wall defect failure are obtained using the alternative two term 
expression (along with a flow stress equal to the average of the yield and tensile 
strength) (Cosham, 2002). In terms of which approximation is closest to the 
infinite series, a comparison performed by Cosham (Cosham, 2002) has shown 
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the original two term expression to be the most conservative of the three; and 
that there is little difference between the alternative two term expression and the 
three term expression over the range of applicability of the three term 
expression, although the modified two term expression is slightly less 
conservative.  
 
It is noted that the origin of the form of the Folias factor used in the Hazard 
Analysis model is unknown. The expression was replaced with the modified two 
term expression however, in the FFREQ model. 
 
3.1.1.3 The Flow Stress 
 
The flow stress is a measure of the stress at which unconstrained plastic flow 
occurs. The NG-18 equations described above are semi-empirical, however the 
definition of the flow stress used in the NG-18 equations is empirical. The flow 
stress in general is not precisely defined however, it has been estimated to 
have a value somewhere between the yield strength and the ultimate tensile 
strength of the material.  
 
In the development of the NG-18 equations a value for the flow stress was 
empirically determined by considering a fit to the results of the series of full 
scale experimental burst tests of vessels with through-wall and part-wall 
defects. The flow stress defined by Battelle and used in the NG-18 equations is 
given by (Cosham, 2002): 
 
ߪത ൌ ߪ௒ ൅ 68.95 MPa        (3.8) 
 
Since the introduction of the NG-18 equations further experimental tests have 
been performed and different definitions of the flow stress have been 
developed. A number of these different definitions are listed below (Cosham, 
2002): 
 
ߪത ൌ 1.1ߪ௒         (3.9) 
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ߪത ൌ 1.15ߪ௒         (3.10) 
 
ߪത ൌ ఙೊାఙೆଶ          (3.11) 
 
ߪത ൌ ݆௡ାଵሺ1/2ሻ௡ߪ௎        (3.12) 
 
ߪത ൌ 0.9ߪ௎         (3.13) 
 
ߪത ൌ ሺߪ௎ሻ௩ሺߪ௒ሻଵି௩        (3.14) 
 
ߪത ൌ ߪ௎         (3.15) 
 
Where in equation (3.12)	j is a constant from the yield criterion and n is the 
hardening index. The value of the exponent ν in equation (3.14) depends upon 
the stress and strain properties of the material beyond yield. Where the flow 
stress has been employed in defect assessment codes, fracture models and 
failure frequency models, including the use of the NG-18 equations, some of the 
different expressions have been used as alternatives to equation (3.8), for 
example (Cosham, 2002): 
 
 The flow stress defined by equation (3.8) is used in the modified B31G 
failure assessment method (Kiefner, 1989). 
 The flow stress defined by equation (3.9) is used in the ASME B31G 
assessment method (Anon., 1991a). 
 The flow stress defined by equation (3.10) is used in the BGDGFM 
(Cosham, 2001a). By extension it is also used in the Hazard Analysis, 
FFREQ, PIE and Cosham failure frequency models in both the NG-18 
equations and the BGDGFM. 
 The flow stress defined by equation (3.11) is used in defect assessment 
codes such as BS 7910 (Anon., 2007b) and British Energy R6 (Anon., 
2001a); and the failure frequency model PIPIN. 
 
As the definitions of the flow stress are all slightly different, each will give 
slightly different predictions for the failure of part-wall and through-wall defects 
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when used with the NG-18 equations. PDAM notes that many different 
recommendations have been made as to which definition to use, usually 
depending on which set of experimental tests are analysed. Overall the 
document recommends the use of the flow stress as defined using equation 
(3.11) (Cosham, 2002). 
 
3.1.1.4 Applicability of the NG-18 Equations 
 
The NG-18 equations are semi-empirical, they were calibrated using series of 
full scale experimental burst tests of vessels with through-wall and part-wall 
defects. The range of applicability of each equation with regards to wall 
thickness can be inferred from the range of vessel wall thicknesses used in the 
corresponding set of burst tests used to derive it. 
 
The through-wall NG-18 equations were calibrated using the results of 92 burst 
tests on vessels with axially orientated, artificially machined, through-wall 
defects. The tests were carried out by Battelle between 1965 and 1974. The 
range of experimental parameters for the through-wall tests is shown in Table 
3.1 (Cosham, 2002). 
 
Parameter Minimum Value Maximum Value 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 167.6 1219.2 
Wall Thickness (mm) 4.9 21.9 
Grade (API 5L) A X100 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 220.6 735.0 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 337.9 908.1 
2/3 Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) 13.6 90.9 
Defect Length (2c) (mm) 25.4 508.0 
Burst Pressure (Nmm-2) 2.21 18.69 
Burst Stress (Nmm-2) 97.9 486.8 
Burst Stress (% Yield) 22.6 135.8 
Table 3.1: Battelle Through-Wall Defect Burst Test Parameter Ranges 
 
The part-wall NG-18 equations were calibrated using the results of 48 burst 
tests on vessels with axially orientated, artificially machined, part-wall defects 
(v-shaped notches). The tests were carried out by Battelle between 1965 and 
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1974. The range of experimental parameters for the part-wall tests is shown in 
Table 3.2 (Cosham, 2002). 
 
Parameter Minimum Value Maximum Value 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 406.4 1066.8 
Wall Thickness (mm) 6.4 15.6 
Grade (API 5L) X52 X65 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 379.2 509.5 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 483.3 633.7 
2/3 Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) 13.6 46.1 
Defect Length (2c) (mm) 63.5 609.6 
Defect Depth (d) (mm) 3.1 11.2 
Burst Pressure (Nmm-2) 1.84 12.4 
Burst Stress (Nmm-2) 61.4 506.1 
Burst Stress (% Yield) 13.7 132.5 
Table 3.2: Battelle Part-Wall Defect Burst Test Parameter Ranges 
 
The parameter ranges in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 suggest that the through-wall 
NG-18 equations are applicable to pipelines with a wall thickness between 4.9 
mm and 21.9 mm and the part-wall NG-18 equations are applicable to pipelines 
with a wall thickness between 6.4 mm and 15.6 mm. 
 
3.1.1.5 The Ductile Flaw Growth Model 
 
Due to the widespread success of the NG-18 equations within the industry, the 
number of alternative pipeline specific models for describing leak / rupture or 
gouge failure is limited. The only notable example is the Ductile Flaw Growth 
Model (DFGM). The DFGM was developed in the 1980s when the Pipeline 
Research Council International (PRCI) commissioned work to update the 
through-wall and part-wall NG-18 equations; it had been acknowledged that the 
occurrence of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in North American pipelines 
required the development of a less conservative, more accurate assessment 
method (Cosham, 2002). 
 
The DFGM is based upon elastic-plastic fracture mechanics and is more 
complex than the simple through-wall and part-wall NG-18 equations; explicitly 
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considering the time dependent behaviour of crack growth. The DFGM is 
implemented in the form of a software package known as the Pipe Axial Failure 
Criterion (PAFFC). It has been reported that the DFGM is more accurate than 
the NG-18 equations (Cosham, 2002). However, due to its complexity, the 
DFGM is unsuitable for inclusion in a failure frequency model based upon 
structural reliability methods. It is therefore not considered any further in this 
work. 
 
3.1.1.6 BS 7910 and Generic Assessment Codes 
 
In the absence of further pipeline specific methods, an alternative way to 
describe leak / rupture and gouge failure is use the models contained in generic 
defect assessment codes. Assessment codes such as BS 7910 (Anon., 2007b), 
API 579 (Anon., 2007a) and British Energy R6 (Anon., 2001a) were developed 
to provide generic assessment methods for defects in metallic structures and 
can be applied to pipelines. In the PIPIN failure frequency model the limit state 
functions are based upon an assessment using British Energy R6 rev. 3 (Anon., 
1986). This section describes an assessment using BS 7910; however, a very 
similar approach is used in the other codes. 
 
In BS 7910 defects can be assessed to three levels of complexity (Anon., 
2007b): 
 
 A level 1 assessment is the most simple and provides a basic screening 
method for defects when information about the material properties is 
limited. It is the most conservative of the three assessment levels. 
 A level 2 assessment is more in-depth and requires knowledge of the 
specific operating conditions, geometry and material properties of the 
structure. This method is termed the “normal assessment route” and 
presents an assessment method which uses data that would most 
commonly be available to the assessor. The level 2 assessment is less 
conservative than the level 1 assessment. 
 A level 3 assessment is the most detailed assessment method and 
would be used when considering ductile materials for which a full tearing 
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resistance analysis could be performed. A large amount of data is 
required to complete a level 3 assessment which would very rarely be 
available to the assessor. The level 3 assessment is the most accurate 
and the least conservative of the three assessment methods. 
 
The level 2 “normal assessment” method could be considered as analogous to 
that of the NG-18 equations when applied to the defect assessment of a 
pipeline in terms of the complexity and the information required. Therefore, for 
the purposes of this review, a level 2 assessment will be described. The 
assessment described, including any assumptions made, will address axially 
orientated through-wall (leak / rupture) and part-wall (gouge) defects in a 
pipeline. These defects are the most relevant to the failure frequency models. 
The defects are assumed to be located in the pipe body away from any areas of 
local stress concentration, structural discontinuities or misalignment. 
 
In all three levels in BS 7910 the assessment of a defect is performed using a 
failure assessment diagram (FAD) approach. This method is derived from 
fracture mechanics theory and considers that failure of the structure can occur 
due to either brittle fracture or plastic collapse. Based on the geometry of the 
structure, its operating conditions and the dimensions of the defect two separate 
quantities are calculated, one representing brittle fracture and one representing 
plastic collapse (Anon., 2007b). 
 
The quantity representing brittle fracture is known as the Fracture Ratio, Kr, and 
this is calculated as from equation (2.40): 
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ௄಺௄಺಴  
 
In equation (2.40) KIC is the material fracture toughness (in Nmm-3/2) and KI is a 
quantity known as the stress intensity factor (in Nmm-3/2)13. The form of the 
stress intensity factor is dependent on the type and the dimensions of the defect 
                                            
13 Note that the units used for the terms in the Fracture Ratio in BS 7910 differ 
slightly from those used in the PIPIN model. 
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and the geometry and operating conditions of the structure being assessed 
(Anon., 2007b). 
 
The quantity representing plastic collapse is known as the Load Ratio, Lr, and 
this is calculated as follows: 
 
ܮ௥ ൌ ఙೝ೐೑ఙೊ          (3.16) 
 
Where σY is the yield stress of the structure (in Nmm-2) and σref is a quantity 
known as the reference stress (in Nmm-2) which is also dependent on the type 
and dimensions of the defect and the geometry and operating conditions of the 
structure being assessed (Anon., 2007b). 
 
Once the specific Kr and Lr for the defect and structure have been calculated 
they can be plotted as a point on a FAD. A FAD is a plot with axes of Kr and Lr 
and shows a function relating acceptable values of the two quantities to each 
other, the failure assessment curve, to which the values of Kr and Lr must be 
compared. An example of a FAD for a level 2 assessment taken from BS 7910 
is shown in Figure 3.1 below (Anon., 2007b): 
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Figure 3.1: Example Failure Assessment Diagram for a Level 2 
Assessment to BS 791014 
 
If the calculated values of Kr and Lr lie within the failure assessment curve then 
the defect is considered acceptable. Conversely, if they lie outside of the curve 
then the defect is considered unacceptable. The form of the failure assessment 
curve for a level 2 assessment is: 
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ሺ1 െ 0.14ܮ௥ଶሻሼ0.3 ൅ 0.7exp	ሺെ0.65ܮ௥଺ሻሽ    (3.17) 
 
A cut-off point is also applicable once Lr is greater than some maximum value 
given by: 
 
ܮ௥௠௔௫ ൌ ఙೊାఙೆଶఙೊ          (3.18) 
 
Beyond this point the value of Kr becomes zero (i.e. all values of fracture ratio 
are unacceptable) (Anon., 2007b). 
 
For the BS 7910 level 2 assessment the circumferential hoop stress (in Nmm-2) 
is calculated using Lamé’s equations: 
 
                                            
14 δr is the Fracture Ratio defined using CTOD parameters. 
 104 
 
ߪு ൌ ܲ ௥೔
మ
௥బమି௥೔మ ቀ1 ൅
௥బమ
௥మ ቁ        (3.19) 
 
Where P is the internal pressure (in Nmm-2), ri is the internal shell radius (in 
mm), r0 the external shell radius (in mm) and r the shell radius at the point of 
interest (in mm). The hoop stress is linearised into primary membrane, σm, and 
bending, σb, components using the following figure from section 6.4 of BS 7910: 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Linearisation of Stress Distributions 
 
The membrane and bending components (in Nmm-2) are given by: 
 
ߪ௠ ൌ ఙ೔ାఙబଶ           (3.20) 
 
ߪ௕ ൌ ఙ೔ିఙబଶ           (3.21) 
 
Where the subscripts i and o denote the stress on the internal and external wall 
of the pipe respectively. 
 
The general form of the stress intensity factor, required for the fracture ratio 
(equation (2.40)) is: 
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ܭூ ൌ ሺܻߪሻ√ߨܺ         (3.22) 
 
Where, X, is a parameter used to represent the defect size. This is half the 
defect length, c (in mm), in the case of a through-wall defect, or the defect 
depth, d (in mm), in the case of a part-wall defect. Y is a function which depends 
the specific conditions of the assessment; and σ represents the stress state in 
the pipe wall (in Nmm-2). 
 
For a level 2 assessment the ሺYσሻ term in equation (3.22) is split into 
components originating from primary and secondary stresses (in Nmm-2) in the 
structure:  
 
ܻߪ ൌ ሺܻߪሻ௉ ൅ ሺܻߪሻௌ        (3.23) 
 
Where the subscripts P and S refer to primary and secondary respectively. For 
the defects under consideration it is assumed that secondary stress 
contributions, ሺYσሻS, are zero. The primary stress component is given by: 
 
ሺܻߪሻ௉ ൌ ܯ ௪݂ሾܯ௠ߪ௠ ൅ܯ௕ߪ௕ሿ      (3.24) 
 
Where M is the bulging correction factor for an axial through-wall or part-wall 
defect in a cylinder, fw is the area correction term for a through-wall or part-wall 
defect in a curved shell, Mm is the membrane stress magnification factor for a 
through-wall or part-wall defect and Mb is the bending stress magnification 
factor for a through-wall or part-wall defect. In equation (3.24) factors due to 
regions of local stress concentration, structural discontinuities and misalignment 
(Mkm,	Mkb,	kt,	ktm,	ktb,	km) do not appear as these are assumed to be equal to 1 in 
accordance with section 6.4.4 and Annex D of BS 7910. The finite width 
correction factor fw is calculated using: 
 
௪݂ ൌ ሼsecሺߨܣଵ/2ܣଶሻሽ଴.ହ       (3.25) 
 
Where A2 (in mm2) is given by: 
 
ܣଶ ൌ ܹݐ         (3.26) 
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Where W is the length of a typical pipe spool (12 m or 6 m). For a through-wall 
defect A1 (in mm2) can be calculated by: 
 
ܣଵ ൌ 2ܿݐ         (3.27) 
 
For a part-wall defect A1 can be calculated using: 
 
ܣଵ ൌ 2ܿ݀         (3.28) 
 
For the case of a through-wall defect, the bulging correction factor, M15 is given 
by: 
 
ܯ ൌ ሼ1 ൅ 3.2ሺܿଶ/2ݎ௠ݐሻሽ଴.ହ       (3.29) 
 
Where rm is the average pipe radius (between the internal and external pipe 
wall surfaces) (in mm). For the case of a part-wall defect M16 is given by: 
 
ܯ ൌ ଵିሼௗ/ሺெ೅௧ሻሽଵିሺௗ/௧ሻ         (3.30) 
 
Where MT is given by: 
 
ܯ் ൌ ሼ1 ൅ 3.2ሺܿଶ/2ݎ௠ݐሻሽ଴.ହ       (3.31) 
 
The membrane and bending load factors, Mm and Mb respectively, are equal to 
1 for a through-wall defect. For a part-wall defect Mm is given by: 
 
ܯ௠ ൌ ሼܯଵ ൅ܯଶሺ݀/ݐሻଶ ൅ ܯଷሺ݀/ݐሻସሽ݃ ఏ݂/∅    (3.32) 
 
Where: 
 
                                            
15 The bulging correction factor in BS 7910 for a through-wall defect is 
analogous to the Folias factor used in the through-wall NG-18 equations, both 
denoted using the letter “M”. 
16 The bulging correction factor in BS 7910 for a part-wall defect is analogous to 
the function MP (equation (3.5)) used in the part-wall NG-18 equations. 
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ܯଵ ൌ 1.13 െ 0.09ሺ݀/ܿሻ    for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5  (3.33) 
ܯଵ ൌ ሺܿ/݀ሻ଴.ହሼ1 ൅ 0.04ሺܿ/݀ሻሽ   for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1  (3.34) 
ܯଶ ൌ ሾ0.89/ሼ0.2 ൅ ሺ݀/ܿሻሽሿ െ 0.54  for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5  (3.35) 
ܯଶ ൌ 0.2ሺܿ/݀ሻସ     for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1  (3.36) 
ܯଷ ൌ 0.5 െ 1/ሼ0.65 ൅ ሺ݀/ܿሻሽ ൅ 14ሼ1 െ ሺ݀/ܿሻሽଶସ for ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5  (3.37) 
ܯଷ ൌ െ0.11ሺܿ/݀ሻସ    for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1  (3.38) 
݃ ൌ 1 ൅ ሼ0.1 ൅ 0.35ሺ݀/ݐሻଶሽሺ1 െ sin ߠሻଶ  for ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5  (3.39) 
݃ ൌ 1 ൅ ሼ0.1 ൅ 0.35ሺܿ/݀ሻሺ݀/ݐሻଶሽሺ1 െ sin ߠሻଶ for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1  (3.40) 
ఏ݂ ൌ ሼሺ݀/ܿሻଶ cosଶ ߠ ൅ sinଶ ߠሽ଴.ଶହ   for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5  (3.41) 
ఏ݂ ൌ ሼሺܿ/݀ሻଶ sinଶ ߠ ൅ cosଶ ߠሽ଴.ଶହ   for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1  (3.42) 
∅ ൌ ሼ1 ൅ 1.464ሺ݀/ܿሻଵ.଺ହሽ଴.ହ   for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5  (3.43) 
∅ ൌ ሼ1 ൅ 1.464ሺܿ/݀ሻଵ.଺ହሽ଴.ହ   for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1  (3.44) 
 
For equation (3.32) to apply the following conditions must be satisfied: 
 
0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1         (3.45) 
0 ൑ ߠ ൑ ߨ         (3.46) 
݀/ݐ ൏ 1.25ሺ݀/ܿ ൅ 0.6ሻ   for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.1 (3.47) 
݀/ݐ ൏ 1.0     for 0.1 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1.0 (3.48) 
 
And if ݀/2ܿ ൐ 1 then the solutions for ݀/2ܿ ൌ 1 can be used. θ is an angle along 
the front of the defect (into the pipe wall thickness) measured from a plane 
tangential to the pipe surface at the point where the defect is located. 
 
For a part-wall defect Mb is given by: 
 
ܯ௕ ൌ ܪ௕ܯ௠ (3.49) 
 
Where Mm is calculated as in equation (3.32) and Hb is calculated using: 
 
ܪ௕ ൌ ܪଵ ൅ ሺܪଶ െ ܪଵሻ sin௤ ߠ (3.50) 
 
Where: 
 
 
 108 
 
ݍ ൌ 0.2 ൅ ሺ݀/ܿሻ ൅ 0.6ሺ݀/ݐሻ   for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5 (3.51) 
ݍ ൌ 0.2 ൅ ሺܿ/݀ሻ ൅ 0.6ሺ݀/ݐሻ   for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1 (3.52) 
ܪଵ ൌ 1 െ 0.34ሺ݀/ݐሻ െ 0.11ሺ݀/ܿሻሺ݀/ݐሻ for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5 (3.53) 
ܪଵ ൌ 1 െ ሼ0.04 ൅ 0.41ሺܿ/݀ሻሽሺ݀/ݐሻ ൅ ሼ0.55 െ 1.93ሺܿ/݀ሻ଴.଻ହ ൅ 1.38ሺܿ/݀ሻଵ.ହሽሺ݀/ݐሻଶ
 for   0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1       (3.54) 
ܪଶ ൌ 1 ൅ ܩଵሺ݀/ݐሻ ൅ ܩଶሺ݀/ݐሻଶ       (3.55) 
 
Where: 
 
ܩଵ ൌ െ1.22 െ 0.12ሺ݀/ܿሻ   for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5 (3.56) 
ܩଵ ൌ െ2.11 ൅ 0.77ሺܿ/݀ሻ   for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1 (3.57) 
ܩଶ ൌ 0.55 െ 1.05ሺ݀/ܿሻ଴.଻ହ ൅ 0.47ሺ݀/ܿሻଵ.ହ for 0 ൑ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 0.5 (3.58) 
ܩଶ ൌ 0.55 െ 0.72ሺܿ/݀ሻ଴.଻ହ ൅ 0.14ሺܿ/݀ሻଵ.ହ for 0.5 ൏ ݀/2ܿ ൑ 1 (3.59) 
 
For equation (3.50) to apply the conditions given by equations (3.45), (3.46), 
(3.47) and (3.48) must be satisfied and if ݀/2ܿ ൐ 1 then the solutions for  
݀/2ܿ ൌ 1 can be used. 
 
The reference stress term in the load ratio (equation (3.16)) for a through-wall 
defect is given by: 
 
ߪ௥௘௙ ൌ ܯ்௜ߪ௠ ൅ ଶఙ್ଷቀଵିమ೎ೈቁ       (3.60) 
 
Where: 
 
ܯ்௜ ൌ ሼ1 ൅ 1.6ሺܿଶ/ݎ௜ݐሻሽ଴.ହ       (3.61) 
 
Where ri is the internal radius of the pipe (in mm). For a part-wall defect the 
reference stress is given by: 
 
ߪ௥௘௙ ൌ ܯௌ௜ߪ௠ ൅ ଶఙ್ଷሺଵିఈᇱᇱሻమ       (3.62) 
 
Where: 
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ܯௌ௜ ൌ ଵିሼௗ/ሺெ೅೔௧ሻሽଵିሺௗ/௧ሻ         (3.63) 
 
ߙᇱᇱ ൌ ቀௗ௧ቁ / ቀ1 ൅
௧
௖ቁ    for ܹ ൒ 2ሺܿ ൅ ݐሻ  (3.64) 
 
ߙᇱᇱ ൌ 2 ቀௗ௧ቁ ቀ
௖
గ௥೔ቁ    for ܹ ൑ 2ሺܿ ൅ ݐሻ  (3.65) 
 
Where MTi is given by equation (3.61). In equations (3.60) and (3.62) a factor of 
1.2 which occurs in the first term of both equations in BS 7910 has not been 
applied. This factor was originally introduced in order to increase the level of 
conservatism in the reference stress solutions for curved shells and therefore a 
more accurate comparison with the NG-18 equations can be achieved by 
ignoring it. 
 
The material fracture toughness is calculated using a correlation with the 
Charpy v-notch energy for a full size specimen. The fracture toughness value 
used is the minimum of those calculated using the “lower shelf and transitional 
behaviour” correlation (equation (3.66)) and the “upper limit for fracture 
toughness” correlation (equation (3.67)): 
 
ܭூ஼ ൌ ൣ൫12ඥܥ௩௙௨௟௟ െ 20൯ሺ25/ݐሻ଴.ଶହ൧ ൅ 20     (3.66)17 
 
Where Cvfull is the lower bound Charpy v-notch impact energy for a full size 
specimen at the operating temperature of the pipeline (in J) (Anon., 2007b). 
 
 ܭூ஼ ൌ 0.54ܥ௩௙௨௟௟ ൅ 55       (3.67) 
 
It is noted that in the PIPIN model the material fracture toughness is not defined 
by equation (3.66) or (3.67) but instead uses the fracture toughness correlation 
from the NG-18 equations (equation (3.6))18. 
                                            
17 Note that equations (3.66) and (3.67) both calculate the fracture toughness in 
units of MPa√m. A conversion factor must therefore be applied before they can 
be used with the stress intensity factor to calculate the Fracture Ratio. 
18 Allowing for a change in the units of E from Nmm-2 to GPa. 
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3.1.1.7 Applicability of BS 7910 Level 2 Assessment 
 
BS 7910 and similar defect assessment codes are generic, they are designed to 
be applicable to any and all metallic structures containing defects. 
Consequently, there is no limit to the wall thickness of pipelines to which the 
code can be applied. The range of applicability of BS 7910 with regards to wall 
thickness is unlimited. In this way the BS 7910 level 2 assessment should be 
suitable for inclusion in a failure frequency model for thick wall dense phase 
CO2 pipelines to define limit state functions for leak / rupture and gouge failure. 
 
3.1.2  Gouged Dent Models 
 
Unlike gouge failure, the number of models describing gouged dent failure is 
large and a full review of each model is beyond the scope of this thesis. This 
review will provide an overall summary of the models and give descriptions of 
those which are most relevant to the current work, selected on the basis of their 
accuracy, level of acceptance within the industry and the amount of information 
known about them. 
 
The most accepted model in the pipeline industry for describing gouged dent 
failure is the semi-empirical BGDGFM. The model is recommended by PDAM 
and the EPRG (Cosham, 2001a). This model is used in the majority of the 
failure frequency models described in Chapter 2 and is described separately in 
section 3.1.2.1.  
 
Both empirical and semi-empirical alternatives to the BGDGFM exist. Empirical 
models are based solely upon a fit to experimental data. Empirical gouged dent 
models have been developed by (Cosham, 2001a): 
 
 British Gas (Early 1980s) 
 EPRG (1995, 2000) 
 Battelle (1979, 1986) 
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The empirical gouged dent models were developed to determine simple criteria 
for the acceptance of gouged dent defects in pipelines. The models are 
significantly less accurate in determining the failure conditions of a gouged dent 
defect than the semi-empirical BGDGFM which was developed specifically for 
that purpose (Cosham, 2001a). The empirical models are therefore considered 
to be less suitable for inclusion in a failure frequency model based upon 
structural reliability methods than the BGDGFM. They have therefore not been 
considered any further in this work. 
 
Semi-empirical models are based upon a combination of fracture mechanics 
theory and a fit to experimental data. Alternative semi-empirical models have 
been developed by (Cosham, 2001a; Jandu, 2008): 
 
 Gasunie (1986) 
 British Gas (1997) 
 Bai and Song (1997) 
 HSE/W.S. Atkins (Late 1990s) 
 Advantica (2004) 
 AFAA/KAI (2008) 
 
The Gasunie, British Gas (1997) and Bai and Song semi-empirical models are 
slight variations on the original BGDGFM. Certain elements of the British Gas 
(1997) and Bai and Song models have not been published and therefore these 
models cannot be considered for inclusion in a failure frequency model based 
upon structural reliability methods (Cosham, 2001a). In addition PDAM 
(Cosham, 2001a) notes that the Gasunie model contains several errors, which 
would also make it an unsuitable candidate. These models have therefore not 
been considered any further in this work.  
 
The HSE/W.S. Atkins model is included in the PIPIN failure frequency model. 
This model is also based on the BGDGFM and is discussed separately in 
section 3.1.2.3.  
 
Advantica and AFAA/KAI are the most recently published gouged dent models. 
Many of the team responsible for the Advantica model were also involved in the 
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development of the AFAA/KAI model; and the AFAA/KAI model builds upon a 
number of principles considered in the Advantica model. The Advantica model 
is discussed in section 3.1.2.4. The AFAA/KAI model currently requires further 
development and validation against experimental data (Jandu, 2008). 
Consequently it has not been considered any further for this work. 
  
3.1.2.1 The British Gas Dent-Gouge Fracture Model 
 
In the Hazard Analysis model, FFREQ, the PIE model and the Cosham model, 
the limit state function for gouged dent failure is derived from the BGDGFM.  
 
The BGDGFM was developed by British Gas in the early 1980s (Cosham, 
2001a). The model was adopted as the standard model for the assessment of 
gouged dent defects in pipelines by the EPRG. The model is semi-empirical and 
is based upon a modified version of the Dugdale strip-yield model and series of 
experimental ring and vessel tests with artificial gouged dent defects created at 
zero pressure. The majority of the tests were ring tests (111 ring tests and 21 
vessel tests). A ring test simulates an infinitely long gouge in an infinitely long 
dent (Cosham, 2001a). 
 
The BGDGFM is used to determine, based upon the current operating 
conditions of the pipeline, whether a part-wall gouged dent defect will progress 
into a through-wall defect. In the model both the gouge and dent are assumed 
to be axially orientated and infinitely long (a consequence of the experimental 
data). The gouge is assumed to be located at the deepest point of the dent. The 
dent is assumed to be of constant width and the gouge is assumed to be of 
constant depth. 
 
The BGDGFM was calibrated using experimental tests for which the gouged 
dent damage was created and measured in an unpressurised pipeline. The dent 
depth used in the model is therefore considered to be the dent depth at zero 
pressure. If an assessment of a gouged dent defect is required for which the 
dent depth was measured when the pipeline was pressurised, a re-rounding 
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correction must be applied to the dent depth before the BGDGFM can be 
applied. 
 
In SI units, the BGDGFM is given by equation (2.10): 
 
ఙಹ
ఙ෥ ൌ
ଶ
గ cosିଵ	 ൤exp	െ ൜113
ଵ.ହగா
ఙ෥మ஺ௗ ቂ ଵܻ ቀ1 െ
ଵ.଼ு
ଶோ ቁ ൅ ଶܻ ቀ10.2
ோ
௧
ு
ଶோቁቃ
ିଶ exp ቂ୪୬ሺ଴.଻ଷ଼஼ೡሻି௄భ௄మ ቃൠ൨ 
  
Where from equations (2.11), (2.12), (2.13), (2.14), (2.15): 
 
ߪ෤ ൌ 1.15ߪ௒ ቀ1 െ ௗ௧ቁ  
 
ଵܻ ൌ 1.12 െ 0.23 ቀௗ௧ቁ ൅ 10.6 ቀ
ௗ
௧ቁ
ଶ െ 21.7 ቀௗ௧ቁ
ଷ ൅ 30.4 ቀௗ௧ቁ
ସ
  
 
ଶܻ ൌ 1.12 െ 1.39 ቀௗ௧ቁ ൅ 7.32 ቀ
ௗ
௧ቁ
ଶ െ 13.1 ቀௗ௧ቁ
ଷ ൅ 14.0 ቀௗ௧ቁ
ସ
  
 
ܭଵ ൌ 1.9  
 
ܭଶ ൌ 0.57  
 
Note that H in equation (2.10) is the depth of a dent in an unpressurised 
pipeline. In the Hazard Analysis model and the PIE model the BGDGFM is used 
(equation (8)) however the dent depth used in those models is (incorrectly) the 
depth in a pressurised pipeline (as derived from the ERS and UKOPA Fault 
Databases).  
 
The function ߪ෤ is the plastic collapse stress (in Nmm-2). If the fracture toughness 
of the pipe material is high (high value of Charpy v-notch impact energy), the 
failure is dominated by plastic collapse and this term dominates the failure 
stress predicted by the BGDGFM. Note that this function is the same as the flow 
stress dependent part-wall NG-18 equation if a gouge of infinite length is 
assumed and a flow stress defined using equation (3.10): 
 
ߪത ൌ 1.15ߪ௒  
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It is noted that because the BGDGFM assumes the gouge is of infinite length, 
the gouge length is not included in the model. The functions Y1 and Y2 are 
stress intensity magnification factors for membrane and bending stresses for a 
long surface defect in a flat plate. These functions are included in generic defect 
assessment codes such as BS 7910 (labelled as Mm and Mb) (Anon., 2007b). 
 
K1 and K2 are empirical regression constants derived using the results of 
experimental ring and vessel tests with artificial gouged dent defects. In these 
tests, the fracture toughness was measured using 2/3 size Charpy specimens. 
Consequently, the value of Cv and A in equation (2.10) are for a 2/3 size Charpy 
specimen. As the BGDGFM was originally derived using imperial units K1 and 
K2 have units of ftlbf. 
 
3.1.2.2 Applicability of the British Gas Dent-Gouge Fracture Model 
 
The BGDGFM is semi-empirical, it was calibrated using the experimental results 
of 111 ring and 21 vessel tests with artificial gouged dent defects created at 
zero pressure. The tests were carried out by British Gas in 1982. The range of 
applicability of the BGDGFM with regards to wall thickness can be inferred from 
the range of wall thicknesses used in the experimental tests to derive it. The 
range of experimental parameters for the tests is shown in Table 3.3 (Cosham, 
2001a): 
 
Parameter Minimum Value Maximum Value 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 323.9 1066.8 
Wall Thickness (mm) 6.6 16.4 
Grade (API 5L) X42 X65 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 348.2 522.6 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 494.0 577.8 
2/3 Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) 15.0 70.5 
Dent Depth (H) (mm) 1.9 77.7 
Gouge Depth (d) (mm) 0.2 7.9 
Burst Stress (% Yield) 7.1 144.9 
Table 3.3: British Gas Gouged Dent Ring and Burst Test Parameter 
Ranges 
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The parameter ranges in Table 3.3 suggest that the BGDGFM is applicable to 
pipelines with a wall thickness between 6.6 mm and 16.4 mm. 
 
3.1.2.3 The PIPIN Gouged Dent Limit State Function 
 
The method used to model gouged dent failure in the PIPIN failure frequency 
model is semi-empirical and is detailed in section 2.4.1.3. 
 
Only a limited amount of information is available regarding the origin of the 
PIPIN gouged dent limit state function. The function appears to be a compilation 
of 3 different models; it is mainly based upon the BGDGFM but contains 
additional elements taken from a British Energy R6 rev. 3 assessment and a 
micro-crack analysis performed by Linkens (Linkens, 1997; Chaplin, 2012). On 
the basis of the equations described in section 2.4.1.3 it appears that all of the 
empirical constants used in the function originate with the various models from 
which it is comprised. In other words, it appears that no empirical calibration of 
the final ‘composite’ function to experimental data was performed. It is not 
known whether the function was validated against the results of experimental 
tests on pipelines with gouged dent defects. Consequently the accuracy and 
range of applicability of the function is unknown. 
 
Given its composite nature, it is perhaps likely that the PIPIN gouged dent limit 
state function is less accurate than other bespoke semi-empirical models such 
as the BGDGFM. Confirmation of this however would require a detailed 
comparison with experimental data. The PIPIN limit state has not been 
considered any further as part of this work, the model is regarded as a slight 
variation on the BGDGFM and the additional elements it incorporates such as 
the FAD approach, the plasticity correction factor and micro-cracks are included 
in the more recent Advantica model, described in the next section. 
 
 
 
 116 
 
3.1.2.4 The Advantica “New Limit State Function” 
 
In 2004, UKOPA commissioned Advantica to develop a new model to describe 
gouged dent failure. An assessment of the various methods used for pipeline 
QRA had suggested that the BGDGFM, which was in use as part of FFREQ, 
UKOPA’s adopted failure frequency model, was “behind the times”. It was noted 
that sophisticated models for other aspects of the QRA process had recently 
been developed following extensive experimental and theoretical research 
work. Conversely, the BGDGFM was unchanged following its development in 
the early 1980s. It was acknowledged that developments had been made in 
fracture mechanics techniques and in understanding the behaviour of pipeline 
defects and that improvements to the model could be made. It was also 
acknowledged that the HSE had already included a more contemporary model 
using the FAD approach from British Energy R6 rev. 3 as part of their PIPIN 
failure frequency model (Francis, 2004). 
 
The model developed by Advantica was known as the “New Limit State 
Function” for the failure of gouged dents. For the purposes of this review it will 
be referred to as the Advantica model. In developing the Advantica model, the 
aims were to (Francis, 2004): 
 
 Provide alignment with the assessment techniques used in PIPIN 
 Improve modelling of the dent via the inclusion of residual stresses 
 Improve modelling of the gouge via the inclusion of micro-cracking 
 
Like PIPIN the model is based upon generic defect assessment codes such as 
R6 rev. 3 or BS 7910. The assessment of a gouged dent is performed using a 
FAD approach and therefore closely follows the BS 7910 level 2 assessment 
methodology described in section 3.1.1.6. In the Advantica model the Fracture 
Ratio, Kr, is calculated using (Francis, 2004): 
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ௄಺௄಺಴ ൅ ߩ         (3.68) 
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Where ρ is the plasticity correction factor (introduced with PIPIN in section 
2.4.1.3). The Load Ratio, Lr, is calculated using same expression from BS 7910, 
equation (3.16): 
 
ܮ௥ ൌ ఙೝ೐೑ఙೊ   
 
The form of the failure assessment curve used in the Advantica model is 
modified from that used in British Energy R6 rev. 3 and BS 7910 to take into 
account the work hardening properties of the pipe steel: 
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ൫1 ൅ 0.5ܮ௥ଶ൯ିଵ/ଶ൫0.3 ൅ 0.7 exp൫െ0.6ܮ௥଺൯൯    (3.69) 
 
The cut-off point for the value of Lr is given by the ratio of the flow stress to the 
yield stress: 
 
ܮ௥௠௔௫ ൌ ఙഥఙೊ         (3.70) 
 
The Advantica model uses the same definition of flow stress as used in the 
BGDGFM, defined by equation (3.10): 
 
ߪത ൌ 1.15ߪ௒  
 
In the Advantica model, the circumferential hoop stress is defined using 
Barlow’s formula, equation (2.5): 
 
ߪு ൌ ௉஽ଶ଴௧  
 
The primary membrane and primary bending stress components (in Nmm-2) are 
derived from the hoop stress. These are modified from those used for gouge 
defects in the BS 7910 level 2 assessment, due to the presence of the dent and 
a micro-crack located at the base of the gouge: 
 
ߪ௠௉ ൌ ߪு ቀ1 െ 1.8 ுଶோቁܭ௧       (3.71) 
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ߪ௕௉ ൌ 0         (3.72) 
 
The gouged dent defect also produces secondary stress contributions (in 
Nmm-2) given by: 
 
ߪ௠ௌ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߦሻΦ ቀ ுଶோቁ ߪ௒       (3.73) 
 
ߪ௕ௌ ൌ 10.2ߪு ோ௧
ு
ଶோ ܭ௧ ൅ ߦΦቀ
ு
ଶோቁ ߪ௒      (3.74) 
 
Where	ߦ is a constant between 0 and 1 and Φ is a function of H/2R given by: 
 
Φ ൌ ுଶோ for 
ு
ଶோ ൏ ߞ       (3.75) 
 
Φ ൌ 1  for ுଶோ ൒ ߞ       (3.76) 
 
Where ζ is a constant. In equations (3.71) and (3.74) the function Kt is a notch 
stress concentration factor, given by: 
 
ܭ௧ ൌ 1 ൅ 2ඥ݀/ݎ௥        (3.77) 
 
Where rr is the radius of the root of the gouge (in mm). The general form of the 
stress intensity factor (in Nmm-3/2), required for the fracture ratio (equation 
(3.68)) is: 
 
ܭூ ൌ ሺܻߪሻඥߨܽ௠         (3.78) 
 
Where, ܽ௠, is the depth of the micro-crack (in mm) located at the base of the 
gouge. In the Advantica model this parameter is preferred to gouge depth, d, as 
the gouge itself is assumed to be a blunt defect which provides no contribution 
to the stress intensity factor. 
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As with a BS 7910 level 2 assessment, the ሺYσሻ term in equation (3.78) is split 
into components originating from primary and secondary stresses (in Nmm-2) in 
the structure (equation (3.23)):  
 
ܻߪ ൌ ሺܻߪሻ௉ ൅ ሺܻߪሻௌ  
 
The primary stress component is given by: 
 
ሺܻߪሻ௉ ൌ ߪ௠௉ ଵܻ൫ܽ௠/ሺݐ െ ݀ሻ൯       (3.79) 
 
And the secondary stress component is given by: 
 
ሺܻߪሻௌ ൌ ߪ௠ௌ ଵܻ൫ܽ௠/ሺݐ െ ݀ሻ൯ ൅ ߪ௕ௌ ଶܻ൫ܽ௠/ሺݐ െ ݀ሻ൯    (3.80) 
 
Where: 
 
ଵܻ ൌ 1.12 െ 0.23 ቀ ௔೘ሺ௧ିௗሻቁ ൅ 10.6 ቀ
௔೘
ሺ௧ିௗሻቁ
ଶ െ 21.7 ቀ ௔೘ሺ௧ିௗሻቁ
ଷ ൅ 30.4 ቀ ௔೘ሺ௧ିௗሻቁ
ସ
  (3.81) 
 
ଶܻ ൌ 1.12 െ 1.39 ቀ ௔೘ሺ௧ିௗሻቁ ൅ 7.32 ቀ
௔೘
ሺ௧ିௗሻቁ
ଶ െ 13.1 ቀ ௔೘ሺ௧ିௗሻቁ
ଷ ൅ 14.0 ቀ ௔೘ሺ௧ିௗሻቁ
ସ
  (3.82) 
 
Hence the overall stress intensity factor is given by: 
 
ܭூ ൌ ൣሺߪ௠௉ ൅ ߪ௠ௌ ሻ ଵܻ൫ܽ௠/ሺݐ െ ݀ሻ൯ ൅ ߪ௕ௌ ଶܻ൫ܽ௠/ሺݐ െ ݀ሻ൯൧ඥߨܽ௠  (3.83) 
 
The reference stress term in the load ratio (equation (3.16)) is given by: 
 
ߪ௥௘௙ ൌ ఙ೘
ು ሾଵିሺௗା௔೘ሻ/ெ௧ሿ
௄೟ሾଵିሺௗା௔೘ሻ/௧ሿ        (3.84) 
 
Where M is the Folias factor defined using the alternative two term expression 
equation (2.35): 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.26 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
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The material fracture toughness (in MPa√m)19 is calculated using a correlation 
with the Charpy v-notch energy for a 2/3 size specimen (in J). The correlation 
was empirically derived using the experimental results of 111 ring and 21 vessel 
tests with artificial gouged dent defects created at zero pressure performed by 
British Gas during the development of the BGDGFM: 
 
ܭூ஼ ൌ 3.2ܥ௩ଵ.ଵ        (3.85) 
 
The plasticity correction factor is calculated from equations (2.57), (2.58), 
(2.59), (2.60) and (2.62), used in PIPIN (taken from BS 7910 and R6 rev. 3): 
 
If ܮ௥ 	൑ 	0.8	 	 	 ߩ	 ൌ 	ߩଵ 
 
If 0.8	 ൏ 	 ܮ௥ 	൏ 	1.05 	 ߩ	 ൌ 	4ߩଵሺ1.05	–	ܮ௥ሻ	 	  
 
If ܮ௥ 	൒ 	1.05	 	 	 ߩ	 ൌ 	0 
 
Where	ρ1 is defined: 
 
ߩଵሺݖሻ ൌ 0.1ݖ଴.଻ଵସ െ 0.007ݖଶ ൅ 0.00003ݖହ   
 
And z is defined: 
 
ݖ ൌ ௄಺ೞ௄಺೛ ௅ೝ൘
  
 
Where (in Nmm-3/2): 
 
ܭூ௣ ൌ ሺܻߪሻ௉ඥߨܽ௠        (3.86) 
 
ܭூ௦ ൌ ሺܻߪሻௌඥߨܽ௠        (3.87) 
                                            
19 A conversion factor to Nmm-3/2 must be applied before the fracture toughness 
can be used with the stress intensity factor to calculate the Fracture Ratio. 
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In addition to the fracture toughness correlation given by equation (3.85), fits to 
the British Gas experimental data were also used to determine the values of 
several constants which appear in the equations used for the Advantica model. 
From equations (3.73), (3.74), (3.75) and (3.76), the values of ξ and ζ were set 
as zero. The gouge radius, rr, from equation (3.77) was given a value of 0.2 m. 
An expression for the depth of the micro-crack, ܽ௠, was proposed by assuming 
a dependence on the amount of remaining wall thickness and plastic straining: 
 
ܽ௠ ൌ ܥ ቀௗ௧ቁ
ఊ ቀ ுଶோቁ
ఓ
         (3.88) 
 
Where C	(in mm), γ and μ are constants determined from the fit to experimental 
data. These were given values of: 
 
ܥ ൌ 0.023         (3.89) 
ߤ ൌ 0.5         (3.90) 
ߛ ൌ 1.5         (3.91) 
 
A mean value for the micro-crack depth was determined to be: 
 
ܽ௠ ൌ 0.4 mm         (3.92) 
 
With a standard deviation of 0.2 mm. 
 
3.1.2.5 Applicability of the Advantica “New Limit State Function” 
 
The Advantica model uses contemporary fracture mechanics techniques 
developed since the publication of the BGDGFM and makes an attempt to 
model the gouged dent defect more accurately. However the empirical 
constants used within the model were determined using fits to the same set of 
experimental data used to calibrate the BGDGFM. It can therefore be concluded 
that the range of applicability of the Advantica model is the same as that of the 
BGDGFM. The experimental data comprised of 111 ring and 21 vessel tests 
with artificial gouged dent defects created at zero pressure. The tests were 
carried out by British Gas in 1982. A table showing the range of experimental 
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parameters for the tests is given in section 3.1.2.2 (Table 3.3). The Advantica 
model is applicable to pipelines with a wall thickness between 6.6 mm and 16.4 
mm. 
 
3.2 Historical Operational Data 
 
In the failure frequency models described in Chapter 2, historical operational 
data is used to derive Incident-Rate values; cumulative probability distributions 
for the random variables representing gouge and gouged dent damage and; 
failure frequencies for failures resulting from damage to branches and fittings 
and drilling operations in-error. 
 
In order to develop a failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 pipelines 
using the same methods an appropriate source of historical operational data 
must be found. 
 
Pipeline failure data is collected by a large number of organisations worldwide. 
For example: 
 
 In the United States, the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety 
Administration (PHMSA) publishes reports on pipeline failure incidents 
over the previous 20 years and has recorded failure data since 1970 for 
gas distribution, gas gathering, gas transmission, hazardous liquid and 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Pipelines (Anon., 2015b). 
 In Canada, the National Energy Board (NEB) has recorded data on 
pipeline rupture events since 1972 (Anon., 2014). 
 Gas pipeline failures in Europe are recorded by the European Gas 
Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG). The EGIG database contains data 
from 1970 onwards (Anon., 2011a).  
 Oil pipeline failures in Europe are recorded by the COnservation of 
Clean Air and Water in Europe group (CONCAWE). CONCAWE’s 
database contains data from 1971 onwards (Davis, 2013) 
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Unfortunately the data required for a failure frequency model is very specific. 
The number, length, depth and type of individual defects affecting operational 
pipelines and caused by third party external interference are required; including 
those which did not lead to a failure.  
 
Considering the sources listed above, PHMSA provides data relating to incident 
cause only (Anon., 2015b). The NEB gives only the cause along with a brief 
description of the incident (Anon., 2014). The EGIG database records the size 
of the damage to the pipeline (hole size), however this is only given using very 
broad classifications (Anon., 2011a). CONCAWE’s main concern lies with 
pollution and consequently details of the spillage volume and the area of 
contaminated land are recorded instead of pipeline damage data (Davis, 2013). 
Additionally only the NEB and CONCAWE provide details of each individual 
incident as part of their reporting process; PHMSA and EGIG present their data 
in the form of statistics only. It is also noted that all of the above sources record 
only details of pipeline failures. Incidents in which the pipe was damaged but did 
not fail are not considered. The use of failure data from regions other than the 
United Kingdom also presents issues. Topography and land-use can differ 
substantially between countries, which could lead to differences in the size and 
frequency of damage affecting pipelines. 
 
The historical operational data used in the failure frequency models from 
Chapter 2 originates from either the UKOPA Fault Database or its predecessor 
the ERS Fault Database. Currently this is the only pipeline fault database which 
provides sufficient information from which cumulative probability distributions 
and Incident-Rates suitable for a failure frequency model based on structural 
reliability methods can be derived. 
 
It is noted that the data contained in the UKOPA and ERS Fault Databases is 
appropriate for the failure frequency models described in Chapter 2 since its 
content is concerned specifically with the type of pipelines the failure frequency 
models are designed for. 
 
In terms of developing a failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 pipelines 
operating in the UK, the most appropriate historical operational data to use 
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would ideally originate only from dense phase CO2 pipelines. More specifically, 
the data would concern dense phase CO2 pipelines with wall thicknesses 
covering the full range over which the model could potentially be applied. 
However, since there are currently no dense phase CO2 pipelines operating in 
the UK and therefore no historical operational data regarding them a 
compromise must be made if a failure frequency model is to be developed. 
 
3.3 Failure Models and Historical Operational Data Discussion 
 
Useable models to describe leak / rupture and gouge failure are the NG-18 
equations and generic assessment codes such as BS 7910. The DFGM is a 
more accurate method to describe gouge failure however this model requires its 
own software and is too complex to include in a failure frequency model based 
on structural reliability methods.  
 
The range of applicability of the NG-18 equations is between 4.9 mm and 21.9 
mm for the through-wall NG-18 equations and between 6.4 mm and 15.6 mm 
for the part-wall NG-18 equations. The BS 7910 method is not limited by wall 
thickness. On the basis of the range of applicability of the equations it would 
appear that a generic assessment method such as BS 7910 would be more 
appropriate for leak / rupture and gouge failure than the NG-18 equations. The 
two assessment methods however are compared in more detail in the next 
chapter, which presents an analysis intended to validate the use of the NG-18 
equations for thick wall pipelines outside the wall thickness range given above. 
 
The NG-18 equations make use of the flow stress and the Folias factor. 
Numerous different expressions for these quantities have been published. The 
use of a different expression for the Folias factor or flow stress in the NG-18 
equations will give slightly different predictions for leak / rupture and gouge 
failure. It appears that the most appropriate form of the Folias factor to use with 
the NG-18 equations is the alternative two term expression, which is more 
accurate than the original two term expression; and can be applied to longer 
defects, unlike both the original two term expression and the three term 
expression. In terms of the flow stress, equation (3.11), which is the average of 
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the yield and tensile stress, is used in BS 7910 and R6 rev. 3 and this is 
recommended by PDAM for use in the absence of detailed stress and strain 
data. If the NG-18 equations are to be used in conjunction with the BGDGFM 
for a failure frequency model however, equation (3.10) should be used to 
describe the flow stress in order to maintain consistency. 
 
On the basis of accuracy and range of applicability the best models to describe 
gouged dent failure are the BGDGFM and the Advantica model. The AFAA/KAI 
model also has potential however this model is not yet completed. 
 
Both the BGDGFM and the Advantica model have the same range of 
applicability between 6.6 mm and 16.4 mm. The wall thickness of a dense 
phase CO2 pipeline could potentially be outside this range of applicability. Due 
to the complexity of the models and the lack of thick wall experimental data for 
gouged dents, validation of the BGDGFM or the Advantica model for thick wall 
pipelines is considered to be outside of the scope of this work. The BGDGFM 
and the Advantica model however, are currently the best published gouged dent 
models and in the absence of any alternative a failure frequency model for 
dense phase CO2 pipelines must use one of them. 
 
It is concluded and recommended that further research must be done in order to 
develop a gouged dent model for thick wall pipelines or to validate the current 
gouged dent models for thick wall pipelines using experiments on thick wall 
pipes with gouged dent defects. 
 
The Advantica model was developed more recently than the BGDGFM. It 
includes new fracture mechanics techniques developed since the BGDGFM 
was published and takes into account additional parameters such as micro-
cracking and the plasticity correction factor. The model however was calibrated 
using the same experimental data as the BGDGFM. 
 
As the two models have the same range of applicability, the choice of which to 
use in a failure frequency model can be determined by their accuracy. A paper 
by Seevam et al. (Seevam, 2008) has compared the models using the set of 
British Gas experimental data which was used to calibrate both. The paper 
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concluded that the BGDGFM was more accurate than the Advantica model in 
predicting the failure pressure of a gouged dent defect. It was also noted that 
although the Advantica model includes a separate micro-cracking parameter, 
the parameter was empirically derived using the British Gas experimental data 
for which the presence of micro-cracking would have been extremely unlikely. 
This casts doubt on the validity of the explicit definition of the micro-crack used. 
It is noted in PDAM and the Seevam et al. paper that micro-cracking is implicitly 
described by the BGDGFM in that the gouge depth, d, is assumed to be the 
total depth comprising of the gouge and any associated micro-cracking. 
 
Taking the above points into consideration it can be concluded that the most 
appropriate model to use for gouged dent failure at present is the BGDGFM. 
 
The most recent UKOPA Fault Database (2010 at the time of the study) is the 
most appropriate source of historical operational data to use for a failure 
frequency model based upon structural reliability methods. 
 
The limitations of the UKOPA Fault Database with regards to thick wall 
pipelines are acknowledged. However, if the Incident-Rates and probability 
distributions used within failure frequency models are regularly updated using 
the most recent version of the UKOPA Fault Database, then the data will 
eventually become more relevant to dense phase CO2 pipelines as more of 
those pipelines are constructed and operated. 
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Chapter 4. Validation of the NG-18 Equations for Thick Wall 
Pipelines 
 
In section 3.3 it was noted that the NG-18 equations and generic assessment 
codes such as BS 7910 are models which could potentially be used to describe 
leak / rupture and gouge failure in a failure frequency model for dense phase 
CO2 pipelines. The applicability of codes such as BS 7910 is not limited by 
pipeline wall thickness; however the validity of the NG-18 equations in terms of 
wall thickness would appear to have an upper limit of 21.9 mm for through-wall 
defects and 15.6 mm for part-wall defects, on the basis of the experimental test 
data used in their derivation. The wall thickness of a dense phase CO2 pipeline 
could potentially be outside this range of applicability. This chapter details a 
study intended to provide a validation of the applicability of the NG-18 equations 
to thick wall pipelines.  
 
A definitive assessment as to the applicability of the NG-18 equations to thick 
wall dense phase CO2 pipelines would require a detailed numerical analysis 
including finite element analysis and an experimental test programme. For the 
purposes of this work, a simpler approach has been proposed which considers 
a comparison between the components of the NG-18 equations and the 
components of BS 7910. This comparison can be used to determine whether an 
increase in pipeline wall thickness introduces effects which are not accounted 
for by the NG-18 equations. This simple approach can, in principle, be applied 
because modern linepipe steel has a high toughness. The lower limit of 
toughness for which this justification is applicable is not currently known and a 
recommendation has been made for further work. 
 
In addition, the accuracy of the NG-18 equations and a BS 7910 level 2 
assessment when compared to experimental data is considered, in order to 
determine the most appropriate model to use. 
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4.1 The Potential Importance of Pipeline Wall Thickness 
 
The transportation of dense phase CO2 by pipeline requires operational 
pressures in excess of the CO2 triple point, potentially up to 200 barg when 
incorporating an appropriate margin to ensure single phase flow. Additionally, a 
high operating pressure will increase pipeline efficiency. The design pressure 
requirement necessitates the use of thick wall linepipe in pipeline construction; 
potentially with dimensions outside of the limits of current operational 
experience. 
 
The NG-18 equations are semi-empirical and were originally developed using 
experimental failure data relating predominantly to standard pipeline wall 
thickness (Cosham, 2002). Consequently, their applicability to thick wall 
pipelines outside the limits of operational experience is uncertain. 
 
In the context of fracture mechanics, an increase in pipeline wall thickness will 
result in an increase in both the constraint and the bending stress (illustrated 
below); and reduce the toughness. The accuracy of the NG-18 equations when 
applied to thick wall pipelines could therefore be affected. Providing validation 
for the use of the equations is therefore justified. 
 
An operational pipeline experiences stresses in the axial, radial and hoop 
directions. The largest of the stresses is the hoop stress. For thin wall pipelines 
an accurate calculation of the hoop stress can be made using Barlow’s formula 
(equation (2.5)): 
 
ߪு ൌ ௉஽ଶ଴௧  
 
Where σH is the hoop stress (in Nmm-2), P the internal pressure (in barg), D the 
external pipe diameter (in mm) and t the pipe wall thickness (in mm). The thin 
wall formula is slightly conservative and assumes that the hoop stress is 
constant radially through the pipe wall thickness. This is a reasonable 
approximation for thin wall pipelines. 
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Thick wall theory predicts that the hoop stress varies through the wall thickness, 
increasing from the outside to the inside surface. For thick wall pipelines the 
value of the hoop stress at any radial distance, r (in mm), within the pipe wall is 
calculated using Lamé’s equations (equation (3.19)): 
 
ߪு ൌ ܲ ௥೔
మ
௥బమି௥೔మ ቀ1 ൅
௥బమ
௥మ ቁ  
 
Where P is the internal pressure (in Nmm-2), ri is the internal pipe radius (in 
mm), and r0 is the external pipe radius (in mm).  
 
The hoop stress through the pipe wall can be considered as a sum of a 
membrane component and a bending component. The membrane stress is the 
average stress through the pipe wall thickness and the bending stress is the 
difference in the total stress. The operational hoop stress through the pipe wall 
can be linearised into the membrane and bending components (in Nmm-2) using 
the simple method from BS 7910 detailed in section 3.1.1.6 and given by 
equations (3.20) and (3.21) (Anon., 2007b): 
 
ߪ௠ ൌ ఙ೔ାఙబଶ   
 
ߪ௕ ൌ ఙ೔ିఙబଶ   
 
Equations (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21) show that in standard thin wall pipelines, the 
bending stress component is small. A pipeline with an external diameter of 610 
mm and a wall thickness of 9.5 mm, operating at a pressure of 40 barg would 
have a membrane stress of 124.45 Nmm-2 but a bending stress of only 2 Nmm-
2. As the pipeline wall thickness is increased however, the bending stress as a 
proportion of the total stress increases. Figure 4.1 shows how the bending 
stress proportion increases with an increase in wall thickness for a 610 mm 
external diameter pipeline operating at a design factor of 0.72. The total hoop 
stress in the pipeline remains constant with the influence of the membrane 
stress decreasing and the influence of the bending stress increasing. 
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Figure 4.1: Membrane and Bending Stress as a Proportion of Total Hoop 
Stress Calculated Using Lamé’s Formula with Wall Thickness for A 610 
mm External Diameter Pipeline Operating at a Design Factor of 0.72 
 
4.2 Failure Model Comparison 
 
This study will provide verification of the applicability of the NG-18 equations to 
thick wall pipelines in the following way: 
 
 An analysis and comparison of the component parts of the thick wall 
validated BS 7910 level 2 assessment method and the non-validated 
toughness dependent NG-18 equations will be made in order to show 
the similarities and differences between the two methods in terms of their 
basic structure. 
 The component parts of each assessment method will then be illustrated 
graphically in order to show the effect of increased wall thickness. 
 On the basis of this analysis, conclusions will be drawn regarding the use 
of the toughness dependent or flow stress dependent through-wall and 
part-wall NG-18 equations. 
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 A comparison will then be made between experimental failure data for 
thick wall pressure vessels and failure predictions made using the flow 
stress dependent NG-18 equations and BS 7910 in order to show the 
accuracy of the NG-18 equations when applied to thick wall pipelines. 
 
The first three points outlined above are detailed in section 4.2, with the last 
point detailed in section 4.3.  
 
It is noted that the justification made using the above approach will only apply if 
the linepipe steel under consideration is high toughness. 
 
4.2.1 Failure Model Parameters 
 
In this section the definitions of quantities such as the flow stress and Folias 
factor in the NG-18 equations and the particular geometry solutions for BS 7910 
level 2 used in the study are stated. 
 
4.2.1.1 The NG-18 Equations 
 
For both the through-wall and part-wall NG-18 equations: 
 
The material fracture toughness KIC (in Nmm-3/2) is defined as in equation (3.6) 
(Cosham, 2002): 
 
ܭூ஼ଶ ൌ ܥ௩ 1000ܣ ܧ 
 
The cross-sectional area of a 2/3 size Charpy specimen is 53.33 mm2, Young’s 
Modulus of steel is taken to be 210,000 Nmm-2. 
 
As noted in sections 3.1.1.2 and 3.1.1.3 the flow stress and Folias factor can be 
defined using a number of different expressions. In this study two forms of each 
have been used. 
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For the purposes of the comparison between the toughness dependent NG-18 
equations and the BS 7910 level 2 assessment method, the expressions used 
are in line with those used in BS 7910. In this instance, the flow stress (in 
Nmm-2) has been defined using equation (3.11), the average of the yield 
strength and the tensile strength: 
 
ߪത ൌ ఙೊାఙೆଶ   
 
The Folias factor has been defined as the original two-term expression 
(equation (2.39)): 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.40 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
   
 
For the purposes of the comparison between the flow stress dependent NG-
18 equations and thick wall experimental data, the expressions used are those 
which are considered the most appropriate for use in a failure frequency model, 
as discussed in section 3.3. In this instance, the flow stress has been defined 
using equation (3.10) in order to be consistent with the BGDGFM: 
 
ߪത ൌ 1.15ߪ௒  
 
The Folias factor has been defined as the alternative two-term expression 
applicable to longer defects (equation (2.35)): 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.26 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
  
 
For the NG-18 equations the pipe wall hoop stress (in Nmm-2) is calculated 
using Barlow’s formula (equation (2.5)): 
 
ߪு ൌ ௉஽ଶ଴௧  
 
Where P is the operating pressure (in barg), D is the external diameter of the 
pipe (in mm) and t is the pipe wall thickness (in mm). 
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4.2.1.2 BS 7910 Level 2 
 
For the BS 7910 level 2 assessment method, the equations used are those 
given in section 3.1.1.6 for through-wall and part-wall defects (Anon., 2007b). 
 
4.2.2 Component Analysis 
 
4.2.2.1 Equation Analysis 
 
The NG-18 equations show the lower bound for unacceptable values of pipeline 
parameters such as pressure, diameter, wall thickness, grade and fracture 
toughness when a defect is present in a pipeline. This is very similar to the 
failure assessment line used in BS 7910 which bounds the acceptable values of 
the brittle fracture and plastic collapse parameters Kr and Lr. 
 
The defect assessment code PD 6493:1991 (Anon., 1991b) is a precursor to BS 
7910:2005 and includes a similar defect assessment method to that of BS 7910 
level 2. If the equation for the failure assessment diagram in PD 6493 is 
considered: 
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ܵ௥ ቄ ଼గమ ln sec ቀ
గ
ଶ ܵ௥ቁቅ
ି଴.ହ
      (4.1) 
 
It can be seen that the form of the equation is very similar to that of the 
toughness dependent NG-18 equations (equations (3.1) and (3.3)): 
 
௄಺಴మ గ
଼௖ఙమ ൌ ln sec ቀ
గெఙಹ
ଶఙ ቁ  
 
௄಺಴మ గ
଼௖ఙమ ൌ ln sec ቀ
గெುఙಹ
ଶఙ ቁ  
 
This is because the NG-18 equations and the FAD in PD 6493 are both based 
on the Dugdale strip yield model (Dugdale, 1960). Note that in equation (4.1) 
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which is taken directly from PD 6493, the quantity Sr has been used. This term 
represents plastic collapse and is similar to the Load Ratio, Lr defined in 
equation (3.16) but instead uses the flow stress in place of the yield stress. The 
FAD used in BS 7910 is similar to that of PD 6493 but has a slower decay with 
respect to Lr to allow different cut off points for different steel types, as seen in 
Figure 3.1. Figure 4.2 shows a comparison between the FADs in PD 6493 and 
BS 7910. It is noted that in Figure 4.2 Sr has been converted to Lr by assuming 
a material grade of L450 (SMYS of 450 Nmm-2 and SMUTS of 535 Nmm-2) and 
the relation: 
 
ܮ௥ߪ௒ ൌ ܵ௥ߪത         (4.2) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Comparison between FADs BS 7910 and PD 6493 
 
Taking this into consideration, the toughness dependent NG-18 equations can 
be written in terms of a failure assessment line with their own brittle fracture and 
plastic collapse terms. If we consider the toughness dependent form of the 
through-wall NG-18 equation (equation (3.1)) this can be rearranged (Cosham, 
2012): 
 
ܭூ஼ଶ ൌ ܿߪଶ ଼గ ln ቂsec ቀ
గ
ଶ ቄ
ெఙಹ
ఙ ቅቁቃ       (4.3) 
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ଵ
௄಺಴మ
ൌ ଵ௖ఙమ ቄ
଼
గ ln ቂsec ቀ
గ
ଶ ቄ
ெఙಹ
ఙ ቅቁቃቅ
ିଵ
       (4.4) 
 
ெమఙಹమగ௖
௄಺಴మ
ൌ ெమఙಹమగ௖௖ఙమ ቄ
଼
గ ln ቂsec ቀ
గ
ଶ ቄ
ெఙಹ
ఙ ቅቁቃቅ
ିଵ
      (4.5) 
 
ெమఙಹమగ௖
௄಺಴మ
ൌ ቄெఙಹఙ ቅ
ଶ ቄ ଼గమ ln ቂsec ቀ
గ
ଶ ቄ
ெఙಹ
ఙ ቅቁቃቅ
ିଵ
      (4.6) 
 
ቄெఙಹ√గ௖௄಺಴ ቅ
ଶ
ൌ ቄெఙಹఙ ቅ
ଶ ቄ ଼గమ ln ቂsec ቀ
గ
ଶ ቄ
ெఙಹ
ఙ ቅቁቃቅ
ିଵ
     (4.7) 
 
ቄெఙಹ√గ௖௄಺಴ ቅ ൌ ቄ
ெఙಹ
ఙ ቅ ቄ
଼
గమ ln ቂsec ቀ
గ
ଶ ቄ
ெఙಹ
ఙ ቅቁቃቅ
ି଴.ହ
     (4.8) 
 
If the left hand side of equation (4.8) is defined as the brittle fracture term, Kr, 
and the expression ቄெఙಹఙഥ ቅ on the right hand side is defined as the plastic 
collapse term, Sr, then the equation becomes: 
 
ܭ௥ ൌ ܵ௥ ቄ ଼గమ ln sec ቀ
గ
ଶ ܵ௥ቁቅ
ି଴.ହ
  
 
The failure assessment line implied within the toughness dependent NG-18 
equations is therefore identical to that of PD 6493 (equation (4.1)).  
 
A comparison of the brittle fracture and plastic collapse terms in equation (4.8) 
with their equivalent definitions in BS 7910, equations (2.40), (3.16), (3.22) and 
(4.2), implies that: 
 
 The Folias factor, M, in the NG-18 equation is analogous to the function 
Y in BS 7910 
 The hoop stress, σH in the NG-18 equation is analogous to the stress 
state, σ in BS 7910 
 The half defect length, c, is analogous to the defect parameter, X, in BS 
7910 
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 The product of the Folias factor and hoop stress in the NG-18 equation, 
MσH, is analogous to the reference stress, σref, in BS 7910 
 
Table 4.1 shows the respective brittle fracture and plastic collapse components 
of each model: 
 
BS 7910 NG-18 
Fracture Ratio 
ܭ௥ ൌ ܭூܭூ஼ 
ܭ௥ ൌ ܭூܭூ஼ 
(implied by equation (4.8)) 
Stress Intensity Factor 
ܭூ ൌ ሺܻߪሻ√ߨܺ 
((Yσ) given by equations in section 
3.1.1.6) 
ܭூ ൌ ሺܯߪுሻ√ߨܿ 
(Implied by equation (4.8)) 
Fracture Toughness 
ܭூ஼ ൌ ൤൬12ටܥ௩௙௨௟௟ െ 20൰ ሺ25/ݐሻ଴.ଶହ൨ ൅ 20 
(Equation (3.66)) 
ܭூ஼ ൌ 0.54ܥ௩௙௨௟௟ ൅ 55 
(Equation (3.67)) 
ܭூ஼ ൌ ඨܥ௩ 1000ܣ ܧ 
Load Ratio 
ܮ௥ ൌ ߪ௥௘௙ߪ௒  
ܮ௥ ൌ ߪ௥௘௙ߪ௒  
(implied by equation (4.8) and Sr – Lr 
relationship) 
Reference Stress 
ߪ௥௘௙ ൌ ܯ்௜ߪ௠ ൅ 2ߪ௕3 ቀ1 െ 2ܹܿቁ
 
(Equation (3.60)) 
ߪ௥௘௙ ൌ ܯߪு 
(implied by equation (4.8) and Sr – Lr 
relationship) 
Table 4.1: Brittle Fracture and Plastic Collapse Components from BS 7910 
and the Toughness Dependent Through-Wall NG-18 Equation 
 
A similar analysis can be performed using the part-wall NG-18 equation. As the 
part-wall NG-18 equation simply involves the substitution of the Folias factor 
with the function MP (equation (3.5)), this is fairly straightforward. The respective 
brittle fracture and plastic collapse components from BS 7910 and NG-18 for 
the part-wall case are shown in Table 4.2 (using the BS 7910 equations 
described in section 3.1.1.6): 
 
 
 137 
 
BS 7910 NG-18 
Fracture Ratio 
ܭ௥ ൌ ܭூܭூ஼ 
ܭ௥ ൌ ܭூܭூ஼ 
(implied by equation (3.3) and 
analysis from equations (4.3) to (4.8))
Stress Intensity Factor 
ܭூ ൌ ሺܻߪሻ√ߨܺ 
(ሺYσሻ given by equations in section 
3.1.1.6) 
ܭூ ൌ ሺܯ௉ߪுሻ√ߨ݀ 
(implied by equation (3.3) and 
analysis from equations (4.3) to (4.8))
Fracture Toughness 
ܭூ஼ ൌ ൣ൫12ඥܥ௩௙௨௟௟ െ 20൯ሺ25/ݐሻ଴.ଶହ൧ ൅ 20
(Equation (3.66)) 
ܭூ஼ ൌ 0.54ܥ௩௙௨௟௟ ൅ 55 
(Equation (3.67)) 
ܭூ஼ ൌ ඨܥ௩ 1000ܣ ܧ 
Load Ratio 
ܮ௥ ൌ ߪ௥௘௙ߪ௒  
ܮ௥ ൌ ߪ௥௘௙ߪ௒  
(implied by equation (3.3), analysis 
from equations (4.3) to (4.8) and Sr – 
Lr relationship) 
Reference Stress 
ߪ௥௘௙ ൌ ܯௌ௜ߪ௠ ൅ 2ߪ௕3ሺ1 െ ߙ′′ሻଶ 
(Equation (3.62)) 
ߪ௥௘௙ ൌ ܯ௉ߪு 
(implied by equation (3.3), analysis 
from equations (4.3) to (4.8) and Sr – 
Lr relationship) 
Table 4.2: Brittle Fracture and Plastic Collapse Components from BS 7910 
and the Toughness Dependent Part-Wall NG-18 Equation 
 
In Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 the quantities MTi and MSi in BS 7910 are based on 
the Folias factor, using the original two term expression. As noted in section 
4.2.1.1 for the purposes of comparison, the same definitions of the Folias factor 
and the flow stress used in BS 7910 have been used in the NG-18 equations. 
 
It is clear from the analysis that the toughness dependent NG-18 equations and 
the BS 7910 level 2 assessment method are structurally very similar.  
 
For the through-wall case, both models have similar expressions for the stress 
intensity factor, KI, and the reference stress, σref. The only difference between 
these components for BS 7910 and NG-18 is the presence of bending stress 
terms in the BS 7910 case. The comparisons made in section 4.2.2.2 will show 
that the effect of the bending terms is small and remains small as the pipeline 
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wall thickness is increased. It is clear from the analysis that the main source of 
difference between the two models is the correlation between the material 
fracture toughness, KIC, and the Charpy v-notch impact energy. The difference 
in fracture toughness is illustrated in section 4.2.2.2. 
 
For the part-wall case, the function MP is used in the expressions for the stress 
intensity factor, KI, and the reference stress, σref for the NG-18 equations. For 
the reference stress, this function is identical to MSi used in BS 7910. As a 
result, the reference stress solutions used in each model once again differ only 
due to the presence of bending stress terms in BS 7910. The comparisons 
made in section 4.2.2.2 will show that the effect of the bending terms is small 
and remains small as the pipeline wall thickness is increased. For the stress 
intensity factor, the presence of MP is a source of difference between BS 7910 
and NG-18. This difference is illustrated in the comparisons in section 4.2.2.2. 
The correlations between the material fracture toughness, KIC, and the Charpy 
v-notch impact energy are identical to those in the through-wall case. 
 
4.2.2.2 Graphical Illustration with Wall Thickness 
 
In order to illustrate the similarities and differences between the BS 7910 and 
NG-18 approaches highlighted in section 4.2.2.1 and to show the effect of 
increased wall thickness, comparisons have been made between the stress 
intensity factor, KI, reference stress, σref and fracture toughness correlation, KIC, 
for each model, considering both through-wall and part-wall defects. The 
comparisons show the variation in each component with increasing wall 
thickness for a range of defect dimensions. 
 
For each of the comparisons made between the components of the through-wall 
and part-wall NG-18 equations and the BS 7910 level 2 assessment a single set 
of pipeline parameters was used. These parameters are shown in Table 4.3: 
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Input Value 
External Diameter 610 mm 
Material Grade L450 
Yield Strength 450 Nmm-2 
Tensile Strength 535 Nmm-2 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (2/3 Size) 100 (66.67) J 
Table 4.3: Pipeline Parameters for NG-18 and BS 7910 Level 2 Comparison 
 
To select a range of reasonable defect dimensions to be used in each 
comparison case, the UKOPA Fault Database (Anon., 2011c) was consulted. 
As noted in section 3.2 this database contains information on specific defect 
dimensions for third party external interference damage incidents affecting gas 
and liquid pipelines in the UK. The dimensions of three through-wall defects and 
three part-wall defects were chosen directly from the database with the intention 
that these would provide a sample of defects which could realistically be 
expected to occur. It is assumed that the defect dimensions (length and depth) 
are independent of the dimensions of the pipeline in which they are located. The 
dimensions of the through-wall and part-wall defects taken from the UKOPA 
Fault Database are shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5: 
 
Defect No. Length (mm) 
1 203 
2 89 
3 5 
Table 4.4: Through-Wall Defect Dimensions for NG-18 and BS 7910 Level 2 
Comparison 
 
Defect No. Length (mm) Depth (% wall thickness) 
1 1350 14 
2 480 54 
3 20 63 
Table 4.5: Part-Wall Defect Dimensions for NG-18 and BS 7910 Level 2 
Comparison 
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Through-Wall Defects 
 
For through-wall defects the comparison has been performed using the three 
defects listed in Table 4.4. with pipeline parameters from Table 4.3. In order to 
counteract the effect of a reduction in the hoop stress in the pipe wall with an 
increase in wall thickness, the pressure has also been varied such that the 
stress at the internal pipe wall (calculated using Lamé’s equation for the hoop 
stress in a thick wall cylinder) always remains at a value of 0.72 of the yield 
strength of the pipeline, a value of 324 Nmm-2. For BS 7910, the specific 
equations used for the stress intensity factor, fracture toughness correlation20 
and reference stress are the same as those listed for the through-wall case in 
section 3.1.1.6. The equations used for NG-18 are listed in Table 4.1. The 
results of the investigation are shown in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 
and are presented as the ratio of the value calculated using BS 7910 to the 
value calculated using the NG-18 equations.  If the ratio is greater than one 
then the value calculated using BS 7910 is smaller, and if it is less than one 
then the value calculated using BS 7910 is larger. 
 
 
 
                                            
20 In line with the BS 7910 level 2 assessment method the units for the fracture 
toughness have been changed from MPa√m to Nmm-3/2 for the comparison. 
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Figure 4.3: Stress Intensity Factor Ratio of NG-18 and BS 7910 Level 2 
with Increasing Wall Thickness for Three Different Axial Through-Wall 
Defects 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Reference Stress Ratio of NG-18 and BS 7910 Level 2 with 
Increasing Wall Thickness for Three Different Axial Through-Wall Defects 
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Figure 4.5: Fracture Toughness Ratio of NG-18 and BS 7910 Level 2 with 
Increasing Wall Thickness for Three Different Axial Through-Wall Defects 
 
The proximity of the data to unity in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 illustrates the 
similarity between the stress intensity factors and reference stress solutions 
used in the through-wall NG-18 equations and BS 7910 level 2. Almost exactly 
the same values are produced for each of the three defects investigated. It is 
noted that the presence of the bending terms in the BS 7910 assessment 
produces negligible difference at low wall thickness. As the wall thickness and 
bending stress increase the bending stress terms lead to a slightly increasing 
difference between the two models, however this difference remains very small 
as the wall thickness approaches 60 mm. The difference is shown by the data 
diverging from unity.  
 
Figure 4.5 shows that the fracture toughness correlation used in the through-
wall NG-18 equation gives substantially different values for fracture toughness 
than the correlation used for BS 7910 level 2. In this chart the results for each 
defect are overlaid as the toughness correlation is independent of defect 
dimensions. The toughness values calculated in the NG-18 equation are over 
four times as large as those from BS 7910. As was shown in section 4.2.2.1, 
this is the largest source of differences between BS 7910 and NG-18 in the 
through-wall case.  
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Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 together show that an increase in wall 
thickness produces only a very small difference between the two models. It is 
illustrated that the largest difference between the models is due to the 
difference in the fracture toughness correlation. It is noted that the fracture 
toughness correlation used in the toughness dependent NG-18 equation was 
derived empirically using the results of full scale tests on thin wall pipe sections 
and may not be applicable to thick wall pipelines. Verification of the application 
of the toughness dependent through-wall NG-18 equation would therefore 
require a detailed numerical analysis including finite element analysis and an 
experimental test programme. However, if the linepipe used in pipeline 
construction is very tough then defect failure is controlled by plastic collapse 
rather than brittle fracture. The flow stress dependent through-wall NG-18 
equation would be the most appropriate form of NG-18 equation to apply for 
high toughness steel. In a plastic collapse failure, the fracture toughness, by 
definition, has no effect. Furthermore, the flow stress dependent form of the 
NG-18 equation does not include a fracture toughness correlation. Therefore for 
high toughness steel, the main source of contention regarding the application of 
the NG-18 equation to thick wall pipelines is negated. It is therefore concluded 
that in principle, the flow stress dependent through-wall NG-18 equation would 
be suitable for application to thick wall pipelines, provided the pipe material was 
of a high toughness. 
 
The lower limit of toughness for which this justification is applicable is not 
currently known. It is therefore recommended that further work is carried out in 
order to determine the toughness at which it is acceptable to ignore the effect of 
fracture toughness and brittle fracture. 
 
Part-Wall Defects 
 
Similarly, for part-wall defects a comparison has been performed using the 
three defects listed in Table 4.5 with pipeline parameters from Table 4.3. In 
order to counteract the effect of a reduction in the hoop stress in the pipe wall 
with an increase in wall thickness the pressure has also been varied such that 
the stress at the internal pipe wall (calculated using Lamé’s equation for the 
hoop stress in a thick wall cylinder) always remains at a value of 0.72 of the 
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yield strength of the pipeline, a value of 324 Nmm-2. For BS 7910, the specific 
equations used for the stress intensity factor, fracture toughness correlation21 
and reference stress are the same as those listed for the part-wall case in 
section 3.1.1.6. The equations used for NG-18 are listed in Table 4.2. The 
results are shown in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 and are presented as the ratio of 
the value calculated using BS 7910 to the value calculated using the NG-18 
equations.  If the ratio is greater than one then the value calculated using BS 
7910 is smaller, and if it is less than one then the value calculated using BS 
7910 is larger. The comparison for fracture toughness correlation has not been 
shown as this is identical to that of Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Stress Intensity Factor Ratio of NG-18 and BS 7910 Level 2 
with Increasing Wall Thickness for Three Different Axial Part-Wall Defects 
 
                                            
21 In line with the BS 7910 level 2 assessment method the units for the fracture 
toughness have been changed from MPa√m to Nmm-3/2 for the comparison. 
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Figure 4.7: Reference Stress Ratio of NG-18 and BS 7910 Level 2 with 
Increasing Wall Thickness for Three Different Axial Part-Wall Defects 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.6, the presence of the function MP in the part-wall 
NG-18 equation produces a large difference between the BS 7910 and NG-18 
stress intensity factors. Defect 1, which is long and shallow, shows the greatest 
difference between the two models, the NG-18 stress intensity factor is over 
seven times as large as BS 7910’s equivalent value for all wall thickness values 
considered. As the defect length is reduced and the defect depth increased the 
difference between the NG-18 and BS 7910 values is reduced. From the 
defects considered it is not possible to identify the cause because both the 
length and the depth are changing when moving from defect 1 through to defect 
3. The shortest and deepest defect shows the closest agreement in stress 
intensity factor between the two models however the difference here is still 
considerable. Defect 3 also displays an opposite trend to that of the other two 
defects with increasing wall thickness. In this case the stress intensity factors 
become more different as pipeline wall thickness is increased.  
 
The proximity of the data to unity in Figure 4.7 illustrates the similarity between 
the reference stress solutions used in the through-wall NG-18 equations and BS 
7910 level 2. Almost exactly the same values are produced for each of the three 
defects investigated. It is noted that the presence of the bending terms in the 
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BS 7910 assessment produces negligible difference at low wall thickness. As 
the wall thickness and bending stress increase the bending stress terms lead to 
a slightly increasing difference between the two models, however this difference 
remains very small as the wall thickness approaches 60 mm. The difference is 
shown by the data diverging from unity. 
 
In the part-wall case, the differences between the two models lie in the fracture 
toughness correlation (as in Figure 4.5) and the stress intensity factors. As both 
of these factors contribute to the approach to brittle failure then it is 
demonstrated that it is the fracture toughness dependence and not the 
approach to plastic collapse that is responsible for the differences. As noted for 
the through-wall case, if the linepipe used in pipeline construction is very tough 
then defect failure is controlled by plastic collapse rather than brittle fracture. 
Therefore, the flow stress dependent part-wall NG-18 equation would then be 
the most appropriate form of the NG-18 equation to apply for high toughness 
steel. This form of the NG-18 equation does not include a brittle fracture, 
toughness dependent component. Therefore for high toughness steel, the main 
source of contention regarding the application of the NG-18 equation to thick 
wall pipelines is negated. It is therefore concluded that in principle, the flow 
stress dependent part-wall NG-18 equation would be suitable for application to 
thick wall pipelines, provided the pipe material was of a high toughness. 
 
The lower limit of toughness for which this justification is applicable is not 
currently known. It is therefore recommended that further work is carried out in 
order to determine the toughness at which it is acceptable to ignore the effect of 
fracture toughness and brittle fracture. 
 
4.3 Comparison with Real Failure Data 
 
In section 4.2 it was shown that the largest source of the difference between the 
NG-18 equations (which are validated for thin wall pipelines) and the BS 7910 
level 2 assessment (which is validated for thin and thick wall pressure vessels) 
are the different expressions for brittle fracture behaviour. It was also noted that 
by imposing a high toughness requirement on linepipe steel, the effect of 
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fracture toughness on defect failure would be negated. It was therefore 
concluded that the flow stress dependent NG-18 equations would, in principle, 
be a suitable method to apply to thick wall pipelines, provided that the pipe 
material was of a high toughness. 
 
However, in order to satisfactorily determine the accuracy of the flow stress 
dependent NG-18 equations when applied to thick wall pipelines, a comparison 
between predicted values of failure pressure and experimental test data is 
required. 
 
In this section the accuracy of the predictions from both models will be 
compared with through-wall and part-wall defect burst tests on thick wall pipe 
sections and pressure vessels taken from a search of available literature. 
 
It is noted that for this section the comparison is between each model and 
experimental data not between the models themselves. Taking this into 
consideration, the expressions used in the NG-18 equations for the flow stress 
and Folias factor are those which are considered the most appropriate for use in 
a failure frequency model, as discussed in section 3.3. The NG-18 equations in 
this form represent how they would be used in practice. This requires replacing 
the Folias factor with the alternative two term approximation applicable to larger 
defects (equation (2.35)): 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.26 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
  
 
And the flow stress with the form used in the BGDGFM (equation (3.10)): 
 
ߪത ൌ 1.15ߪ௒  
 
The BS 7910 level 2 assessment method remains as outlined in section 3.1.1.6. 
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4.3.1 Through-Wall Defects 
 
4.3.1.1 Through-Wall Failure Data 
 
The experimental failure data available for burst tests of through-wall defects on 
thick wall vessels originates from Sturm and Stoppler in 1985 (Sturm, 1990; 
Cosham, 2002; Staat, 2004). 
 
Three tests were performed on vessels constructed from 20 MnMoNi 55 grade 
manganese-molybdenum-nickel alloy steel and one test was performed on a 
vessel constructed from 22 NiMoCr 37 mod nickel-molybdenum-chromium alloy 
steel. Details of the vessels and tests are summarised in Table 4.6. 
 
Input Value 
External Diameter (mm) 798 
Wall Thickness (mm) 47.2 
Material Grade 20 MnMoNi 55, 22 NiMoCr 37 mod 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 428, 417 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 605, 622 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) Full-Size 150, 50 
Defect Length Range (2c) (mm) 650 – 1105 
Table 4.6: Thick Wall, Through-Wall Burst Test Vessel Details, Sturm and 
Stoppler, 1985 
 
Data from burst tests of through-wall defects on thin wall vessels have also 
been included in order to provide a comparison. This data originates from 
Battelle in 1973 (Kiefner, 1973; Cosham, 2002). Data from 90 burst tests of 
through-wall defects on thin wall pressure vessels has been included. These 
tests were performed for a range of different vessels and parameters. Details 
are summarised in Table 4.7: 
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Input Value 
External Diameter Range (mm) 168 – 1219 
Wall Thickness Range (mm) 4.9 – 21.9 
Yield Strength Range (Nmm-2) 220 – 735 
Tensile Strength Range (Nmm-2) 338 – 908 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) Full-Size 20 – 136 
Defect Length Range (2c) (mm) 25 – 508 
Table 4.7: Thin Wall, Through-Wall Burst Test Vessel Details, Kiefner et al., 
1973 
 
4.3.1.2 Failure Data Comparison 
 
A comparison has been made between the actual failure pressures for the set 
of axial through-wall defects in thick wall pressure vessels, reported by Sturm 
and Stoppler in 1985 and summarised in Table 4.6; and those predicted for the 
same set of defects by the through-wall NG-18 equation and a BS 7910 level 2 
assessment. The results are shown in Figure 4.8 with the failure stress as a 
percentage of the yield stress. For BS 7910 the failure stress is assumed to be 
the stress on the internal pipe wall at the failure pressure and has been 
calculated using Lamé’s equation for the hoop stress in a thick wall pressure 
vessel. For the NG-18 equation the failure stress is assumed to be the hoop 
stress at the failure pressure as calculated using Barlow’s formula. 
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Figure 4.8: Predicted versus Actual Failure Stress for Axial Through-Wall 
Defects in Thick Wall Pipe Sections According to NG-18 and BS 7910 
Level 2, Sturm and Stoppler 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the same data from Figure 4.8 and also includes the results of 
the burst tests on axial through-wall defects in thin wall pressure vessels from 
Battelle in 1973, summarised in Table 4.7. 
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Figure 4.9: Predicted versus Actual Failure Stress for Axial Through-Wall 
Defects in Thick and Thin Wall Pipe Sections According to NG-18 and BS 
7910 Level 2, Sturm and Stoppler, Kiefner et al. 
 
In Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 data points which lie below the line of unity are 
conservative, with the model predicting a failure stress below that of the 
experimental failure stress. Conversely, data points which lie above the line of 
unity are non-conservative. The closer data points are to the line of unity, the 
more accurate the prediction of failure stress.  
 
Figure 4.8 implies that the predictions of BS 7910 are more conservative than 
those of NG-18. The failure stresses calculated by NG-18 are approximately 
four to eight times as large as those calculated by BS 7910 for the experimental 
cases considered. Figure 4.8 shows that the flow stress dependent NG-18 
equation is the most accurate of the two models in calculating predictions of 
pipeline failure stress for through-wall defects in thick wall pipelines. 
 
Figure 4.9 includes the thin wall failure data from which the NG-18 equations 
were originally calibrated. It is clear that for NG-18, the thick wall data is 
contained within the scatter of the data points of the thin wall data. 
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Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 suggest that the flow stress dependent NG-18 
equation is a valid model for through-wall defects in pipelines up to at least 47.2 
mm wall thickness, provided that the toughness is high.  
 
On the basis of the accuracy of the two models it can be concluded that the flow 
stress dependent through-wall NG-18 equation is the most appropriate model to 
use to describe leak / rupture in a failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 
pipelines. 
 
4.3.2 Part-Wall Defects 
 
4.3.2.1 Part-Wall Failure Data 
 
The experimental failure data available for burst tests of part-wall defects on 
thick wall vessels originates from Eibner in 1971 (Staat, 2004), Wellinger and 
Sturm in 1971 (Wellinger, 1971; Staat, 2004), Sturm and Stoppler in 
1985 (Sturm, 1990; Cosham, 2002; Staat, 2004), Keller in 1990 (Keller, 1987; 
Cosham, 2002; Staat, 2004) and Demofonti et al. in 2001 (Demofonti, 2000; 
Cosham, 2002; Staat, 2004). 
 
As reported by Eibner, four tests were performed on vessels constructed from A 
106 B grade steel, two tests were performed on vessels constructed from Type 
316 steel and one test was performed on a vessel constructed from A 316 steel. 
Details of the vessels and tests are summarised in Table 4.8. It should be noted 
that for the Eibner data there was no information available on the 
internal/external classification of the part-wall defects. Due to the practicalities 
of machining part-wall defects in a vessel, the defects have been assumed to 
be external. It should also be noted that the Charpy v-notch impact energy 
values were not given for two of the tests. Values of 81 J and 200 J were 
assumed for these tests, which are in line with values from the rest of the data. 
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Input Value 
External Diameter (mm) 609.6 
Wall Thickness Range (mm) 38.1 – 43.7 
Material Grade A 106 B, Type 316, A 316 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 155, 241 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 426, 570 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) Full-Size Range 81 – 200 
Defect Length Range (2c) (mm) 76 – 361 
Defect Depth Range (d) (% wall thickness) 47 – 88 
Table 4.8: Thick Wall, Part-Wall Burst Test Vessel Details, Eibner 1971 
 
As reported by Wellinger and Sturm, 23 tests were performed on vessels 
constructed from St 35 grade steel and two tests were performed on vessels 
constructed from FB 70 grade steel. Details of the vessels and tests are 
summarised in Table 4.9. It should be noted that for the Wellinger and Sturm 
data the Charpy v-notch impact energy values were not given for 24 of the 
tests. Values of 56 J were assumed for 22 of the tests and 71 J for the 
remaining two, in line with values from the rest of the data. 
 
Input Value 
External Diameter (mm) 88.9 
Wall Thickness (mm) 22.2 
Material Grade St 35, FB 70 
Yield Strength Range (Nmm-2) 199 – 473 
Tensile Strength Range (Nmm-2) 438 – 614 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) Full-Size Range 56 – 71 
Defect Length Range (2c) (mm) 40.5 – 123 
Defect Depth Range (d) (% wall thickness) 18.9 – 88.7 
Table 4.9: Thick Wall, Part-Wall Burst Test Vessel Details, Wellinger and 
Sturm 1971 
 
As reported by Sturm and Stoppler, four tests were performed on vessels 
constructed from 20 MnMoNi 55 grade steel and three tests were performed on 
vessels constructed from 22 NiMoCr 37 grade steel. Details of the vessels and 
tests are summarised in Table 4.10. 
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Input Value 
External Diameter (mm) 797.9, 793.9 
Wall Thickness (mm) 47.2 
Material Grade 20 MnMoNi 55, 22 NiMoCr 37 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 428, 417 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 622, 605 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) Full-Size 150, 50 
Defect Length Range (2c) (mm) 709 – 1500 
Defect Depth Range (d) (% wall thickness) 74 – 81 
Table 4.10: Thick Wall, Part-Wall Burst Test Vessel Details, Sturm and 
Stoppler 1985 
 
As reported by Keller, two tests were performed on vessels constructed from 34 
CrMo 4 grade steel. Details of the vessels and tests are summarised in Table 
4.11. 
 
Input Value 
External Diameter (mm) 564.8, 565.4 
Wall Thickness (mm) 20.4, 21.7 
Material Grade 34 CrMo 4 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 878, 866 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 990, 979 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) Full-Size 64, 65 
Defect Length (2c) (mm) 48, 32.5 
Defect Depth (d) (% wall thickness) 78.9, 66.8 
Table 4.11: Thick Wall, Part-Wall Burst Test Vessel Details, Keller 1990 
 
As reported by Demofonti et al., two tests were performed on vessels 
constructed from API 5L X100 grade steel. Details of the vessels and tests are 
summarised in Table 4.12. It should be noted that for the Demofonti data there 
was no information available on the internal/external classification of the part-
wall defects. Due to the practicalities of machining part-wall defects in a vessel, 
the defects have been assumed to be external. 
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Input Value 
External Diameter (mm) 1422.4 
Wall Thickness (mm) 19.25, 20.1 
Material Grade API 5L X100 
Yield Strength (Nmm-2) 740, 795 
Tensile Strength (Nmm-2) 774, 840 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) 2/3-Size 261, 171 
Defect Length (2c) (mm) 180, 385 
Defect Depth (d) (% wall thickness) 54, 18.9 
Table 4.12: Thick Wall, Part-Wall Burst Test Vessel Details, Demofonti et 
al. 2001 
 
Data from burst tests of part-wall defects on thin wall vessels has also been 
included in order to provide a comparison. This data originates from Battelle in 
1973 (Kiefner, 1973; Cosham, 2002). Data from 33 burst tests of part-wall 
defects on thin wall pressure vessels has been included. These tests were 
performed for a range of different vessels and parameters. Details are 
summarised in Table 4.13. 
 
Input Value 
External Diameter Range (mm) 762 – 1067 
Wall Thickness Range (mm) 9.1 – 15.6 
Yield Strength Range (Nmm-2) 379 – 510 
Tensile Strength Range (Nmm-2) 531 – 634 
Charpy V-Notch Impact Energy (J) Full-Size 24 – 69 
Defect Length Range (2c) (mm) 64 – 610 
Defect Depth Range (d) (% wall thickness) 25 – 92 
Table 4.13: Thin Wall, Part-Wall Burst Test Vessel Details, Kiefner et al., 
1973 
 
4.3.2.2 Failure Data Comparison 
 
A comparison has been made between the actual failure pressures for the set 
of axial part-wall defects in thick wall pressure vessels, reported by Eibner in 
1971, Wellinger and Sturm in 1971, Sturm and Stoppler in 1985, Keller in 1990 
and Demofonti et al. in 2001, summarised in Table 4.8 to Table 4.12; and those 
predicted for the same set of defects by the part-wall NG-18 equation and a BS 
7910 level 2 assessment. The results are shown in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 
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with the failure stress as a percentage of the yield stress. For BS 7910 the 
failure stress is assumed to be the stress on the internal pipe wall at the failure 
pressure and has been calculated using Lamé’s equation for the hoop stress in 
a thick wall pressure vessel. For the NG-18 equation the failure stress is 
assumed to be the hoop stress at the failure pressure as calculated using 
Barlow’s formula. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Predicted versus Actual Failure Stress for Axial Part-Wall 
Defects in Thick Wall Pipe Sections According to NG-18 and BS 7910 
Level 2, Eibner, Sturm and Stoppler, Keller and Demofonti et al. 
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Figure 4.11: Predicted versus Actual Failure Stress for Axial Part-Wall 
Defects in Thick Wall Pipe Sections According to NG-18 and BS 7910 
Level 2, Wellinger and Sturm 
 
Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 show the same data from Figure 4.10 and Figure 
4.11 and also include the results of the burst tests on axial part-wall defects in 
thin wall pressure vessels from Battelle in 1973, summarised in Table 4.13. 
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Figure 4.12: Predicted versus Actual Failure Stress for Axial Part-Wall 
Defects in Thick and Thin Wall Pipe Sections According to NG-18 and BS 
7910 Level 2, Eibner, Sturm and Stoppler, Keller, Demofonti et al. and 
Kiefner et al. 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Predicted versus Actual Failure Stress for Axial Part-Wall 
Defects in Thick and Thin Wall Pipe Sections According to NG-18 and BS 
7910 Level 2, Wellinger and Sturm, Kiefner et al. 
 
In Figure 4.10, Figure 4.11, Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 data points which lie 
below the line of unity are conservative, with the assessment method predicting 
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a failure stress below that of the experimental failure stress. Conversely, data 
points which lie above the line of unity are non-conservative. The closer data 
points are to the line of unity, the more accurate the prediction of failure stress.  
 
For the experimental data considered in Figure 4.10 the predictions of BS 7910 
are generally conservative in comparison to those of NG-18. The failure 
stresses calculated by NG-18 range from being approximately equal to 6.8 
times larger than those calculated by BS 7910 for the experimental cases 
considered. For the experimental data considered in Figure 4.11, the 
predictions of BS 7910 are slightly more conservative than those of NG-18. The 
failure stresses calculated by NG-18 range from being approximately equal to 
1.7 times larger than those calculated by BS 7910 for the experimental cases 
considered. The conservatism of the failure stresses calculated by BS 7910 
over NG-18 in the part-wall case reflects that of the through-wall case, however 
in this case the conservatism is less evident. 
 
The experimental data considered in Figure 4.10 suggests that the accuracy of 
NG-18 in calculating pipeline failure stress for part-wall defects in thick wall 
pipelines may be slightly higher than that of BS 7910. The experimental data 
considered in Figure 4.11 suggests that the accuracy of NG-18 and BS 7910 
are approximately equal. 
 
Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 include the thin wall failure data from which the 
NG-18 equations were originally calibrated. In Figure 4.12 the thick wall data for 
NG-18 is contained within the scatter of the data points of the thin wall data. In 
Figure 4.13 the thick wall data for NG-18 does not lie within the scatter of the 
data points of the thin wall data. The reason for this is the atypically large, pipe 
radius to wall thickness ratio of the vessels used in these tests. The large size 
of the ratio emphasises the conservative nature of Barlow’s equation for thin 
wall pipelines when applied to thick wall pipelines, as was noted in section 4.1. 
Regardless of this conservatism, the accuracy of the NG-18 equation can be 
considered as approximately equal to BS 7910 when considering these 
particular tests. 
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Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 suggest that the flow stress dependent NG-18 is a 
valid model for part-wall defects in pipelines up to at least 47.2 mm wall 
thickness, provided that the toughness is high.  
 
On the basis of the accuracy of the two models both the flow stress dependent 
part-wall NG-18 equation and the BS 7910 level 2 assessment are appropriate 
to use to describe gouge failure in a failure frequency model. However, the flow 
stress dependent NG-18 equation would be preferred over BS 7910 due to its 
simplicity. 
 
4.4 Validation of the NG-18 Equations for Thick Wall Pipelines 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented a study to validate the application of the NG-18 
equations to thick wall pipelines. The NG-18 equations were derived using tests 
on thin wall pressure vessels. In the context of fracture mechanics, an increase 
in pipeline wall thickness will result in an increase in both the constraint and the 
bending stress; and reduce the toughness. The accuracy of the NG-18 
equations when applied to thick wall pipelines could therefore potentially be 
affected. 
 
The approach taken has considered a comparison between the component 
parts of the NG-18 equations and the component parts of the defect 
assessment code BS 7910, which is valid for application to both thin and thick 
walled pressure vessels. The aim was to determine whether an increase in 
pipeline wall thickness introduces effects which are not accounted for by the 
NG-18 equations. In addition, the accuracy of the NG-18 equations and a BS 
7910 level 2 assessment when compared to thick wall experimental failure data 
was considered, in order to determine the most appropriate model to use in a 
failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 pipelines. 
 
It was found that the through-wall and part-wall toughness dependent NG-18 
equations can be written in the form of a failure assessment diagram which is 
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analogous to the BS 7910 level 2 assessment method and mathematically 
identical to the failure assessment diagram used in PD 6493. 
 
Comparisons between the BS 7910 level 2 assessment method; and the 
through-wall and part-wall toughness dependent NG-18 equations written in the 
same form; indicated that the two models are structurally very similar. Wall 
thickness effects were shown to be minimal and the main source of difference 
between the two models is the calculation of the fracture ratio, particularly for 
part-wall defects. These differences arise from the correlation used for material 
fracture toughness and the calculation of the stress intensity factor. 
 
For modern, high toughness linepipe steel, defect failure will occur as a result of 
plastic collapse rather than brittle fracture. The flow stress dependent NG-18 
equations are therefore the most appropriate form of the NG-18 equations to 
apply for high toughness steel. 
 
In a plastic collapse failure the fracture toughness, by definition, has no effect. 
Furthermore, the flow stress dependent form of the NG-18 equations do not 
include a brittle fracture, toughness dependent component. Therefore for high 
toughness steel, the main source of the difference between BS 7910 and NG-
18 is negated. In principle, the flow stress dependent NG-18 equations would 
be suitable for application to thick wall pipelines, provided the pipe material was 
of a high toughness. 
 
On the basis of the above points and the comparison made with thick wall 
experimental failure data, it is concluded that the flow stress dependent 
through-wall NG-18 equation is a valid model for through-wall axial defects in 
pipelines up to at least 47.2 mm wall thickness, provided that the linepipe steel 
has a high toughness. 
 
On the basis of the comparison made with thick wall experimental failure data, it 
is concluded that the flow stress dependent through-wall NG-18 equation is a 
more appropriate model to use than the BS 7910 level 2 assessment to 
describe leak / rupture in a failure frequency model for dense phase CO2 
pipelines. 
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On the basis of the above points and the comparison made with thick wall 
experimental failure data, it is concluded that the flow stress dependent part-
wall NG-18 equation is a valid model for part-wall axial defects in pipelines up to 
at least 47.2 mm wall thickness, provided that the linepipe steel has a high 
toughness. 
 
On the basis of the comparison made with thick wall experimental failure data, it 
is concluded that both the flow stress dependent part-wall NG-18 equation and 
the BS 7910 level 2 assessment are appropriate to use to describe gouge 
failure in a failure frequency model. However, the flow stress dependent NG-18 
equation would be preferred over BS 7910 due to its simplicity. 
 
It is noted that verification for the application of the toughness dependent NG-18 
equation would require a detailed numerical analysis including finite element 
analysis and an experimental test programme. 
 
It is recommended that further work is carried out in order to determine the 
toughness limit at which it is acceptable to ignore the effect of fracture 
toughness and brittle fracture. 
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Chapter 5. Development of the AFFECT Failure Frequency 
Model for Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines (Part 1) 
 
Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 have considered the suitability of available models and 
data, for the purposes of developing a model to calculate the failure frequency 
of a dense phase CO2 pipeline due to third party external interference. Chapter 
5 to Chapter 7 detail the development of the model, to be known as AFFECT: A 
Failure Frequency Estimation model for dense phase CO2 Transport. 
 
As previously noted, pipeline failure frequency models are typically based upon 
probabilistic structural reliability methods which use limit state functions defined 
by pipeline failure models; and probability distributions derived from historical 
operational data. In terms of using structural reliability techniques to develop the 
AFFECT model, it was concluded in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4  that: 
 
 The NG-18 equations are the most appropriate models to describe leak / 
rupture and gouge failure. 
 The BGDGFM is the most appropriate model to describe gouged dent 
failure 
 
The most basic failure frequency model considered in Chapter 2 incorporating 
these aspects is the PIE model. The PIE model has therefore been used as a 
template from which to develop the AFFECT model. 
 
All of the pipeline failure frequency models which use structural reliability 
methods are based upon a methodology originally developed by British Gas. It 
was shown in Chapter 2 however, that many of the models incorporate 
modifications to this methodology on the basis of further research into damage 
modelling; improved operational data; or different interpretations of the problem. 
These modifications are discussed in section 2.8. AFFECT has been developed 
in a stepwise manner by considering the effect of including some of these 
modifications in the model. 
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From the starting point of the PIE model Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 will detail the 
step by step construction of the AFFECT model. The first four stages are 
covered in Chapter 5, an analysis of the most recent UKOPA Fault Database is 
presented in Chapter 6 and the final two stages are detailed in Chapter 7. Each 
modification made to the PIE model is outlined and estimates of pipeline failure 
frequency calculated at each stage are presented. In this way the effect of each 
modification on the estimated value of failure frequency can be observed. 
 
The modifications considered in Chapter 5 include: 
 
 Changes to the probability of failure calculation; 
 The re-rounding effect of the pipeline internal operating pressure on a 
dent; 
 The force which causes a dent; 
 Distributions derived from recent historical operational damage data. 
 
It is noted that the PIE model, as discussed in section 2.8, does not adequately 
address failures caused by damage to branches and fittings; and drilling 
operations in-error. In order that the AFFECT model address failures of these 
types, the development of an historical data component or additional damage 
specific failure models would be required. The development of these elements 
however, has not been performed as part of this work. It is therefore 
recommended that such a task is considered as part of further work. 
 
5.1 The Modified PIE Model 
 
The basis for the AFFECT model is the PIE model. The model is described in 
section 2.5, however it was noted in the discussion in section 2.8 that in 
comparing the PIE and Cosham failure frequency models, the expressions used 
for calculation of the probability of failure in the Cosham model are more 
accurate than those used in the PIE model. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
study, changes have been made to the probability of failure calculation in the 
PIE model to bring it more in line with the Cosham model. The model used as 
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the basis for the AFFECT model is therefore referred to as the “Modified PIE 
model”. The changes made to the PIE model are outlined below. 
 
The total probability of failure for gouges in the PIE model, given by equation 
(2.73), is replaced in the Modified PIE model with the equivalent equation from 
the Cosham model (equation (2.84)): 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿஶ଴   
 
The probability of a gouge leak, Pgougeleak, and probability of a gouge rupture, 
Pgougerupture, are therefore given by equations (2.74) and (2.85): 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿ௅೎ೝ೔೟଴   
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿஶ௅೎ೝ೔೟   
 
The total probability of failure for gouged dents in the PIE model, given by 
equation (2.76), is replaced in the Modified PIE model by:  
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿஶ଴ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ (5.1) 
 
Where dcritBGDGFM is given by equation (2.87). Note that although equation (5.1) 
uses the same form as the probability of failure for gouged dents in the Cosham 
model (equation (2.86)), the dent depth random variable, H, from the PIE model 
is retained. The value of Hcrit is calculated using equation (2.16).  
 
It follows from equation (5.1) that the probability of a gouged dent failing as a 
leak and a gouged dent failing as a rupture are given by: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿ௅೎ೝ೔೟଴ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ (5.2) 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿஶ௅೎ೝ೔೟ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴுሺܪ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ (5.3) 
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The critical length of the gouged dent gouge in equation (5.2) and (5.3) is the 
same as that used in the both the PIE and Cosham models, equation (2.72). 
 
It should be noted that all other aspects of the Modified PIE model remain the 
same as the original PIE model. The Incident-Rate is given in Table 2.10, the 
probabilities that mechanical damage will be a gouge or a gouged dent in Table 
2.11, the random variables in Table 2.12 and the Weibull probability distribution 
parameters in Table 2.13. 
 
5.2 Modified PIE Model Results 
 
Estimated pipeline failure frequency values have been calculated using the 
Modified PIE model for six example pipeline cases. In each case the leak, 
rupture and total failure frequency has been calculated. The example cases 
represent typical design parameters for 610 mm and 762 mm external diameter 
pipelines operating between 0.3 and 0.72 design factor, with a range of steel 
toughness. 
 
The study has been performed for set values of external diameter, internal 
operating pressure, material and fracture toughness (as measured by the 2/3 
Charpy v-notch impact energy). Variation in the failure frequency is presented 
as a function of the pipeline wall thickness. The only difference between 
examples 1, 2 and 3 is an increase in the material fracture toughness of the 
pipeline; likewise for examples 4, 5 and 6. 
 
Details of the example pipeline cases are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Example 
No. 
External 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
(min/max) 
Operating 
Pressure 
(barg) 
Material 
Grade 
Specified 
Minimum 
Yield 
Strength 
(Nmm-2) 
Ultimate 
Tensile 
Strength 
(Nmm-2) 
2/3 Charpy 
V-Notch 
Impact 
Energy (J) 
1 610 12.7 / 25.4 135 L450 450 535 27 
2 610 12.7 / 25.4 135 L450 450 535 43 
3 610 12.7 / 25.4 135 L450 450 535 167 
4 762 9.5 / 19.1 34 L450 450 535 27 
5 762 9.5 / 19.1 34 L450 450 535 43 
6 762 9.5 / 19.1 34 L450 450 535 167 
Table 5.1: Example Pipeline Cases 
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The variation in leak, rupture and total failure frequency with wall thickness for 
example no.1 in Table 5.1, is shown in Figure 5.1. The variation in leak, rupture 
and total failure frequency with wall thickness for example no.4, is shown in 
Figure 5.2. Equivalent charts for the remaining examples are included in 
Appendix A . 
 
A comparison between total failure frequency values calculated for examples 1, 
2, and 3 is shown in Figure 5.3 indicating the effect of an increase in material 
fracture toughness. A similar comparison between total failure frequency values 
calculated for examples 4, 5 and 6 is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the 
Modified PIE Model, for Example 1 
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Figure 5.2: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the 
Modified PIE Model, for Example 4 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
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Figure 5.4: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
 
Based on the results, the following observations can be made regarding 
estimations of pipeline failure frequency made by the Modified PIE model. 
 
The value of failure frequency decreases with increasing wall thickness. This 
result is expected; a thicker pipeline would require deeper and longer gouges to 
cause failure and deeper and longer gouges are less likely to occur (as 
indicated by the Weibull probability distributions which are shown in Figure 2.7 
and Figure 2.8). 
 
Taking into consideration all of the examples calculated, the leak failure 
frequency is, for the most part, in excess of the rupture failure frequency. This is 
also to be expected given that the rupture failure condition is based upon the 
defect length exceeding a minimum critical value; and that longer defects are 
less likely to occur. The pipeline examples with a higher operating pressure 
(numbers 1, 2 and 3) indicate that the rupture failure frequency becomes more 
dominant at the minimum value of wall thickness considered. In these cases an 
increased pipe wall hoop stress results in a critical length that is sufficiently 
small such that the majority of failures would occur as ruptures. The same effect 
is not observed when the operating pressure is lower in the considered 
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examples 4, 5 and 6, although the overall trend suggests this would happen if 
the wall thickness was sufficiently low. 
 
The value of failure frequency decreases with increasing material toughness 
(Charpy 2/3 v-notch impact energy). This effect is to be expected; toughness is 
a measure of the resistance of a material to fracture and therefore an increase 
in this quantity would suggest a decrease in the number of failures. This 
decrease would be expected to tail off as the toughness increases and 
vulnerability to brittle fracture is minimised. The effect is due to the decreasing 
influence of the gouged dent failure probability as the toughness is increased 
(calculated by equations (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3)). From the gouged dent limit state 
function, equation (2.16), an increase in toughness increases the value of dent 
depth required to cause a gouged dent failure. From the dent depth Weibull 
distribution (Figure 2.9), deeper dents are less likely to occur; therefore the 
gouged dent failure probability is decreased. Note that the leak / rupture 
boundary and gouge failure probability are unaffected by an increase in 
toughness, the flow stress dependent NG-18 equations (equations (3.2) and 
(3.4)) have no toughness dependency. 
 
5.3 The Re-Rounding Model 
 
In the Modified PIE model, the BGDGFM is used to produce a limit state 
function for the failure of a gouged dent.  
 
As explained in section 3.1.2.1, the BGDGFM is a semi-empirical model 
formulated using fracture mechanics theory and the results of experimental 
burst tests of gouged dent defects. In the burst tests used to calibrate the 
model, the dent damage was introduced and measured with the pipeline at zero 
pressure. The dent depth used in the BGDGFM is therefore defined as the dent 
depth in an unpressurised pipeline.  
 
The dent depth recorded in the UKOPA Fault Database however, is (in most 
cases) the dent depth measured at pressure. Therefore, given that it was 
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derived using the UKOPA Fault data, the dent depth Weibull probability 
distribution used in the Modified PIE model will refer to dent depth at pressure. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that the use of the BGDGFM in the Modified PIE 
model may produce non-conservative predictions of the behaviour of damage 
recorded during operation. 
 
It was noted in section 3.1.2.1 that if an assessment of a gouged dent defect is 
required for which the dent depth was measured when the pipeline was 
pressurised, a re-rounding correction must be applied to the dent depth before 
the BGDGFM can be applied. The Cosham failure frequency model described 
in Chapter 2 acknowledges the potential for non-conservative predictions with 
the BGDGFM and applies a re-rounding correction factor developed by the 
EPRG and given by equation (2.82): 
 
ܪ ൌ 1.43ܪ௉  
 
Where H is the dent depth in the unpressurised pipeline (in mm) and HP is the 
dent depth in the pressurised pipeline (in mm). 
 
The above relationship is considered to improve the accuracy of calculations 
made using the BGDGFM for damage recorded during operation. The 
relationship has therefore been added to the Modified PIE model as the second 
stage in the construction of AFFECT. This version of the model will be referred 
to as the “Re-Rounding model”. 
 
In the Modified PIE model the dent depth required to cause a gouged dent to 
fail is calculated using equation (2.16). This value is then used in the calculation 
of the probability of failure. In the Re-Rounding model, the dent depth calculated 
by equation (2.16) is first transformed to an equivalent, pressurised dent depth 
using equation (2.82) before being used to calculate the probability of failure. 
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5.4 Re-Rounding Model Results 
 
Estimated pipeline failure frequency values have been calculated using the Re-
Rounding model for the six example pipeline cases listed in Table 5.1. As for 
the Modified PIE model, the leak, rupture and total failure frequency has been 
calculated. 
 
The variation in leak, rupture and total failure frequency with wall thickness for 
example no.1 in Table 5.1, is shown in Figure 5.5. The variation in leak, rupture 
and total failure frequency with wall thickness for example no.4, is shown in 
Figure 5.6. Equivalent charts for the remaining examples are included in 
Appendix A . 
 
A comparison between total failure frequency values for examples 1, 2, and 3 
as calculated by the Re-Rounding model and the Modified PIE model, is shown 
in Figure 5.7. A similar comparison between total failure frequency values 
calculated for examples 4, 5 and 6 is shown in Figure 5.8. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Re-Rounding Model, for Example 1 
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Figure 5.6: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Re-Rounding Model, for Example 4 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
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Figure 5.8: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the PIE Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
 
Based on the results, the following observations can be made regarding 
estimations of pipeline failure frequency made by the Re-Rounding model. 
 
A direct comparison between the results calculated for each example using the 
Modified PIE model and the Re-Rounding model indicates that the Re-
Rounding model estimates higher values of failure frequency. The use of the re-
rounding relationship given by equation (2.82) lowers the value of the dent 
depth required to cause a gouged dent failure. From the dent depth Weibull 
distribution (Figure 2.9), shallower dents are more likely to occur; therefore the 
overall probability of failure is increased. 
 
The leak and rupture failure frequencies for each example follow an identical 
trend to that shown by the Modified PIE model. From the leak / rupture limit 
state function (equation (2.72)), the leak / rupture boundary is determined by the 
gouge length. Gouge length is not affected by the introduction of equation (2.82) 
to the model; therefore a change in the relative significance of leak and rupture 
failure frequencies would not be expected. 
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The effect on the estimated failure frequency of introducing equation (2.82) to 
the model decreases with increasing material toughness (Charpy 2/3 v-notch 
impact energy). A deeper dent is required as the toughness increases, therefore 
the effect of dent depth (and therefore equation (2.82)) on the failure frequency 
decreases as the toughness increases. 
 
5.5 The Dent Force Model 
 
In the Modified PIE and Re-Rounding models the dent depth probability 
distribution is based upon an analysis of all dent depth data in the 2005 UKOPA 
Fault Database.  
 
A dent is a deformation in the shape of the pipe; therefore its dimensions will be 
influenced by the pipe geometry in a way that gouge defects are not.  
 
A probability distribution derived from a dent damage database will not only be 
influenced by the size of the dents but also by the geometry of the pipelines in 
the database. 
 
A more desirable situation would be to remove the influence of pipe geometry 
from the dent depth distribution, allowing more accurate values of probability to 
be calculated in the case of a specific pipeline. 
 
This issue is addressed by the FFREQ, PIPIN, and Cosham failure frequency 
models described in Chapter 2, which take into account the resistance of a pipe 
to denting. The probability of failure of a gouged dent in these models is 
determined from the force required to cause the dent, rather than the dent 
depth.  
 
In the PIPIN and Cosham models22 the dent force is incorporated into the 
gouged dent limit state function, through the use of a semi-empirical relationship 
                                            
22 In FFREQ the exact implementation is unknown (section 2.3.5). 
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developed by the EPRG (Corder, 1995b) which relates it to dent depth 
(equation (2.83)): 
 
ܨௗ௘௡௧ ൌ 0.49√ܴ݁ݏܪ௉଴.ସଶ  
 
Where Fdent is the dent force (in kN) and Res (in N1/2mm) is defined using: 
  
ܴ݁ݏ ൌ ඥܮߪ௒ݐ ቀݐ ൅ ଴.଻௉஽ଵ଴ఙೆቁ       (5.4) 
 
Where L is the length of the excavator tooth (in mm), assumed by both models 
to be 80 mm. Documentation relating to the development of the Cosham model 
indicates that this assumption is consistent with a paper by Linkens (Linkens, 
1998; Cosham, 2007). The use of a relationship such as that given by equations 
(2.83) and (5.4), allows dent force to be introduced as a random variable in 
place of the dent depth.  
 
The use of a dent force variable would remove the influence of pipe geometry 
and provide a more realistic calculation of the gouged dent failure probability. A 
dent force variable has therefore been substituted for the dent depth variable in 
the Re-Rounding model as the third stage in the construction of AFFECT. This 
version of the model will be referred to as the “Dent Force model”. 
 
In the Re-Rounding model, pressurised dent depth is calculated using 
equations (2.16) and (2.82) before the dent depth Weibull probability distribution 
(Figure 2.9) is used to calculate dent depth probability. In the Dent Force model, 
the EPRG relationship given by equations (2.83) and (5.4) is used to transform 
the pressurised dent depth calculated by equations (2.16) and (2.82) into a dent 
force. A dent force Weibull distribution is then used to calculate dent force 
probability. In order to be consistent with the Cosham and PIPIN models the 
tooth length assumption of 80 mm from those models has been retained.  
 
In principle, the dent force distribution can be derived from the dent depth 
distribution. For a specific pipeline the quantities, P, D, t, σY and σU are constant, 
therefore from equations (2.83) and (5.4) and the definitions of Weibull 
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probability distributions given in section 2.2.1.3 (equations (2.17), (2.18), (2.19), 
(2.20) and (2.21)): 
 
ு݂ሺܪሻ݀ܪ ൌ ி݂೏೐೙೟ሺܨௗ௘௡௧ሻ݀ܨௗ௘௡௧      (5.5) 
 
׬ ு݂ሺܪሻ݀ܪு଴ ൌ ׬ ி݂೏೐೙೟ሺܨௗ௘௡௧ሻ݀ܨௗ௘௡௧
ி೏೐೙೟ሺுሻ
଴     (5.6) 
 
ܨሺܪሻ ൌ ܨሺܨௗ௘௡௧ሺܪሻሻ        (5.7) 
 
ܴ௫ሺܪሻ ൌ ܴ௫ሺܨௗ௘௡௧ሺܪሻሻ       (5.8) 
 
For the Dent Force model however, the dent force distribution from the PIPIN 
and Cosham models has been used. The parameters for this distribution are 
taken from the independent review of the QRA for the onshore pipeline of the 
Corrib Field Development Project conducted by Advantica (Acton, 2006; 
Cosham, 2007). 
 
In the Dent Force model the dent depth random variable has been replaced with 
a dent force variable, however all other random variables remain unchanged 
from the Modified PIE and Re-Rounding models. The parameters defining the 
cumulative probability distributions in the Dent Force model are therefore 
identical to those used in the Cosham Model and are given in Table 2.15. The 
total probability of failure for gouged dents is expressed using equation (2.86) 
from the Cosham model, rather than equation (5.1): 
 
݌௚௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿஶ଴ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ  
 
Where dcritBGDGFM is given by equation (2.87); the subscript F denotes the use of 
the dent force distribution; and the value of Fcrit is dependent on d and 
calculated using equations (2.16), (2.82), (2.83) and (5.4). 
 
Similarly, the probability of a gouged dent failing as a leak and a gouged dent 
failing as a rupture are given by equations (2.88) and (2.89), rather than 
equations (5.2) and (5.3): 
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݌௚௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿ௅೎ೝ೔೟଴ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ 
  
݌௚௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ଶ݂௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿஶ௅೎ೝ೔೟ . ቂ׬ ௗ݂ሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ 
  
The critical length of the gouged dent gouge in equations (2.88) and (2.89) is 
the same as that used in the both the PIE and Cosham models, equation (2.72). 
 
5.6 Dent Force Model Results 
 
Estimated pipeline failure frequency values have been calculated using the 
Dent Force model for the 6 example pipeline cases listed in Table 5.1. As 
before, leak, rupture and total failure frequency has been calculated. 
 
A comparison between total failure frequency values for example 1 as 
calculated by the Dent Force model, Re-Rounding model and the Modified PIE 
model, is shown in Figure 5.9. A similar comparison between total failure 
frequency values for example 4 is shown in Figure 5.10. Equivalent charts for 
the remaining examples are included in Appendix A . 
 
A comparison between total failure frequency values for examples 1, 2, and 3 
as calculated by the Dent Force model and the Re-Rounding model, is shown in 
Figure 5.11. A similar comparison between total failure frequency values 
calculated for examples 4, 5 and 6 is shown in Figure 5.12. 
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Figure 5.9: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 1 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 4 
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Figure 5.11: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model and the Re-Rounding Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model and the Re-Rounding Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
 
Based on the results, the following observations can be made regarding 
estimations of pipeline failure frequency made by the Dent Force model. 
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A direct comparison between the results calculated for each example using the 
Modified PIE model, Re-Rounding model and the Dent Force model indicates 
that the Dent Force model estimates lower values of failure frequency for high 
wall thicknesses and higher values of failure frequency for lower wall 
thicknesses. The use of the dent force distribution in the model allows the effect 
of the specific pipeline geometry being considered to have more influence on 
the probability of failure. The dent depth in thick pipe is smaller than in thin pipe 
resulting in a lower failure frequency. 
 
The effect on estimated failure frequency of introducing the dent force 
distribution to the model decreases with increasing material toughness (Charpy 
2/3 v-notch impact energy). The effect is due to the decreasing influence of the 
gouged dent failure probability as the toughness is increased (calculated by 
equations (2.86), (2.88) and (2.89)), as noted in the last paragraph of section 
5.2. As with the Re-Rounding model the introduction of the dent force 
distribution to the model affects only the gouged dent failure probability. The 
influence of the changes which this model makes to the failure frequency are 
reduced as the influence of the gouged dent failure probability is reduced. 
 
5.7 The New Distributions Model 
 
Alongside the conclusions stated at the beginning of this chapter, a conclusion 
was also made in Chapter 3 regarding the use of historical operational data in 
the development of AFFECT. It was concluded that the most recent UKOPA 
Fault Database is the most appropriate source of historical operational data to 
use for the model. 
 
In 2010 UKOPA commissioned Penspen to update the probability distributions 
and Incident-Rates for the FFREQ failure frequency model, as detailed in 
section 2.7 (Goodfellow, 2012). An assessment of the 2009 UKOPA Fault 
Database was performed by Penspen for this purpose. It was noted in section 
2.7 that despite the fact that the motivation was to provide an update to FFREQ, 
the particular probability distributions and Incident-Rate derived by Penspen are 
actually more suited to the PIE model (and by extension the AFFECT model). 
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In comparison to the values used by the Modified PIE model, the Re-Rounding 
model and the Dent Force model, the updated Penspen parameters take into 
account four additional years of historical operational data related to pipeline 
mechanical damage23. On the basis of the conclusion from Chapter 3, they are 
therefore considered to be a more accurate representation of the occurrence 
and size of mechanical damage. Taking this into consideration the updated 
parameters have been substituted for the Incident-Rate and probability 
distributions used in the Re-Rounding model as the fourth stage in the 
construction of AFFECT. This version of the model will be referred to as the 
New Distributions model. It should be noted that the changes have been made 
to the Re-Rounding model (the second stage in the construction of AFFECT) 
rather than the Dent Force model (the third stage) as the 2010 Penspen 
analysis fitted only a dent depth distribution from the UKOPA Fault Database 
and dent force was not considered. A corresponding update to the dent force 
distribution is considered in Chapter 7. It is also noted that the updated 
Penspen Incident-Rate refers to pipelines located in R-type areas only. The 
original PIE Model Incident-Rate used in the Modified PIE, Re-Rounding and 
Dent Force models made no distinction between S-type and R-type areas. The 
New Distributions model and subsequent models using this Incident-Rate are 
therefore applicable only to rural pipelines. In order apply the model to pipelines 
located in S-type areas a factor must be applied to the Incident-Rate, as 
explained in the discussion in section 2.8. Further details are given in section 
7.7. 
 
The updated Incident-Rate used in the New Distributions model is given in 
Table 2.16. The parameters defining the probability distributions are given in 
Table 2.17. The distributions are shown in comparison with those from the 
Modified PIE / Re-Rounding models in Figure 5.13, Figure 5.14 and Figure 
5.15. In considering the probabilities that mechanical damage will be a gouge or 
a gouged dent, no analysis regarding this aspect was performed by Penspen. 
The values therefore remain unchanged from the Modified PIE / Re-Rounding 
models. 
                                            
23 The PIE model uses the 2005 UKOPA Fault Database as a source of 
historical operational data. 
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Figure 5.13: Gouge Length Distribution, Modified PIE / Re-Rounding and 
Penspen Comparison 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Gouge Depth Distribution, Modified PIE / Re-Rounding and 
Penspen Comparison 
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Figure 5.15: Dent Depth Distribution, Modified PIE / Re-Rounding and 
Penspen Comparison 
 
5.8 New Distributions Model Results 
 
Estimated pipeline failure frequency values have been calculated using the New 
Distributions model for the six example pipeline cases listed in Table 5.1. As 
before, leak, rupture and total failure frequency has been calculated. 
 
A comparison between total failure frequency values for example 1 as 
calculated by the New Distributions model, Dent Force model, Re-Rounding 
model and the Modified PIE model, is shown in Figure 5.16. A similar 
comparison between total failure frequency values for example 4 is shown in 
Figure 5.17. Equivalent charts for the remaining examples are included in 
Appendix A . 
 
A comparison between total failure frequency values for examples 1, 2, and 3 
as calculated by the New Distributions model and the analogous Re-Rounding 
model, is shown in Figure 5.18. A similar comparison between total failure 
frequency values calculated for examples 4, 5 and 6 is shown in Figure 5.19. 
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Figure 5.16: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the 
Modified PIE Model for Example 1 
 
 
Figure 5.17: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the 
Modified PIE Model for Example 4 
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Figure 5.18: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model and the Re-Rounding Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure 5.19: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model and the Re-Rounding Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
 
Based on the results, the following observations can be made regarding 
estimations of pipeline failure frequency made by the New Distributions model. 
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A direct comparison between the results calculated for each example using the 
Modified PIE Model, the Re-Rounding model, the Dent Force model and the 
New Distributions model indicates that the New Distributions model generally 
estimates higher values of failure frequency than the other models. Values are 
observed to drop slightly below the Re-Rounding model for higher wall 
thicknesses in the high pressure examples (1, 2 and 3) for the two lowest 
material toughnesses. The Dent Force model is also seen to estimate slightly 
higher values than the New Distributions model for the lowest wall thicknesses 
in the low pressure example with the lowest material toughness (example 4). 
 
The effect on estimated failure frequency of introducing the new parameters to 
the model shows an increase with increasing material toughness (Charpy 2/3 v-
notch impact energy). This effect is due to the differences between the Modified 
PIE / Re-Rounding and Penspen distributions observed in Figure 5.13, Figure 
5.14 and Figure 5.15 and the decreasing influence of the gouged dent failure 
probability as the toughness is increased (as noted in the last paragraph of 
section 5.2). For the examples considered, the majority of the gouge failures 
integrated within equation (2.84) have depths above approximately 6 mm. 
These gouges reside in the region of Figure 5.14 where the Penspen 
distribution probability exceeds the Modified PIE / Re-Rounding distribution 
probability meaning that the overall gouge failure probability is higher for the 
New Distributions model than the Re-Rounding model. Using similar arguments 
it can be shown that the overall gouged dent probability is higher for the Re-
Rounding model than the New Distributions model. At lower toughnesses, 
where the gouged dent probability has more influence, the differences cancel 
for the most part. This can be seen in the very similar estimations of failure 
frequency in the high pressure examples with the two lowest material 
toughnesses. In the low pressure examples, the difference in gouge depth 
failure probability between the Penspen and Modified PIE / Re-Rounding 
distributions is larger, which is seen as an increase in the New Distributions 
model estimations over the Re-Rounding model. As toughness is increased the 
gouged dent failure probability reduces but the gouge failure probability is 
unaffected. The Re-Rounding model, with its higher gouged dent failure 
probabilities, therefore shows a large drop off with toughness whilst the New 
Distributions model is affected to a much lesser extent. 
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5.9 Development of AFFECT (Part 1) Conclusions 
 
This chapter has charted the first four stages in the construction of AFFECT, a 
failure frequency model for dense phase carbon dioxide pipelines based upon 
probabilistic structural reliability methods. The AFFECT model has been 
developed by making modifications to the PIE model, a basic failure frequency 
model which uses appropriate failure models identified in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. The modifications made in this chapter consider damage modelling; 
operational data and calculation methods. Table 5.2 summarises the basis and 
benefits of each discrete stage in the model development; a flow chart showing 
the progression of the model is shown in Figure 5.20. 
 
Each of the modifications addressed is considered to provide improvement to 
the PIE model. The Modified PIE model improves the probability of failure 
calculations. The Re-Rounding model and the Dent Force model provide 
improvement in defining failure limit states by modelling pipeline mechanical 
damage in a more accurate way, allowing for damage in thicker walled 
pipelines, in particular, to be modelled more appropriately. The New 
Distributions model provides improvement to the probability distributions 
describing the nature of pipeline mechanical damage. 
 
Model Basis / Development Benefits 
Modified PIE 
Structural reliability model based upon a simplified 
version of the British Gas methodology. Updated 
with calculations from the Cosham model. 
Use of most appropriate models for leak / rupture, 
gouge failure and gouged dent failure. Probability of 
failure calculated accurately 
Re-Rounding As Modified PIE model but with EPRG dent re-rounding equation Dent depth is modelled more accurately 
Dent Force 
As Re-Rounding model but with EPRG dent force 
equation used to derive dent force distribution in 
place of dent depth 
Denting modelled more accurately, dependence on 
geometry is removed 
New Distributions As Re-Rounding model but with updated distributions Distributions up to date as of 2009 
Table 5.2: Summary of the Basis and Benefits of the First Four Stages in 
the Construction of AFFECT 
 
Following the modifications made for the New Distributions model, the next 
logical stage in the construction of AFFECT is an update to the dent force 
distribution using recent operational data. In this way the improvements 
introduced in The Dent Force model can be combined with those from the New 
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Distributions model. In the absence of any existing studies providing a new dent 
force distribution an analysis of the most recent UKOPA Fault Database must 
be performed in order to derive the updated distribution.  
 
An analysis of the UKOPA Fault Database also allows the number of random 
variables used in the AFFECT model to be investigated. In Chapter 2 it was 
highlighted that the original Hazard Analysis model, FFREQ and PIPIN all 
assumed the gouge length and gouge depth variables to be separate to those 
for gouged dent gouge length and gouged dent gouge depth. In the PIE and 
Cosham models and the updated Penspen distributions the variables were 
consolidated. The importance in determining the correct approach was noted in 
the discussion in section 2.8 and will provide scope for an additional stage in 
the construction for the AFFECT model. 
 
At the time of writing the most recent UKOPA Fault Database is 2010. The 
analysis of the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database is detailed in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 5.20: The First Four Stages in the Construction of AFFECT 
  
 
Modified 
PIE 
Model 
Re-
Rounding  
Model 
  
New 
Distributions 
Model 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM 
Incident-Rate:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent-Gouge Probability:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge length: PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge depth:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Depth:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM + RR 
Incident-Rate: PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent-Gouge Probability:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Length:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Depth:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Depth:   PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent 
Force 
Model 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM + RR + DF 
Incident-Rate:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent-Gouge Probability:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Length: PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Depth:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Force:   PIPIN / Cosham Models 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM + RR 
Incident-Rate:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
Dent-Gouge Probability:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Length:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Depth:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Depth:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
 
Key 
 
NG-18 – Flow stress dependent NG-18 equations 
 
BGDGFM – British Gas dent-gouge fracture model 
 
PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) – Derived by PIE using 
2005 UKOPA Fault Database 
 
RR – EPRG re-rounding equation 
 
DF – EPRG dent force equation 
 
PIPIN / Cosham Models – Taken from the PIPIN / 
Cosham Models 
 
Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) – Derived by Penspen 
using 2009 UKOPA Fault Database  
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Chapter 6. An Assessment of the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database 
 
Details of historical operational damage and failures caused by external 
interference are recorded in the UKOPA Pipeline Fault Database (Anon., 
2011c). This chapter presents a detailed filtering and assessment process of 
the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database. The data has been provided by UKOPA for 
use in the development of the AFFECT model. 
 
The aims of this chapter are: firstly, to derive from the UKOPA Fault Database 
suitable pipeline damage data sets to which probability distributions for dent 
force, gouge depth and gouge length can be fitted and used in the AFFECT 
model; and secondly to provide a comprehensive statistical analysis of the 
database in order to identify trends and assist in the refinement of the model. 
 
6.1 Description of the UKOPA Fault Database 
 
The UKOPA Pipeline Fault Database contains details of pipeline faults and 
failures which have been subject to an excavation and on-site assessment 
dating back to 1962. The database covers approximately 23,000 km of gas and 
liquid pipelines (both operating and decommissioned) in the UK. It includes 
information about the affected pipeline including its external diameter, wall 
thickness, steel grade, operating pressure and the specific component affected. 
For the fault, its type, date of discovery, orientation and the extent of the 
damage are recorded. In line with other recognised pipeline databases, the 
cause of the fault is stated, including comments providing additional information. 
The UKOPA Fault Database is unique in that it also contains detailed 
information on the size of pipeline defects, both for cases of part-wall damage 
and through-wall failures, which have resulted in a of loss of containment. 
 
6.1.1 Data Requirements for the AFFECT Model 
 
The causes of pipeline faults recorded within the UKOPA Fault Database 
include construction damage, external interference, corrosion, material and 
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welding defects (Anon., 2011c; McConnell, 2011). Given that AFFECT is a 
model for calculating the failure frequency due to third party external 
interference, only the faults resulting from external interference damage are of 
concern. 
 
The data required from the UKOPA Fault Database for the development of the 
AFFECT model includes: 
 
 The total number of external interference damage incidents; 
 The operating parameters for the pipelines affected in each damage 
incident; 
 The type of the damage caused in each incident; 
 The size of the damage caused in each incident; 
  
In addition to the total operational exposure of pipelines covered by UKOPA, 
this data allows derivation of: the Incident-Rate24, the probability that external 
interference damage will be a gouge or a gouged dent; and probability 
distributions for each of the random variables in the model. 
 
Regarding the “type of the damage”, in line with its basis in the PIE and 
Cosham models, AFFECT considers the probability of failure due to part-wall 
and through-wall damage from gouges and gouged dents only. As noted in 
Chapter 2, external interference damage to branch pipes or fittings; or due to 
drilling operations in-error, can in some cases result in a pipeline failure. These 
types of pipeline failure are not considered to be the same as failure of part-wall 
and through-wall gouges and gouged dents. Data from the UKOPA Fault 
Database relating to these types of failure must not be included in any 
derivations relating to gouge and gouged dent damage. It is therefore important 
to determine the mode of failure from the UKOPA Fault Database in order to 
ensure that AFFECT is constructed correctly.  
 
                                            
24 Note however that in this analysis a new value for Incident-Rate has not been 
derived. The value derived in the Penspen analysis is considered to be perfectly 
adequate. 
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In order to incorporate failures from branches and fittings and drilling operations 
in-error into a failure frequency model either separate branch / fitting failure and 
drill puncture models must be developed; or an additional historical data 
component (see section 2.2.2) is required. The development of such 
components for AFFECT has not been considered as part of this work. 
 
The “size of the damage” relates to the measured damage dimensions which 
are random variables in the model. The important dimensions for gouge 
damage are the gouge length and gouge depth. The important dimensions for 
gouged dent damage are the dent depth, gouge length and gouge depth. Dent 
force can be derived from the dent depth using equations (2.83) and (5.4). 
Information taken from the UKOPA Fault Database allows probability 
distributions to be derived for each damage dimension of importance. 
 
6.1.2 Overview of External Interference Damage Data 
 
A detailed review of the damage and failure data recorded within the UKOPA 
Fault Database as being due to external interference has been carried out. A 
summary of the “type of damage” category as described in section 6.1.1 
following this review is given in Table 6.1. A complete description of the review 
process is included in Appendix B . 
 
It is noted that due to non-standardised methods of data reporting and a wide 
variety of contributing sources, much of the information recorded within the 
UKOPA Fault Database is uncertain or non-specific, particularly regarding the 
type of damage. The row headings listed in Table 6.1 are not taken directly 
taken from the database, but rather the data has been categorised using 
judgement based upon the available information.  
 
Table 6.1 indicates which damage records within the database can be used in 
the development of the AFFECT model. Where the term “Damage” is used, this 
refers to either gouge, dent or gouged dent damage. This subdivision is 
explored further in section 6.2. Note that damage to pipeline components other 
than the pipe body or bends are not included (damage to branches and fittings). 
 194 
 
As previously noted the AFFECT model is not applicable to these components. 
Damage to the pipeline within operator compounds is also not included. These 
areas are not accessible to the general public and the damage does not qualify 
as third party external interference. Damage classed as “coating damage” is 
considered to be superficial and cannot be considered as dent, gouge or 
gouged dent damage. Unknown damage has not been included due to a lack of 
information associated with those records. Table 6.1 also includes a category 
for “not external interference”. Damage within this category was recorded as 
“external interference” in the database but a review of the available information 
subsequently highlighted this to not be the case. This data has not been used in 
the development of the AFFECT model. 
 
Table 6.1 also includes a column indicating that 307 of the total 1292 recorded 
external interference damage records contained no information on the 
dimensions of the damage. With regards to the AFFECT model, only damage 
data with recorded dimensions is included in the derivation of the probability 
distributions. It is noted however, that where impact damage is recorded without 
damage dimensions, the data can still be taken into account in determining the 
probability that external interference damage will be a gouge or a gouged dent. 
Furthermore, if an impact is recorded but specific dent or gouge damage to the 
pipe wall does not occur, the data remains adequate for inclusion into the 
Incident-Rate. 
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Description of damage No. Of Defects 
No. w/out 
dimensions Comments 
Not external interference 64 13 Not included in derivations from dent and gouge data 
Coating damage to pipe/bend 104 23 May be used to adjust Incident-Rate 
Damage to pipe/bend 932 222 
Only data with recorded dimensions can be used for 
probability distributions. Otherwise, gouge/gouged dent 
probability only 
Damage to pipe/bend with corrosion 29 4 As above 
Damage to weld on pipe/bend 7 2 As above 
“Leak” of pipe/bend 24 7 As above. 10 separate incidents. 
“Fracture” of pipe/bend 13 2 As above. 7 separate incidents. 
Drill damage to pipe/bend 21 1 As above 
Drill “leak” of pipe/bend 7 1 Not included in derivations from dent and gouge data and require a separate treatment 
Damage to above ground or within complex pipe/bend 33 9 Not included in derivations from dent and gouge data 
Damage to tee, weldolet, sleeve, valve, branch, dome 
end etc. 35 10 
Not included in derivations from dent and gouge data. 
Failures require a separate treatment. 
Unknown damage incidents to pipe/bend/weld 17 10 Not included in derivations from dent and gouge data 
Unknown “leak”/”fracture” on pipe/bend 1 1 Not included in derivations from dent and gouge data and require a separate treatment. 
Damage to unknown components 5 2 Not included in derivations from dent and gouge data 
Total 1292 307  
Table 6.1: Overview of External Interference Damage and Failure Data 
 
6.2 Damage Data 
 
As noted in section 6.1.1, the damage data of primary interest in the 
development of the AFFECT model is that concerning gouges and gouged 
dents. Probability distributions must be derived relating to the damage 
dimensions. Damage dimensions are recorded for each record within the 
UKOPA Fault Database, giving the length, width and depth of a particular 
incident. Dents and gouges within the database have separate records, each 
with their own set of dimensions. Each record also has a “defect number” and a 
“fault number”. The “defect number” is simply an individual identifier for each 
damage record contained within the database. The “fault number” is a group 
identifier assigned to one or more defects located on the same pipeline, in close 
proximity to each other, and discovered during the same excavation. A dent 
record may be associated with a gouge record by the “fault number”. Due to the 
uncertain nature of the information within the UKOPA Fault Database it has 
conservatively been assumed that a dent and gouge sharing the same “fault 
number” can be classed as gouged dent damage. Gouge records which do not 
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share a “fault number” with a dent record have been classed as gouge damage 
and dent records which do not share a “fault number” with a gouge record have 
been classed as dent damage. 
 
An assessment of the dent depth, gouge depth and gouge length data is made 
in this chapter in order to determine which of the records contained within the 
database are appropriate for the derivation of damage dimension probability 
distributions. Discussion is also made regarding trends within the data. The 
dimensions are considered directly as recorded from the UKOPA Fault 
Database, however considering the level of uncertainty within the database, it is 
likely some error exists. 
 
The database classifies pipeline failures simply as “dents” or “gouges”. As noted 
in section 6.1.1 pipeline failures from branches and fittings and drilling 
operations in-error must not be included in any derivations relating to gouge and 
gouged dent damage. Damage to branches and fittings is easily identified by an 
“affected component” field included in the database. This data is not included in 
the following assessments. A specific identifier relating to drilling however does 
not exist; and failures caused by drilling are grouped together with other pipeline 
damage and classified as “dent” or “gouge”. Judgement must therefore be 
made as to whether drilling was the cause of the failure. In the following 
assessments, all damage data relating to the pipe or bend, either in the pipe 
body or on a weld is included. For this reason pipe or bend failures caused by 
drilling are included in the assessment, despite the fact that they must be 
excluded from any subsequent derivations. The classification of drilling failures 
is addressed in section 6.3. 
 
6.2.1 Dents 
 
As described in section 2.1.1, a dent is a plastic deformation of the pipe profile, 
which causes a concentration of stress and therefore reduces the pressure at 
which the pipe may fail. There are 107 external interference dents to pipe or a 
bend recorded within the UKOPA Fault Database. Two of the dents were 
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recorded as being associated with the coating only, as a result these have been 
removed from the assessment.  
 
Of the remaining 105 dents, 85 are recorded with associated gouges, five are 
recorded with associated gouges and corrosion25, and five are recorded with 
associated gouges and lead to a pipeline failure (“leak” or “fracture”); ten of the 
dents are considered to be plain dents (with no associated gouge). 
 
Of the 105 dents, only 66 have a recorded dent depth. Figure 6.1 shows the 
depths of these dents, plotted against the wall thickness of the pipeline in which 
they occurred, in terms of their measured depth. Figure 6.2 shows the depths in 
terms of the percentage of the pipeline’s external diameter (%OD). 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Dent Depth (mm) vs. Wall Thickness 
 
                                            
25 Corrosion develops as a result of damage to the pipeline coating when the 
dent occurs. It can add to the damage severity by increasing the size of any 
associated gouging. 
 198 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Dent Depth (%OD) vs. Wall Thickness 
 
The deepest dent in the database is a dent associated with a gouge. This dent 
was located in a pipeline of wall thickness 15.9 mm and external diameter 610 
mm. The dent was recorded to be 58 mm deep or 9.5 %OD, with an associated 
gouge of 1.5 mm deep. The deepest dent, relative to pipeline external diameter, 
in the database is a dent associated with a gouge and corrosion. This dent was 
located in a pipeline of wall thickness 4 mm and external diameter 76 mm. The 
dent was recorded to be 20 mm deep or 26.3 %OD. The associated 
gouge/corrosion does not have a recorded depth.  
 
The deepest recorded plain dent was located in a pipeline of wall thickness 6.4 
mm and external diameter 450 mm. The dent was recorded to be 17 mm deep 
or 3.8 %OD.  
 
The dent associated with a pipeline failure (“leak”) was located in a pipeline of 
wall thickness 7.1 mm and external diameter 218 mm. The dent was recorded 
to be 25 mm deep or 11.5 %OD, with an associated gouge of 7.1 mm. The 
failure was caused by an excavator. 
 
Table 6.2 summarises six significant dents in the database. 
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Description 
Operating 
Pressure 
(barg) 
Pipe 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Dent 
Length 
(mm) 
Dent 
Width 
(mm) 
Dent 
Depth 
(mm) 
Dent 
Depth 
(%OD) 
Fault Comment 
Plain Dent 7 450 6.4 210 120 17 3.8 TWO DENTS: #2 ENTERED AS GOUGE 
Dent with gouge 17 610 15.9 1400 320 58 9.5 DENT&SPALLING. FALLING MASONRY 
Dent with gouge 6.5 610 7.9 700 250 42 6.9 DMGE BY IMPACT CORE DRILL 
Dent with gouge 50 450 11.1 160 110 33 7.3 INTERF/BOREHOLE SURVEY/W.MAIN 
Dent with gouge (corrosion) 14 76 4 50 50 20 26.3 DENT & EXT. CORROSION     OLI4 
Dent with gouge (leak) 6.9 218 7.1 133 133 25 11.5 Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Note: The dents highlighted in yellow were caused by drilling machines 
Table 6.2: Summary of Significant Dents 
 
Note that in Table 6.2 the plain dent record refers to “Two dents: #2 entered as 
a gouge”, in this case the comment has been used to reclassify the type of 
damage from gouge to dent and this has been included in the above totals. 
 
Figure 6.2 shows that the maximum depth of dents, relative to the pipeline 
external diameter, decreases with increasing wall thickness. This is an expected 
trend as pipeline external diameter typically increases with wall thickness 
whereas the machinery (in terms of impact force delivered) involved in creating 
pipeline denting will be the same regardless of the pipeline they are hitting. 
From Figure 6.1 it is clear that the majority of dents are below 30 mm deep 
suggesting that the typical machinery working in the vicinity of pipelines is 
capable of delivering a force large enough to cause a maximum dent depth of 
30 mm. Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 6.2, of the three dents with 
depths greater than 30 mm, two were caused by powerful drilling machines 
capable of delivering a sustained force to the pipeline, rather than an 
instantaneous impact; and one was caused by falling masonry, which is an 
atypical damage mechanism. Both Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 appear to show 
that the depth of dents decreases significantly for pipelines subject to external 
interference with a wall thickness in excess of 8 mm. This suggests that thicker 
walled pipelines are more difficult to dent. It should be noted however that 
substantially fewer dents occurred in pipelines with wall thicknesses greater 
than 8 mm. 
 
On the basis of the above assessment it is concluded that the 66 dents with a 
recorded depth dimension are suitable for the derivation of a probability 
distribution to be used in the AFFECT model. 
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6.2.2 Gouges 
 
As described in section 2.1.1, a gouge is a loss of material which results in a 
reduction of wall thickness, which may include crack like defects.  
 
There are 1027 external interference gouges to a pipe or bend recorded within 
the UKOPA Fault Database. 99 of the gouges were recorded as being 
associated with the coating only, as a result these have been removed from the 
following assessment.  
 
Of the remaining 928 gouges, 194 are recorded as being associated with 
dents26. Of these 194, 15 are recorded with associated corrosion27, 15 lead to a 
pipeline failure (“leak” or “fracture”) and six have been classified as being 
caused by drilling. 
 
734 of the gouges are recorded with no associated dent. Of these, nine are 
recorded with associated corrosion, 20 were caused by drilling and 24 lead to a 
pipeline failure (seven of the 24 failures were caused by drilling). 
 
In terms of dimensions, the severity of a part-wall gouge is a function of its 
depth as a proportion of wall thickness, and length as a multiple of external 
pipeline radius. 
 
6.2.2.1 Gouge Depth 
 
Of the 928 gouges, only 596 have a recorded gouge depth which is sensible28. 
Of these, 110 are recorded as being associated with dents and 486 are 
recorded with no associated dent. 
                                            
26 Some dents are associated with multiple gouges. 
27 Corrosion develops as a result of damage to the pipeline coating when the gouge occurs. It 
can add to the damage severity by increasing the size of the gouge over time. 
28 16 gouges have a recorded gouge depth which exceeds the pipeline wall thickness, nine as a 
result of the wall thickness being omitted from the database and one with a potentially 
erroneous depth of 99 mm. The remainder are gouges associated with dents, possibly 
suggesting that gouge depths have been recorded as a combination of dent depth and gouge 
depth.  
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Figure 6.3 shows the depths of these gouges, plotted against the wall thickness 
of the pipeline in which they occurred in terms of their measured depth. Gouge 
depth frequency is shown in Figure 6.4. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Gouge Depth vs. Wall Thickness 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Gouge Depth Frequency 
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Pipeline failures caused by drilling have been explicitly shown in Figure 6.3. As 
noted in section 6.1.1 these defects are not considered to be the same as 
failure of severe part-wall or through-wall gouges in the context of the AFFECT 
model. A drill will deliver a sustained boring action to the pipe wall, whereas 
typical gouges are metal loss defects caused by an instantaneous transmission 
of energy when machinery accidentally strikes a pipeline. Consequently, the 
chances of a failure resulting from a drill puncture are not reduced in thicker wall 
pipelines in the same way as typical gouges. Failures as a result of this damage 
mechanism are considered to be wall thickness independent. 
 
The deepest recorded gouge in the database was a through-wall failure located 
in a pipeline of wall thickness 10.3 mm and external diameter 457 mm. This 
gouge was not associated with a dent. The failure either occurred during a 
welded sleeve repair or was repaired by a welded sleeve (details are uncertain). 
 
The deepest gouge which did not result in a failure was located in a pipeline of 
wall thickness 17.5 mm and external diameter 914 mm. The gouge was 
recorded to be 7 mm deep and was not associated with a dent. Table 6.3 
summarises the 15 deepest gouges in the database in order of depth. 
 
Description 
Operating 
Pressure 
(barg) 
Pipe 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Defect 
Length 
(mm) 
Defect 
Width 
(mm) 
Defect 
Depth 
(mm) 
Fault Comment 
Gouge (Failure) 14.1 457 10.3 0 0 10.3 WELDED SLV REPAIR 
Gouge (Failure) 21.4 457 9.5 0 0 9.5 SHEETPILERSLICEDTHRUSIDEOFPIPE 
Gouge (Drill Failure) 10.3 325 7.9 23 23 7.9 // LINES-WRONG 1 DRILLED-25MMH 
Gouge (Drill Failure) 15.9 274 7.1 11 11 7.1 GAS LINE MISTAKEN FOR WATER PI 
Gouge with Dent (Failure) 6.9 218 7.1 5 5 7.1 Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge 0 914 17.5 25 10 7 JACK HAMMER CHISEL GOUGE 
Gouge (Drill Failure) 12.3 325 6.4 50 50 6.4 DRILLED IN ERROR BY DISTN. 
Gouge with Dent (Failure) 14.5 324 6.4 89 89 6.4 HOLE , INDENTATION 
Gouge 6.9 406 7.9 0 0 6.4 GOUGES 
Gouge (Drill Failure) 10.3 168 6.4 0 0 6.4 [MS]SERVICE LAYER DRILLED WRONG MN 
Gouge (Failure) 6.9 218 6.4 8 8 6.4 LINE HOLED BY PNEUMATIC DRILL 
Gouge with Dent (Failure) 6.2 324 6.4 25 3 6.4 4 HITS , 1 PENETRATION 
Gouge (Failure) 16.5 325 6.4 64 13 6.4 TRENCH CUTTER HOLED PIPE 
Gouge (Failure) 13.8 168 6.4 0 0 6.4 JCB HIT DIVERTED PIPE-ROADWRKS 
Gouge (Failure) 30.1 218 7.1 8 3 6.3 PIPE CUT BY GRINDER IN ERROR 
Table 6.3: Summary of Deepest Gouges 
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In Figure 6.3 a diagonal line of data with positive gradient, where gouge depth is 
equal to wall thickness, bounds the remaining data points. This line represents 
the pipeline failures classified in the database as gouges. Below this it is clear 
that the majority of gouges are below 6 mm deep; Figure 6.4 shows that 87% of 
gouges are 2 mm deep or less, with only 2.6% at 6 mm or greater. This 
suggests that the typical machinery working in the vicinity of pipelines is 
capable of delivering a force large enough to cause a maximum gouge depth of 
6 mm. The majority of these gouges are not significant and did not result in 
failure.   Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 6.3, of the 15 gouges with 
depths greater than 6 mm; four were caused by drill damage; three were 
caused by machines similar to drills (jack hammer chisel, pneumatic drill, 
grinder); and two were caused by powerful slicing machines (sheet-piler and 
trench cutter). Of the remaining six gouges, four of the records do not provide 
enough information to draw satisfactory conclusions as to their origin; leaving 
only two gouges with a depth greater than 6 mm definitively indicated as typical 
gouge damage. These gouges are highlighted in Table 6.3. 
 
It can also be seen from Figure 6.3 that the maximum depth of gouges 
associated with dents decreases with increasing wall thickness, whilst the 
maximum depth of gouges not associated with dents remains approximately 
constant. Considering this trend in conjunction with the trends shown in section 
6.2.1 suggests that because additional force is required to dent a pipeline of 
higher wall thickness, less force will be available to create an associated gouge 
on impact, thus reducing the depth of these gouges as pipeline wall thickness 
increases. 
 
In a similar way to pipeline denting in section 6.2.1, Figure 6.3 also appears to 
show that the depth of gouges decreases for pipelines subject to external 
interference with a wall thickness in excess of 12.7 mm (outlier at 17.5 mm wall 
thickness noted). However, contrary to the case of dents, which are 
deformations in the shape of the pipe wall, which the wall thickness would work 
directly against; a gouge is a metal loss defect and would therefore not be 
affected by the pipeline wall thickness. Intuitively, there is no reason why such a 
relationship would occur. It should be noted that substantially fewer gouges 
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occurred in pipelines with wall thicknesses greater than 12.7 mm which could 
possibly explain the trend.  
 
On the basis of the above assessment it is concluded that the 570 gouges with 
a sensible gouge depth dimension are suitable for use in the development of 
the AFFECT model. 26 gouges associated with pipeline failure are addressed 
further in section 6.3. 
 
6.2.2.2 Gouge Length 
 
Of 928 gouges, only 636 have a recorded gouge length. Of these 118 are 
recorded as being associated with dents and 518 are recorded with no 
associated dent. Figure 6.5 shows the lengths of these gouges, plotted against 
the wall thickness of the pipeline in which they occurred in terms of their 
measured length29. Gouge length frequency is shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Gouge Length vs. Wall Thickness 
 
                                            
29Note that ten gouges lie on the y-axis due to the wall thickness of the pipeline 
in which they were located being omitted from the database. 
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Figure 6.6: Gouge Length Frequency 
 
The longest recorded gouge in the database was located in a pipeline of wall 
thickness 4.88 mm and external diameter 219 mm. The gouge was recorded to 
be 3300 mm long and was not associated with a dent. 
 
The longest gouges associated with a failure were located in a pipeline of wall 
thickness 7.1 mm and external diameter 218 mm. The gouges were both 
recorded to be 3000 mm long and were associated with a dent. Both gouges 
occurred as a result of the same incident. It should be noted that neither of 
these gouges were the cause of the failure itself, they share a “fault number” 
with a much shorter 5 mm long gouge which failed. The dent defect and other 
gouge defects associated with this failure appear both in the tables of important 
dents and deepest gouges in sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.1 respectively. The failure 
was caused by an excavator during landscaping. 
 
Table 6.4 summarises the 15 longest gouges in the database in order of length. 
 
 
 
 206 
 
Description 
Operating 
Pressure 
(barg) 
Pipe 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Defect 
Length 
(mm) 
Defect 
Width 
(mm) 
Defect 
Depth 
(mm) 
Fault Comment 
Gouge 19.8 219 4.88 3300 0 1.5 186k cable laying - pipe was pegged-out 
Gouge 24.1 325 7.9 3048 0 0 2 LARGE GOUGES IN DITCH 
Gouge with Dent (Failure) 6.9 218 7.1 3000 0 0 Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge with Dent (Failure) 6.9 218 7.1 3000 0 0 Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge 19.8 219 4.88 1640 0 1.5 186k cable laying - pipe was pegged-out 
Gouge 7 325 6.4 1500 0 0 MINOR(ABRASNS&WRAP).DRAINLAYER 
Gouge 22.1 218 5.6 1473 0 0 BUCKET SCRATCHED PIPE 
Gouge 98 273 5.56 1350 350 0.8 ROSEN IP SURVEY 
Gouge 37.2 274 7.9 1300 75 0.3 PIPE IN DYKE - DURING CLEARING 
Gouge 36 610 11.9 1252 20 1.5 3 SMALL GOUGES 
Gouge 12.1 457 9.5 1250 0 0 2(SCORE/WRAP DAMAGE)     HYMAC 
Gouge 15 450 15.9 1220 5 0.9 18 INCH COLESHILL/TIPTON PIPELINE 
Gouge 44.8 610 12.7 1198 2 1 DUE TO COLD CUTTING MACHINE 
Gouge 0 762 19.6 1197 0 0.1 LINE AIR PURGED FOR STN. MODS. 
Gouge 8.3 610 15.9 1118 0 0.4 7SCRATCHES-22.5DEG BEND SECTN. 
Gouge 40.3 457 10.3 1020 5 0.3 3GOUGES,3CRACKS&1SCC-FORESTRYC 
Table 6.4: Summary of Longest Gouges 
 
Figure 6.5 shows that the majority of the longest gouges are not associated with 
dents. Of the 15 longest gouges, only one was associated with a dent. 
Furthermore, this gouge was located in a grouping with at least four other 
gouges, one of which was considerably shorter and deeper (as highlighted in 
Table 6.3) and which resulted in a pipeline failure. It can be seen from the 
gouge depths in Table 6.4 that the longest gouges in the UKOPA Fault 
Database are also very shallow, with the deepest recorded as 1.5 mm. This 
point is discussed further in section 6.2.2.3. If the four outlying data points are 
excluded, a relatively constant maximum gouge length of between 1100 and 
1600 mm exists across all wall thicknesses. Figure 6.6 shows that 74% of 
gouges are 200 mm or less and only 10.8% are 500 mm or greater. This 
suggests that the typical machinery working in the vicinity of pipelines is unlikely 
to produce gouges with lengths in excess of this. Gouges associated with dents 
are generally shorter than those not associated with dents, the majority of which 
are below 350 mm long. Figure 6.5 also shows that the majority of gouges 
associated with failures are short, this suggests that most failures occur as 
leaks rather than ruptures. Gouges and failures caused by drills are shown to 
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be very short. This is expected as the gouge defects associated with drills are 
generally limited to the diameter of the impinging drill bit. 
 
Figure 6.5 indicates that there is no obvious relationship between gouge length 
and wall thickness. The lack of such a trend would be expected as gouge length 
and wall thickness represent measurements in two orthogonal dimensions. 
 
On the basis of the above assessment it is concluded that 611 gouges with a 
recorded gouge length dimension are suitable for use in the development of the 
AFFECT model. 2530 gouges associated with pipeline failure are addressed 
further in section 6.3. 
 
6.2.2.3 Gouge Severity 
 
As mentioned in section 6.2.2 the severity of a part-wall gouge depends on both 
the gouge length and gouge depth. Of the 928 gouges, only 516 have both a 
recorded gouge length and gouge depth which is sensible. Figure 6.7 shows the 
depth of gouges caused by external interference, plotted against their 
corresponding length. Gouge depth and gouge length frequency are shown in 
Figure 6.8. 
 
                                            
30 This value differs from the gouge depth value because in some cases a depth 
but no length is recorded, the opposite is also true. 
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Figure 6.7: Gouge Depth vs. Gouge Length 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Gouge Depth vs. Gouge Length Frequency 
 
In Figure 6.7 the gouge data is distributed close to the chart axes with the 
greatest concentration of data points occurring around the origin. The pattern 
suggests that long gouges are more likely to be shallow and deep gouges are 
more likely to be short; and confirms trends illustrated in Table 6.3 and Table 
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6.4. It can be seen that the majority of gouges which have failed lie towards the 
extremes of the recorded data, as would be expected. Gouges associated with 
failures with dimensions not at the extremes of the data tend to be those 
associated with dents, highlighting the onerous nature of this form of damage. 
The majority of gouges associated with a failure are short and deep suggesting 
that gouge depth is a more important factor than gouge length in terms of gouge 
severity. Figure 6.7 also shows that gouges associated with dents have a 
similar range of values to gouges not associated with dents when considering 
gouge depth. However, the range for gouge length is shorter.  
 
Analysis of the data presented in Figure 6.8 shows that 235 out of 487 
combined gouge depth/length records (48%) are of depths 2 mm or less and 
length 100 mm or less, and 335 combined gouge depth/length records (69%) 
are of depths 2 mm or less and lengths 200 mm or less. 336 combined gouge 
depth/length records (75%) are of depth 7mm or less and length 200 mm or 
less, and 39 records (8%) are of depth 7 mm or less and length greater than 
500 mm. 
 
In terms of the AFFECT model, the severity of a part-wall gouge is determined 
using the flow stress dependent part-wall NG-18 equation (equations (3.4) and 
(3.5)). Figure 6.9 shows the severity of external interference gouges, 
represented in terms of the failure stress calculated using the flow stress 
dependent part-wall NG-18 equation; plotted against the wall thickness of the 
pipeline in which they occurred31. In producing this chart the quantities of 
pipeline operating pressure, external diameter, wall thickness and grade 
associated with damage are taken directly as recorded from the UKOPA Fault 
Database. Gouges which are associated with failures have not been included in 
the chart. Pipeline failures are addressed in section 6.3. 
 
                                            
31 Note that of the 516 gouges displayed in Figure 6.7, 12 are not included in 
Figure 6.9 due to the grade of the pipeline in which they occurred being omitted 
from the database and two are not included in Figure 6.9 due to the external 
diameter of the pipeline in which they occurred being omitted from the 
database. 
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Figure 6.9: Gouge Severity vs. Wall Thickness 
 
The most severe gouge in the database which did not fail is a gouge associated 
with a dent. This gouge was located in a pipeline of wall thickness 6.4 mm and 
external diameter 168 mm. The gouge was recorded to be 5.4 mm deep, with a 
length of 590 mm. The associated dent does not have a recorded depth and the 
gouge occurred during ditch clearing. 
 
The most severe gouge not associated with a dent was located in a pipeline of 
wall thickness 4.8 mm and external diameter 218 mm. The gouge was recorded 
to be 2.6 mm deep, with a length of 480 mm and was caused by a JCB during a 
fencing procedure. 
 
Table 6.5 summarises the gouges with a failure stress less than 0.72 of the 
pipeline SMYS in descending order of severity. 
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Description 
Operating 
Pressure 
(barg) 
Pipe 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Defect 
Length 
(mm) 
Defect 
Width 
(mm) 
Defect 
Depth 
(mm) 
Failure 
Stress 
(Fraction 
SMYS) 
Fault Comment 
Gouge with Dent 19 168 6.4 590 40 5.4 0.19 Discovered by tenant, ditch clearing, 3 dents 
Gouge with Dent 19 168 6.4 570 35 4.8 0.31 Discovered by tenant, ditch clearing, 3 dents 
Gouge with Dent 14 76 4 50 6 3 0.43 (DENT<12%DIA&GOUGE<76%WT) OLI4 
Gouge with Dent (Corrosion) 14 76 4 35 20 3 0.50 DT/G/AB+DENT+GOUGE+EXT.CR.OLI4 
Gouge 16.6 218 4.8 480 186 2.6 0.56 JCB WHILE FENCING DAMAGE<55%WT 
Gouge with Dent 13.8 218 4.8 305 102 2.4 0.62 DENT,GOUGES&SCRATCHES-GRASSCUT 
Gouge with Dent (Corrosion) 14 76 4 110 5 2 0.64 DT/G/AB+DENT+GOUGE+EXT.CR.OLI4 
Gouge 19 219 5.1 114.7 10 2.713 0.67 Ditch Crossing, Damage caused by Plough. 
Gouge 14 76 4 38 0 2.3 0.71 GOUGE                     OLI4 
Table 6.5: Summary of the Most Severe Gouges 
 
Figure 6.9 clearly shows that the severity (according to the part-wall NG-18 
equation) of the external interference gouges decreases with increasing wall 
thickness. Based on the trends seen in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.5 relating to the 
maximum length and depth of gouges caused by machinery typically working in 
the vicinity of a pipeline, this relationship would be expected. The force capable 
of being exerted on a pipeline to cause damage is limited and therefore as the 
pipeline wall thickness increases the severity of the gouges produced will 
decrease. The majority of the most severe gouges for each wall thickness in 
Figure 6.9 follow a curve. There are two outlying points at 6.4 mm which do not 
follow the general trend. These gouges are highlighted in Table 6.5. It should be 
noted that these gouges also make up two of the outlying points in Figure 6.7. 
In the database, these two gouges are grouped with a further gouge and a dent. 
The gouge defects have recorded dimensions whereas the dent defect does 
not. The fault comments in the UKOPA Fault Database note the presence of 
three dents, however gouging is not mentioned. The damage is also quoted as 
being “Slight” rather than “Severe” which contradicts the evidence shown in 
Figure 6.9. On this basis it could be speculated that the three “gouges” in this 
fault grouping actually refer to dent defects and that the “dent” defect without 
dimensions is more a placeholder or notification and refers to the other three 
defects rather than being an actual defect itself. 
 
It should be noted that the failure stress assigned to gouges associated with 
dents in Figure 6.9 will be non-conservative due to the presence of the dent. 
 212 
 
Figure 6.9 shows gouge severity according to the part-wall NG-18 equation 
only. Gouged dents are assessed using the BGDGFM. 
 
6.2.3 Probability of a Gouge and a Gouged Dent 
 
Using the data from sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, an analysis has been performed 
in order to determine the probability that external interference damage will 
manifest as either a gouge or a gouged dent. The updated probabilities for 
gouges and gouged dents are given in Table 6.6. The probabilities are 
unchanged from those determined from the 2005 UKOPA Fault Database and 
used in the PIE and Cosham models. 
 
Damage Type Symbol Probability 
Gouge Pgougedamage 0.82 
Gouged Dent Pgougeddentdamage 0.18 
Table 6.6: Probabilities that External Interference Damage will be a Gouge 
or a Gouged Dent 
 
6.2.4 Statistical Difference between Gouge and Gouged Dent 
 
For the AFFECT model the required damage dimensions are gouge length, 
gouge depth and dent depth. Values for gouge length and gouge depth exist in 
the database for damage classed as both gouge and gouged dent. Probability 
distributions can therefore be derived for gouge length and gouge depth 
considering either the gouge and gouged dent data as a whole (2 distributions): 
 
 Gouge length; 
 Gouge depth. 
 
 or separately (four distributions): 
 
 Gouge length; 
 Gouged dent gouge length; 
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 Gouge depth; 
 Gouged dent gouge depth. 
 
A statistical analysis of the filtered UKOPA Fault Database has been carried out 
by the Newcastle University Industrial Statistics Research Department (ISRU) 
(Coleman, 2013).The statistical report by ISRU has suggested that the 
dimensions of gouge damage should be treated separately to those of gouged 
dent damage. In order to investigate this conclusion further, two additional 
statistical tests have been performed on the data. These are: 
 
 2 Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. 
 Mann-Whitney U Test. 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests are non-parametric tests 
which test whether the underlying probability distributions for two data samples 
are different (Anon., 2010). 
 
The tests have been performed using Minitab (Anon., 2010), all tests were 
performed using a p-value of 0.05, i.e. the confidence limit was set at 95%. The 
tests have been performed separately on the gouge length dimensions and the 
gouge depth dimensions. The two samples in each case are gouges and 
gouges associated with dents. Two sets of data were used in each case. The 
first was the data concluded as suitable in sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2. In an 
attempt to remove information from the data which could possibly skew the 
outcome of the tests, the tests were also performed on a second set of data. 
This data set was a subset of the first data set ignoring all incidents of pipeline 
failure and gouges associated with corrosion. Details of the sample size of each 
data set are presented in Table 6.7. 
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 Sample Size (Large Data Set) 
Sample Size 
(Small Data Set) 
Gouge Length 518 484 
Gouged Dent Gouge Length 118 92 
Gouge Depth 486 445 
Gouged Dent Gouge Depth 110 86 
Table 6.7: Sample Sizes for Non-Parametric Tests of Gouge Length and 
Gouge Depth 
 
Details of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics are presented in Table 6.8. 
 
 Sample Size (Large Data Set) 
Sample Size 
(Small Data Set) 
 Test Statistic 
Critical 
Value 
Test 
Statistic 
Critical 
Value 
Gouge Length Data 0.135 0.138 0.174 0.154 
Gouge Depth Data 0.262 0.143 0.216 0.160 
Table 6.8: 2 Sample Kolmogorov – Smirnov Test Statistics 
 
 Details of the Mann-Whitney calculated p-values are presented in Table 6.9. 
 
 Sample Size (Large Data Set) 
Sample Size 
(Small Data Set) 
 P Value Critical Value P Value 
Critical 
Value 
Gouge Length Data 0.099 0.050 0.092 0.050 
Gouge Depth Data 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.050 
Table 6.9: Mann – Whitney U Test P Values 
 
The results of the test outcomes are summarised in Table 6.10. 
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 Sample Size (Large Data Set) 
Sample Size 
(Small Data Set) 
 Kolmogorov – Smirnov 
Mann – 
Whitney U 
Kolmogorov – 
Smirnov 
Mann – 
Whitney U 
Gouge Length Data 
Insufficient 
evidence to 
conclude 
Insufficient 
evidence to 
conclude 
Distributions 
concluded as 
different 
Insufficient 
evidence to 
conclude 
Gouge Depth Data 
Distributions 
concluded as 
different 
Distributions 
concluded as 
different 
Distributions 
concluded as 
different 
Distributions 
concluded as 
different 
Table 6.10: Summary of Test Outcomes 
 
From Table 6.10 it can be seen that for the gouge depth data sets every test led 
to the conclusion that the underlying distributions were different. For the gouge 
length data sets the outcome was less certain, a conclusion that the underlying 
distributions were different was only possible in one of the four tests made, with 
there being insufficient evidence to accept a conclusion of different distributions 
in the other three cases. 
 
On the basis of five of the eight total tests showing gouge and gouged dent 
damage to be statistically different to each other it is concluded that for the 
purposes of the AFFECT model, gouge dimension data and gouged dent 
dimension data should be treated separately and used to derive separate 
probability distributions. 
 
On the basis of the above assessment it is concluded that the 570 gouges with 
a sensible gouge depth dimension suitable for use in the development of the 
AFFECT model (section 6.2.2.1) are split into 467 gouges and 103 gouges 
associated with dents for the purposes of derivation of damage dimension 
probability distributions. 
 
On the basis of the above assessment it is concluded that the 611 gouges with 
a recorded gouge length dimension suitable for use in the development of the 
AFFECT model (section 6.2.2.2) are split into 503 gouges and 108 gouges 
associated with dents for the purposes of derivation of damage dimension 
probability distributions. 
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6.3 Failure Data 
 
The dent and gouge data discussed in section 6.2 includes damage which 
resulted in through-wall pipeline failure.  
 
There are 44 external interference defects to a pipe or bend associated with 
pipeline failures within the UKOPA Fault Database. Considering the “fault 
number” grouping within the database, these defects comprise 24 separate 
incidents of pipeline failure32. Of the 44 defects, five are dents with associated 
gouges; 15 are the gouges associated with these dents; 24 are gouges not 
associated with dents, of which seven are gouges caused by drilling. Of the five 
dents associated with failures, only one has a recorded dent depth. Of the 39 
gouges, 26 have a recorded gouge depth and 25 have a recorded gouge 
length, with only 20 having both a length and depth measurement.  
 
From a risk assessment point of view, the most important factor in pipeline 
failure is whether the failure will occur as a leak or as a rupture. Whether a 
failure will occur as a leak or a rupture is determined by the critical defect 
length, which is based on the pipeline geometry and operating conditions. 
Defects with a length in excess of the critical length, are expected to fail as 
ruptures. A rupture is significantly worse than a leak in consequence terms. The 
UKOPA Fault Database records classify all pipeline failure incidents as either a 
“leak” or a “fracture”. These classifications can be assumed to refer to leak and 
rupture failures respectively.  
 
Table 6.11 collates all of the defects associated with pipeline failures. These are 
grouped by each particular pipeline failure. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
32 Some failures consist of multiple defects. 
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Description 
Operating 
Pressure 
(barg) 
Pipe 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Defect 
Length 
(mm) 
Defect 
Width 
(mm) 
Defect 
Depth 
(mm) 
Extent of 
Damage Fault Comment 
Gouge (drill failure) 10.3 168 6.4 0 0 6.4 Leak [MS]SERVICE LAYER DRILLED WRONG MN 
Gouge (drill failure) 19 218 4.8 0 0 0 Leak NO CUSTOMER LOSS WRONG P.DRILLED 
Gouge (failure) 6.9 218 6.4 8 8 6.4 Leak LINE HOLED BY PNEUMATIC DRILL 
Gouge (failure) 5.5 102 4.8 51 6 4.8 Leak 2 HOLES 
Gouge (failure) 5.5 102 4.8 16 5 4.8 Leak 2 HOLES 
Gouge (drill failure) 11.7 457 6.4 2 2 0 Leak HOLE DRILLED TO FIND PIPE 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 6.2 324 6.4 0 0 0 Leak 4 HITS , 1 PENETRATION 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.2 324 6.4 25 3 6.4 Leak 4 HITS , 1 PENETRATION 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.2 324 6.4 0 0 0 Leak 4 HITS , 1 PENETRATION 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.2 324 6.4 0 0 0 Leak 4 HITS , 1 PENETRATION 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.2 324 6.4 0 0 0 Leak 4 HITS , 1 PENETRATION 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 6.9 218 7.1 133 133 25 Leak Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.9 218 7.1 5 5 7.1 Leak Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.9 218 7.1 3000 0 0 Leak Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.9 218 7.1 3000 0 0 Leak Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.9 218 7.1 0 0 0 Leak Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 6.9 218 7.1 0 0 0 Leak Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge (drill failure) 10.3 325 7.9 23 23 7.9 Leak // LINES-WRONG 1 DRILLED-25MMH 
Gouge (failure) 0 218 5.6 685 0 5.6 Fracture No Loss, severed pre commission 
Gouge (failure) 0 218 5.6 0 0 5.6 Fracture No Loss, severed pre commission 
Gouge (failure) 0 218 5.6 0 0 0 Fracture No Loss, severed pre commission 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 14.5 324 6.4 127 127 0 Leak HOLE , INDENTATION 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 14.5 324 6.4 89 89 6.4 Leak HOLE , INDENTATION 
Gouge (failure) 16.5 325 6.4 64 13 6.4 Leak TRENCH CUTTER HOLED PIPE 
Gouge (failure) 16.5 325 6.4 152 102 0 Leak TRENCH CUTTER HOLED PIPE 
Gouge (drill failure) 12.3 325 6.4 50 50 6.4 Leak DRILLED IN ERROR BY DISTN. 
Gouge (failure) 30.1 218 7.1 8 3 6.3 Leak PIPE CUT BY GRINDER IN ERROR 
Gouge (drill failure) 15.9 274 7.1 11 11 7.1 Leak GAS LINE MISTAKEN FOR WATER PI 
Gouge (failure) 21.4 457 9.5 0 0 9.5 Fracture SHEETPILERSLICEDTHRUSIDEOFPIPE 
Gouge (failure) 7.6 168 4.4 502 0 4.4 Fracture LINE SHEARED BY MOLE PLOUGH 
Gouge (drill failure) 17.2 76 4 10 10 4 Leak DRILLED IN ERROR-TO BE CUT OUT 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 17.2 168 4.8 0 0 0 Fracture 36 cust. Line holed by trencher during excavation for water main 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 17.2 168 4.8 90 21 3 Fracture 36 cust. Line holed by trencher during excavation for water main 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 17.2 168 4.8 19 4 1 Fracture 36 cust. Line holed by trencher during excavation for water main 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 17.2 168 4.8 34 15 1.5 Fracture 36 cust. Line holed by trencher during excavation for water main 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 17.2 168 4.8 23 18 0 Fracture 36 cust. Line holed by trencher during excavation for water main 
Gouge (failure) 13.8 168 6.4 0 0 6.4 Leak JCB HIT DIVERTED PIPE-ROADWRKS 
Gouge (failure) 13.8 168 6.4 0 0 0 Leak JCB HIT DIVERTED PIPE-ROADWRKS 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 22.8 168 4.8 45 45 0 Leak Mole plough holed pipe 
Gouge with Dent (failure) 22.8 168 4.8 45 45 4.8 Leak Mole plough holed pipe 
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Description 
Operating 
Pressure 
(barg) 
Pipe 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Defect 
Length 
(mm) 
Defect 
Width 
(mm) 
Defect 
Depth 
(mm) 
Extent of 
Damage Fault Comment 
Gouge (failure) 15.8 102 4.4 0 0 4.4 Fracture EXCV.FRACTUREDPIPE-LANDDRAINAG 
Gouge (failure) 15.8 168 4.8 149 149 4.8 Fracture 30 cust. Line sliced longitudinally by D6 Bogmaster during roadworks 
Gouge (failure) 21 168 5.6 203 152 5.6 Fracture 203x152mm hole punched by CAT 977 Traxcavator during drainage work 
Gouge (failure) 14.1 457 10.3 0 0 10.3 Leak WELDED SLV REPAIR 
Table 6.11: External Interference Failure Data 
 
In Table 6.11, lines between rows are used to show the end of one incident of 
pipeline failure and the start of another based upon the “fault number”. 
Considering the information regarding the damage in groupings of multiple 
defects it can be seen that in the majority of cases, each group has a standout 
“gouge” defect with a depth equal to that of the pipeline wall thickness. For 
these cases it can reasonably be assumed that this individual defect is the 
source of the failure and that the other associated defects are less severe non-
failing damage. Two exceptions to this are noted:  
 
 The failure incident highlighted in yellow includes two defects for which 
the comment in the database clearly reads “2 holes”. In this case each 
defect in the grouping has been assumed to represent a separate failure. 
 The failure incident highlighted in green includes a dent and four gouge 
defects. None of the defects have a recorded gouge depth equal to the 
pipeline wall thickness. In this case the available information does not 
allow which of the gouges failed to be determined. 
 
Seven failures can be concluded as having being caused by drills from the 
information included in the database, these are highlighted in blue. Drill 
punctures must be separated from the data used in the derivation of probability 
distributions for part-wall and through-wall gouge and gouged dent damage. 
Drill punctures are unlike conventional through-wall punctures in that they are 
assumed to be wall thickness independent. A separate historical data 
component or drill-puncture model would therefore need to be developed in 
order to incorporate them into the AFFECT model. It should be noted that 
classification of the drill failure data is made solely on the basis of the 
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comments associated with the defects in each case and interpretation of this 
information is largely subjective. Only the non-drill failure data from the UKOPA 
Fault Database has been in used in the derivation of the damage dimension 
probability distributions for use in AFFECT. The development of either a drill 
puncture model or an historical data component for AFFECT is recommended. 
 
Table 6.11 shows that the majority of pipeline failures occurred on small 
external diameter, low wall thickness pipelines. Furthermore, six out of seven 
pipeline ruptures occurred on pipelines with external diameters below 220 mm. 
Rupture type failures generally occurred as a result of gouge defects which 
were not associated with dents. This is potentially due to the shorter gouge 
length which is found in gouges associated with dents, as illustrated in section 
6.2, which means the majority of gouges associated with dents remain below 
the critical length. It is clear that the thickest pipelines to suffer a failure 
generally did so as a result of drill or drill-type defects (grinder, welding torch), 
which failed as stable leaks. The most concerning failure is the rupture of a 
pipeline with wall thickness 9.5 mm and external diameter 457 mm, caused by a 
sheet-piler machine. 
 
It is concluded that 14 gouges associated with a failure with a sensible gouge 
depth dimension and no failures caused by drilling should be included with the 
467 gouges for the purposes of derivation of damage dimensions probability 
distributions. It is concluded that seven gouges associated with dents and 
associated with failures, with a sensible gouge depth dimension and no failures 
caused by drilling should be included with the 103 gouges associated with dents 
for the purposes of derivation of damage dimensions probability distributions. 
 
It is concluded that ten gouges associated with a failure with a recorded gouge 
length dimension and no failures caused by drilling should be included with the 
503 gouges for the purposes of derivation of damage dimensions probability 
distributions. It is concluded that ten gouges associated with dents and 
associated with failures with recorded length dimensions and no failures caused 
by drilling should be included with the 108 gouges associated with dents for the 
purposes of derivation of damage dimensions probability distributions. 
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6.4 Assessment of the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented a detailed filtering and assessment of the 2010 
UKOPA Fault Database. As a result of the assessment process appropriate 
data sets were derived to which probability distributions can be fitted and used 
in the AFFECT failure frequency model. A comprehensive statistical analysis 
performed on the database indicated that gouge dimension data and gouged 
dent dimension data should be treated separately and used to derive separate 
probability distributions. The data sets derived for use in the AFFECT model 
therefore relate to gouge depth, gouged dent gouge depth, gouge length, 
gouged dent gouge length and dent depth / dent force. A summary of the size of 
the data sets and the number of incidents of pipeline failure included in each 
data set is shown in Table 6.12. 
 
The assessment of the database also showed the probabilities of external 
interference damage manifesting as either a gouge or a gouged dent are 
unchanged from the values determined from the 2005 UKOPA Fault Database 
and used in the PIE and Cosham models. 
 
 Total Number Split Category Number 
Number of 
Failures 
Gouge Depth 570 
Gouge Depth 467 14 
Gouged Dent Gouge 
Depth 103 7 
Gouge Length 611 
Gouge Length 503 10 
Gouged Dent Gouge 
Length 108 10 
Dent Depth / Dent Force 66  1 
Table 6.12: UKOPA Fault Database Data Set Summary 
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Chapter 7. Development of the AFFECT Failure Frequency 
Model for Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines (Part 2) 
 
Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 of this thesis detail the step by step construction of the 
AFFECT model to calculate the failure frequency of a dense phase CO2 pipeline 
due to third party external interference. The first four stages of development 
have been covered in Chapter 5 and an analysis of the 2010 UKOPA Fault 
Database has been described in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 the final two stages 
are considered. As with Chapter 5, each modification made to the model is 
outlined and estimates of pipeline failure frequency calculated at each stage are 
presented. In this way the effect of each modification on the estimated value of 
failure frequency can be observed. 
 
The modifications considered in Chapter 7 include: 
 
 A dent force distribution derived from the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database; 
 Separate depth and length distributions for gouges and gouged dents. 
 
7.1 The Lognormal Force Model 
 
In the New Distributions model described in section 5.7, updated distributions 
and Incident-Rates derived by Penspen in 2010 were included. It was noted that 
that a dent force distribution was not fitted by Penspen and therefore the New 
Distributions model uses dent depth instead of dent force. 
 
As outlined in section 5.5, including a dent force distribution over dent depth is 
beneficial in terms of improving the accuracy of the probability of failure 
calculation. Taking this into account, a dent force distribution has been derived 
using data from the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database. The distribution has been 
used to provide an update for dent force which is analogous to the update 
provided for dent depth by the Penspen distributions. 
 
In order to derive a dent force distribution, the depth data for the 66 dents 
concluded as suitable in section 6.2.1 (along with corresponding geometry, 
 222 
 
operating and material parameters) was transformed using equations (2.83) and 
(5.4). A distribution was then fitted to the resulting force data. 
 
The probability distributions used to describe the random variables in the 
Hazard Analysis, FFREQ, PIE and Cosham models, as well as for the 2010 
Penspen updates, are Weibull distributions. In the PIPIN model, the majority of 
the distributions are Weibull; however normal and lognormal distributions are 
used to describe some of the random variables. As part of the derivation of a 
dent force distribution, an assessment of the data was performed using the 
statistical software package Minitab (Anon., 2010) in order to determine if 
Weibull was the most appropriate distribution to use in order to describe the 
data. Figure 7.1 shows a comparison between a Weibull fit and the dent force 
data; and a lognormal fit and the dent force data. This chart compares the data 
to the regression line in each case; a graphical comparison between the two 
distributions is shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Dent Force Lognormal and Weibull Comparison 
 
The lognormal probability density function describing a random variable x has 
the form: 
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݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ଵ௫ఙ೏√ଶగ exp ቂെ
ሺ୪୬௫ିఓ೏ሻమ
ଶఙ೏మ ቃ      (7.1) 
 
Where σd and µd are distribution parameters. The cumulative probability density 
function is given by: 
 
ܨሺݔሻ ൌ ଵଶ ൅
ଵ
ଶ erf ቂ
୪୬௫ିఓ೏
ఙ೏√ଶ ቃ       (7.2) 
 
Where erf is the error function. 
 
A distribution is considered to be a good fit for the data if its statistical p-value 
exceeds 0.05. In Figure 7.1, the low p-value of <0.010 for the Weibull 
distribution indicates that a Weibull is not a good fit to the dent force data. 
Conversely, the lognormal distribution has a p-value of 0.214. The Minitab 
analysis suggests that a more accurate representation of the dent force random 
variable would be obtained if a lognormal distribution is fitted to the data. 
 
A comparison between the dent force probability distributions for Weibull and 
lognormal when fitted to the data from the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database is 
shown in Figure 7.2 alongside the original data points. Figure 7.2 gives visual 
confirmation that the lognormal distribution is a better fit to the data than the 
Weibull.  
 
In Figure 7.2 the dent force distribution from the Corrib QRA, used in the Dent 
Force model in section 5.5 is included for reference. This curve is significantly 
different to the lognormal and Weibull fits. The curve was derived using an 
alternative method, detailed in Espiner (Espiner, 1996a). A comparison showing 
the specific effect on the values of failure frequency of selecting either this curve 
or the lognormal dent force distribution is detailed in section 7.3. 
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Figure 7.2: Dent Force Distribution Lognormal and Weibull Comparison 
 
A lognormal distribution for dent force has been derived based on the 2010 
UKOPA Fault Database. This has been used in conjunction with the updated 
Incident-Rate, gouge length and gouge depth distributions, derived by Penspen 
and used in the New Distributions model33, as the fifth stage in the construction 
of AFFECT. This version of the model will be referred to as the Lognormal 
Force model. The parameters defining the cumulative probability distributions 
used in the Lognormal Force model are summarised in Table 7.1.  
 
Variable Distribution α (Weibull) µd (Lognormal) 
β (Weibull) 
σd (Lognormal) 
Gouge Length Weibull 0.573 125.4 
Gouge Depth Weibull 0.674 0.916 
Dent Force Lognormal 4.052 0.486 
Table 7.1: Lognormal Force Model Distribution Parameters 
 
                                            
33 Note that at this stage, following the analysis of the 2010 UKOPA Fault 
Database, the probabilities that mechanical damage will be a gouge or a 
gouged dent taken from the original PIE model and given in Table 2.11 should 
also be updated in line with Table 6.6. In this case however, the values are 
identical. 
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7.2 Lognormal Force Model Results 
 
Estimated pipeline failure frequency values have been calculated using the 
Lognormal Force model for the six example pipeline cases listed in Table 5.1. 
As before, leak, rupture and total failure frequency has been calculated. 
 
A comparison between the total failure frequency values for example 1 as 
calculated by the Lognormal Force model, New Distributions model, Dent Force 
model, Re-Rounding model and the Modified PIE model, is shown in Figure 7.3. 
A similar comparison between total failure frequency values for example 4 is 
shown in Figure 7.4. Equivalent charts for the remaining examples are included 
in Appendix A . 
 
A comparison between the total failure frequency values for examples 1, 2, and 
3 as calculated by the Lognormal Force model and the analogous Dent Force 
model, is shown in Figure 7.5. A similar comparison between the total failure 
frequency values calculated for examples 4, 5 and 6 is shown in Figure 7.6. 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal Force 
Model, New Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model 
and the Modified PIE Model for Example 1 
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Figure 7.4: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal Force 
Model, New Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model 
and the Modified PIE Model for Example 4 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal Force 
Model and the Dent Force Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
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Figure 7.6: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal Force 
Model and the Dent Force Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
 
Based on the results, the following observations can be made regarding 
estimations of pipeline failure frequency made by the Lognormal Force model. 
 
A direct comparison between the results calculated for each example indicates 
that the Lognormal Force model generally mirrors the behaviour of the New 
Distributions model from section 5.7 but estimates lower values of failure 
frequency. The model does not display the level of drop off in its results that is 
observed in models based upon the 2005 UKOPA Fault Database. This is 
highlighted in the comparison with the analogous Dent Force model. The 
difference between the two models is due to the differences between the 
distributions. Not only do the updated gouge length and gouge depth 
parameters have an effect (as explained in section 5.8) but the dent force 
distribution is significantly different, as highlighted by Figure 7.2. 
 
7.3 The Effect of Dent Force Distribution on Failure Frequency 
 
In section 7.1, Figure 7.2 compares the lognormal dent force distribution used in 
the Lognormal Force model with the Corrib QRA dent force distribution used in 
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the Dent Force model. Figure 7.2 shows that the two distributions are 
significantly different to each other.  
 
In order to investigate the effect that the difference in the two distributions has 
on calculated values of failure frequency a further analysis has been performed. 
For this analysis the failure frequencies calculated by two separate models, 
Model A and Model B, have been compared. Model A is the Lognormal Force 
model described in section 7.1. Model B is identical to Model A but with the 
lognormal dent force distribution replaced by the Corrib QRA dent force 
distribution (in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6, the gouge length and gouge depth 
distributions are different). 
 
Estimated pipeline failure frequency values have been calculated using Model A 
and Model B for the six example pipeline cases listed in Table 5.1. A 
comparison between total failure frequency values for example 1 is shown in 
Figure 7.7. Equivalent charts for the remaining examples are included in 
Appendix A . 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model A and Model B 
for Example 1 
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A direct comparison between the results calculated for each example indicates 
that Model A generally estimates lower values of failure frequency than Model 
B. It can be concluded that the use of the Corrib QRA dent force distribution 
within a failure frequency model produces higher values of failure frequency 
than the use of the lognormal dent force distribution, when all other components 
are equal. The reason for this is evident from the behaviour of the dent force 
distributions shown in Figure 7.2. For the majority of dent force values shown in 
Figure 7.2 (above approximately 27 kN), the probability given by the Corrib 
QRA distribution exceeds that given by the lognormal force distribution by up to 
a maximum of approximately 0.35. In regions of Figure 7.2 in which the 
lognormal dent force distribution gives higher probabilities than the Corrib QRA 
distribution, the difference between the two curves is small. The combined 
effect of this is that the overall gouged dent failure probability will be higher 
when using the Corrib QRA distribution if all other aspects of the model are 
equal.  
 
The difference between the lognormal and Corrib QRA distributions decreases 
beyond approximately 75 kN. As pipeline wall thickness is increased, larger 
dent force values will be required in order to cause a gouged dent failure. This 
will cause the difference in failure frequencies calculated by models using the 
lognormal and Corrib QRA distributions to decrease, an effect which can be 
seen in Figure 7.7. 
 
The difference in failure frequencies calculated by the models due to the dent 
force distributions is also reduced by increasing the pipeline material toughness. 
This is because the gouged dent contribution to the failure frequency reduces 
with increasing toughness. 
 
Overall, Figure 7.7 shows that differences between the results are small, and 
that it is the changes to the other distributions that are the cause of the larger 
differences between the ‘Dent Force model’ and the ‘Lognormal Force model’. 
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7.4 The Split Distributions Model 
 
In Chapter 2 it was highlighted that the original Hazard Analysis model, FFREQ 
and PIPIN assumed the gouge length and gouge depth random variables to be 
separate to those for gouged dent gouge length and gouged dent gouge depth. 
In the PIE and Cosham models and the updated Penspen distributions 
however, the variables were consolidated. In order to determine the correct 
approach, a statistical analysis of the gouge and gouged dent data from the 
2010 UKOPA Fault Database was performed and is detailed in section 6.2.4. 
From the analysis it was concluded that gouges and gouges existing as part of 
a gouged dent come from different populations and therefore should be treated 
separately. 
 
Based on these findings, a further stage in the construction of AFFECT has 
been investigated through the use of separate probability distributions for gouge 
length and gouge depth based on whether a defect is a gouge or a gouged 
dent. Taking the findings of the statistical analysis into consideration, the gouge 
length and depth data from the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database concluded as 
suitable in sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2 has been split into: 
 
 Gouge length; 
 Gouged dent gouge length; 
 Gouge depth; 
 Gouged dent gouge depth. 
 
Probability distributions can be fitted to the split data sets in order to describe 
the behaviour of the now four random variables. These can then be 
incorporated into the failure frequency model in place of the gouge length and 
gouge depth distributions used in the Lognormal Force model. In accordance 
with the conclusions made in section 6.3, data from gouges and gouged dents 
which resulted in through-wall pipeline failure should be included in the 
derivation of the probability distributions, with the exception of failures caused 
by drilling. As previously explained, drill puncture data must be implemented 
into a failure frequency model through the use of a separate historical data 
component or a drill puncture model. 
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7.4.1 Probability Distributions 
 
Following removal of the drill puncture data, probability distributions have been 
fitted to the gouge length, gouge depth, gouged dent gouge length and gouged 
dent gouge depth data sets. In a similar way to the dent force distribution in 
section 7.1, a Minitab analysis considering common probability distributions was 
performed (Anon., 2010) in order to determine the most appropriate distribution 
to use in order to describe the data. The analysis suggested the most accurate 
representation of the variables as follows: 
 
 Gouge length – Weibull distribution. 
 Gouge depth – Lognormal distribution. 
 Gouged dent gouge length – Lognormal distribution. 
 Gouged dent gouge depth – Weibull distribution. 
 
Figure 7.8, Figure 7.9, Figure 7.10 and Figure 7.11 show the selected fits to the 
data. The fits were selected by choosing the lowest Anderson-Darling 
coefficient in each case apart from that of the gouge depth. For this variable, the 
distribution which best fitted the data with the highest depth values was chosen. 
According to the use of the gouge limit state function (equations (3.4) and (3.5)) 
in the model, only depth probabilities of the critical depth and above are 
considered within the model. The fit of the distribution is therefore more 
important at higher depths than lower ones. This condition does not follow for 
the other variables where a failure state can occur at any value. For gouge 
depth a reliability/survival analysis was also performed on the data to censor the 
probability fits to lower depth values in an attempt to achieve a closer fit to 
higher depth values. The analysis was performed using no censorship, 
censoring values below 0.5 mm depth, and censoring values below 1 mm 
depth. The best fit to high depth data was chosen by observation. It should be 
noted that the probability distributions considered in the Minitab analysis do not 
represent an exhaustive collection of all possible distributions for each variable. 
Furthermore the choice of distribution for a variable can have a significant effect 
on the values of failure frequency calculated by the model. A further study 
investigating this effect has been performed in section 7.6.   
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Figure 7.8: Gouge Length Weibull Distribution 
 
 
Figure 7.9: Gouge Depth Lognormal Distribution 
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Figure 7.10: Gouged Dent Gouge Length Lognormal Distribution 
 
 
Figure 7.11: Gouged Dent Gouge Depth Weibull Distribution 
 
The distributions for gouge length, gouge depth, gouged dent gouge length and 
gouged dent gouge depth based on the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database have 
been incorporated into the failure frequency model in place of the gouge length 
and gouge depth distributions used in the Lognormal Force model, as the sixth 
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stage in the construction of AFFECT. This version of the model will be referred 
to as the Split Distributions model. The parameters defining the cumulative 
probability distributions used in the Split Distributions model are summarised in 
Table 7.2. Comparisons between the gouge and gouged dent, gouge depth and 
gouge length probability distributions used in the Split Distributions model and 
those used in the Lognormal Force model are shown in Figure 7.12 and Figure 
7.13. 
 
Variable Distribution α (Weibull) µd (Lognormal) 
β (Weibull) 
σd (Lognormal) 
Gouge Length Weibull 0.803 174.769 
Gouge Depth Lognormal -0.587 1.050 
Gouged Dent Gouge Length Lognormal 4.342 1.222 
Gouged Dent Gouge Depth Weibull 1.062 1.594 
Dent Force Lognormal 4.052 0.486 
Table 7.2: Split Distributions Model Distribution Parameters 
 
 
Figure 7.12: Gouge Depth Distribution Comparison, Split Distributions 
Model and Lognormal Force Model 
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Figure 7.13: Gouge Length Distribution Comparison, Split Distributions 
Model and Lognormal Force Model 
 
The additional probability distributions are implemented by modifying the 
expressions for gouge and gouged dent failure probability. The probability of 
failure for gouges (equation (2.84)) becomes: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻܴ௚ௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧ሻ݀2ܿஶ଴       (7.3) 
 
Where the subscripts g2c and gd denote the use of the gouge length and gouge 
depth distribution parameters respectively. 
 
Similarly the probability of failure of gouged dents (equation (2.86)) becomes: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ௗଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿஶ଴ . ቂ׬ ௚݂ௗௗሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴ௚ௗௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ (7.4) 
 
Where the subscript F denotes the use of the dent force distribution and Fcrit 
being the critical force required to cause a failure in combination with a gouge of 
depth d. The integrals for leak and rupture (equations (2.88), (2.89)) become: 
 
௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௟௘௔௞ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ௗଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿ௅೎ೝ೔೟଴ . ቂ׬ ௚݂ௗௗሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴ௚ௗௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ  (7.5) 
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௚ܲ௢௨௚௘ௗௗ௘௡௧௥௨௣௧௨௥௘ ൌ ׬ ௚݂ௗଶ௖ሺ2ܿሻ݀2ܿஶ௅೎ೝ೔೟ . ቂ׬ ௚݂ௗௗሺ݀ሻܴிሺܨ௖௥௜௧ሻ݀݀ ൅
ௗ೎ೝ೔೟ಳಸವಸಷಾ
଴ ܴ௚ௗௗሺ݀௖௥௜௧஻ீ஽ீிெሻቃ  (7.6) 
 
Where the subscripts gdd and gd2c denote the use of the gouged dent gouge 
depth and gouged dent gouge length distribution parameters respectively. 
 
7.5 Split Distributions Model Results 
 
Estimated pipeline failure frequency values have been calculated using the Split 
Distributions model for the six example pipeline cases listed in Table 5.1. As 
before, leak, rupture and total failure frequency have been calculated. 
 
A comparison between total failure frequency values for example 1 as 
calculated by the Split Distributions model, Lognormal Force model, New 
Distributions model, Dent Force model, Re-Rounding model and the Modified 
PIE model, is shown in Figure 7.14. A similar comparison between total failure 
frequency values for example 4 is shown in Figure 7.15. These charts show the 
progression of the models. Equivalent charts for the remaining examples are 
included in Appendix A . 
 
A comparison between total failure frequency values for examples 1, 2, and 3 
as calculated by the Split Distributions model and the Lognormal Force model, 
is shown in Figure 7.16. A similar comparison between total failure frequency 
values calculated for examples 4, 5 and 6 is shown in Figure 7.17. 
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Figure 7.14: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model, Lognormal Force Model, New Distributions Model, 
Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for 
Example 1 
 
 
Figure 7.15: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model, Lognormal Force Model, New Distributions Model, 
Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for 
Example 4 
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Figure 7.16: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model and the Lognormal Force Model for Examples 
1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure 7.17: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model and the Lognormal Force Model for Examples 
4, 5 and 6 
 
Based on the results, the following observations can be made regarding 
estimations of pipeline failure frequency made by the Split Distributions model. 
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A direct comparison between the results calculated for each example indicates 
that at low wall thickness, the Split Distributions model estimates the lowest 
values of failure frequency of all the models considered so far. The model 
however, displays a reduced rate of decay in values of failure frequency with 
increasing wall thickness in comparison to the other models. The effect of this is 
that at higher wall thicknesses, depending on the conditions, the Split 
Distributions model can produce failure frequencies in excess of the other 
models.  
 
The depth and length distributions used in the Split Distributions model from 
Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13 give an insight into the behaviour of the model. A 
similar trend in the gouge depth and gouged dent gouge length probability 
distributions with increasing depth and length can be seen in these charts as is 
observed for the Split Distributions failure frequencies with increasing wall 
thickness. From Table 7.2, these curves are lognormal fits. It is clear that the 
presence of the lognormal fits within the model is strongly influencing the 
estimated failure frequencies. 
 
7.6 The Effect of Distribution Choice on Failure Frequency 
 
In section 7.4.1, an analysis to determine the most appropriate probability 
distributions for the random variables introduced in the Split Distributions model 
was performed. The analysis was performed using the statistical software 
package Minitab. In this analysis a range of distributions were fitted for each of 
the four variables using different distribution types and fitting methods. For each 
random variable two different distributions types and two different curve fitting 
methods were used. The distribution types used were chosen on the basis of 
their historical use in failure frequency models such as Hazard Analysis and 
PIPIN. The distributions fitted for each variable are given in Table 7.3: 
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Distribution Type Curve Fitting Method 
Weibull Maximum Likelihood 
Weibull Least Squares 
Lognormal Maximum Likelihood 
Lognormal Least Squares 
Table 7.3: Distribution Range for Each Variable for Minitab Analysis 
 
In addition, a further range of distributions were fitted for the gouge depth 
variable using a reliability/survival analysis. The aim of the reliability/survival 
analysis was to censor the curve fitting method to lower depth values in an 
attempt to achieve distributions closer fit to higher depth values. As explained in 
section 7.4.1, the fit of the gouge depth distribution is more important at higher 
depths than lower ones as this is where the failure states occur. This condition 
does not follow for the other variables where a failure state can occur at any 
value. The additional distributions fitted for gouge depth are given in Table 7.4: 
 
Distribution Type Curve Fitting Method Censoring Depth (mm) 
Weibull Maximum Likelihood 1 
Weibull Least Squares 1 
Lognormal Maximum Likelihood 1 
Lognormal Least Squares 1 
Weibull Maximum Likelihood 0.5 
Weibull Least Squares 0.5 
Lognormal Maximum Likelihood 0.5 
Lognormal Least Squares 0.5 
Table 7.4: Additional Distributions for Gouge Depth for Minitab Analysis 
 
From the distributions given in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 the best fit was selected 
for each different variable on the basis of either the lowest calculated Anderson-
Darling coefficient; or, in the case of gouge depth, the observed best fit to the 
data points at the highest depth values.  
 
Using the above method a best fit distribution was selected for each variable 
from a range of at least four different fits. It should be noted however that the 
different fits considered by the method do not represent an exhaustive collection 
of all possible distributions for each variable. Other distribution types such as 
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exponential, gamma, logistic and loglogistic could be used to produce fits to the 
data. In addition, further options are also available to influence the procedure of 
curve fitting. It is possible that through some combination of these a better fit to 
the data sets for each variable could be achieved. Performing such an exercise 
would prove to be inconsequential however, due to the nature of the data 
source itself. Because of the level of uncertainty of the UKOPA Fault Database, 
the data sets derived for each variable depend upon a subjective interpretation 
of the data made by the assessor during their derivation. A separate analysis 
performed by a different assessor would yield different data sets regardless of 
the fact that the data source is the same. The data sets would be similar, 
however even small differences would affect the outcome of curve fitting leading 
to different “best fit” probability distributions. In conclusion, there is no definitive 
method of analysis of the UKOPA Fault Database to derive the true data sets 
for each of the random variables and therefore no way to determine the 
absolute best fit probability distributions. It must be accepted that the probability 
distributions derived from any analysis of the UKOPA Fault Database will have 
an associated error. 
 
In order to investigate the effect that differences in the probability distribution fits 
can have on the values of failure frequency calculated by the model a further 
analysis has been performed. For this analysis the failure frequencies 
calculated by three separate models, Model C, Model D and Model E have 
been compared. Model D is the Split Distributions model described in section 
7.4. Model C and Model E are identical to Model D, but use different gouge 
length probability distributions, selected from the distributions fitted as part of 
the Minitab analysis described above. The gouge length probability distributions 
derived as part of the Minitab analysis are shown in Figure 7.18 alongside the 
raw data points. 
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Figure 7.18: Gouge Depth Distributions Fitted for Minitab Analysis 
 
In Figure 7.18 the distributions selected for this analysis have been highlighted 
as thicker coloured lines. Note that in this case the distributions have been 
chosen because they represent the range of the different fits produced in the 
Minitab analysis in relation to the gouge depth data points, rather than the 
accuracy of their fit as determined by their goodness-of-fit parameters. A 
summary of the gouge depth distributions selected for models C, D and E is 
given in Table 7.5. The distributions for the other variables are identical and 
equivalent to those used in the Split Distributions model. 
 
Model Distribution Type Curve Fitting Method 
Censoring 
Depth 
(mm) 
C Weibull Maximum Likelihood N/A 
D Lognormal Maximum Likelihood 0.5 
E Lognormal Maximum Likelihood 1 
Table 7.5: Gouge Depth Distributions for Models in the “Effect of 
Distribution Choice on Failure Frequency” Comparison 
 
Estimated pipeline failure frequency values have been calculated using Model 
C, Model D and Model E for the six example pipeline cases listed in Table 5.1. 
A comparison between total failure frequency values for example 1 is shown in 
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Figure 7.19. Equivalent charts for the remaining examples are included in 
Appendix A . 
 
 
Figure 7.19: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model C, Model D 
and Model E for Example 1 
 
The results show that the model using the gouge depth distribution which gives 
the lowest gouge depth probabilities of those selected in Figure 7.18, Model C, 
produces the lowest values of calculated failure frequency. Similarly the model 
which gives the highest gouge depth probabilities in Figure 7.18 produces the 
highest calculated values of failure frequency, Model E.  
 
From the results it can be concluded that failure frequency is strongly influenced 
by the distributions used in its calculation. In terms of the models used in this 
analysis, if a comparison is made between the differences produced by 
introducing the modifications to the model explained in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 
(shown in Figure 7.14 for example 1); and the differences produced by 
changing the gouge depth distribution only, distribution choice is shown to be a 
significant factor, especially at high wall thickness. At approximately 20 mm wall 
thickness Model C produces values of failure frequency which are almost an 
order of magnitude lower than those produced by Model E. The difference 
becomes increasingly divergent as wall thickness is increased further. In 
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comparison the differences produced over the whole range of model 
modifications shown in Figure 7.14 is of approximately the same order. 
Furthermore, the differences shown account for changes in the distributions of 
only one of the five random variables. Further differences, either additive or 
subtractive depending on the chosen distributions, would occur if the 
distributions for the other random variables were also changed between 
models. It is also noted that the values of failure frequency calculated using 
Model C are the lowest of all the models considered so far. A particular choice 
of distribution could therefore potentially lead to non-conservative results. 
 
It is recommended that further work is performed towards investigating the 
potential error in failure frequencies as a result of interpretation of the UKOPA 
Fault Database and selecting a distribution fit. 
 
7.7 Additional Model Considerations for AFFECT 
 
The Split Distributions model described in section 7.4 represents the final stage 
in the construction of the AFFECT model. However, following on from the 
discussion in section 2.8 there are two additional considerations to be 
addressed.  
 
Firstly, as noted in section 5.7, the updated value for the Penspen Incident-Rate 
used in the AFFECT model refers to pipelines located in R-type areas only. The 
basic AFFECT model is therefore applicable only to rural pipelines. In the 
discussion from section 2.8 it was suggested that an appropriate factor applied 
to the R-type Incident-Rate could be used to account for pipelines located in S-
type areas. The PIPIN failure frequency model employs such a system, using a 
factor of 4. An analysis has been performed using the 2010 UKOPA Fault 
Database in order to derive a similar factor for the AFFECT model. This factor is 
given in Table 7.6. The factor is derived by calculating the ratio of the total 
number of external interference incidents affecting pipelines in R-type areas to 
the total number of external incidents affecting pipelines in S-type areas.  
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Incident-Rate 
Factor 
3.6 
Table 7.6: R-Type/S-Type Area Incident-Rate Factor for AFFECT 
 
Secondly, as noted in the discussion in section 2.8, pipeline depth of cover is an 
important consideration when applying a failure frequency model to a specific 
pipeline. For the basic AFFECT model a pipeline is assumed to have the 
average depth of cover for all of the pipelines considered in the UKOPA Fault 
Database. This follows from the probability distributions and Incident-Rate used 
in the model, which are derived from an amalgamation of the data from each 
damaged pipeline. Both the FFREQ and PIPIN models included a facility to take 
into account the pipeline depth of cover by applying modifying factors to the 
Incident-Rate. These factors were derived from separate analyses performed 
when the models were originally developed. An updated analysis was 
performed in 2012 by GLND on behalf of UKOPA, which can be used to provide 
similar factors for the AFFECT model. The modifying factors were derived from 
historical operational data contained in the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database by 
relating the number of pipeline damage incidents to the depth of cover (Mumby, 
2012). The modifying factors for depth of cover derived by GLND are shown 
graphically in Figure 7.20. For comparison the equivalent factors from FFREQ 
and PIPIN are also shown. 
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Figure 7.20: Depth of Cover Factors from GLND with PIPIN and FFREQ 
 
Figure 7.20 shows that for the GLND analysis the modifying factor has a value 
of 1 when the depth of cover is 1.6 m. It follows logically that if the depth of 
cover factor is omitted, the assumption is that the particular pipeline under 
consideration is buried with a depth of 1.6 m. This value is higher the value 
derived for FFREQ but approximately equal to that from PIPIN. Above 1 m 
depth of cover the modifying factors are higher than those used in both FFREQ 
and PIPIN. 
 
7.8 Development of AFFECT (Part 2) Conclusions 
 
This chapter has charted the final two stages in the construction of AFFECT, a 
failure frequency model for dense phase carbon dioxide pipelines based upon 
probabilistic structural reliability methods. Additional factors have also been 
proposed to enable the AFFECT model to take account of pipelines located in 
S-type areas and pipeline depth of cover. The AFFECT model has been 
developed by making modifications to the PIE model, a basic failure frequency 
model which uses appropriate failure models identified in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. The modifications made in this chapter consider the results of a 
statistical analysis of the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database. Table 7.7 summarises 
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the basis and benefits of each discrete stage in the model development; a flow 
chart showing the progression of the entire AFFECT model is shown in Figure 
7.21.  
 
Each of the modifications addressed is considered to provide improvement to 
the PIE model. In addition to the stages detailed in Chapter 5, the Lognormal 
Force model and the Split Distributions model provide further improvement to 
the probability distributions describing the nature of pipeline mechanical 
damage.  
 
It is noted that the AFFECT model does not adequately address failures caused 
by damage to branches and fittings; and drilling operations in-error. In order that 
the model address failures of these types, the development of an historical data 
component or additional damage specific failure models would be required. The 
development of these elements however, has not been performed as part of this 
work. It is therefore recommended that such a task is considered as part of 
further work. 
 
It is concluded that differences in the probability distribution fits used to describe 
the random variables in a failure frequency model can have a significant effect 
on the values of failure frequency calculated by that model. It is recommended 
that further work is performed towards investigating the potential error in failure 
frequencies as a result of interpretation of the UKOPA Fault Database and 
selecting a distribution fit. 
 
Further comparison studies have been performed using AFFECT. These 
include an analysis of the trends observed when the model is applied to 
different pipeline scenarios and also comparison calculations with the observed 
failure rate of the UK pipeline system. This work provides validation of the 
model. Details are included in Chapter 8. It is recommended that the additional 
factors detailed in section 7.7 are used depending on the depth of cover of the 
pipeline and if the AFFECT model is to be applied to pipelines located in S-type 
areas. 
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Model Basis / Development Benefits 
Modified PIE 
Structural reliability model based upon a simplified 
version of the British Gas methodology. Updated 
with calculations from the Cosham model. 
Use of most appropriate models for leak / rupture, 
gouge failure and gouged dent failure. Probability of 
failure calculated accurately 
Re-Rounding As Modified PIE model but with EPRG dent re-rounding equation Dent depth is modelled more accurately 
Dent Force 
As Re-Rounding model but with EPRG dent force 
equation used to derive dent force distribution in 
place of dent depth 
Denting modelled more accurately, dependence on 
geometry is removed 
New Distributions As Re-Rounding model but with updated distributions Distributions up to date as of 2009 
Lognormal Force New Distributions and Dent Force models effectively combined 
Distributions up to date as of 2010 including dent 
force distribution 
Split Distributions Gouge and gouged dent parameters treated separately, new distributions for each derived 
Acknowledges the difference between the two forms 
of damage 
Table 7.7: Summary of the Basis and Benefits of All Stages in the 
Construction of AFFECT 
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Figure 7.21: All Stages in the Construction of AFFECT 
  
Key 
 
NG-18 – Flow stress dependent NG-18 equations 
 
BGDGFM – British Gas dent-gouge fracture model 
 
PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) – Derived by PIE using 
2005 UKOPA Fault Database 
 
RR – EPRG re-rounding equation 
 
DF – EPRG dent force equation 
 
PIPIN / Cosham Models – Taken from the PIPIN / 
Cosham Models 
 
Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) – Derived by Penspen 
using 2009 UKOPA Fault Database  
 
Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) – Derived by C. J. Lyons 
using 2010 UKOPA Fault Database 
 
 
Modified 
PIE 
Model
Re-
Rounding  
Model 
  
New 
Distributions 
Model 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM 
Incident-Rate:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent-Gouge Probability:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge length: PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge depth:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Depth:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM + RR 
Incident-Rate: PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent-Gouge Probability:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Length:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Depth:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Depth:   PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent 
Force 
Model 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM + RR + DF 
Incident-Rate:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent-Gouge Probability:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Length: PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Depth:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Force:   PIPIN / Cosham Models 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM + RR 
Incident-Rate:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
Dent-Gouge Probability:  PIE (2005 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Length:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Depth:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Depth:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD)
 
  
  
Lognormal 
Force 
Model 
Split 
Distributions 
Model 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM + RR +DF 
Incident Rate:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD)  
Dent-Gouge Probability:  Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Length:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Depth:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Force:  Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) 
Equations:   NG-18, BGDGFM + RR +DF 
Incident Rate:  Penspen (2009 UKOPA FD)  
Dent-Gouge Probability:  Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Length:  Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge in Dent Length:  Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge Depth:  Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) 
Gouge in Dent Depth: Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) 
Dent Force:  Lyons (2010 UKOPA FD) 
 
AFFECT 
model 
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Chapter 8. Trends of the AFFECT Failure Frequency Model for 
Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines 
 
Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 have detailed the development of the AFFECT model to 
calculate the failure frequency due to third party external interference of a dense 
phase CO2 pipeline. This chapter details an analysis of the trends observed 
when the AFFECT model is applied to different pipeline scenarios. Validation of 
the model is also provided through a comparison between model predictions, 
historical operational data and the current industry standard failure frequency 
model FFREQ. 
 
The studies included in this chapter are: 
 
 A comparison between the number of failures recorded historically for 
pipelines in the UKOPA Pipeline Database; and the number which would 
be expected as calculated using both the AFFECT and FFREQ models. 
 A sensitivity study of pipeline failure frequency calculated using the 
AFFECT model, to wall thickness. 
 A sensitivity study of pipeline failure frequency calculated using the 
AFFECT model, to design factor. 
 An example comparison between the operating stress of a 610 mm 
external diameter dense phase CO2 pipeline operating at 135 barg; and 
its proximity to the leak/rupture boundary for a long defect, calculated 
using the AFFECT model. 
 
8.1 Comparison with Historical Operational Failure Data 
 
Although AFFECT has been developed for the purpose of application to thick 
wall dense phase CO2 pipelines, the model is based upon the methodology 
originally developed by British Gas for the Hazard Analysis model and can be 
used to estimate failure frequencies for both thin and thick wall pipelines. Taking 
this into consideration a validation study has been performed by comparing the 
number of failures of pipelines listed in the UKOPA Pipeline Database 
(McConnell, 2012) which would be expected when calculated by AFFECT, with 
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the true value from historical operational failure data (McConnell, 2011). A 
comparison with the industry standard failure frequency software FFREQ has 
also been included. 
 
8.1.1 AFFECT Calculation 
 
The UKOPA Pipeline Database contains details of 2,300 pipelines located in the 
UK, including both those currently operating and those decommissioned. Like 
the UKOPA Fault Database the UKOPA Pipeline Database includes information 
about the pipelines including their external diameter, wall thickness, steel grade 
and operating pressure. It also includes information on the length of each 
pipeline, their commissioning and decommissioning dates (where relevant), and 
whether they are routed through R-type, S-type or town (T-type) areas. 
 
A value for the expected number of failures on pipelines listed in the UKOPA 
Pipeline Database can be calculated by the AFFECT model based on the 
operational exposure of pipelines in the database. 
 
In the AFFECT model, the Incident-Rate is the number of times per unit of 
operational exposure that a pipeline is subject to damage due to third party 
external interference. By multiplying the Incident-Rate by the pipeline 
operational exposure, a value for the total predicted number of third party 
external interference damage incidents a pipeline has experienced in its lifetime 
can be derived: 
 
Number of Third Party External Interference Damage Incidents = Incident-Rate 
x Operational Exposure 
 
This value can then be multiplied by the probability of failure for the pipeline, 
calculated by AFFECT, in order to determine a value for the total number of 
failures a pipeline has suffered in its lifetime. 
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In order to calculate the total expected number of failures on pipelines listed in 
the UKOPA Pipeline Database, the above method has been applied to each 
pipeline in the database individually and the results summed. 
The AFFECT model as described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 calculates failure 
frequencies for pipelines routed through R-type areas. In order to take account 
of pipelines in the UKOPA Pipeline Database routed through S-type and T-type 
areas in this study, the Incident-Rate factor of 3.6 described in section 7.7 has 
been applied. An increased Incident-Rate acknowledges the increased level of 
third party activity in these areas. 
 
Note that specific depth of cover information for each pipeline in the UKOPA 
Pipeline Database was not provided. The depth of cover factors described in 
section 7.7 were therefore not applied as part of the calculation. In excluding 
these factors, the assumption is that each pipeline in the database has a depth 
of cover equal to the average depth of cover for the entire database. This was 
considered to be a reasonable assumption given that the calculation considers 
a sum over every pipeline within the database. 
 
For each pipeline in the UKOPA Pipeline Database the external diameter and 
operational exposure for each area class have been taken as stated in the 
database. The pipe yield strength and tensile strength in each case have been 
assumed as the SMYS and the SMUTS of the reported pipe grade. The pipeline 
operating pressure and wall thickness have been taken from the fields 
“Maximum Operating Pressure” and “Main Nominal Wall Thickness” in the 
database, respectively. The 2/3 Charpy v-notch energy for each pipeline is not 
recorded in the UKOPA Pipeline Database. Conservatively a value of 27 J has 
been assumed for each case. 
 
Note that in the UKOPA Pipeline Database seven pipelines do not have a 
reported pipe grade, 11 do not have a reported maximum operating pressure, 
29 do not have a reported wall thickness and one pipeline does not have a 
reported external diameter, wall thickness or pipe grade. In the absence of this 
information these 48 pipelines have not been included in the calculation of the 
expected number of pipeline failures. The calculation therefore considers a total 
of 2,252 pipelines. 
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8.1.2 Historical Operational Failure Data 
 
The historical operational failure data used in the comparison with the AFFECT 
calculation is taken from the 2010 UKOPA Fault Database described in Chapter 
6.  
 
By construction, the AFFECT model is used to calculate the pipeline failure 
frequency, due to third party external interference, which has resulted in part-
wall or through-wall damage (either a gouge or a gouged dent), to a pipe body, 
or pipe bend. The UKOPA Fault Database includes the details of failures 
caused by third party external interference, which occurred to components such 
as weldolets, valves, tees, stand pipes etc. Failure incidents such as these are 
not appropriate for a comparison with calculations made by AFFECT and are 
therefore not included. In addition, punctures to the pipeline resulting from 
drilling operations in-error are not included in the comparison; pipeline failure 
resulting from this form of damage is not the same as a conventional through-
wall failure. From a total of 39 historical incidents of pipeline failure caused by 
external interference recorded in the UKOPA Fault Database, there are 
conservatively 18 which are considered appropriate for comparison with 
calculations made using AFFECT. Further details on the UKOPA Fault 
Database and the suitability of data with respect to the AFFECT model are 
contained in Chapter 6. 
 
Details of the 18 pipeline failure incidents used in the comparison are given in 
Table 8.134: 
 
 
 
 
                                            
34 Note that in comparison with Table 6.11 in Chapter 6, only the individual 
defects considered to have been the source of the failure are shown in Table 
8.1. Additional defects which share the same fault number as those in Table 8.1 
but did not fail are not shown. 
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Description Date Discovered 
Pipeline 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Extent of 
Damage 
Fault Comment from the UKOPA Fault 
Database 
Gouge (failure) 20 May 1980 218 6.4 Leak LINE HOLED BY PNEUMATIC DRILL 
Gouge (failure) 28 April 1978 102 4.8 Leak 2 HOLES 
Gouge (failure) 28 April 1978 102 4.8 Leak 2 HOLES 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 08 June 1972 324 6.4 Leak 4 HITS , 1 PENETRATION 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 31 May 1988 218 7.1 Leak Damaged by FE20 excavator during landscaping 
Gouge (failure) 09 June 1970 218 5.6 Fracture No Loss, severed pre commission 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 30 September 1971 324 6.4 Leak HOLE , INDENTATION 
Gouge (failure) 28 September 1983 325 6.4 Leak TRENCH CUTTER HOLED PIPE 
Gouge (failure) 04 February 1992 218 7.1 Leak PIPE CUT BY GRINDER IN ERROR 
Gouge (failure) 03 May 1978 457 9.5 Fracture SHEETPILERSLICEDTHRUSIDEOFPIPE 
Gouge (failure) 27 April 1971 168 4.4 Fracture LINE SHEARED BY MOLE PLOUGH 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 02 April 1990 168 4.8 Fracture 36 cust. Line holed by trencher during excavation for water main 
Gouge (failure) 01 December 1971 168 6.4 Leak JCB HIT DIVERTED PIPE-ROADWRKS 
Dent with Gouge (failure) 26 September 1984 168 4.8 Leak Mole plough holed pipe 
Gouge (failure) 17 November 1973 102 4.4 Fracture EXCV.FRACTUREDPIPE-LANDDRAINAG 
Gouge (failure) 03 April 1983 168 4.8 Fracture 30 cust. Line sliced longitudinally by D6 Bogmaster during roadworks 
Gouge (failure) 21 October 1983 168 5.6 Fracture 203x152mm hole punched by CAT 977 Traxcavator during drainage work 
Gouge (failure) 17 June 1969 457 10.3 Leak WELDED SLV REPAIR 
Table 8.1: Historical Operational Failure Data Used in Comparison with 
AFFECT 
 
8.1.3 FFREQ Calculation 
 
In addition to the calculation of the total expected number of failures on 
pipelines listed in the UKOPA Pipeline Database by AFFECT, a calculation has 
also been made using the FFREQ model. FFREQ is considered as the current 
industry standard for the calculation of pipeline failure frequency and has been 
used in pipeline QRA since the early 1990s (Corder, 1992; Corder, 1995a). 
Calculations made using FFREQ are included as a further comparison for the 
AFFECT model. 
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8.1.4 Comparison Results 
 
The AFFECT failure frequency model has been used to calculate the total 
expected number of failures on pipelines listed in the UKOPA Pipeline 
Database based on their operational exposure and the results have been 
compared with a similar calculation made using FFREQ and the true value from 
historical operational failure data. In order to present the comparison the failure 
values have been split into groupings by pipeline diameter and by failure mode, 
i.e. whether they represent a leak or a rupture. In Table 8.1 the classification 
“Leak” in the “Extent of Damage” column is assumed to refer to a leak failure 
whereas the classification “Fracture” is assumed to refer to a rupture35. Table 
8.2 shows the number of pipelines in each diameter group. 
 
Diameter (mm) No. of Pipelines Operational Exposure (km.yr) 
0 - 114 219 39239 
127 - 273 618 161610 
304 - 406 513 131519 
457 - 559 363 115165 
609 - 711 274 127103 
762 - 863 78 37942 
914 - 1219 187 172806 
All 2252 785350 
Table 8.2: Number of Pipelines and Operational Exposure per Diameter 
Group 
 
Figure 8.1 shows a comparison between the number of leak failures calculated 
by AFFECT, FFREQ and the true value from historical operational data. The 
data from Figure 8.1 is presented in Table 8.3. 
 
                                            
35In the AFFECT model, defects with an axial length longer than the critical 
length, for the specified operating conditions, are predicted to fail as a rupture. 
Defects with an axial length shorter or equal to the critical length are predicted 
to fail as a leak. 
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Figure 8.1: Comparison between AFFECT, FFREQ and Historical 
Operational Data for Leaks 
 
Diameter (mm) AFFECT Leaks FFREQ Leaks Historical Leaks 
0 - 114 1.59 1.91 2 
127 - 273 5.05 6.59 5 
304 - 406 2.66 3.93 3 
457 - 559 1.21 2.11 1 
609 - 711 0.77 1.44 0 
762 - 863 0.17 0.30 0 
914 - 1219 0.99 1.26 0 
All 12.44 17.55 11 
Table 8.3: Number of Leaks from AFFECT, FFREQ and Historical 
Operational Data 
 
From Figure 8.1, the historical operational data shows that all leak failures 
occurred on pipelines with diameters less than 609 mm (24”). The most failures 
occurred in the diameter group 127 to 273 mm (5 to 10”), in which there were 
five leaks. The overall trend of the historical operational data is a decrease in 
the number of failures per diameter group with an increase in diameter. This 
trend is due to the increased wall thickness as pipeline diameter increases, 
giving better resistance to damage. The smallest diameter group, 0 to 114 mm 
(0 to 4”) does not follow the trend shown by the other groups and contains only 
two leak failures. Pipelines in this group are the most susceptible to failure in 
the event of damage and therefore this group would be expected to show the 
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largest number of failures. The low number of leak failures in this case is due to 
the relatively low number of pipelines and operational exposure contained within 
this group compared with the other smaller diameter groups. 
 
In terms of the calculated data, both failure frequency models are shown to 
closely follow the general trend of the historical operational data. For leaks the 
AFFECT model gives more accurate values than FFREQ. If the data is rounded 
to the nearest failure, which is considered reasonable given that fractional 
failures cannot occur, then AFFECT predicts the same values as observed in 
the historical operational data for five of the seven diameter groups. In the 
remaining two groups AFFECT gives calculated values which are conservative 
by one failure. Conversely, FFREQ is more conservative than the historical 
operational data. The values calculated by FFREQ are greater than observed in 
the historical operational data in five of the seven diameter groups. 
 
It is concluded that, when applied to the UKOPA Pipeline Database, both 
AFFECT and FFREQ give a good approximation of the number of leak failures 
in comparison to historical operational data. Both models are conservative, 
however the AFFECT model produced the most accurate results. 
 
Figure 8.2 shows a comparison between the number of rupture failures 
calculated by AFFECT, FFREQ and the true value from historical operational 
data. The data from Figure 8.2 is presented in Table 8.4. 
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Figure 8.2: Comparison between AFFECT, FFREQ and Historical 
Operational Data for Ruptures 
 
Diameter (mm) AFFECT Ruptures FFREQ Ruptures 
Historical 
Ruptures 
0 - 114 0.25 0.28 1 
127 - 273 2.25 3.19 5 
304 - 406 0.53 0.67 0 
457 - 559 0.22 0.28 1 
609 - 711 0.22 0.26 0 
762 - 863 0.05 0.05 0 
914 - 1219 0.45 0.50 0 
All 3.97 5.23 7 
Table 8.4: Number of Ruptures from AFFECT, FFREQ and Historical 
Operational Data 
 
From a risk assessment point of view, ruptures are the most important of the 
two failure modes. A rupture is significantly worse than a leak in terms of the 
consequences. In a similar way to leaks Figure 8.2 shows a decrease in the 
number of failures with increasing diameter; all rupture failures occurred on 
pipelines with diameters less than 609 mm (24”). However, the majority of the 
data is contained within one diameter group, 127 to 273 mm (5 to 10”), and the 
drop off with increasing diameter is more abrupt than in the leak case. This can 
be explained by noting that an increase in diameter and wall thickness not only 
increases a pipeline’s resistance to failure, but also increases the margin 
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between defects which fail as a leak and those which fail as a rupture36. i.e. 
there is an additional factor of protection against ruptures in comparison with 
leaks. The low number of failures in the 0 to 114 mm (0 to 4”) diameter group 
can again be explained by the relatively low number of pipelines and low 
operational exposure within this group. 
 
In terms of the calculated data, both failure frequency models match the overall 
trend in the historical operational data, however neither model displays the 
same level of accuracy in predicted values as was observed for the leak case. 
For diameter groups in which ruptures were recorded, both AFFECT and 
FFREQ give non-conservative values.  
 
It should be noted however that determining which historical operational rupture 
data would be suitable for a comparison to failure frequency model calculations 
is difficult. Both failure frequency models define rupture in terms of the failure of 
severe part-wall damage or punctures to the pipeline. The models do not 
address severed or broken pipe type failures, which are also defined as a form 
of pipeline rupture. The failure data contained within Table 8.1 is conservatively 
considered to be appropriate for comparison to the failure frequency models. 
However, it is noted that five of the total seven pipeline ruptures in the table 
include words in the “Comment” field such as “severed”, “sliced”, “sheared” and 
“fractured” which could suggest that a severed or broken pipe was the source of 
the rupture in these cases. If this data was removed from the comparison then 
the number of pipeline ruptures would be reduced to two residing in the 127 to 
273 mm diameter group. In this case the calculations of the failure frequency 
models would be more in line with the historical operational data. 
 
It should also be noted however, that this argument should only serve to 
highlight the difficulty of making a comparison between historical operational 
rupture data and failure frequency model calculations, rather than to imply the 
accuracy of AFFECT.  If the data was removed from the comparison then the 
                                            
36 Considering the effect of increased diameter and wall thickness on the critical 
length, which determines the leak / rupture behaviour of severe part-wall 
defects or punctures. Intuitively, a similar pattern would be expected between 
leaks and severed / broken pipe type ruptures. 
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probability distributions used in the AFFECT model would need to be refitted 
and AFFECT would produce different calculated values. All of the rupture data 
has been included in the development of the model and therefore also included 
in the comparison.  
 
The decision to include all of the rupture data in the development of AFFECT 
was made because of the uncertain nature of the UKOPA Fault Database. 
Despite the presence of the terms noted above for five of the seven pipeline 
ruptures, the limited information available for each damage record in the 
database makes it difficult to ascertain the exact nature of each failure. Unlike 
failures caused by drilling operations in-error, which are more readily identified 
by the “Comment” field and thus can justifiably be removed, the descriptors 
used for rupture are more open to subjective interpretation. The data was 
retained for the purposes of the model development as the evidence for its 
removal was considered to be insufficient. 
 
The fact that the results from this study do not match up to the historical 
operational rupture data suggests that this interpretation may be incorrect and 
that the data should be removed and used in the development of a separate 
failure model or historical data component to address severed or broken pipes. 
An additional component to the model such as this may be necessary in order 
to provide a complete description of failure frequency due to third party external 
interference. 
 
It is concluded that, when applied to the UKOPA Pipeline Database, both 
AFFECT and FFREQ agree with the overall trend of historical operational 
rupture data. Both models are non-conservative, however an accurate 
comparison with rupture failures is difficult, due to the uncertain nature of the 
historical operational data. 
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8.2 Wall Thickness Sensitivity Study 
 
A sensitivity study has been performed in order to determine the variation in 
pipeline failure frequency calculated using the AFFECT model, with pipeline 
wall thickness. 
 
For the sensitivity study, the pipeline diameter, material grade (yield strength) 
and 2/3 Charpy v-notch impact energy have been set to fixed values, whilst the 
wall thickness is varied. Details of the fixed pipeline parameters are provided in 
Table 8.5. 
 
Parameter Value 
External Diameter (mm) 610 
Material Grade L450 
SMYS (Nmm-2) 450 
SMUTS (Nmm-2) 535 
2/3 Charpy V–Notch Impact Energy (J) 16737 
Table 8.5: Fixed Pipeline Parameters for Sensitivity Studies 
 
The study has been performed for three different design factors, 0.72, 0.5 and 
0.3, representing the defined operational limits for the area classes in the 
Institution of Gas Engineers and Managers (IGEM) standard for steel natural 
gas pipelines, IGEM/TD/1 (Anon., 2009). Pipeline design factor is related to the 
other operational parameters using Barlow’s formula: 
 
ߪு ൌ ߪ௒. ݂݀ ൌ ௉஽ଶ଴௧        (8.1) 
 
Where σH is the hoop stress in the pipe wall (in Nmm-2), σY is the yield stress (in 
Nmm-2), df is the design factor, P is the internal operating pressure (in barg), D 
is the external diameter of the pipeline (in mm) and t is the wall thickness (in 
mm). In the study, in order to counteract the effect of wall thickness variation on 
the design factor, the pipeline operating pressure has been varied in 
accordance with equation (8.1). 
                                            
37 The equivalent full size Charpy v-notch impact energy is 250 J. 
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For the wall thickness sensitivity study the depth of cover and S-type area 
factors have not been applied to AFFECT. The results therefore apply to 
pipelines located in R-type areas with the average depth of cover for a UK 
pipeline. 
 
Figure 8.3 shows the variation in failure frequency, as calculated by AFFECT, 
with wall thickness, for a pipeline with the fixed parameters from Table 8.5, 
operating at a design factor of 0.72. The results are presented for both the 
rupture and total failure frequency. 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Variation in Failure Frequency with Wall Thickness for 0.72 
Design Factor 
 
Figure 8.4 shows the variation in failure frequency, as calculated by AFFECT, 
with wall thickness, for a pipeline with the fixed parameters from Table 8.5, 
operating at a design factor of 0.5. The results are presented for both the 
rupture and total failure frequency. 
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Figure 8.4: Variation in Failure Frequency with Wall Thickness for 0.5 
Design Factor 
 
Figure 8.5 shows the variation in failure frequency, as calculated by AFFECT, 
with wall thickness, for a pipeline with the fixed parameters from Table 8.5, 
operating at a design factor of 0.3. The results are presented for both the 
rupture and total failure frequency. 
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Figure 8.5: Variation in Failure Frequency with Wall Thickness for 0.3 
Design Factor 
 
Figure 8.3, Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 show that pipeline failure frequency is 
strongly dependent on wall thickness. An increase in wall thickness results in a 
decrease in failure frequency. The same trend is seen for both rupture and total 
failure frequencies and at each design factor considered. The reason for this 
trend is that severe part-wall defects and through-wall punctures are less likely 
to occur in thick pipelines than thin ones, assuming the machinery and tools 
used by third parties in the vicinity of pipelines remain constant. The critical 
defect depth for part-wall failure increases with wall thickness and deeper 
defects are less common. For each design factor considered, both the rupture 
and the total failure frequency fall by approximately 1.5 orders of magnitude 
when the wall thickness is increased from 12.7 mm to 31 mm. The decrease in 
failure frequency with wall thickness is non-linear, meaning the relative benefit 
on failure frequency value decreases as the wall thickness increases, in 
addition to the absolute value. 
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8.3 Design Factor Sensitivity Study 
 
A sensitivity study has been performed in order to determine the variation in 
pipeline failure frequency calculated using the AFFECT model, with pipeline 
design factor. 
 
For the sensitivity study, the pipeline diameter, material grade (yield strength) 
and 2/3 Charpy v-notch impact energy have been set to fixed values, whilst the 
design factor is varied. Details of the fixed pipeline parameters are provided in 
Table 8.5. 
 
The study has been performed for two different wall thicknesses, 12.7 mm and 
19.1 mm. In the study, in order to allow a constant wall thickness to be used 
while design factor is varied, the pipeline operating pressure has been varied in 
accordance with equation (8.1). 
 
For the design factor sensitivity study the depth of cover and S-type area factors 
have not been applied to AFFECT. The results therefore apply to pipelines 
located in R-type areas with the average depth of cover for a UK pipeline. 
 
Figure 8.6 shows the variation in failure frequency, as calculated by AFFECT, 
with design factor, for a pipeline with the fixed parameters from Table 8.5, and a 
wall thickness of 19.1 mm. The results are presented for both the rupture and 
total failure frequency. 
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Figure 8.6: Variation in Failure Frequency with Design Factor for 19.1 mm 
Wall Thickness 
 
Figure 8.7 shows the variation in failure frequency, as calculated by AFFECT, 
with design factor, for a pipeline with the fixed parameters from Table 8.5, and a 
wall thickness of 12.7 mm. The results are presented for both the rupture and 
total failure frequency. 
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Figure 8.7: Variation in Failure Frequency with Design Factor for 12.7 mm 
Wall Thickness 
 
Figure 8.6 and Figure 8.7 show that pipeline failure frequency is strongly 
dependent on design factor. An increase in design factor results in an increase 
in failure frequency. The same trend is seen for both rupture and total failure 
frequencies and at each wall thickness considered. The reason for this trend is 
that a pipeline operating at a higher design factor is under higher stress than a 
pipeline at lower design factor. Severe part-wall defects are more likely to occur 
in high stress pipelines than low stress ones, assuming the machinery and tools 
used by third parties in the vicinity of pipelines remain constant. The critical 
defect depth for part-wall failure decreases with increasing stress and smaller 
defects are more common. For each wall thickness considered, the rupture 
failure frequency increases by approximately three orders of magnitude as the 
design factor is increased from 0.1 to 0.72; and the total failure frequency 
increases by approximately one order of magnitude. The increase in failure 
frequency with design factor is non-linear, meaning the relative detriment to the 
failure frequency value increases as the design factor is increased, in addition 
to the absolute value. 
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8.4 Leak / Rupture Example Calculation 
 
In this section an example calculation has been performed in order to 
demonstrate how pipeline failure mode can vary with wall thickness. The 
example considers a 610 mm external diameter dense phase CO2 pipeline, 
constructed from L450 grade steel and operating at a pressure of 135 barg. A 
comparison has been made between the operating stress of the pipeline at 
different wall thicknesses; and its proximity to the leak / rupture boundary for a 
hypothetical 508 mm (20”) long defect, calculated using the AFFECT model. 
 
For this example, the pipeline diameter, material grade (yield strength) and 
operating pressure have been set to fixed values, whilst the wall thickness is 
varied. In accordance with equation (8.1) this will result in a variation of the 
pipeline operating stress. Details of the fixed pipeline parameters are provided 
in Table 8.6.  
 
Parameter Value 
External Diameter (mm) 610 
Material Grade L450 
SMYS (Nmm-2) 450 
SMUTS (Nmm-2) 535 
Operating Pressure (barg) 135 
Table 8.6: Fixed Pipeline Parameters for Leak/Rupture Example 
 
The leak / rupture boundary for a 508 mm (20”) long defect in the pipeline has 
been calculated using the AFFECT model at each wall thickness considered. A 
508 mm defect has been chosen as an example of a long defect which could be 
introduced by third party external interference. In the UKOPA Fault Database 
approximately 90% of third party external interference defects are shorter than 
508 mm (Chapter 6). 
 
In the AFFECT model the leak / rupture boundary is defined by the flow stress 
dependent through-wall NG-18 equation (equation (3.2)): 
   
ߪு ൌ ܯିଵߪ  
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Where the flow stress, ߪ, is defined using equation (3.10): 
 
ߪ ൌ 1.15ߪ௒  
 
And the Folias factor, M, is given by equation (2.35): 
 
ܯ ൌ ට1 ൅ 0.26 ቀ ଶ௖√ோ௧ቁ
ଶ
  
 
A hoop stress greater than the right hand side of equation (3.2) will cause the 
defect to fail as a rupture; if the hoop stress is less than the right hand side of 
equation (3.2) then the defect will fail as a leak. 
 
Figure 8.8 shows the comparison between the operating stress of the pipeline 
and its proximity to the leak / rupture boundary at different wall thicknesses. The 
operating stress and leak / rupture boundary are presented in terms of the 
pipeline design factor. The leak / rupture boundary can be written in terms of the 
design factor using equation (8.1): 
 
݂݀ ൌ ெషభఙఙೊ          (8.2) 
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Figure 8.8: Operating Stress and Leak / Rupture Boundary Comparison for 
610 mm External Diameter, L450 Grade, 135 barg Pipeline with a 508 mm 
Long Defect 
 
Figure 8.8 shows that the operating stress (design factor) of the pipeline 
decreases as wall thickness is increased. The purple line represents the leak / 
rupture boundary of the 508 mm long defect. If the defect was to fail with the 
pipeline operating in the region above the boundary, the failure would occur as 
a rupture; if the defect was to fail with the pipeline operating in the region below 
the boundary, the failure would occur as a leak. The operating stress of the 
pipeline crosses the leak / rupture boundary at a wall thickness of approximately 
25 mm. As noted in section 8.1.4, a rupture is significantly worse than a leak in 
terms of the consequences. A leak failure is preferable to a rupture. In this 
example a wall thickness of at least 25 mm would ensure that all severe third 
party external interference defects and punctures up to a length of 508 mm 
would fail only as leaks. This would correspond to the pipeline operating at a 
maximum design factor of 0.37. It should be noted that as the wall thickness of 
the pipeline is increased, the chances of a through-wall puncture are reduced; 
and a severe part-wall defect would be less likely to occur as the critical defect 
depth for failure would increase and deeper defects are less common. 
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8.5 Trends of the AFFECT Failure Frequency Model Conclusions 
 
This chapter has considered an analysis of the trends observed when the 
AFFECT model is applied to different pipeline scenarios. Validation of the model 
has also been provided through a comparison between model predictions, 
historical operational data and the current industry standard failure frequency 
model FFREQ. 
 
When applied to the UKOPA Pipeline Database, it is concluded that both 
AFFECT and FFREQ give a good approximation of the number of leak failures 
in comparison to historical operational data. Both models are conservative, 
however the AFFECT model produced the most accurate results of the two. In 
terms of ruptures, both AFFECT and FFREQ agree with the overall trend of 
historical operational data. Both models are non-conservative, however an 
accurate comparison with rupture failures is difficult, due to the uncertain nature 
of the historical operational data. 
 
An analysis of failure frequency trends with wall thickness indicated that both 
rupture and total failure frequency calculated by AFFECT are strongly 
dependent on wall thickness. An increase in wall thickness results in a decrease 
in failure frequency. 
 
Similarly an analysis of failure frequency trends with design factor indicated that 
both rupture and total failure frequency calculated by AFFECT are strongly 
dependent on design factor. An increase in design factor results in an increase 
in failure frequency. 
 
It is recommended that further work is performed regarding the inclusion of 
historical operational rupture data in the development of AFFECT. The 
development of a separate failure model or historical data component to 
address severed and broken pipes may be necessary in order to provide a 
complete description of failure frequency due to third party external interference. 
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Chapter 9. A Shelter Model for Consequence Predictions 
Following A CO2 Pipeline Release 
 
The background and development of the AFFECT model detailed in Chapter 2 
to Chapter 8 is concerned with the likelihood of failure side of a QRA for a 
dense phase CO2 pipeline; the aim being to reduce the probability of 
occurrence of a catastrophic pipeline failure. The other side of the QRA 
procedure is the assessment of the potential consequences to any surrounding 
population in the event of such a failure. In Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 elements 
of the consequences of failure side are considered through an investigation into 
shelter and escape in the event of a rupture of a dense phase CO2 pipeline. 
 
A rupture to a pipeline carrying dense phase CO2 could have dramatic 
consequences for people located in the vicinity of the release. CO2 is both toxic 
and acts as an asphyxiant in high concentrations. Due to the high density of 
CO2 in comparison to air, a CO2 cloud emitted during a pipeline rupture could 
remain at ground level, therefore increasing the probability that people could be 
affected by such concentrations. 
 
It is assumed that in the event of a pipeline rupture, people outdoors in the 
vicinity will attempt to run from the CO2 cloud to safety. It is also reasonable to 
assume that nearby buildings could offer some form of shelter against the 
harmful effects of CO2. As the CO2 enters the building through open windows, 
doors or via the adventitious openings characteristic of all buildings, the 
concentration of CO2 within a building engulfed in a CO2 cloud is a matter of 
importance. For example, if the release was constant and continuous, 
eventually the concentration inside could increase to match that of the external 
atmosphere.  However it is considered that the time required for this process to 
occur could provide those taking shelter in the building with additional time 
before a harmful concentration is reached, increasing the chance of help 
arriving. In the case of a decaying release, it may be that the maximum 
concentration experienced indoors would be limited due to the effects of the 
decaying nature of the release and the closing of valves. 
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To investigate the level of shelter that buildings can provide; and the potential 
for escape on foot, in the event of a rupture of a dense phase CO2 pipeline, two 
models have been developed:  
 
 An indoor “shelter” model considering the ingress of CO2 into a building 
surrounded by an environment with a high CO2 concentration. 
 An outdoor “escape” model considering escape on foot from a moving 
cloud of CO2.  
 
The effect of CO2 exposure on humans is quantified in the form of a time-
accumulated dose which is calculated within both models. The development of 
the shelter model is described in Chapter 9 and the escape model is described 
in Chapter 10. In each chapter results are presented which have been produced 
using the models for a number of simulated releases of dense phase CO2 from 
a pipeline. 
 
A number of factors are considered between the two models. These include 
atmospheric conditions; the distance to the source of the CO2 release; the size 
of the air flow pathways into/out of the building; and the conditions of the 
pipeline failure. In terms of the escape model, starting position and direction of 
travel are also considered. 
 
Input data for the models has been provided by DNV-GL. The data was 
generated by simulating pipeline failure events using DNV-GL’s own custom 
built flat terrain computer model (Cleaver, 2014e). Input data produced using 
the Phast model (Anon., 2011b) has also been provided by HSL. In addition, the 
shelter model has been verified using experimental data from the Spadeadam 
test site. All of the input data has been produced from release and dispersion 
studies performed as part of the wider COOLTRANS research programme. 
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9.1 Shelter Model Background and Development 
 
The shelter model considers the ingress of CO2 into a single building and the 
subsequent effect this has on the building occupants. The model is based on 
the principles of natural building ventilation which are explained by Etheridge 
and Sandberg (Etheridge, 1996) and form the basis for the simple ventilation 
equations in British Standard BS 5925 (Anon., 1995).  
 
In the model it is assumed that initially the concentration of CO2 in the building 
is the low background level in the atmosphere.  It is assumed that the pipeline 
release occurs and that, as a result, the building is subject to a cloud of CO2 
that drifts past the building. The concentration of CO2 in the external 
atmosphere is transient and will change with time as the CO2 cloud released 
from the pipeline disperses. Similarly, the concentration of CO2 within the 
building will change as CO2 is drawn in from the concentrations outside through 
the process of natural ventilation. The change in the internal concentration of 
CO2 is modelled over the course of the rupture event. 
 
For the purposes of the model a building is represented as a three dimensional 
rectangular structure of specified length, width and height (lb,wb,hb), located at a 
fixed distance from a pipeline rupture. Openings in the building envelope 
between the indoor and the outdoor environment are used to represent the 
doors, windows and adventitious openings found in real buildings. The building 
is assumed to have no internal partitions, an assumption which is considered to 
be conservative and the concentration within the interior is assumed to be 
uniform. 
 
Air flow between the internal and external atmospheres in the building occurs 
due to a pressure difference across the openings in the building envelope. Air 
will flow from a region of higher pressure to a region of lower pressure. The 
pressure difference can arise as result of wind effects externally and/or 
buoyancy effects internally. An example of ventilation air flow incorporating both 
of these effects is shown in Figure 9.1. 
 
 275 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Air Flow through Openings due to Pressure Difference 
(Side View) 
 
9.1.1 Wind Pressure 
 
The dynamic pressure (in Pa) due to the (free stream) wind flow is given by 
(Etheridge, 1984; Etheridge, 1996): 
 
௪ܲ௜௡ௗ ൌ ଵଶ ߩ௔௜௥ܷ௪௜௡ௗଶ         (9.1) 
 
Where ρair is the density of the outside air (in kgm-3) and Uwind is the wind speed 
(in ms-1). 
 
Wind blowing against the surfaces of a building will cause an increase in the air 
pressure at those surfaces and any openings on those surfaces. Conversely, 
the surfaces and openings of the building sheltered from the wind will 
experience a decrease in air pressure. In order to determine the change in air 
pressure due to the effect of the wind on a particular building surface, equation 
(9.1) is multiplied by a surface pressure coefficient, Cp. The value of Cp depends 
upon the angle at which the wind impacts the surface in question. 
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9.1.2 Buoyancy Pressure 
 
Pressure differences due to buoyancy arise as a result of a difference in 
temperature between the internal and external environments. Due to the 
principle of hydrostatics, atmospheric air pressure decreases with increasing 
altitude (Etheridge, 1984; Etheridge, 1996). The pressure change (in Pa) from 
the bottom to the top of a building can be represented using the following 
equation: 
 
௔ܲ௧௠௢௦ ൌ ௥ܲ௘௙௘௥௘௡௖௘ ൅ ߩ௥௘௙௘௥௘௡௖௘݃௔ݖ௛     (9.2) 
 
Where Preference is the atmospheric pressure at the top of the building (in Pa), 
ρreference is the density of the air at the top of the building38 (in kgm-3), ga is the 
acceleration due to gravity (9.81 ms-2) and zh is the height above ground level at 
any point subtracted from the height of the building (in m).  
 
The density of the air in equation (9.2) can be approximated using the ideal gas 
equation: 
 
ߩ௥௘௙௘௥௘௡௖௘ ൌ ௉ೝ೐೑೐ೝ೐೙೎೐ோ಺்        (9.3) 
 
Where RI the ideal gas constant (8.31 Jmol-1K-1) and T the air temperature (in 
K).  
 
If the building is not air-tight and the internal atmosphere is at the same 
temperature as the external atmosphere then the internal and external pressure 
will be the same (assuming there is no wind) and will display an identical 
variation with height. 
 
An increased internal air temperature however, results in a reduction in the 
internal air density, from equation (9.3). Because of the principle of hydrostatics, 
                                            
38 Note that equation (9.2) assumes that the change in air density with height is 
negligible. This is a reasonable approximation when considering values of 
height of the order of the height of a building. 
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the less dense air within the building will rise resulting in an increased number 
of air molecules at the top of the building and a decreased number at the 
bottom. The internal air pressure is therefore increased from its initial value at 
the top of the building and decreased from its initial value at the bottom of the 
building. The resultant outcome is one of a steeper pressure gradient within the 
building than that outside, given by equation (9.2). At some point within the 
building above ground level there will exist a plane in which the internal 
pressure equals the external pressure, this is the neutral pressure level shown 
in Figure 9.1 and its position depends on the magnitude of the temperature 
difference between the internal and external atmospheres. Air will flow from 
high pressure to low pressure, therefore any openings in the envelope of the 
building below the neutral pressure level will draw air in from the outside and 
any openings above the neutral pressure level will push air outside. This sets up 
a flow of air within the building from the floor to the ceiling. 
 
9.1.3 Pressure Differences and Building Air Flow 
 
Within the shelter model, pressure differences across the openings in the 
envelope of the building are calculated by combining the effects of wind and 
buoyancy.  
 
Taking into account wind and hydrostatic effects, an expression for the external 
air pressure (in Pa) on a particular building face, at some value of zh, can be 
written as: 
 
௘ܲ௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ሺݖ௛ሻ ൌ ௥ܲ௘௙௘௥௘௡௖௘ ൅ ଵଶ ߩ௘௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ܷ௪௜௡ௗଶ ܥ௣ ൅ ߩ௘௫௧௘௥௡௔௟݃௔ݖ௛   (9.4) 
 
Similarly, the corresponding expression for the internal air pressure (in Pa) on 
the same face at the same value of zh can be written as: 
 
௜ܲ௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ሺݖ௛ሻ ൌ ௥ܲ௘௙௘௥௘௡௖௘ ൅	ܲᇱ ൅ ߩ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟݃௔ݖ௛    (9.5) 
 
For some value of P’  (in Pa), as yet undefined, that is determined by the 
location of the neutral pressure level and volume conservation. From equations 
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(9.4) and (9.5), the difference in pressure (in Pa) across an opening in the 
envelope of the building at zh is given by: 
 
∆ܲሺݖ௛ሻ ൌ ଵଶ ߩ௘௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ܷ௪௜௡ௗଶ ܥ௣ െ ܲᇱ ൅ ݃௔ݖ௛ሺߩ௘௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ െ ߩ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ሻ  (9.6) 
 
As explained in section 9.1, a pressure difference between the internal and 
external environments causes air flow through openings in the building 
envelope. The magnitude of the air flow (in m2s-1) across an opening at zh can 
be calculated using (Etheridge, 1984; Etheridge, 1996): 
 
ܳሺݖ௛ሻ ൌ ܥௗ ௢ܹሺݖ௛ሻටଶ|∆௉|ఘೌ೔ೝ        (9.7) 
 
Where Cd is the coefficient of discharge for the particular type of opening under 
consideration, Woሺzhሻ is the width of the opening (in m) at zh and ρair is the 
internal or external air density (in kgm-3). 
 
By imposing a boundary condition for the conservation of volume, i.e. all air flow 
into the building must equal all air flow out of the building; the unknown 
pressure P’ in equations (9.5) and (9.6) can be calculated and the air flow (in 
m3s-1) for the building solved: 
 
׬ ܳ௜௡௭బ௛್ ݀ݖ௛ ൌ ׬ ܳ௢௨௧݀ݖ௛
଴
௭బ        (9.8) 
 
Where hb is the height of the building (in m) and z0 (in m) is the value of zh 
corresponding to the neutral pressure level from Figure 9.1 at which it is known 
that: 
 
௜ܲ௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ሺݖ଴ሻ ൌ ௘ܲ௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ሺݖ଴ሻ       (9.9) 
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9.1.4 Shelter Model Example Flow Rates 
 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 9.2 shows an example of how the ventilation 
flow rate for a building changes with an increasing wind speed, as calculated by 
the shelter model. 
 
In this particular example the flow rate is shown for constant temperature 
differences between the internal and external environment of 10, 20 and 30 
degrees Celsius39 as the wind speed changes from 0 ms-1 to 7 ms-1. For the 
purposes of this example the external and internal CO2 concentrations are 
equal to zero. Figure 9.2 presents the ventilation rate in terms of the number of 
air changes in the building per hour (AC/hr). This is a standard unit used in 
building ventilation studies (Anon., 1995) and is calculated by dividing the 
volume flow rate per hour by the total building volume. 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Example of Ventilation Rate with Increasing Wind Speed 
 
                                            
39 The choice of temperature differences for Figure 9.2 is arbitrary as the 
purpose is simply to illustrate the transition between buoyancy driven and wind 
driven ventilation as the wind speed increases. The values chosen however are 
within the range of typical values expected for a building located in the UK. 
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Figure 9.2 shows the relative strengths of wind driven and buoyancy driven 
ventilation and how these can change depending on the conditions. At low wind 
speeds (<1 ms-1) the chart shows that the ventilation rate is independent of the 
wind speed. In this region pressure differences arising due to the wind are 
negligible and the flow rate is driven by buoyancy arising from the temperature 
differences between the internal and external environments; a larger 
temperature difference produces a higher ventilation rate. As the wind speed is 
gradually increased the wind pressure gains more influence. In the region 
between 1 ms-1 and 2 ms-1 wind driven and buoyancy driven effects are of a 
similar magnitude and compete against each other in terms of the total air flow 
rate into and out of the building. This is shown by the slight dip in ventilation rate 
for each example. As the wind speed increases further the wind pressure 
becomes the dominant cause of pressure difference. The lines on the chart 
converge with each other beyond approximately 3 ms-1 showing that at wind 
speeds beyond this, the flow rate is driven by wind pressure only and buoyancy 
effects have become negligible. 
 
9.1.5 CO2 Concentration 
 
In equations (9.4) to (9.8) the flow rate of air into and out of a building is 
dependent on both the external and internal density of air. In the shelter model, 
the building is surrounded by a cloud of CO2 from a ruptured dense phase CO2 
pipeline resulting in a high external concentration of CO2 in the air. The external 
concentration of CO2 will change over time as the rupture event evolves. 
Furthermore the internal concentration of CO2 will change with time as more 
CO2 is drawn in from outside. An increased presence of CO2 compared to 
normal air will affect the air density. The internal and external air densities (in 
kgm-3) at any one time can be calculated by assuming an air/CO2 mixture which 
behaves as an ideal gas: 
 
ߩ௘௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ ൌ 	 ௉೐ೣ೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ோ಺ ቂ
௖೐ೣ೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗௠಴ೀమ
்೐ೣ೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ ൅
ሺଵି௖೐ೣ೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ሻ௠ೌ೔ೝ
்೐ೣ೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ ቃ   (9.10) 
 
ߩ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ ൌ 	 ௉೔೙೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ோ಺ ቂ
௖೔೙೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗௠಴ೀమ
்೔೙೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ ൅
ሺଵି௖೔೙೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ሻ௠ೌ೔ೝ
்೔೙೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ ቃ   (9.11) 
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Where Pexternal and Pinternal are the external and internal pressures (in Pa) 
respectively; RI is the ideal gas constant (in Jmol-1K-1); Texternal and Tinternal are 
the external and internal temperatures (in K); cexternal and cinternal are the internal 
and external volume concentrations of CO2; and mCO2 and mair are the molar 
masses of CO2 and air (in kgmol-1). For the purposes of the model the internal 
and external pressures in equations (9.10) and (9.11) are assumed to be the 
same and equal to Preference in equations (9.4) and (9.5). For cases of interest, 
associated with relatively higher external concentrations of CO2, this makes 
only a small difference to the calculated value of the density compared to the 
changes resulting from concentration variations and so is ignored. 
 
In the shelter model equation (9.8) is solved in order to determine the rate of air 
flow by ventilation into and out of the building at any instant in time. The air/CO2 
mixture from the outside drawn into the building is assumed to mix perfectly with 
the internal air/CO2 causing the internal concentration of CO2 to change. The 
internal concentration of CO2 is calculated using the following method (Harris, 
1989): 
 
The volume of CO2 flowing in to the building (in m3) in a time period dt (in s) is: 
 
∆ ஼ܸைమ௜௡ ൌ ܳ௜௡ܿ௘௫௧௘௥௡௔௟݀ݐ       (9.12) 
 
And the volume of CO2 flowing out of the building (in m3) over dt is: 
 
∆ ஼ܸைమ௢௨௧ ൌ ܳ௢௨௧ܿ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟݀ݐ       (9.13) 
 
Therefore the total change in internal CO2 concentration over dt is: 
 
݀ܿ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ሺ݀ݐሻ ൌ ቀ∆௏಴ೀమ೔೙ି∆௏಴ೀమ೚ೠ೟ቁ௏್ೠ೔೗೏೔೙೒       (9.14) 
 
Where Vbuilding is the total volume of the building (in m3). The total internal 
concentration at a time t	൅	dt will therefore be: 
 
ܿ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ሺݐ ൅ ݀ݐሻ ൌ ܿ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ሺݐሻ ൅ ݀ܿ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ሺ݀ݐሻ    (9.15) 
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9.1.6 Temperature Change 
 
Section 9.1.2 outlined the importance of internal and external temperature 
difference in establishing a ventilation flow rate due to buoyancy. CO2 vapour 
from a dense phase pipeline rupture can be released into the atmosphere at 
temperatures of approximately -80 degrees Celsius due to the Joule-Thomson 
effect. A low vapour temperature such as this can change the temperature of 
the external environment surrounding the building and therefore affect its 
density and the ventilation flow rate. Furthermore, as external air is drawn into 
the building as the event progresses the temperature of the internal 
environment will also be affected. These considerations are taken into account 
in the model by considering energy conservation. The energy equation is 
approximated to equation (9.16), which is derived assuming that heat changes 
from inside to outside are not significant and that any inflow caused by 
temperature changes in the interior can be neglected. 
 
ܯ௜௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ ௗ்೔೙೟೐ೝ೙ೌ೗ௗ௧ ൌ
ௗ௠೔೙
ௗ௧ ሺ ௘ܶ௫௧௘௥௡௔௟ െ ௜ܶ௡௧௘௥௡௔௟ሻ    (9.16) 
 
Where Minternal and min are the masses of air/CO2 mixture (in kg) within the 
building and entering the building in time dt respectively; and Tinternal and Texternal 
are the internal and external temperatures. Using equation (9.16) the change in 
internal temperature over dt can be calculated. 
 
9.2 CO2 Toxic Dose and Probit 
 
In the shelter model the effect that an increased atmospheric concentration of 
CO2 has on people is quantified in terms of a toxic dose. The toxic dose is 
cumulative over time meaning that duration of increased CO2 exposure is 
equally as important as the value of the concentration.  
 
A generalised equation for the toxic dose of exposure to some contaminant (in 
(ppmn0min) is: 
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ܦ௢ ൌ ׬ ܿ௢ሺݐሻ௡೚݀ݐ        (9.17) 
 
Where coሺtሻ is the concentration of the contaminant a person is exposed to in 
parts per million (ppm), and t is the time of the exposure in minutes. no is the 
toxic index which can take different values depending on the nature of the 
contaminant. For CO2 the HSE specify that the value no = 8 is used (Halford, 
2011; HSE, 2015). 
 
9.2.1 Dangerous Toxic Loads 
 
Dangerous toxic loads (DTL) are values of dose specified by the HSE40 which 
represent harmful levels of exposure to a contaminant (Halford, 2011):  
 
 The Specified Level of Toxicity (SLOT). For an average population 
exposed to the SLOT dose, 3% of people would be expected to die. The 
SLOT dose for CO2 is 1.5 x 1040 ppm8.min. 
 The Significant Likelihood of Death (SLOD). For an average population 
exposed to the SLOD dose, 50% of people would be expected to die. 
The SLOD dose for CO2 is 1.5 x 1041 ppm8.min. 
 
9.2.2 Probit 
 
The DTL values for CO2 can be used as part of a Probit analysis. In general, it 
is assumed that the percentage of fatalities (lethality) due to contaminant 
exposure in an average population follows a cumulative lognormal distribution 
with increasing toxic dose (Lees, 1996). 
 
ܨ ൌ ଵଶ ቂ1 ൅ erf ቀ
୪୬௫ିఓ೏
ఙ೏√ଶ ቁቃ       (9.18) 
 
Where erfሺxሻ is the error function.  
                                            
40 The HSE define fatalities from a SLOT dose as being between 1% and 5%. A 
value of 3% has been assumed in line with assumptions made by DNV-GL. 
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However, in a probit analysis the lethality response to increasing toxic dose is 
represented as a straight line, with the percentage lethality measured using a 
new unit, “probits”. By transforming known dose-lethality coordinates onto the 
probit scale, a straight line probit relationship for a particular contaminant can 
be derived. This relationship can provide a simple way to determine the 
percentage lethality in an average population at a specific dose. 
 
For the purposes of determining CO2 lethality in the shelter model, a straight 
line probit relationship has been derived using the SLOT and SLOD values 
given in section 9.2.1. The probit equation is: 
 
݌ݎ݋ܾ݅ݐ ൌ 0.82 lnሺ݀݋ݏ݁ሻ െ 72.41      (9.19) 
 
In this way, the chances of death for a building occupant can be plotted with 
exposure time for the model. 
 
9.3 Shelter Model Validation 
 
The shelter model has been validated for use using experimental data from the 
COOLTRANS test programme at Spadeadam (Allason, 2012). This section 
provides details of the test case used for the validation and shows a comparison 
between the results of the test case and predictions made using input data from 
the test case in the shelter model with the same conditions. In this way, the 
validity of the shelter model for predicting the change in the internal 
concentration of CO2 in a building following the rupture of a nearby dense 
phase CO2 pipeline is confirmed. 
 
9.3.1 Validation Test Case 
 
The validation test case was that of a scaled pipeline rupture experiment, with 
measurements taken of gas accumulation within a specific building, placed in 
the path of the drifting cloud produced by the rupture (Cleaver, 2013a; Cleaver, 
2013b). 
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In the rupture experiment, a simulated building was situated downwind of the 
source of release.  The structure used for this purpose was a welding hut 
normally used to provide protection during pipe welding operations on the test 
site. The hut was a metal framed building with sheet metal sides and a roof.  
The majority of the openings that are normally present on the building were 
deliberately sealed for the experiments.  However, two openings on opposing 
side walls were left open to provide a path for CO2 ingress and egress from the 
building. Figure 9.3 shows a sketch of the building and provides a record of the 
instrumentation that was used to record the CO2 concentration and 
temperatures at the inlet, within and at the outlet of the building. 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Schematic Drawing of the Welding Hut and Instrumentation 
 
The welding hut was installed downwind of the source of the release, on a line 
that is 15 degrees to the north of the measurement array centreline. The hut 
dimensions remain proprietary information to National Grid, but the actual 
dimensions to the nearest cm were used as input in the calculations that follow. 
 
A plot of the variation of concentration (as measured by sensors OC78 and 
OC79) and temperature (as measured by sensors FT56 and FT57) at the inlet 
against time is given in Figure 9.4 and Figure 9.5.  These show that the 
measurements made at the upper and lower levels of the inlet follow the same 
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trends and have a similar magnitude. This suggests that the average of the 
upper and lower values provides a reasonable estimate of the concentration 
and temperature of the air/CO2 mixture that entered the welding hut.  
 
 
Figure 9.4: Plot of the Concentration Values Recorded at the Inlet on the 
Front Face of the Welding Hut 
 
 
Figure 9.5: Plot of the Temperature Values Recorded at the Inlet on the 
Front Face of the Welding Hut 
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The average wind speed measured during the release was 1.15 ms-1 in a 
direction of 235o relative to the instrumentation centreline, the values are plotted 
in Figure 9.6 and Figure 9.7.  The wind is incident on the front face of the hut at 
an angle of approximately 20o from the normal.  
 
 
Figure 9.6: Recorded Wind Speed Upstream of Release 
 
 
Figure 9.7: Recorded Wind Direction Upstream of the Release 
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9.3.2 Shelter Model Test Case Predictions 
 
The shelter model was run using the same conditions and the external CO2 
concentration and temperature data from the experimental test case outlined in 
section 9.3.1 in order to calculate predictions of the internal CO2 concentration 
and temperature. These predictions were compared with the internal CO2 
concentration and temperature recorded in the test in order to provide validation 
for the shelter model. 
 
The experimental test case was not designed exclusively for the purposes of 
validating the shelter model. Consequently, certain minor differences exist 
between the allowable input for the model and the design of the test case. In 
order to allow for these differences a number of assumptions were made 
regarding the input to the model. The assumptions are listed below: 
 
 All experimental input data from non-integer times (2.1s, 2.2s, 2.3s 
etc.) was removed in order to reduce processing time. 
 The single rectangular windows front and back in the test case were 
replaced with two closely spaced square windows front and back in 
the shelter model. The windows were spaced with a vertical gap of 
0.04 m between them. 
 The windows both front and back in the shelter model are identically 
sized, unlike those in the experimental test case. The individual 
window area in the shelter model has been selected as the area of 
the rectangular window on the upwind face divided by 2 (i.e the total 
window area on the upwind face is identical to that of the experiment). 
 The experimental data included a number of negative values for 
external concentration. This was a side-effect of the particular 
instrumentation used for recording. For the external concentration 
input to the shelter model, these negative values were replaced with 
the lowest positive value in the data set. 
 External CO2 concentration and temperature input data was averaged 
over both sensors as suggested in section 9.3.1. 
 It was assumed that the wind was directly incident onto the face of 
the building with no angle to the normal.  
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 The front and back face pressure coefficients Cpf and Cpb were 
assumed to be 0.7 and -0.25 respectively and were taken from BS 
5925 (Anon., 1995) for a directly incident wind onto a building with the 
same dimensions as those in the experimental test case. 
 The window discharge coefficient Cd was assumed to be 0.61 and 
was taken from BS 5925 (Anon., 1995). 
 The wind speed used was an average of the entire set of wind speed 
measurements and had a value of 1.168 ms-1. 
 The initial internal temperature in the welding hut was assumed to be 
the same as the initial external temperature. 
 
Figure 9.8 shows the comparison between values of internal CO2 concentration 
predicted using the shelter model and those recorded during the experimental 
test case. For the experimental data in Figure 9.8 an average taken between 
values recorded at sensors OC75 and OC27 from Figure 9.3 represents the 
concentration inside the welding hut. An average between values recorded at 
sensors OC75, OC27, OC77 and OC76 is also shown, which incorporates 
additional measurements from the outlet to the hut. 
 
 
Figure 9.8: Comparison between Recorded and Predicted Values of 
Internal CO2 Concentration for the Validation Test Case 
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Figure 9.8 shows that the initial build-up of CO2 in the welding hut occurs faster 
in the experiment than predicted by the model, however the difference between 
model and experiment is reduced as the maximum concentration is 
approached. The predicted maximum CO2 concentration is reached within 
approximately 50 seconds of the experimental maximum. The maximum CO2 
concentration predicted by the model is only approximately 0.05% of CO2 
higher than experiment when considering the two internal sensors alone, and 
approximately 0.6% of CO2 lower than experiment when incorporating the outlet 
data. After the peak value is reached, the shelter model shows conservative 
behaviour, as the decay in CO2 concentration is slower than that recorded by 
the experiment. The general trend of the model follows the experimental data. 
 
Similarly, Figure 9.9 shows the comparison between the predicted and recorded 
values of internal temperature. For the experimental data in Figure 9.9 an 
average taken between values recorded at sensors FT23 and FT53 from Figure 
9.3 represents the concentration inside the welding hut. An average between 
values recorded at sensors FT23, FT53, FT54 and FT55 is also shown, which 
incorporates additional measurements from the outlet to the hut. 
 
 
Figure 9.9: Comparison between Recorded and Predicted Values of 
Internal Temperature for the Validation Test Case 
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Figure 9.9 shows that the initial drop in welding hut temperature occurs faster in 
the experiment than predicted by the model, however the difference between 
model and experiment is reduced as the minimum temperature is approached. 
The predicted minimum temperature is reached within 60 seconds of the 
experimental minimum. The minimum temperature predicted by the model is 
approximately 1.5 degrees lower than that of the experiment. After the minimum 
value is reached, the shelter model initially shows the temperature increase to 
be slower than that recorded by the experiment. After approximately 750 
seconds however, this trend is reversed and model temperatures exceed those 
of the experiment after approximately 1200 seconds. From this point onwards 
the model and experimental curves slowly converge. 
 
From the comparisons shown in Figure 9.8 and Figure 9.9 it can be concluded 
that the shelter model gives a good approximation to experimental data for both 
internal CO2 concentration and internal temperature. The shelter model is 
considered suitable for the purpose of predicting the change in the internal 
concentration of CO2 in a building following the rupture of a nearby dense 
phase CO2 pipeline. 
 
9.4 Model Simulations 
 
9.4.1 DNV-GL Cases 
 
For the purposes of the COOLTRANS research programme, DNV-GL have 
performed simulations of a dense phase CO2 pipeline rupture using their in-
house, custom built, flat terrain dispersion model developed from the results of 
COOLTRANS experiments (Cleaver, 2014e). The DNV-GL model simulates the 
dispersion of the released CO2 cloud and provides values for atmospheric CO2 
concentration and vapour temperature variation with time and distance from the 
release.  
 
The data from these simulations has been used as input to the shelter model in 
order to investigate the level of shelter a nearby building can provide in the 
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event of a real dense phase CO2 pipeline rupture (Cleaver, 2014e; Cleaver, 
2014b; Cleaver, 2014c; Cleaver, 2014d; Cleaver, 2014a). 
 
In order to explore shelter under different conditions, the results of four different 
simulation cases have been provided. Each simulation is based upon a double 
ended guillotine break type rupture at the mid-point of a 96 km long dense 
phase CO2 pipeline. Details of the input conditions which remain constant 
between each simulation are provided in Table 9.1.  
 
Input Value 
Pipeline Length 96 km 
Pipeline Outside Diameter 610 mm 
Pipeline Wall Thickness 19.4 mm 
Pipeline Internal Pressure 150 barg
Material Carbon Dioxide 
Table 9.1: DNV-GL Dispersion Model Input Conditions 
 
The input conditions which vary between each simulation are the atmospheric 
conditions, the temperature of the CO2 in the pipeline and whether or not shut-
off valves are operated in the event of a rupture. The four cases considered are: 
 
1. CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s 
wind speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. 
 
2. CO2 at 10°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s 
wind speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. 
 
3. CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s 
wind speed), no valve closure. 
 
4. CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 2F (night with 2 m/s 
wind speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. 
 
Case 1 is regarded as the default case, with the remaining three cases each 
providing sensitivity in one of the variable input conditions, whilst keeping the 
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others constant. In the simulations, atmospheric conditions of 5D are used to 
represent a rupture during daylight hours whereas conditions of 2F represent a 
rupture at night. The implications these conditions have for the shelter model 
are the presence of different wind speeds in each case. 
 
The shelter model has been applied to the results of the above four simulations 
from DNV-GL. The main variable considered in the investigation was the 
distance of the building from the release. For the purposes of the investigation 
all other variables were kept constant. The distances used in the investigation 
were exclusively along the centreline axis in the simulated release and the wind 
was assumed to be blowing directly onto the face of the building closest to the 
rupture source (angle of 0° to the normal). In each of the four cases DNV-GL 
has modelled the CO2 cloud dispersion for two hours following the rupture or 
until the external CO2 concentration returned to the pre-release level. 
 
The data from the DNV-GL simulations includes two values for atmospheric 
CO2 concentration and one value for external temperature. The concentration 
values are termed “C-mean” and “C-equiv”. “C-mean” is a value for the mean 
atmospheric CO2 concentration and “C-equiv” is an “equivalent” higher value 
adjusted so that concentration fluctuations are included. For the cases 
considered, the values for “C-mean” have been used in conjunction with the 
temperature values in order to calculate the air flow rates between the internal 
and external atmospheres in the shelter model. The values of “C-equiv” have 
been used in conjunction with the calculated air flow rates to determine the toxic 
dose and lethality within the building. It is assumed in the analysis that the CO2 
cloud completely envelopes the building over all dimensions. 
 
Table 9.2 provides the assumptions and input conditions for the shelter model 
used in the investigation. 
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Input Value 
Starting Internal Temperature 293 K (20° C) 
Initial Internal CO2 Concentration 0.039% 
Wind Direction 0° to the normal 
Initial External CO2 Concentration 0.039% 
Building Height 5 m 
Building Length 10 m 
Building Width 10 m 
Cp Front Face 0.7 
Cp Back Face -0.2 
Window Discharge Coefficient, Cd 0.61 
Number of Windows on Front/Back Face 2 on each 
Height of Bottom of Lowest Window 0.25 m 
Vertical Separation of Windows 2 m 
Window Area 0.02125 m2 
Table 9.2: Shelter Model Input Conditions and Assumptions 
 
The window discharge coefficient and pressure coefficients for the specified 
wind direction were taken from BS 5925 (Anon., 1995). 
 
The building used in the analysis was a single cuboid structure with dimensions 
given in Table 9.2, the interior of the building did not contain different rooms or 
partitions. The dimensions of the building are taken from the DNV-GL report 
9500 (Halford, 2011) which presented a similar study based on a simple wind 
driven ventilation model. The windows in the building were square shaped and 
identically sized. For the investigation the window area has been chosen as 
0.02125 m2. A starting internal temperature of 20° C was chosen as an example 
of a typical room temperature.  
 
The choice of input conditions and assumptions produces a ventilation flow rate 
of approximately 0.65 AC/hr when the building is subject to a direct wind of 5 
m/s with a 10° C temperature difference between the internal and external 
environment. As explained in section 9.1 the ventilation flow rate will vary 
depending on the wind speed; internal and external CO2 concentration; and 
internal and external temperature difference. The ventilation flow rate is 
therefore subject to continuous variation throughout the course of each 
simulation. Typical ventilation rates for a real dwelling with internal partitions 
range between 0.5 and 3 AC/hr (Harris, 1989). If internal partitions were 
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included in the model it is anticipated that the flow rate would vary between 
different rooms, and that the predicted CO2 concentration would be higher in 
rooms on the side facing the wind than those on the opposite side; and higher 
on the ground floor than on the upper floor. 
 
9.4.2 Investigation Results 
 
The change in internal CO2 concentration and temperature with time has been 
modelled for a building, located at eight distances along the centreline axis, 
using the shelter model with the DNV-GL simulations. In each case, following 
the rupture there is a period of time before the cloud reaches the building in 
which the internal and external conditions remain constant at their initial levels. 
The duration of this time period is determined by the wind speed, which controls 
the speed of the released CO2 cloud; and the distance of the building from the 
rupture. The distances considered and respective times that the CO2 cloud 
takes to reach the building, for each of the wind speeds investigated are shown 
in Table 9.3. 
 
It is noted that the building is located downwind on the centreline axis in each 
case. The results produced may be different for a similar distance crosswind or 
upwind. The downwind case is assumed to be the worst case direction. In a full 
QRA, other locations throughout the cloud would be also need to be 
considered. 
 
Distance (m) Time at Wind Speed of 2 m/s (s) Time at Wind Speed of 5 m/s (s) 
100 50 20 
150 75 30 
200 100 40 
300 150 60 
400 200 80 
500 250 100 
700 350 140 
1000 500 200 
Table 9.3: Time Taken for the Arrival of CO2 Cloud with Distance from 
Rupture 
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Mean Concentration 
 
Figure 9.10 shows the change in the mean internal concentration of CO2 (C-
mean) calculated using the shelter model for the eight distances given in Table 
9.3 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 
5 m/s wind speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. The mean external 
concentration with time is also shown. Charts for the remaining cases are 
included in Appendix C . 
 
 
Figure 9.10: Change in Mean Internal CO2 Concentration with Time and 
Distance for Case 1 
 
For each case considered, the calculated internal concentration follows a trend 
of diminishing increase. The reason for this is that the internal concentration 
always acts to match the time-decaying external concentration. As a result, the 
maximum mean internal concentration of CO2 is reached when it equals the 
external concentration, after this point it begins to fall. 
 
For the purposes of this investigation, the mean internal and external CO2 
concentrations contribute to the value of air flow rate between the internal and 
external atmospheres. 
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Temperature 
 
Figure 9.11 shows the change in the internal temperature calculated using the 
shelter model for the eight distances given in Table 9.3 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C 
in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve 
closure after 15 minutes. The external temperature with time is also shown. 
Charts for the remaining cases are included in Appendix C . 
 
 
Figure 9.11: Change in Internal Temperature with Time and Distance for 
Case 1 
 
For each case considered, the calculated internal temperature follows a trend of 
diminishing decrease. The reason for this is that the internal temperature 
always acts to match the time-increasing external temperature. As a result, the 
minimum internal temperature is reached when it equals the external 
temperature, after this point it begins to rise. 
 
In the shelter model, the internal and external temperatures contribute to the 
value of air flow rate between the internal and external atmospheres.  
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Equivalent Concentration 
 
Figure 9.12 shows the change in the equivalent internal concentration of CO2 
(C-equiv) calculated using the shelter model for the eight distances given in 
Table 9.3 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D 
(day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. The equivalent 
external concentration with time is also shown. Charts for the remaining cases 
are included in Appendix C . 
 
 
Figure 9.12: Change in Equivalent Internal CO2 Concentration with Time 
and Distance for Case 1 
 
For each case considered, the calculated internal concentration follows a trend 
of diminishing increase. The reason for this is that the internal concentration 
always acts to match the time-decaying external concentration. As a result, the 
maximum equivalent internal concentration of CO2 is reached when it equals 
the external concentration, after this point it begins to fall. 
 
For the purposes of this investigation, the equivalent internal CO2 concentration 
is used to calculate the toxic dose for occupants of the building. 
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Toxic Dose 
 
Figure 9.13 shows the CO2 dose that a building occupant would receive, as 
calculated using the equivalent internal concentration from the shelter model for 
the eight distances given in Table 9.3 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, 
atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve closure after 15 
minutes. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD DTLs are also shown. Charts for the 
remaining cases are included in Appendix C . 
 
 
Figure 9.13: Dose Received by a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 1 
 
The toxic dose is a cumulative quantity; this is reflected in the charts, which 
show a continuous increase in dose for each case. In the cases with valve 
closure, the magnitude of the increase diminishes as the simulation progresses 
because the internal equivalent CO2 concentration reaches its maximum value 
and begins to fall (Figure 9.12). As the external concentration of CO2 returns to 
atmospheric levels the toxic dose value for each case will become constant. 
 
The toxic dose is used to calculate the lethality for occupants of the building. 
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Lethality 
 
Figure 9.14 shows the chances of lethality for a building occupant, as calculated 
using the toxic dose for the eight distances given in Table 9.3 for case 1: CO2 at 
30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), 
valve closure after 15 minutes. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD percentages are 
also shown. Charts for the remaining cases are included in Appendix C . 
 
 
Figure 9.14: Percentage Lethality for a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 1 
 
Lethality is represented as a cumulative percentage and is derived from the 
toxic dose. Its value therefore increases as the toxic dose increases (Figure 
9.13). A summary of the times taken for the lethality to exceed the SLOT and 
SLOD percentages of 3% and 50% for each case considered is given in Table 
9.4. Note that in Table 9.4 an entry of “-“ indicates that the specific DTL was not 
exceeded during the course of the simulation. 
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  Time (hours) 
Dangerous 
Toxic Load/ 
Percentage 
Lethality 
Distance (m) Case 1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
SLOT 
100 0.95 0.91 0.75 - 
150 - 1.2 0.89 - 
200 - - 1.11 - 
300 - - 1.69 - 
400 - - - - 
500 - - - - 
700 - - - - 
1000 - - - - 
SLOD 
100 - - 1.13 - 
150 - - 1.39 - 
200 - - 1.84 - 
300 - - - - 
400 - - - - 
500 - - - - 
700 - - - - 
1000 - - - - 
Table 9.4: Times until The SLOT and SLOD Dangerous Toxic Loads are 
Exceeded for Building Occupants with Distance 
 
From Table 9.4 and the lethality charts, it can be concluded that the time period 
before a specific percentage lethality is reached within the building in question, 
increases with distance from the source of the release for all of the cases 
considered. Additionally, the maximum lethality reached over the duration of the 
simulation decreases with distance from the source of the release. These trends 
are inherent from the concentration and temperature input data which shows a 
reduction in the mean and equivalent external concentration of CO2 with 
distance and external temperatures which are closer the pre-release ambient 
temperature. The trend is carried through the shelter model as shown in the 
mean and equivalent concentration, temperature and toxic dose charts. 
 
A decrease in the initial temperature of the CO2 in the pipeline between 30 
degrees and 10 degrees (i.e. the difference between case 1 and case 2) results 
in a decrease in the time period before a specific percentage lethality is reached 
within the building, at each distance. Additionally, the maximum lethality 
reached over the duration of the simulation increases for each distance. 
Assuming the DNV-GL model produces a realistic representation of CO2 
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dispersion following a rupture, the analysis suggests that a decrease in the 
temperature of CO2 in the pipeline may lead to worse consequences for nearby 
building occupants in the event of a rupture. However, in order to fully 
investigate this possibility, a more comprehensive sensitivity study into CO2 
temperature would need to be carried out. 
 
If shut-off valves are not operated 15 minutes after the release then the result is 
a decrease in the time period before a specific lethality is reached within the 
building, at each distance. Additionally, the maximum lethality reached over the 
duration of the simulation increases for each distance. This effect is much larger 
than that observed between case 1 and case 2. The effect is a clear reflection 
of the input data which shows that in case 3, the external CO2 concentration 
remains significantly higher than the standard atmospheric value two hours after 
the release at each distance. In case 1, the presence of the shut-off valves 
limits the volume of CO2 which can escape to the atmosphere and ensures that 
the external CO2 concentration and external temperature are disturbed for a 
much shorter period. Assuming the DNV-GL model produces a realistic 
representation of CO2 dispersion following a rupture, it can be concluded from 
this analysis that shut-off valves can be used to reduce the consequences for 
nearby building occupants in the event of a rupture. 
 
A change in the atmospheric conditions from 5D to 2F (i.e. the difference 
between case 1 and case 4) results in an increase in the time period before a 
specific percentage lethality is reached within the building, at each distance. 
Additionally, the maximum lethality reached over the duration of the simulation 
decreases for each distance. In case 4 the different atmospheric conditions lead 
to a lower external concentration of CO2 and an external temperature which is 
closer to that of the pre-release ambient temperature. These conditions in turn 
lead to a lower air flow rate into the building and a lower lethality percentage. 
Assuming the DNV-GL model produces a realistic representation of CO2 
dispersion following a rupture, it can be concluded from this analysis that a 
rupture in atmospheric conditions of 2F would have fewer consequences for 
nearby building occupants than an identical rupture in 5D conditions. 
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For a case 1 release, the minimum distance for which the internal concentration 
of CO2 in the building considered will remain below the level required for a 
SLOT DTL is between 100 m and 150 m. The minimum distance for which the 
internal concentration in the building will remain below the level required for a 
SLOD DTL is less than 100 m.  
 
For a case 2 release, the minimum distance for which the internal concentration 
of CO2 in the building considered will remain below the level required for a 
SLOT DTL is between 150 m and 200 m. The minimum distance for which the 
internal concentration in the building will remain below the level required for a 
SLOD DTL is less than 100 m. 
 
For a case 3 release, the minimum distance for which the internal concentration 
of CO2 in the building considered will remain below the level required for a 
SLOT DTL is between 300 m and 400 m. The minimum distance for which the 
internal concentration in the building will remain below the level required for a 
SLOD DTL is between 200 m and 300 m. For all of the simulations considered, 
the highest maximum percentage lethality and the shortest time to a specific 
percentage lethality within the building at each particular distance occur in the 
case without valve closure. 
 
For a case 4 release, the minimum distance for which the internal concentration 
of CO2 in the building considered will remain below the level required for both 
SLOT and SLOD DTLs is less than 100 m. For all of the simulations considered, 
the lowest maximum percentage lethality and the longest time to a specific 
percentage lethality within the building at each particular distance are seen in 
the case with F2 atmospheric conditions. 
 
It is noted however, that the above results are for a building located downwind 
on the centreline axis which is considered to be the worst case. The results 
produced may be different for a building located crosswind or upwind, which 
should be considered as part of future work. 
 
It is also noted that the CO2 cloud in the analysis was assumed to completely 
envelope the building, a recommendation for future work would be to consider 
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clouds which only cover a fraction of the building’s height. In addition, the 
building considered in the analysis was a single cuboid structure and therefore 
a simplified representation of the majority of buildings which could be occupied. 
A recommendation for future work would therefore be to introduce partitions 
within the building to simulate different rooms, thereby refining the analysis. 
 
9.4.3 Ventilation Rate Study 
 
The input conditions and assumptions given in Table 9.2 and used for the 
investigation detailed in sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 produce a ventilation flow rate 
of approximately 0.65 AC/hr when the building in question is subject to a direct 
wind of 5 m/s with a 10° C temperature difference between the internal and 
external environment. However, it was also noted in section 9.4.1 that that 
typical ventilation rates for a real dwelling can range from between 0.5 to 3 
AC/hr.  Taking this into consideration, a study has been performed in order to 
investigate the effect of ventilation flow rate on the level of shelter a nearby 
building can provide in the event of a dense phase CO2 pipeline rupture. 
 
For this study the shelter model has been applied to the results of the case 1 
simulation from DNV-GL only. The main variable considered in the study was 
the building window area, which was used to dictate the size of the ventilation 
flow rates. Three different window areas were selected as input for the model in 
order to produce small, medium and large ventilation flow rates. For the 
purposes of the study all other variables were kept constant. Other than the 
window area, the assumptions and input conditions for the shelter model used 
in the study are identical to those given in Table 9.2. 
 
The distance of the building from the source of the rupture was set at 100 m 
along the centreline axis in the simulated release. As with the investigation in 
sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 the wind was assumed to be blowing directly onto the 
face of the building closest to the rupture source.  
 
Table 9.5 provides the values of window area used in the study in addition to 
the value of ventilation flow rate which would be produced if the building were 
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subject to a direct wind of 5 m/s with a 10° C temperature difference between 
the internal and external environment. 
 
Window Area (m2) Ventilation Flow Rate (AC/hr) 
0.02125 0.65 
0.0425 1.3 
0.085 2.6 
Table 9.5: Window Areas for Ventilation Rate Study 
 
Note that the flow rates given in Table 9.5 are for constant atmospheric 
conditions and in the absence of a nearby pipeline rupture. Ventilation flow rate 
is dependent on wind speed; internal and external CO2 concentration; and 
internal and external temperature difference. The conditions experienced by the 
building over the course of the case 1 simulation therefore lead to continuous 
variation in the ventilation flow rate. In the study, the different window area 
values in Table 9.5 produce ventilation rates which vary over the course of the 
simulation but remain small, medium and large relative to each other. The 
ventilation flow rates with time for the study are shown in Figure 9.15. 
 
9.4.4 Ventilation Study Results 
 
The change in internal CO2 concentration and temperature with time has been 
modelled for a building, located at a distance of 100 m along the centreline axis 
from the source of the release, using the shelter model with the case 1 DNV-GL 
simulation. Modelling has been performed three times using different window 
area values in order to investigate the effect of ventilation flow rate. 
 
Ventilation Flow Rate 
 
Figure 9.15 shows the change in the ventilation flow rate calculated using the 
shelter model for the three window area values given in Table 9.5 for case 1: 
CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind 
speed), valve closure after 15 minutes.  
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Figure 9.15: Change in Ventilation Flow Rate with Time and Window Area 
for Case 1 
 
For each different window area, the ventilation flow rate is initially similar to its 
respective value in Table 9.5. This represents the period of time before the 
cloud reaches the building in which the internal and external conditions remain 
constant at their initial levels. An increase in the window area by a factor of two 
produces an increase in the ventilation flow rate by a factor of two for constant 
internal and external conditions. 
 
Once the building is surrounded by the CO2 cloud the ventilation flow rates 
change in line with the variation in internal and external conditions. The flow 
rates vary continuously throughout the course of the simulation with the extent 
of the variation increasing with increasing window area. The reason for this is 
the larger the window area, the higher the overall flow rate and the quicker the 
internal conditions will change to match the external conditions. 
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Mean Concentration 
 
Figure 9.16 shows the change in the mean internal concentration of CO2 (C-
mean) calculated using the shelter model for the three window area values 
given in Table 9.5 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric 
conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. The 
mean external concentration with time is also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.16: Change in Mean Internal CO2 Concentration with Time and 
Window Area for Case 1 
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Temperature 
 
Figure 9.17 shows the change in the internal temperature calculated using the 
shelter model for the three window area values given in Table 9.5 for case 1: 
CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind 
speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. The external temperature with time is 
also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.17: Change in Internal Temperature with Time and Window Area 
for Case 1 
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Equivalent Concentration 
 
Figure 9.18 shows the change in the equivalent internal concentration of CO2 
(C-equiv) calculated using the shelter model for the three window area values 
given in Table 9.5 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric 
conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. The 
equivalent external concentration with time is also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.18: Change in Equivalent Internal CO2 Concentration with Time 
and Window Area for Case 1 
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Toxic Dose 
 
Figure 9.19 shows the CO2 dose that a building occupant would receive, as 
calculated using the equivalent internal concentration from the shelter model for 
the three window area values given in Table 9.5 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the 
pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve closure 
after 15 minutes. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD DTLs are also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.19: Dose Received by a Building Occupant with Time and 
Window Area for Case 1 
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Lethality 
 
Figure 9.20 shows the chances of lethality for a building occupant, as calculated 
using the toxic dose for the three window area values given in Table 9.5 for 
case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s 
wind speed), valve closure after 15 minutes. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD 
percentages are also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.20: Percentage Lethality for a Building Occupant with Time and 
Window Area for Case 1 
 
A summary of the times taken for the lethality to exceed the SLOT and SLOD 
percentages of 3% and 50% respectively for each window area considered is 
given in Table 9.6. Note that in Table 9.6 an entry of “-“ indicates that the 
specific DTL was not exceeded during the course of the simulation.  
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Dangerous 
Toxic Load/ 
Percentage 
Lethality 
Window Area (m2) Time (hours) 
SLOT 
0.02125 0.95 
0.0425 0.39 
0.085 0.20 
SLOD 
0.02125 - 
0.0425 0.65 
0.085 0.28 
Table 9.6: Times until The SLOT and SLOD Dangerous Toxic Loads are 
Exceeded for Building Occupants with Window Area 
 
From Table 9.6 and the lethality charts, it can be concluded that the time period 
before a specific percentage lethality is reached within the building in question, 
decreases with increasing ventilation flow rate (window area). Additionally, the 
maximum lethality reached over the duration of the simulation increases with 
increasing ventilation flow rate. The trend is carried through the shelter model 
as shown in the mean and equivalent concentration and toxic dose charts. 
 
9.4.5 Phast Examples 
 
The shelter model can also be used with output data from the industry hazard 
analysis software tool Phast (Anon., 2011b). In a similar way to the DNV-GL 
model, the Phast tool can be used to model the dispersion of a cloud of 
released CO2 providing values for atmospheric CO2 concentration and vapour 
temperature with distance away from the release. An example analysis using 
Phast data in the shelter model has been performed in order to demonstrate 
this functionality. Phast simulations of a dense phase CO2 pipeline rupture have 
been performed for the study by HSL (Gant, 2014). The Phast tool models time-
varying releases from pipelines in a different way to the DNV-GL model used in 
sections 9.4.1 and 9.4.2. There are two possible simulation methods: 
 
1. The release is modelled using a single discharge rate calculated from the 
average over the first 20 seconds of the release. In this method, for any 
particular distance from the release, the external concentration of CO2 is 
constant with time for the duration of the simulation. 
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2. The release is modelled using a time-varying discharge rate. The 
duration of the simulation is split into ten segments, each using a 
different release rate which diminishes over time. 
 
For the example study, a single rupture event has been simulated twice, using 
each of the possible methods. Results were provided for a distance of 100 m 
from the source of the release along the centreline axis. The simulation case 
modelled by Phast for this investigation was that of a downward generic 
dispersion in 2F atmospheric conditions (night with 2 m/s wind speed). Table 
9.7 provides the input details of the simulation: 
  
Input Value 
Pipeline Length 96 km 
Pipeline Outside Diameter 610 mm 
Pipeline Wall Thickness 19.4 mm 
Atmospheric Conditions 2F 
Wind Speed 2 ms-1 
Material Carbon Dioxide 
Concentration Calculated at Height 1 m 
Table 9.7: Phast Input Conditions 
 
The shelter model has been applied to the results from the Phast tool. For 
comparison, the CO2 cloud dispersion has been modelled until the external CO2 
concentration would have returned to pre-release levels in both cases. In 
contrast to the DNV-GL model, Phast provides only one value for atmospheric 
CO2 concentration in addition to the external temperature. Consequently, the 
same value of external CO2 concentration has been used for the calculation of 
air flow rates between the internal and external atmospheres as was used to 
calculate the toxic dose and lethality in the shelter model. The remaining input 
conditions and assumptions used for the shelter model are the same as those 
used for the DNV-GL cases and are detailed in section 9.4.1 and Table 9.2. 
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9.4.6 Phast Results 
 
The change in internal CO2 concentration and temperature with time has been 
modelled for a building, located at a distance of 100 m along the centreline axis 
from the source of the release, using the shelter model with Phast simulations. 
 
Concentration 
 
Figure 9.21 shows the change in internal concentration of CO2 calculated using 
the shelter model at a distance of 100 m from the release, for the example 
Phast simulations. The external concentration with time is also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.21: Change in Internal CO2 Concentration with Time for Example 
Phast Cases 
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Temperature 
 
Figure 9.22 shows the change in internal temperature calculated using the 
shelter model at a distance of 100 m from the release, for the example Phast 
simulations. The external temperature with time is also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.22: Change in Internal Temperature with Time for Example Phast 
Cases 
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Toxic Dose 
 
Figure 9.23 shows the CO2 dose that a building occupant would receive, as 
calculated using the internal concentration from the shelter model at a distance 
of 100 m from the release, for the example Phast simulations. Lines for the 
SLOT and SLOD DTLs are also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.23: Dose Received by a Building Occupant with Time for Example 
Phast Cases 
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Lethality 
 
Figure 9.24 shows the chances of lethality for a building occupant, as calculated 
using the toxic dose at a distance of 100 m from the release, for the example 
Phast simulations. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD DTLs are also shown. 
 
 
Figure 9.24: Percentage Lethality for a Building Occupant with Time for 
Example Phast Cases 
 
From Figure 9.23 it is clear that the CO2 dose received by building occupants 
increases quickest for the constant release case, in which the external 
concentration of CO2 remains at its initial, highest value for the duration of the 
release (Figure 9.21). However, because the release rate is so high in this case, 
the volume of CO2 in the pipeline is discharged very quickly and the external 
concentration returns to pre-release levels after only 0.12 hours. After this point 
the internal concentration begins to fall and this is reflected in Figure 9.23 as the 
increase in CO2 dose is considerably less. For the segmented release case, the 
initial build-up of CO2 in the building is slower (Figure 9.21), but the extended 
duration of an elevated external CO2 concentration (Figure 9.23) means that the 
maximum CO2 dose building occupants receive, exceeds that of the constant 
release case. Neither of the cases reach either the SLOT or SLOD DTLs and 
therefore the lethality remains low for both cases. The segmented release case 
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is a more realistic representation of a true rupture incident than the constant 
release case. 
 
9.5 Shelter Model Conclusions 
 
In this chapter the development of a shelter model for the prediction of the 
casualty probability for persons indoors subjected to a dispersing cloud of CO2 
vapour has been considered. The shelter model has demonstrated the ability to 
calculate a distance within the hazard range at which a building can provide 
safe shelter. The shelter model has been compared with experimental data. The 
model has demonstrated a clear illustration of the difference between the DNV-
GL COOLTRANS model and the industry standard commercial package Phast. 
 
In terms of the model results when applied to the DNV-GL dispersion 
predictions, the calculated mean and equivalent internal concentrations were 
found to follow a trend of diminishing increase for all of the simulated rupture 
cases analysed using the model. Conversely, the calculated internal 
temperature was found to follow a trend of diminishing decrease for all of the 
simulated rupture cases analysed. 
 
The analysis suggests that a decrease in the temperature of CO2 in the pipeline 
may lead to worse consequences for nearby building occupants in the event of 
a rupture. However, it can be concluded that shut-off valves can be used to 
reduce the consequences. A rupture in atmospheric conditions of 2F (night with 
2 m/s wind speed) would also have fewer consequences for nearby building 
occupants than an identical rupture in 5D conditions (day with 5 m/s wind 
speed). 
 
It can be concluded that the time period before a specific percentage lethality is 
reached within the building in question, increases with distance from the source 
of the release; and the maximum lethality reached over the duration of the 
simulation decreases with distance from the source of the release. Additionally, 
the time period before a specific percentage lethality is reached decreases with 
increasing ventilation flow rate (window area); and the maximum lethality 
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reached over the duration of the simulation increases with increasing ventilation 
flow rate. 
 
It is noted that for each case performed as part of the analysis the building was 
located downwind on the centreline axis. This is considered to be the worst 
case direction and the results produced may be different for a building located 
crosswind or upwind. It is recommended that buildings located in different 
directions be considered as part of future work. 
 
In order to fully investigate the possibility that a decrease in the temperature of 
CO2 in the pipeline may lead to worse consequences for nearby building 
occupants in the event of a rupture, it is recommended that a more 
comprehensive sensitivity study into CO2 temperature is carried out. 
 
It is noted that the CO2 cloud in the analysis was assumed to completely 
envelope the building, a recommendation for future work would be to consider 
clouds which only cover a fraction of the building’s height. Furthermore, it is 
noted that the building considered in the analysis was a single cuboid structure 
and therefore a simplified representation of the majority of buildings which could 
be occupied. A recommendation for future work would therefore be to introduce 
partitions within the building to simulate different rooms, thereby refining the 
analysis. 
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Chapter 10. An Escape Model for Consequence Predictions 
Following A CO2 Pipeline Release 
 
In Chapter 9 the level of shelter that buildings can provide in the event of a 
rupture of a dense phase CO2 pipeline was considered through the shelter 
model. The potential for escape on foot in these circumstances is considered in 
Chapter 10, through the development of an escape model. 
 
10.1 Escape Model Background and Development 
 
The escape model considers the potential for escape on foot, of a person 
located in close vicinity to the rupture of a dense phase CO2 pipeline. The 
escaping person will be affected by the increased concentration of CO2 in the 
local atmosphere resulting from a cloud of CO2 released by the pipeline failure. 
As with the shelter model the concentration of CO2 in the local atmosphere is 
transient and will change with time as the CO2 cloud disperses.  
 
In the escape model a person attempting escape is exposed to the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 at their location. Unlike the shelter model, the escaping 
person is not located at a fixed distance from the CO2 release and therefore the 
concentration of CO2 he/she is exposed to is determined not only by the 
dispersion of the CO2 cloud but also by their position relative to it. 
 
In the escape model a person is assumed to be located at ground level and is 
given initial location coordinates relative to the location of the pipeline rupture. A 
constant speed and angle of escape are chosen and the dose of CO2 the 
escaping person accumulates over time is calculated based upon their 
changing location and the changing external concentration of CO2. 
 
Distances within the model are calculated using trigonometry and the simple 
equation of motion: 
 
ݏሺ݀ݐሻ ൌ ݒ௣. ݀ݐ        (10.1) 
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Where s is the distance travelled by the escaping person (in m) in the time 
period dt, vp is their constant velocity (in ms-1) and dt is the time period under 
consideration (in s). Hence the model requires that external CO2 concentration 
data is provided for both the downwind and crosswind spatial dimensions at 
close to ground level and also how these data change with time. 
 
If after a set time period the escaping person’s location does not coincide with 
the location of a CO2 concentration measurement then the concentration at their 
location is inferred using linear interpolation between the four closest 
surrounding (in space) concentration values. 
 
For the escape model the method to calculate the toxic dose from exposure to 
CO2 and the probit relationship giving the chances of death for an escaping 
person are identical to those used for the shelter model and detailed in section 
9.2. 
 
10.2 Model Simulations 
 
The data from the DNV-GL simulations detailed in section 9.4.1 has also been 
used as input to the escape model in order to investigate the potential for 
escape on foot in the event of a real dense phase CO2 pipeline rupture. The 
escape model considers an escaping individual moving away from a rupture 
event and therefore requires the input of atmospheric CO2 concentration data, 
as a function of time and distance from the release in two dimensions in the 
plane of the Earth’s surface. 
 
The escape model has been applied to the results of the four simulations 
produced by DNV-GL using their flat terrain dispersion model developed from 
the results of COOLTRANS experiments. The input conditions and assumptions 
made for the simulations are identical to those described in section 9.4.1. 
 
The escape model has been used to demonstrate the differences in the 
potential for escape which may occur when considering two different variables, 
these are: 
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 The initial location of the escaping individual at the time of the 
release; and 
 The direction in which the escaping individual chooses to move 
 
It has been assumed that the initial location of the escaping individual lies 
exclusively along the centreline axis in the simulated release and is analogous 
to the way in which building location was used for the shelter model. As with the 
shelter model, the wind was assumed to be blowing parallel to the centreline 
axis. For the direction of escape, the investigation has considered two 
possibilities; downwind escape, in which the individual travels from their initial 
location in a direction parallel to the centreline axis and directly away from the 
source of the release; and crosswind escape in which the individual travels from 
their initial location in a direction which is 90 degrees to the centreline axis. For 
each case, the direction of escape was set at the start and did not change 
throughout the course of the simulation. The individual has been assumed to 
start moving at the exact moment of release and their movement has been 
modelled until they leave the area covered by the simulation data. In all cases 
the speed of the escaping individual has been assumed to be 2.5 ms-1. It should 
be noted that any potential physiological effects of an increasing CO2 dose are 
ignored. 
 
As for the shelter model, the data from the DNV-GL simulations includes values 
for the mean and equivalent atmospheric CO2 concentrations; and for the 
external temperature. For the escape model there is no ventilation air flow and 
therefore the mean CO2 concentration and external temperature values are 
redundant. For the cases considered the toxic dose and lethality experienced by 
the escaping individual are calculated using the equivalent CO2 concentration. 
 
10.2.1 Investigation Results 
 
The effect of atmospheric CO2 concentration with time on a person escaping 
either downwind or crosswind from a dense phase CO2 pipeline rupture, has 
been modelled for eight starting distances along the centreline axis, using the 
escape model with the DNV-GL simulations. In each case, following the rupture 
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there is a period of time before the cloud reaches the escaping individual in 
which the external CO2 concentration remains at its initial level. The duration of 
this time period is determined by; the wind speed, which controls the speed of 
the released CO2 cloud; the starting distance of the individual from the rupture; 
and the direction of escape. The starting distances and escape directions 
considered and respective times that the CO2 cloud takes to reach the 
individual, for each of the wind speeds investigated are shown in Table 10.1. 
Note that in Table 10.1 an entry of “-“ indicates that the individual was able to 
elude the CO2 cloud for the entire course of the simulation. 
 
Direction 
of Escape Starting Distance (m)
Time at Wind 
Speed of 2 m/s (s) 
Time at Wind 
Speed of 5 m/s (s) 
Downwind 
100 - 40 
150 - 60 
200 - 80 
300 - 120 
400 - 160 
500 - 200 
700 - 280 
1000 - 400 
Crosswind 
100 50 20 
150 75 30 
200 100 40 
300 150 60 
400 200 80 
500 250 100 
700 350 140 
1000 - 200 
Table 10.1: Time Taken for CO2 Cloud to Reach Escaping Individual 
 
Note that while the results of this investigation show that escape is possible 
downwind from a closer distance to the rupture than is possible crosswind, this 
is based upon simulations from the DNV-GL flat terrain dispersion model. In real 
cases, local topography could potentially cause differences in the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 with time and distance, which could in turn result in 
crosswind escape being safer than downwind. 
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Toxic Dose – Downwind 
 
Figure 10.1 shows the CO2 dose that an escaping individual would receive 
when travelling in the downwind direction, calculated using the escape model 
for the eight starting distances given in Table 10.1 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in 
the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve 
closure after 15 minutes. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD DTLs are also shown. 
Charts for the remaining cases are included in Appendix D . 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Downwind with Time and Distance for Case 1 
 
For the escape model, the escaping individual receives the largest dose of CO2 
immediately after the cloud reaches their position. Following this, the individual 
(if they were to survive the initial dose) continues their path away from the 
source of the release. The atmospheric CO2 concentration to which they are 
exposed to is reduced and the dose received per unit time decreases. This is 
reflected in the charts which show that the toxic dose received rapidly 
approaches a constant once the individual encounters the cloud. 
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Toxic Dose – Crosswind 
 
Figure 10.2 shows the CO2 dose that an escaping individual would receive 
when travelling in the crosswind direction, calculated using the escape model 
for the eight starting distances given in Table 10.1 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in 
the pipeline, atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve 
closure after 15 minutes. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD DTLs are also shown. 
Charts for the remaining cases are included in Appendix D . 
 
 
Figure 10.2: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 1 
 
In the crosswind direction, the largest dose of CO2 again occurs immediately 
after the cloud has reached the escaping individual. In this direction however, 
the atmospheric CO2 concentration within the cloud does not decrease as 
quickly with distance from the starting position as in the downwind direction. As 
the individual continues their path, they are exposed to high concentrations of 
CO2 for longer. This is reflected in the charts which show that the toxic dose 
received takes longer to approach a constant value than in the downwind 
analysis. 
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Lethality – Downwind 
 
Figure 10.3 shows the chances of lethality for an escaping individual when 
travelling in the downwind direction, as calculated using the toxic dose for the 
eight distances given in Table 10.1 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, 
atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve closure after 15 
minutes. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD percentages are also shown. Charts for 
the remaining cases are included in Appendix D . 
 
 
Figure 10.3: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Downwind with Time and Distance for Case 1 
 
A summary of the times taken for the lethality to exceed the SLOT and SLOD 
percentages of 3% and 50% for each case considered is given in Table 10.2. 
Note that in Table 10.2 an entry of “-“ indicates that the specific DTL was not 
exceeded during the course of the simulation. 
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  Time (seconds) 
Dangerous 
Toxic 
Load/ 
Percentage 
Lethality 
Distance 
(m) 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
SLOT 
100 50 60 50 - 
150 70 80 70 - 
200 90 100 90 - 
300 210 - 210 - 
400 - - - - 
500 - - - - 
700 - - - - 
1000 - - - - 
SLOD 
100 50 60 50 - 
150 70 80 70 - 
200 160 - 160 - 
300 - - - - 
400 - - - - 
500 - - - - 
700 - - - - 
1000 - - - - 
Table 10.2: Times until The SLOT and SLOD Dangerous Toxic Loads are 
Exceeded for Downwind Escape 
 
From Table 10.2 and the lethality charts, it can be concluded that the further 
away from the source the individual begins their escape, the more chance they 
have of survival for ruptures similar to those of cases 1, 2 and 3. For a case 4 
rupture in which the atmospheric conditions are 2F (night with 2 m/s wind 
speed), the individual travels at a faster speed than the CO2 cloud and always 
escapes regardless of their starting position. In cases 1, 2 and 3 it can be seen 
that for starting distances of less than 200 m from the release, both the SLOT 
and SLOD DTLs are exceeded at the same time. This highlights the magnitude 
of the initial CO2 dose which the escaping individual receives the instant they 
encounter the cloud. Approximately 50% of the total dose the individual 
receives throughout the simulation occurs within 20 seconds of the cloud 
arriving at their position. The maximum lethality reached over the duration of the 
simulation decreases with starting distance from the source of the release. 
These trends are due to a reduction in the concentration of CO2 within the cloud 
with distance. This behaviour can also be used to explain why the times at 
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which SLOT and SLOD DTLs are exceeded begin to differ with increasing 
starting distance. 
 
A decrease in the initial temperature of the CO2 in the pipeline between 30 
degrees and 10 degrees (i.e. the difference between case 1 and case 2) results 
in little difference for the chances of survival for an individual escaping 
downwind. A slight increase in the time period before a specific percentage 
lethality is reached, at each distance; and a reduction in the maximum lethality 
reached over the duration of the simulation is observed. With reference to the 
differences observed between the same cases for the shelter model, it is likely 
that for the escape model, the timescales under consideration are too short for 
the temperature to have a notable effect. 
 
If shut-off valves are not operated 15 minutes after the release (i.e. the 
difference between case 1 and case 3) then there is no difference to the 
chances of survival for an individual escaping downwind. This result is evident 
from the timescales under consideration. For the escape model the escaping 
individual, assuming they are able to survive, takes a maximum time of 880 
seconds to escape the area covered by the simulation data. This value is less 
than the 900 seconds (15 minutes) required before valve closure in case 1 and 
therefore shut-off valve operation cannot influence the chances of escape of the 
individual. 
 
A change in the atmospheric conditions from 5D to 2F (i.e. the difference 
between case 1 and case 4) has a large effect on the chances of survival for an 
individual escaping downwind. Assuming an escape speed of 2.5 ms-1, the 
individual is easily able to outrun the approaching CO2 cloud in 2F conditions 
where the wind speed is only 2 ms-1. In this case, the starting distance of the 
individual is irrelevant. For 5D conditions, the cloud always reaches the 
individual eventually and the chances of survival are dependent on the starting 
position. It can be concluded from this analysis that a rupture in atmospheric 
conditions of 2F would have fewer consequences for escaping individuals than 
an identical rupture in 5D conditions. 
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For a case 1 release, the minimum starting distance for which the toxic dose an 
individual escaping downwind receives will remain below a SLOT DTL is 
between 300 m and 400 m. The minimum starting distance for which the dose 
will remain below a SLOD DTL is between 200 m and 300 m. 
 
For a case 2 release, the minimum starting distance for which the toxic dose an 
individual escaping downwind receives will remain below a SLOT DTL is 
between 200 m and 300 m. The minimum starting distance for which the dose 
will remain below a SLOD DTL is between 150 m and 200 m. 
 
For a case 3 release, the minimum starting distance for which the toxic dose an 
individual escaping downwind receives will remain below a SLOT DTL is 
between 300 m and 400 m. The minimum starting distance for which the dose 
will remain below a SLOD DTL is between 200 m and 300 m. 
 
For a case 4 release, there is no minimum starting distance for which the toxic 
dose an individual escaping downwind receives will remain below both the 
SLOT and SLOD DTLs. In the cases with F2 atmospheric conditions an 
individual escaping downwind always outruns the approaching CO2 cloud. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 330 
 
Lethality – Crosswind 
 
Figure 10.4 shows the chances of lethality for an escaping individual when 
travelling in the crosswind direction, as calculated using the toxic dose for the 
eight distances given in Table 10.1 for case 1: CO2 at 30°C in the pipeline, 
atmospheric conditions 5D (day with 5 m/s wind speed), valve closure after 15 
minutes. Lines for the SLOT and SLOD percentages are also shown. Charts for 
the remaining cases are included in Appendix D . 
 
 
Figure 10.4: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 1 
 
A summary of the times taken for the lethality to exceed the SLOT and SLOD 
percentages of 3% and 50% for each case considered is given in Table 10.3. 
Note that in Table 10.3 an entry of “-“ indicates that the specific DTL was not 
exceeded during the course of the simulation. 
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  Time (seconds) 
Dangerous 
Toxic 
Load/ 
Percentage 
Lethality 
Distance 
(m) 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
SLOT 
100 30 40 30 60 
150 40 50 40 85 
200 50 60 50 110 
300 70 80 70 170 
400 90 100 90 250 
500 120 120 120 - 
700 270 - 270 - 
1000 - - - - 
SLOD 
100 30 40 30 60 
150 40 50 40 85 
200 50 60 50 130 
300 70 80 70 290 
400 120 140 120 - 
500 240 316 240 - 
700 - - - - 
1000 - - - - 
Table 10.3: Times until The SLOT and SLOD Dangerous Toxic Loads are 
Exceeded for Crosswind Escape 
 
Similarly to downwind escape, it can be concluded from Table 10.3 and the 
lethality charts, that the further away from the source the individual begins their 
escape crosswind, the more chance they have of survival, for all of the cases 
considered. For the crosswind analysis, the individual is travelling in an 
orthogonal direction to the approaching cloud and therefore the cloud is not 
evaded for a case 4 rupture. It can be seen that for starting distances of less 
than 400 m from the release in cases 1, 2 and 3 and 200 m from the release for 
case 4, both the SLOT and SLOD DTLs are exceeded at the same time. This 
highlights the magnitude of the initial CO2 dose which the escaping individual 
receives the instant they encounter the cloud. As with downwind escape, the 
maximum lethality reached over the duration of the simulation decreases with 
starting distance from the source of the release because of a reduction in the 
concentration of CO2 within the cloud. It was previously noted that the CO2 
concentration within the cloud in the crosswind direction does not decrease as 
quickly as for the downwind direction. The result of this phenomenon is that the 
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maximum toxic dose experienced by an escaping individual is far greater in the 
crosswind direction than in the downwind direction. This is reflected in a 
comparison between Table 10.3 and Table 10.2 which shows that the number 
of escape analyses in which DTLs are exceeded is higher for crosswind. It 
should be noted that this outcome is contrary to normal industry safety 
procedure which recommends that the best escape route from a release plume 
is crosswind not downwind. The reason for this is the high value of n0 specified 
for CO2 in the toxic dose equation (9.17). 
 
A decrease in the initial temperature of the CO2 in the pipeline between 30 
degrees and 10 degrees (i.e. the difference between case 1 and case 2) results 
in little difference for the chances of survival for an individual escaping 
crosswind. A slight increase in the time period before a specific percentage 
lethality is reached, at each distance; and a reduction in the maximum lethality 
reached over the duration of the simulation is observed. The differences 
between the results are not sufficient to conclude that the initial CO2 
temperature has an effect on crosswind escape. With reference to the 
differences observed between the same cases for the shelter model, it is likely 
that for the escape model, the timescales under consideration are too short for 
the temperature to have a notable effect. 
 
As with downwind escape, if shut-off valves are not operated 15 minutes after 
the release (i.e. the difference between case 1 and case 3) then there is no 
difference to the chances of survival for an individual escaping crosswind. This 
result is due to each analysis being completed before the valves are due to 
close. 
 
A change in the atmospheric conditions from 5D to 2F (i.e. the difference 
between case 1 and case 4) has a large effect on the chances of survival for an 
individual escaping crosswind. The reduced wind speed of 2 ms-1 in 2F 
conditions gives the individual additional time to travel further from their starting 
position than for the 5D conditions. In this way, when the individual eventually 
encounters the cloud they will be further from the highest concentrations of 
CO2, found on the centreline axis of the release, and therefore more likely to 
survive the CO2 dose they receive. Additionally, the maximum concentration of 
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CO2 associated with a 2F conditions is less than that associated with 5D. This is 
reflected in Table 10.3 which shows longer times to each DTL and fewer 
instances in which a DTL was exceeded for case 4 compared to case 1. It can 
be concluded from this analysis that a rupture in atmospheric conditions of 2F 
would have fewer consequences for escaping individuals than an identical 
rupture in 5D conditions. 
 
For a case 1 release, the minimum starting distance for which the toxic dose an 
individual escaping crosswind receives will remain below a SLOT DTL is 
between 700 m and 1000 m. The minimum starting distance for which the dose 
will remain below a SLOD DTL is between 500 m and 700 m. 
 
For a case 2 release, the minimum starting distance for which the toxic dose an 
individual escaping crosswind receives will remain below a SLOT DTL is 
between 500 m and 700 m. The minimum starting distance for which the dose 
will remain below a SLOD DTL is between 500 m and 700 m. 
 
For a case 3 release, the minimum starting distance for which the toxic dose an 
individual escaping crosswind receives will remain below a SLOT DTL is 
between 700 m and 1000 m. The minimum starting distance for which the dose 
will remain below a SLOD DTL is between 500 m and 700 m. 
 
For a case 4 release, the minimum starting distance for which the toxic dose an 
individual escaping crosswind receives will remain below a SLOT DTL is 
between 400 m and 500 m. The minimum starting distance for which the dose 
will remain below a SLOD DTL is between 300 m and 400 m. 
 
10.3 Escape Decision Tree 
 
When considering the individual consequences to a person in the event of a 
rupture of a dense phase CO2 pipeline, the models detailed in Chapter 9 and 
Chapter 10 can be combined to provide a complete overview of the chances of 
survival. Figure 10.5 and Figure 10.6 together show an example of the potential 
choices facing an individual located in the vicinity of a dense phase CO2 
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pipeline rupture. These figures show how the shelter and escape models could 
be linked in order to provide the chances of survival of a person based upon the 
decisions he/she makes. 
 
Figure 10.5 shows the decision process which can take place at any one instant 
in time following the rupture. The person may or may not find themselves with 
an opportunity to enter a nearby building (shelter). A decision is made as to 
whether the building is entered (if possible). A decision to enter a building would 
result in the shelter model being employed in order to calculate the dose the 
person would receive within the building as time passes. A decision to not enter 
the building (or if there is no building available) would result in another choice 
for the person, between running and standing still. In this branch of the diagram 
a person’s dose is calculated by the escape model. A decision to stand still 
would result in an escape speed of 0 ms-1 in the escape model, they would be 
subject to the external concentration of CO2 in that position until at some later 
time they decided to run or enter an available nearby building. Conversely, if the 
person decides to run they must then choose which direction they run in, 
effectively selecting their angle and escape speed within the model. Running in 
a particular direction may result in the discovery of a building with the potential 
for entry. 
 
Figure 10.6 shows an overview of the process with the evolution of time, any 
one of the grey segments within the diagram represents an instant in time and 
one cycle of the decision tree in Figure 10.5. The outcome at the end of each 
time instant will depend on the decisions made within that time instant; and will 
affect what happens in the next time instant. After any one time instant, the 
person could be inside and therefore subject to the shelter model; outside and 
subject to the escape model; or making a switch between the shelter and 
escape models. 
 
It is recommended that an analysis based upon Figure 10.5 and Figure 10.6 is 
performed as part of future work in order to further investigate the chances of 
survival for an individual in the event of a rupture of a dense phase CO2 
pipeline. 
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Figure 10.5: Escape Decision Tree – Part A 
 
 
Figure 10.6: Escape Decision Tree – Part B 
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10.4 Escape Model Conclusions 
 
In this chapter the development of an escape model for the prediction of the 
casualty probability for persons outdoors subjected to a dispersing cloud of CO2 
vapour has been considered. The escape model has demonstrated the ability to 
calculate a distance within the hazard range at which it is possible to escape to 
a safe distance. 
 
In terms of the model results when applied to the DNV-GL dispersion 
predictions, it is concluded that for all of the simulated rupture cases analysed, 
an individual escaping receives the largest dose of CO2 per unit time, 
immediately after the cloud reaches their position.  
 
When considering downwind escape, the further away from the source the 
individual begins their escape, the more chance they have of survival for 
ruptures similar to those of cases 1, 2 and 3. For a case 4 rupture in which the 
atmospheric conditions are 2F, the individual travels at a faster speed than the 
CO2 cloud and always escapes regardless of their starting position. A decrease 
in the initial temperature of the CO2 in the pipeline between 30 degrees and 10 
degrees results in negligible difference for the chances of survival for an 
escaping individual. Similarly, the chances of survival are unaffected by the use 
of shut-off valves within 15 minutes after the release. It can be concluded 
however, that a rupture in atmospheric conditions of 2F would have fewer 
consequences for escaping individuals than an identical rupture in 5D 
conditions. 
 
When considering crosswind escape, the further away from the source the 
individual begins their escape, the more chance they have of survival for all of 
the simulated rupture cases considered. The CO2 concentration within a cloud 
released in a rupture event does not decrease as quickly with distance in the 
crosswind direction as in the downwind direction. The result of this phenomenon 
is that the maximum toxic dose experienced by an escaping individual is far 
greater in the crosswind direction than in the downwind direction. It should be 
noted that this outcome is contrary to normal industry safety procedure which 
recommends that the best escape route from a release plume is crosswind not 
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downwind. The reason for this is the high value of n0 specified for CO2 in the 
toxic dose equation (9.17). As with the downwind case, a decrease in the initial 
temperature of the CO2 in the pipeline between 30 degrees and 10 degrees 
results in negligible difference for the chances of survival for an escaping 
individual crosswind. Similarly, the chances of survival are unaffected by the 
use of shut-off valves within 15 minutes after the release; and a rupture in 
atmospheric conditions of 2F would have fewer consequences for escaping 
individuals than an identical rupture in 5D conditions. 
 
It is recommended that future work consider the effects of local topography on 
the atmospheric concentration of CO2 with time and distance; and the 
physiological effects of an increasing CO2 dose, with respect to the potential for 
escape. An analysis linking the shelter and escape models together should also 
be performed in order to provide a more comprehensive description of an 
individual’s behaviour in the event of a the rupture of a dense phase CO2 
pipeline and to calculate more accurate values for the chances of survival. 
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Chapter 11. Conclusions and Recommendations for Further 
Work 
 
11.1 Conclusions 
 
This thesis has presented the development of failure frequency, shelter and 
escape models to be used as part of the QRA methodology for dense phase 
CO2 pipelines. 
 
11.1.1 Failure Frequency Model 
 
The failure frequency model has been named AFFECT. The model is used to 
calculate the failure frequency of a dense phase CO2 pipeline due to third party 
external interference. The need to develop a failure frequency model arose from 
the design requirements for dense phase CO2 pipelines. For oil and natural gas 
pipelines, the frequency of pipeline failure due to third party external 
interference is calculated using models based upon structural reliability 
methods. These models combine semi-empirical pipeline failure models with 
probability distributions derived from historical operational damage data. Dense 
phase CO2 pipelines require the use of thick wall linepipe in pipeline 
construction, potentially with wall thickness dimensions outside the limits of 
operational experience for oil and natural gas. The reliance of the current failure 
frequency models on empirical data and semi-empirical relations suggested 
their application to dense phase CO2 pipelines may be inappropriate. 
 
There was a desire however to extend the use of structural reliability methods to 
calculate failure frequency for dense phase CO2 pipelines. These methods have 
been employed for over 25 years, and as a result are tried, tested and well 
understood. A review of the available failure frequency models was therefore 
performed in order to assess their applicability to dense phase CO2 pipelines. 
This review concluded that the applicability of structural reliability methods to 
thick wall pipelines depends entirely upon the applicability of the pipeline failure 
models and operational damage data contained within them. 
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A review of the available failure models and operational data was performed. 
The review considered the suitability of the models and data for inclusion into a 
failure frequency model and their applicability to thick wall pipelines. It was 
concluded that the NG-18 equations and generic assessment codes such as BS 
7910 were suitable models to be used to describe the failure of gouges and leak 
/ rupture behaviour in a failure frequency model based on structural reliability 
methods. It was also concluded that the British Gas Dent-Gouge Fracture 
Model (BGDGFM) was the most suitable model to be used to describe the 
failure of a gouged dent and that the UKOPA Fault Database was the most 
suitable source of historical operational damage data for the probability 
distributions. 
 
It was found that the largest wall thickness in the experimental tests used to 
derive the NG-18 equations was 21.9 mm for the through-wall equations and 
15.6 mm for the part-wall equations. The BS 7910 assessment method is not 
limited by wall thickness. A study was performed in order to provide a validation 
of the applicability of the flow stress dependent NG-18 equations to thick wall 
pipelines; and to compare the accuracy of the flow stress dependent NG-18 
equations and the BS 7910 assessment method when applied to thick wall pipe. 
In this study predicted burst pressures for thick wall pipe were calculated using 
both the flow stress dependent NG-18 equations and BS 7910 and compared 
with values from experimental test data. Based upon the comparison with 
experimental test data, the flow stress dependent NG-18 equations were found 
to be the most accurate of the two models. From the range of the experimental 
test data used in the study, the flow stress dependent NG-18 equations are 
considered to be applicable to pipelines with a wall thickness of up to 47.2 mm, 
provided the linepipe steel has a high toughness. 
 
It was found that the largest wall thickness in the experimental tests used to 
derive the BGDGFM was 16.4 mm. The wall thickness of a dense phase CO2 
pipeline could potentially be outside this range of applicability. However, due to 
complexity of the model and the lack of thick wall experimental data for gouged 
dents, validation of the BGDGFM for thick wall pipelines was considered to be 
outside of the scope of this work. 
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The wall thicknesses contained in the UKOPA Fault Database are limited by 
operational pipelines. Since there are no dense phase CO2 pipelines currently 
in operation the database does not contain data covering the required wall 
thickness range. At present there is no solution to this problem, however the 
future construction and operation of dense phase CO2 pipelines will ensure this 
data source becomes more relevant with time. 
 
The AFFECT model has been developed using structural reliability methods. 
The flow stress dependent NG-18 equations have been used to describe the 
failure of gouges and leak / rupture behaviour in the model and the BGDGFM 
has been used to describe the failure of a gouged dent. The UKOPA Fault 
Database has been used as the source of historical operational damage data to 
derive the required probability distributions. The failure frequency models 
currently in use within the pipeline industry have been used as a basis for the 
AFFECT model. The model has been developed by making modifications to the 
PIE model, a basic failure frequency model which uses the appropriate failure 
models and historical operational data. The modifications made considered 
improvements in damage modelling and calculation methods. A statistical 
analysis of the most recent version of the UKOPA Fault Database was also 
performed as part of the development process. Each of the modifications is 
considered to provide improvement to the structure of the AFFECT model. 
 
It is noted that the review of failure frequency models highlighted that in order to 
describe failures from branches and fittings; and from drilling operations in-
error, in a failure frequency model, either separate branch / fitting failure and 
drill puncture models must be developed; or an additional historical data 
component is required. The development of such components for AFFECT has 
not been considered in this thesis. 
 
It was concluded through the development of the AFFECT model and the 
statistical analysis that differences in the fit of the probability distributions used 
in a failure frequency model can have a significant effect on the values of failure 
frequency calculated by that model. 
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The AFFECT model has been validated through a comparison between model 
predictions, historical operational data and the current industry standard failure 
frequency model, FFREQ. When applied to the historical operational data from 
the UKOPA Pipeline Database, it is concluded that both AFFECT and FFREQ 
give a good approximation of the number of leak failures. Both models are 
conservative, however the AFFECT model produced the most accurate results 
of the two. In terms of ruptures, both AFFECT and FFREQ agree with the 
overall trend of historical data. Both models are non-conservative, however an 
accurate comparison with rupture failures is difficult, due to the uncertain nature 
of the historical operational data. It was noted that development of a separate 
failure model or historical data component to address severed and broken pipes 
may be necessary in order to provide a complete description of failure 
frequency due to third party external interference. 
 
11.1.2 Shelter Model 
 
Models have been developed to describe the impact of CO2 on people 
sheltering inside buildings and those attempting to escape on foot during a 
pipeline release event. The need to develop shelter and escape models arose 
from the hazards and behaviour of dense phase CO2 in the event of a pipeline 
rupture, which are significantly different to those of oil or natural gas and 
therefore not addressed by current models. 
 
The indoor “shelter” model considers the ingress of CO2 into a building 
surrounded by an environment with a high CO2 concentration. The model is 
based on the principles of natural building ventilation for which air flow is driven 
by wind effects externally and buoyancy effects internally. The shelter model 
enables the prediction of the casualty probability for persons indoors subjected 
to a dispersing cloud of CO2 vapour. The shelter model has been validated 
using experimental data and has demonstrated the ability to calculate a 
distance within the hazard range at which a building can provide safe shelter.  
 
The shelter model has been applied to dispersion predictions made for a 
number of simulated releases of dense phase CO2 from a pipeline. When 
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applied to the dispersion predictions, the internal concentration of CO2 
calculated by the model was found to follow a trend of diminishing increase for 
all of the simulated rupture cases analysed. Conversely, the calculated internal 
temperature was found to follow a trend of diminishing decrease for all of the 
simulated rupture cases analysed. 
 
The analysis suggested that a decrease in the temperature of CO2 in the 
pipeline may lead to worse consequences for nearby building occupants in the 
event of a rupture. However a more comprehensive sensitivity study into CO2 
temperature would be required in order to fully investigate this effect. It has 
been concluded that shut-off valves can be used to reduce the consequences. 
A rupture in atmospheric conditions of 2F (night with 2 m/s wind speed) would 
also have fewer consequences for nearby building occupants than an identical 
rupture in 5D conditions (day with 5 m/s wind speed). 
 
It was also concluded that the time period before a specific percentage lethality 
is reached within the building in question, increases with distance from the 
source of the release; and the maximum lethality reached over the duration of 
the simulation decreases with distance from the source of the release. 
Additionally, the time period before a specific percentage lethality is reached 
decreases with increasing ventilation flow rate (window area); and the maximum 
lethality reached over the duration of the simulation increases with increasing 
ventilation flow rate. 
 
It is noted that for each simulated rupture case performed as part of the analysis 
the building was located downwind on the centreline axis. This is considered to 
be the worst case direction and the results produced may be different for a 
building located crosswind or upwind. 
 
It is also noted that the following simplifying assumptions were made as part of 
the analysis for each simulated rupture case: the CO2 cloud was assumed to 
completely envelope the building; and the building considered was a single 
cuboid structure with no internal partitions. 
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11.1.3 Escape Model 
 
The outdoor “escape” model considers the escape on foot from a moving cloud 
of CO2. The model is based upon a simple equation of motion and distances 
are calculated using trigonometry. The escape model enables the prediction of 
the casualty probability for persons outdoors subjected to a dispersing cloud of 
CO2 vapour. The escape model has demonstrated the ability to calculate a 
distance within the hazard range at which it is possible to escape to a safe 
distance. 
 
The escape model has been applied to dispersion predictions made for a 
number of simulated releases of dense phase CO2 from a pipeline. When 
applied to the dispersion predictions it was found that for all of the simulated 
rupture cases analysed, an individual escaping receives the largest dose of CO2 
per unit time, immediately after the CO2 cloud reaches their position.  
 
When considering downwind escape, it can be concluded that the further away 
from the source the individual begins their escape, the more chance they have 
of survival. A decrease in the initial temperature of the CO2 in the pipeline 
between 30 degrees and 10 degrees results in negligible difference for the 
chances of survival for an escaping individual. Similarly, the chances of survival 
are unaffected by the use of shut-off valves within 15 minutes after the release. 
It can be concluded however, that a rupture in atmospheric conditions of 2F 
would have fewer consequences for escaping individuals than an identical 
rupture in 5D conditions. 
 
When considering crosswind escape, it can also be concluded that the further 
away from the source the individual begins their escape, the more chance they 
have of survival. The CO2 concentration within a cloud released in a rupture 
event does not decrease as quickly with distance in the crosswind direction as 
in the downwind direction. The result of this phenomenon is that the maximum 
toxic dose experienced by an escaping individual is far greater in the crosswind 
direction than in the downwind direction. It should be noted that this outcome is 
contrary to normal industry safety procedure which recommends that the best 
escape route from a release plume is crosswind not downwind. The reason for 
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this is the high value of n0 specified for CO2 in the toxic dose equation. As with 
the downwind case, a decrease in the initial temperature of the CO2 in the 
pipeline between 30 degrees and 10 degrees results in negligible difference for 
the chances of survival for an escaping individual crosswind. Similarly, the 
chances of survival are unaffected by the use of shut-off valves within 15 
minutes after the release; and a rupture in atmospheric conditions of 2F would 
have fewer consequences for escaping individuals than an identical rupture in 
5D conditions. 
 
It is noted that the following simplifying assumptions were made as part of the 
analysis for each simulated rupture case: the local topography was assumed to 
be perfectly flat; and the physiological effects of an increasing CO2 dose were 
ignored. 
 
11.2 Contributions of the Work 
 
In terms of the contributions of this work to the wider body of knowledge of 
CCS; the failure frequency, shelter and escape models produced in this thesis 
have been included in the QRA methodology for dense phase CO2 pipelines 
developed as part of the COOLTRANS research programme and to be used in 
planning the construction of dense phase CO2 pipelines in the UK. Furthermore, 
the models have been used to inform the QRA studies for the design of the 
planned National Grid Carbon CO2 network in the Humber and Yorkshire area 
of the UK (Barnett, 2014; Cooper, 2014). 
 
In addition, the work has provided further contributions to pipeline defect 
assessment and failure frequency modelling. It has been shown that the flow 
stress dependent NG-18 equations are suitable to be applied to pipelines with a 
wall thickness of up to 47.2 mm, provided the linepipe steel has a high 
toughness. The review of existing failure frequency models has clearly outlined 
the structure and the similarities and differences between the various failure 
frequency models currently in use in the pipeline industry. Furthermore the 
process of analysing of the UKOPA Fault Database to derive probability 
distributions for the AFFECT model has been documented in detail for future 
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reference. The development of the AFFECT model has highlighted potential 
issues with the current use of failure frequency models, in terms of their 
treatment of failures resulting from damage to branches and fittings, drilling 
operations in-error and broken or severed pipelines.  It has also been shown 
that the specific probability distribution fits made to the historical operational 
damage data in the models can significantly affect the values of failure 
frequency calculated by those models. 
 
11.3 Recommendations 
 
The recommendations for further work made in this thesis are as follows: 
 
 Further research should be carried out in order to either develop a model 
to describe gouged dent failure which is applicable to thick wall pipelines; 
or to validate the current gouged dent models for thick wall pipelines 
through experimental tests on thick wall pipes with gouged dent defects. 
 The Incident-Rates and probability distributions used within the AFFECT 
model should be regularly updated using the most recent version of the 
UKOPA database. This will ensure that the data becomes more relevant 
to dense phase CO2 pipelines over time as more of those pipelines are 
constructed and operated. 
 With reference to the applicability of the flow stress dependent NG-18 
equations to thick wall pipe, further research should be carried out in 
order to determine the lower limit of material fracture toughness at which 
it is acceptable to ignore the effect of fracture toughness and brittle 
fracture. 
 Further work should be performed towards investigating the potential 
error in failure frequencies as a result of interpretation of the UKOPA 
Fault Database and selecting a distribution fit. 
 Either a separate drill puncture model or a separate historical data 
component should be developed and added to the AFFECT model in 
order to accurately describe pipeline failures due to drilling operations 
in-error. 
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 Either a separate branch or fitting puncture model or a separate historical 
data component should be developed and added to the AFFECT model 
in order to accurately describe third party external interference pipeline 
failures from branches and fittings. 
 Either a separate severed or broken pipe failure model or a separate 
historical data component should be developed and added to the 
AFFECT model in order to accurately describe pipeline failures resulting 
in a severed or broken pipeline. 
 For the analysis performed using the shelter model it is noted that for 
each simulated rupture case the building was located downwind on the 
centreline axis. This is considered to be the worst case direction and the 
results produced may be different for a building located crosswind or 
upwind. Buildings located in different directions should therefore be 
considered as part of further work. 
 In order to fully investigate the possibility that a decrease in the 
temperature of CO2 in the pipeline may lead to worse consequences for 
nearby building occupants in the event of a rupture, a more 
comprehensive sensitivity study into CO2 temperature should be carried 
out as part of further work. 
 Further work into shelter should consider clouds of CO2 which cover only 
a fraction of the height of the buildings used for shelter, rather than 
completely envelope them. 
 Further work into shelter should consider buildings with internal partitions 
in order to simulate different rooms. 
 For the analysis performed using the escape model further work should 
consider the effects of local topography on the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 with time and distance; and the physiological 
effects of an increasing CO2 dose, with respect to the potential for 
escape. 
 Further work should consider an analysis linking the shelter and escape 
models together in order to provide a more comprehensive description of 
an individual’s behaviour in the event of the rupture of a dense phase 
CO2 pipeline and to calculate more accurate values for the chances of 
survival. 
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Appendix A  Development of the AFFECT Failure Frequency 
Model for Dense Phase CO2 Pipelines (Charts) 
 
 
Figure A.1: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Example 1 
 
 
Figure A.2: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Example 2 
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Figure A.3: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Example 3 
 
 
Figure A.4: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Modified PIE Model, for Example 1 
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Figure A.5: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Modified PIE Model, for Example 2 
 
 
Figure A.6: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Modified PIE Model, for Example 3 
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Figure A.7: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure A.8: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Example 4 
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Figure A.9: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Example 5 
 
 
Figure A.10: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Example 6 
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Figure A.11: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Modified PIE Model, for Example 4 
 
 
Figure A.12: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Modified PIE Model, for Example 5 
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Figure A.13: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Modified PIE Model, for Example 6 
 
 
Figure A.14: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Modified PIE 
Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
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Figure A.15: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 1 
 
 
Figure A.16: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 2 
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Figure A.17: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 3 
 
 
Figure A.18: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Re-Rounding Model, for Example 1 
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Figure A.19: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Re-Rounding Model, for Example 2 
 
 
Figure A.20: Leak Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Re-Rounding Model, for Example 3 
 
 A-11 
 
 
Figure A.21: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure A.22: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 4 
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Figure A.23: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 5 
 
 
Figure A.24: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 6 
 
 A-13 
 
 
Figure A.25: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Re-Rounding Model, for Example 4 
 
 
Figure A.26: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Re-Rounding Model, for Example 5 
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Figure A.27: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Re-Rounding Model, for Example 6 
 
 
Figure A.28: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Re-Rounding 
Model and the PIE Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
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Figure A.29: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 1 
 
 
Figure A.30: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 2 
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Figure A.31: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 3 
 
 
Figure A.32: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Dent Force Model, for Example 1 
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Figure A.33: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Dent Force Model, for Example 2 
 
 
Figure A.34: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Dent Force Model, for Example 3 
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Figure A.35: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model and the Re-Rounding Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure A.36: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 4 
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Figure A.37: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 5 
 
 
Figure A.38: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 6 
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Figure A.39: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Dent Force Model, for Example 4 
 
 
Figure A.40: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Dent Force Model, for Example 5 
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Figure A.41: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Dent Force Model, for Example 6 
 
 
Figure A.42: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Dent Force 
Model and the Re-Rounding Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
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Figure A.43: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the 
Modified PIE Model for Example 1 
 
 
Figure A.44: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the 
Modified PIE Model for Example 2 
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Figure A.45: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the 
Modified PIE Model for Example 3 
 
 
Figure A.46: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the New Distributions Model, for Example 1 
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Figure A.47: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the New Distributions Model, for Example 2 
 
 
Figure A.48: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the New Distributions Model, for Example 3 
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Figure A.49: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model and the Re-Rounding Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure A.50: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the 
Modified PIE Model for Example 4 
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Figure A.51: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the 
Modified PIE Model for Example 5 
 
 
Figure A.52: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the 
Modified PIE Model for Example 6 
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Figure A.53: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the New Distributions Model, for Example 4 
 
 
Figure A.54: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the New Distributions Model, for Example 5 
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Figure A.55: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the New Distributions Model, for Example 6 
 
 
Figure A.56: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the New 
Distributions Model and the Re-Rounding Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
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Figure A.57: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal 
Force Model, New Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 1 
 
 
Figure A.58: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal 
Force Model, New Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 2 
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Figure A.59: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal 
Force Model, New Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 3 
 
 
Figure A.60: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Lognormal Force Model, for Example 1 
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Figure A.61: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Lognormal Force Model, for Example 2 
 
 
Figure A.62: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Lognormal Force Model, for Example 3 
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Figure A.63: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal 
Force Model and the Dent Force Model for Examples 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure A.64: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal 
Force Model, New Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 4 
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Figure A.65: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal 
Force Model, New Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 5 
 
 
Figure A.66: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal 
Force Model, New Distributions Model, Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding 
Model and the Modified PIE Model for Example 6 
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Figure A.67: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Lognormal Force Model, for Example 4 
 
 
Figure A.68: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Lognormal Force Model, for Example 5 
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Figure A.69: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Lognormal Force Model, for Example 6 
 
 
Figure A.70: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Lognormal 
Force Model and the Dent Force Model for Examples 4, 5 and 6 
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Figure A.71: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model A and Model 
B for Example 1 
 
 
Figure A.72: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model A and Model 
B for Example 2 
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Figure A.73: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model A and Model 
B for Example 3 
 
 
Figure A.74: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model A and Model 
B for Example 4 
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Figure A.75: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model A and Model 
B for Example 5 
 
 
Figure A.76: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model A and Model 
B for Example 6 
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Figure A.77: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model, Lognormal Force Model, New Distributions Model, 
Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for 
Example 1 
 
 
Figure A.78: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model, Lognormal Force Model, New Distributions Model, 
Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for 
Example 2 
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Figure A.79: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model, Lognormal Force Model, New Distributions Model, 
Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for 
Example 3 
 
 
Figure A.80: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Split Distributions Model, for Example 1 
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Figure A.81: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Split Distributions Model, for Example 2 
 
 
Figure A.82: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Split Distributions Model, for Example 3 
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Figure A.83: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model and the Lognormal Force Model for Examples 
1, 2 and 3 
 
 
Figure A.84: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model, Lognormal Force Model, New Distributions Model, 
Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for 
Example 4 
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Figure A.85: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model, Lognormal Force Model, New Distributions Model, 
Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for 
Example 5 
 
 
Figure A.86: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model, Lognormal Force Model, New Distributions Model, 
Dent Force Model, Re-Rounding Model and the Modified PIE Model for 
Example 6 
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Figure A.87: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Split Distributions Model, for Example 4 
 
 
Figure A.88: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Split Distributions Model, for Example 5 
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Figure A.89: Leak, Rupture and Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by 
the Split Distributions Model, for Example 6 
 
 
Figure A.90: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by the Split 
Distributions Model and the Lognormal Force Model for Examples 
4, 5 and 6 
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Figure A.91: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model C, Model D 
and Model E for Example 1 
 
 
Figure A.92: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model C, Model D 
and Model E for Example 2 
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Figure A.93: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model C, Model D 
and Model E for Example 3 
 
 
Figure A.94: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model C, Model D 
and Model E for Example 4 
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Figure A.95: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model C, Model D 
and Model E for Example 5 
 
 
Figure A.96: Total Failure Frequency as Calculated by Model C, Model D 
and Model E for Example 6 
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Appendix B  An Assessment of the 2010 UKOPA Fault 
Database (Review Process) 
 
The UKOPA Fault Database gives details of all known faults discovered since 
1962 associated with pipelines under the jurisdiction of UKOPA. On discovery 
and investigation of a fault, the pipeline operator in question completes an FR1 
“Fault Data Input Form” detailing the relevant information. This form is then 
submitted to UKOPA for inclusion in the database. In the database, reported 
faults are presented as a table of records known as the “Fault Listing”. Records 
in the fault listing consist of 48 different fields and provide data on both the fault 
and the affected pipeline. The complete list of fields in the fault listing is as 
follows: 
 
 Fault Number 
 Pipe Outside Diameter at Fault mm 
 Local Wall Thickness mm 
 Fault Material Grade 
 Type of Pipe Construction at Fault 
 Fault Pipeline Location 
 Fault Specific Location 
 How Fault was Discovered 
 Fault Discovery Date  
 Operating Pressure at Fault 
 Fault Product Supply Action 
 Fault Cause 
 Fault Secondary / Other Cause 
 Fault External Interference Type 
 Affected Component 
 Fault Extent of Damage 
 Fault Centre Location 0 – 360 degrees 
 Fault Repair Method Used 
 Cathodic Protection Status 
 Protective Measures at Fault 
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 Type of Backfill at Fault 
 Fault Depth of Cover 
 External Coating Type at Fault 
 Was Pipe Insulated at Fault 
 Internal Coating at Fault 
 Date of Previous CP Survey 
 Date of Previous ILI Inspection 
 Date of Previous Aerial Inspection 
 Fault Additional Comments 
 Fault Comments 
 Number of Defects for This Fault 
 Hole Area 
 Hole Length 
 Hole Width 
 Hole Circular Position 
 Amount of Product Released 
 Was a Crater Formed? 
 Crater Length 
 Crater Width 
 Crater Depth 
 Crater Affected Radius m 
 Was There Ignition? 
 Ignition Type 
 Fire Type 
 Radius of Damage m 
 Flame Length 
 Flame Inclination 
 Failure Comments 
 
A single reported fault may contain several individual flaws, for example clusters 
of corrosion or the presence of multiple tooth marks from a single excavator 
bucket. Within the context of the database, these flaws are known as defects. A 
separate table, titled “Defects Associated with Faults” gives details of all the 
individual defects which make up the pipeline faults. Records in the table of 
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defects associated with faults consist of 15 different fields and include the 
measured dimensions of each flaw. The complete list of fields in the table of 
defects associated with faults is as follows: 
 
 Defect Number 
 Fault Number 
 Date Discovered 
 Operating Pressure 
 Pipe Diameter 
 Wall Thickness 
 Grade 
 Defect Length mm 
 Defect Width mm 
 Defect Depth mm 
 Defect Orientation 
 Defect Type 
 Fault Cause 
 Fault Comment 
 Fault Additional Comment 
 
The total number of faults and defects contained within the database are shown 
in Table B.1. Records in the table of defects associated with faults are linked to 
their matching record in the fault listing via the fault number which provides a 
unique numerical identifier for each fault. The corresponding records from each 
table together provide all of the known data about a single fault. It should be 
noted that some fault numbers appear in the fault listing but not the table of 
defects associated with faults, and vice versa. In these cases the information 
about the fault is incomplete. Table B.1 highlights the number of cases for which 
this occurs. 
 
Table Total Number of Records in Table 
Number of Faults 
Exclusive to Table 
Fault Listing 3080 200 
Defects Associated with Faults 5087 11 
Table B.1: Summary of Fault and Defect Numbers 
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The failure frequency model developed as part of this work requires the use of 
probability distributions for the size of pipeline damage caused by external 
interference. The table of defects associated with faults within the UKOPA Fault 
Database contains the necessary data required to derive these probability 
distributions. The table has therefore been analysed and filtered to produce 
appropriate data sets for this purpose. Descriptions of the most important fields 
in the table with regards to this analysis are given below. Note that the fields 
“Affected Component” and “Fault Extent of Damage” appear only in the fault 
listing and not the table of defects associated with faults. These fields are 
considered to provide vital information with respect to data classification and as 
a result have been included in the analysis. 
 
Defect Number   
 
In the defect number field, a record within the table of defects associated with 
faults is assigned a unique numerical identifier. The defect number can be used 
to distinguish between defect records which would otherwise be identical. The 
range of the defect number for the whole database is from one to 5093. 
 
Fault Number  
 
The fault number is also a numerical identifier and is used in the table of defects 
associated with faults to identify which fault a particular defect belongs to. 
Consequently, one or more defect records can share the same fault number. 
The range of the fault number is from one to 3107. 
 
Operating Pressure 
 
This field gives the operating pressure of the pipeline affected by the defect in 
barg. In considering defects caused by external interference for the purposes of 
this work, the information given in this field has been assumed to be the 
pressure at which the pipeline was operating at the time the damage occurred. 
It should be noted that the database contains 329 defect records for which the 
operating pressure is not given or has a nonsensical value, details of which are 
given in Table B.2: 
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Stated Operating Pressure Value No. of Defects with Value 
-1 212 
0 114 
“NULL” 3 
Table B.2: Details of Nonsensical Operating Pressure Values 
 
In the derivation of a dent force distribution for this work (section 7.1), which 
specifically requires the use of the operating pressure associated with a 
particular defect, defects with those values of operating pressures shown in 
Table B.2 have not been included in the procedure due to the absence of 
accurate data. It is noted that a stated operating pressure of “0” could suggest 
that the damage occurred when the line was not operating (pre-commission, 
during modifications etc.) rather than the omission of a value. Indeed, situations 
such as this are occasionally indicated by information contained within the other 
fields in the defect record. However, although the operating pressure value in 
these cases would be considered accurate, the equations used to derive dent 
force are not applicable to damage incidents which occur at zero pressure. 
 
Pipe Diameter 
 
This field gives the external diameter of the pipeline affected by the defect in 
millimetres. It should be noted that the database contains 31 defect records for 
which the pipe diameter is not given or has a nonsensical value, details of which 
are given in Table B.3. 
 
Stated Pipe Diameter Value No. of Defects with Value 
6096 5 
0 15 
“NULL” 3 
Blank 8 
Table B.3: Details of Nonsensical Pipe Diameter Values 
 
In the derivation of a dent force distribution for this work (section 7.1) which 
specifically requires the use of the external diameter, defects with a pipe 
diameter of “0”, “NULL” or blanks have not been included in the procedure due 
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to the absence of  accurate data. None of the five defects with a pipe diameter 
of “6096” represent external interference damage and as a result are not 
considered in the analysis for this work. It could be inferred with some 
confidence however, that for these defects the true pipe diameter is a standard 
size of 609.6 mm (24”) and has been entered into the database incorrectly. 
 
Wall Thickness 
 
This field gives the wall thickness of the pipeline affected by the defect in 
millimetres. For the purposes of this work, the information given in this field has 
been assumed to be the local wall thickness in the region of the defect. 
However, based on the prevalence of standard pipe wall thickness values in this 
field throughout the database, it is likely that in many cases the value given is 
the nominal or minimum wall thickness for the pipeline. It should be noted that 
the database contains 62 defect records for which the wall thickness is not 
given or has a nonsensical value, details of which are given in Table B.4. 
 
Stated Wall Thickness Value No. of Defects with Value 
0 45 
“NULL” 9 
Blank 8 
Table B.4: Details of Nonsensical Wall Thickness Values 
 
In the derivation of a dent force distribution for this work (section 7.1) which 
specifically requires the use of the wall thickness, defects with a missing or 
nonsensical wall thickness have not been included in the procedure due to the 
absence of accurate data. 
 
Grade 
 
This field gives the steel grade of the pipeline affected by the defect using the 
API 5L specification terminology (Anon., 2007c). For the purposes of this work, 
the yield and tensile strength values for the pipe material affected by the defect 
have been assumed on the basis of this field. The minimum values for the 
stated grade in the API 5L specification have been assumed in each case 
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(SMYS and SMUTS). It should be noted that the database contains 142 defect 
records for which the wall thickness is not given, details of which are given in 
Table B.5. 
 
Stated Grade Value No. of Defects 
“Unknown” 115 
“NULL” 19 
Blank 8 
Table B.5: Details of Missing Pipe Grade Values 
 
In the derivation of a dent force distribution for this work (section 7.1) which 
specifically requires the use of the pipe steel yield and tensile strength, defects 
with a missing pipe grade have not been included in the procedure due to the 
absence of accurate data. 
 
Defect Length mm 
 
This field gives the length of the defect in millimetres. For the purposes of this 
work it is assumed that the value given in this field represents the extent of the 
defect in the axial direction. It should be noted that there are 1516 defect 
records for which the defect length is given as “0”. It can be inferred from other 
fields in the table of defects associated with faults, that the use of “0” for a 
defect length could indicate either; the axial length was too small to measure 
with available tools (for example circumferential scratches, girth weld cracks, 
pin holes); the investigating party believed recording a defect length was not 
necessary or not applicable (for example coating damage, valve leaks, severed 
weldolets); the defect was discovered by in-line inspection tool which did not 
perform sizing; or that the defect must have had a measurable length but that 
the data was omitted for unknown reasons. In the case of defects from the 
same fault, a not uncommon occurrence is for the defect with the lowest defect 
number (the “first” defect in the fault) to receive a non-zero defect length and for 
the remaining defects to have a length of “0”. This possibility is not restricted to 
the defect length and, when it occurs, typically affects also the defect width and 
defect depth fields. In these instances, the database is uncertain. An omitted 
length, width and depth value for a defect otherwise identical to one with non-
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zero length, width and depth could suggest that its true dimensions mirror those 
of the sized defect (for example identical marks from adjacent excavator teeth). 
Alternatively, the records could suggest that the un-sized defects in the 
grouping were too small or superficial compared to the sized defect to warrant 
measurement. Based upon the above observations, it is acknowledged that a 
recorded length of “0” is incorrect for a large number of the 1516 defects within 
the database with this value. Due to the absence of any conclusive information, 
the defect length has been assumed as stated for this work. However, in the 
derivation of gouge length distributions (section 7.4), defects with a defect 
length of “0” have not been included in the procedure. 
 
Defect Depth mm 
 
This field gives the depth of the defect in millimetres. It is assumed that the 
value given in this field represents the depth of the defect in radial direction 
towards the pipe axis. For defects which are the result of metal loss on the pipe 
(for example gouges, corrosion) this will correspond to the depth through-wall 
thickness. For defects which are the result of a deformation in the pipe wall (for 
example dents) it is assumed the depth represents the maximum extent of the 
deformation, relative to the un-deformed pipe surface. It should be noted that 
there are 1595 defect records for which the defect depth is given as “0”. Similar 
observations and conclusions regarding these data can be made as to those for 
the defect length. Consequently, for the purposes of this work, the defect depth 
has been assumed as stated and defects with a defect depth of “0” have not 
been included in the derivation of gouge depth distributions (section 7.4). There 
are 136 defects in the database with a recorded defect depth in excess of the 
stated pipe wall thickness. For deformation-type defects, depths in excess of 
the wall thickness are possible due to the nature of the damage. Metal loss-type 
defects however, are by definition a reduction in the pipe wall thickness. It is 
therefore impossible for the depth of a metal loss defect to exceed the wall 
thickness of the pipe. The 136 defects can be categorised as shown in Table 
B.6: 
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Defects with Depth Greater Than Wall Thickness 
136 
Metal Loss Dents Unknown 
41 
90 5 
Wall 
Thickness 
Zero 
Wall 
Thickness 
Non-Zero 
17 24 
Table B.6: Categorisation of Defects with Depth Greater Than Wall 
Thickness 
 
Of the 136 defects with a depth in excess of the wall thickness, 90 of the 
defects are dents and 41 are metal loss-type defects. Additionally, five of the 
defects are classed as either milling or weld defects. The available information 
for these defects is sparse and as a result the nature of the damage in these 
cases is unknown. The majority of the dents can be considered to have an 
acceptable depth measurement, given they are deformation-type defects. One 
dent from the 90 however has a recorded depth of 7777 mm, this depth is too 
large to be realistic and is therefore considered to be incorrect. From the 41 
metal loss-type defects, 17 are from records where the pipe wall thickness is 
given as “0”. In the majority of these cases the defect depths can also be 
considered acceptable on the basis that the wall thickness is incorrect. Only one 
defect from the 17, with a depth of 38 mm, is considered to be incorrect. This 
defect depth is larger than the maximum pipe wall thickness in operation on all 
pipelines and therefore must be erroneous. 24 of the metal loss-type defects 
have a recorded wall thickness which is non-zero. In all of these cases the 
defect depth must be incorrect. Based upon information contained within the 
other fields in the defect records, it is evident that for some of these defects the 
depth measurement may be complicated by the presence of a dent occupying 
the same space on the pipeline (the metal loss-type defect is part of a fault 
which also includes a dent). It is speculated that in these cases the investigating 
party may have recorded a joint depth incorporating both dent and metal loss-
type defect depths. Regardless of this, a realistic depth measurement cannot be 
obtained for any of the 24 defects. In the derivation of gouge depth distributions 
for this work, metal loss-type defects caused by external interference which are 
considered to have an unacceptable depth measurement by virtue of it 
exceeding the pipe wall thickness have not been included in the procedure. 
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Defect Type 
 
In the defect type field the records are categorised according to the nature of 
the defect. There are six different types of defect recorded in the database, 
namely: 
 
 Corrosion 
 Crack 
 Dent 
 Gouge 
 Mill Defect 
 Weld Defect 
 
This work is concerned exclusively with defects which are caused by external 
interference. The defect types caused by external interference are “Crack”, 
“Dent” and “Gouge”. Gouges and cracks can be classed as the aforementioned 
metal loss-type defects, whereas dents are deformation-type defects. It should 
be noted that the database contains 152 defect records for which the defect 
type is given as “NULL”. It can be inferred from other fields in the table of 
defects associated with faults that the use of “NULL” for the defect type could 
indicate either; the investigating party believed recording a defect type was not 
necessary or not applicable (for example coating faults); the defect was 
discovered by in-line inspection tool which did not perform the necessary 
identification; or that the data was omitted for unknown reasons. In 
approximately half of the cases, the defect type can be inferred based upon 
information contained within the other fields in the defect record. However, the 
majority of defects for which this is possible are corrosion, mill defects and weld 
defects. Only four defects of the 152 can be definitively identified as cracks, 
dents or gouges. Defects for which the defect type cannot be determined have 
not been included in the analysis. 
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Fault Cause 
 
In the fault cause field the source of a particular fault is detailed. All defects 
which are part of the same fault are assigned the same fault cause. There are 
11 main categories of fault cause recorded in the database, namely: 
 
 Damage During Original Construction 
 External Corrosion 
 External Interference 
 Girth Weld Defect 
 Ground Movement 
 Internal Corrosion 
 Other 
 Pipe Defect 
 Pipe Mill Damage 
 Seam Weld Defect 
 Unknown 
 
This work is concerned exclusively with defects which are caused by external 
interference. The fault cause field is therefore critical in distinguishing which 
defects should be included in the analysis. The majority of the fault cause 
categories are self-explanatory and cover the common causes of damage to 
pipelines with “Other” used for mechanisms which do not fit one of the larger 
categories; and “Unknown” reserved for defects for which the cause is not 
known. It should be noted that the database contains 33 defect records for 
which the fault cause is not given, details of which are given in Table B.7: 
 
Stated Fault Cause No. of Defects 
“NULL” 32 
Blank 1 
Table B.7: Details of Missing Fault Cause Data 
 
In all 33 cases the information contained within the other fields in the defect 
records is not sufficient to determine a definitive fault cause. The defects with 
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missing fault cause data can therefore be treated in the same way as defects 
for which the fault cause is “Unknown”. 
 
Fault Comment 
 
The purpose of the fault comment field is for the investigating party to indicate 
any additional information regarding a particular fault that they feel is important. 
All defects which are part of the same fault are assigned the same fault 
comment. This field is unlike the previous fields described in that there are no 
rules regarding the information it should contain. There are a large number of 
contributing sources to the database and therefore the information given in the 
fault comment shows a large degree of variation. An exhaustive list of the 
information the field can cover would be too large to include here, however the 
majority of comments can be broadly categorised as either: 
 
 A description of the damage  
 How the damage was caused  
 Details of repairs carried out  
 How and/or when the damage was discovered  
 The location of the damage 
 
It is not uncommon for more than one of the above to be recorded for any single 
fault. For the purposes of this work the fault comment can provide vital 
information for understanding the nature of defects and classifying them as part 
of the analysis. For example one defect in particular is listed with: 
 
Defect Type Fault Cause Fault Comment 
Gouge External Interference //LINES-WRONG ONE DRILLED-25MMH 
Table B.8: Example Fault Comment 1 
 
The fault comment in this case indicates that the damage was caused by a drill 
and therefore allows the defect to be classified in a different way to other 
gouges caused by external interference. This would not be possible if only the 
first two fields were given and would result in the defect being misclassified. 
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Unfortunately there is little consistency between the information recorded from 
one fault comment to the next, both in terms of the category of the information 
given; and how the information is presented within those categories. In contrast 
to the case shown above for example, the fault comment may only contain 
information already presented in other fields: 
 
Defect Type Fault Cause Fault Comment 
Gouge External Interference PIPE MISTAKEN FOR OLD RLWAY LI 
Gouge External Interference 3 SMALL GOUGES 
Table B.9: Example Fault Comments 2 & 3 
 
These comments, taken from two separate defects, are useful in the respect 
that they confirm and clarify data given in the fault cause and defect type fields 
of their respective records. However, they present no additional information 
about each defect. Furthermore, fault comments which give only the repair 
method used, the method of discovery or the location contain no relevant 
information as the models considered for the work are concerned only with the 
size and nature of damage to the pipeline: 
  
Defect Type Fault Cause Fault Comment 
Dent External Interference PERMANENT REPAIR-STOPPLE BYPASS 
Gouge External Interference DETECTED BY PEARSON 
Gouge External Interference Location 412730 552869 
Table B.10: Example Fault Comments 4, 5 & 6 
 
Additionally the database contains 364 defect records for which a fault comment 
is not given. Consequently, the usefulness of the field with regards to this work 
varies considerably from defect to defect. 
  
Fault Additional Comment 
 
The fault additional comment field is similar to the fault comment field and 
allows the investigating party to include further information about the fault. For 
example, if the fault comment field shows data relating to one of the categories 
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listed in the fault comment section, the fault additional comment field may be 
used to include data relating to another category in the list. The range of 
information that the field can cover and the presentation of the data is much the 
same as that of the fault comment field and the majority of the observations 
made regarding that field can also be applied to this one. Fault additional 
comment data therefore has the potential to be useful within the context of this 
work. It should be noted however, that perhaps due to its similarity to the fault 
comment field, the fault additional comment only rarely contains data. There are 
4677 defects out of a total 5087 for which a fault additional comment is not 
given. 
 
Affected Component 
 
The purpose of the affected component field is to designate which particular 
element of the pipeline structure a fault is associated with. This field appears in 
the fault listing only and as a result all defects which are part of the same fault 
have been assumed to affect the same component. There are nine main 
categories of fault cause recorded in the database, namely: 
 
 Bend 
 Flanged Joint 
 Insulation Joint 
 Other 
 Pig Trap 
 Pipe 
 Sleeve 
 Tee 
 Valve 
 
The affected component categories cover the major component parts of an 
operating pipeline. The “Other” category is used for components which suffer 
faults less frequently, such stand pipes or dome ends. In the failure frequency 
model the probability distributions derived from the UKOPA Fault Database are 
used in conjunction with a limit state function, based on fracture mechanics 
failure models for the failure of defects in pressurised pipes. It is therefore 
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necessary to ensure that the distributions used in the failure frequency model 
are derived from data which is appropriate to the fracture mechanics failure 
models. The analysis is therefore concerned exclusively with defects that are 
located on either on the pipe or bend components. In this way the affected 
component field is critical in distinguishing which defects should be included in 
the analysis. It should be noted that the database contains 132 defect records 
for which the affected component is not given or cannot be determined. 13 of 
the 132 defects correspond to those 11 faults shown in Table B.1 for which the 
matching fault records in the fault listing are missing. Table B.11 summarises 
the data: 
 
Stated Affected Component No. of Defects 
“NULL” 119 
Associated fault does not appear in fault listing 13 
Table B.11: Details of Missing Affected Component Data 
 
The 132 defects in Table B.11 have not been included in the analysis as it is not 
known whether they are appropriate to the fracture mechanics failure models 
used in the failure frequency model. 
 
Fault Extent of Damage 
 
The fault extent of damage field indicates the severity of the damage associated 
with the fault. This field appears in the fault listing only and consequently refers 
to the overall severity of a fault rather than each individual defect within it. There 
are six main categories of damage severity recorded in the database, namely: 
 
 Coating only 
 No Loss – severe 
 No Loss – Slight 
 Product Loss – Fracture 
 Product Loss – Leak 
 Unknown 
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The fault extent of damage field can provide an additional layer of information to 
assist in understanding the nature of defects and classifying them as part of the 
analysis. For example, only external interference damage which has occurred to 
the pipe steel is considered appropriate to the fracture mechanics failure 
models used in the failure frequency model. This type of information is often not 
implied or indicated by one of the other fields, however an indication of “Coating 
only” damage in the fault extent of damage field can help to avoid 
misclassification and allow inappropriate data to be removed from the analysis. 
It can also be determined from this field if a fault resulted in pipeline failure. 
Defects caused by external interference which have failed must be treated, 
within the model, according to the mechanism of failure. It should be noted that 
the database contains 41 defect records for which the fault extent of damage is 
not given or cannot be determined. 13 of the 41 defects correspond to those 11 
faults shown in Table B.1 for which the matching fault records in the fault listing 
are missing. In these cases classification of the defect must be made solely on 
the basis of the other fields in the defect record. Table B.12 summarises the 
data: 
 
Stated Affected Component No. of Defects 
“NULL” 28 
Associated fault does not appear in fault listing 13 
Table B.12: Details of Missing Fault Extent of Damage Data 
 
Classification of Defects and Uncertainty within the Database 
 
The information required to determine the suitability of defects for inclusion in 
the probability distribution data sets, is contained within the fields: 
 
 Defect Type 
 Fault Cause 
 Fault Comment 
 Fault Additional Comment 
 Affected Component 
 Fault Extent of Damage 
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Unfortunately, the classification process is not as straightforward as simply 
eliminating unsuitable defects by assessing each of the above fields in turn. The 
data within these fields should ideally be considered as a whole for each defect. 
This is due to inconsistencies in the way the data has been recorded between 
each of the fields. For example, two separate defects have defect type, fault 
cause and fault comment as shown in Table B.13: 
 
Defect 
Type Fault Cause Fault Comment 
Gouge Damage during original construction 
SLIGHT SCORE/CORR. & EXT. 
CORR. 
Corrosion External Corrosion GOUGE&CORR-S/F-CONSTRUCN?-OLI4 
Table B.13: Defect Classification Example 1 
 
Taking all of the information together, the two defects appear to be very similar 
in both cause and nature, despite having different defect types and fault causes 
listed. Both defects should be classified as gouges caused by construction 
damage with associated corrosion. It would be easy to misclassify the defects 
however, if either of the first two fields was considered in isolation. 
 
The source of the inconsistencies within the database lies in the way the data is 
recorded and compiled. Some of the categories within each field are not 
mutually exclusive; for example in the defect type field, the term “Weld Defect” 
is non-specific and certain defects of this type could also be described as a 
“Crack”, “Gouge”, “Dent” or “Corrosion” depending on their nature. In terms of 
the fault cause, “External Corrosion” is generally used for external corrosion 
faults, however almost all of the other possible categories within this field can 
lead to the development of external corrosion provided the pipe coating is 
damaged and the cathodic protection (CP) system is ineffective. There is also a 
certain degree of crossover between the fields, for example a fault cause can 
be recorded as “Pipe Mill Damage”, but there also exists a defect type category 
of “Mill Defect”. Given these circumstances, it is clear that the way in which fault 
information is recorded for the database will largely be dependent on the party 
investigating the fault and how they interpret the FR1 fault data input form. 
Since the database is comprised of fault data from a large number of 
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independent contributing sources inconsistency between fault and defect 
records is not surprising. 
 
If the above points are taken into consideration then the majority of defects 
within the database can be classified satisfactorily. Unfortunately however, 
there are a number of defects for which the data is uncertain. The issue is 
illustrated by the defect shown in Table B.14: 
 
Defect Type Fault Cause Fault Comment 
Dent External Corrosion 2EXT.CORR,4INDENTS,GOUGE OLI4 
Table B.14: Defect Classification Example 2 
 
The fault comment for this defect indicates that corrosion was present in 
addition to a dent and a gouge. Dents and gouges are common forms of 
pipeline damage and can result from most of the categories listed in the “Fault 
Cause” section, apart from internal and external corrosion. Whilst corrosion is 
indicated to be present, recording the fault cause as “External Corrosion” in this 
case masks the true cause of the damage. The external corrosion is a 
secondary flaw which will have developed following the initial pipe damage 
which caused the dent and gouge. The uncertain nature of the fault cause in 
this case presents problems for the analysis. The fault may or may not have 
been caused by external interference and therefore may or may not be relevant 
to the current work. 
 
The database also contains defects which contradict themselves in the data 
they present. In these cases, at least some of the recorded data must be 
incorrect. Table B.15 gives four examples: 
 
Defect Type Fault Cause Fault Comment 
Gouge Other CONSTRUCTION DAMAGE GOUGES 
Mill Defect External Interference OLI EVERY 5 YEARS 
Gouge External Interference PROBABLY CONSTRUCTION DAMAGE 
Corrosion External Interference NULL 
Table B.15: Defect Classification Examples 3, 4, 5, & 6 
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The first defect in Table B.15 has a fault cause of “Other”, however the fault 
comment clearly indicates construction damage as the source. The defect 
contains no other information regarding the fault origins so it is not clear as to 
why “Damage During Original Construction” was not used in this case. Either 
construction damage was not the cause of the fault, or the “Other” category has 
been used in error. The second defect in Table B.15 has a fault cause of 
“External Interference”, however the defect type indicates it to be a “Mill Defect”. 
In this case the information given in the defect type and the fault cause are 
mutually exclusive, the defect cannot occur as part of the milling process and be 
caused by external interference. For the third defect in Table B.15 the fault 
comment shows uncertainty regarding the source of the fault but it suggests it is 
probably construction damage. The fault cause field however, records the 
defect as being due to “External Interference”. Construction and external 
interference can produce very similar defects and the information in this case 
implies that the investigating party is not sure of the source. It is not clear 
however why the defect was recorded as external interference if construction 
damage was the more likely of the two mechanisms. The final defect in Table 
B.15 has a fault cause of “External Interference” and a defect type of 
“Corrosion”. In this case one could argue that the defect is simply analogous to 
those shown in Table B.13 and Table B.14 (indicating the development of 
external corrosion following initial pipeline damage), but with an alternative fault 
cause. However, given that the other fields in the defect present no further 
information; and that examples of defects with directly contradicting data have 
already been shown, being absolutely certain of this conclusion is difficult. 
 
As previously noted this work is concerned only with defects which have been 
caused by external interference. The probability distributions used in the failure 
frequency model must be accurate representations of this damage mechanism. 
With regards to the above observations concerning uncertain and contradictory 
data, it was therefore decided that for the purposes of the analysis, only defects 
where an origin of external interference was certain would be included. For this 
purpose, defect classification has been focussed towards removing as much 
uncertainty as possible from the data: 
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 The Fault Cause field has been used as the main indicator of a defect’s 
origin. All defects without a fault cause of “External Interference” have 
not been considered. 
 From those defects left, a judgement has been made based on the 
defect type, fault comment and fault additional comment fields together 
as to the type of the defect and whether external interference appears to 
be the true cause of the damage. If another damage mechanism is 
suggested then the defect has not been included. 
 The Affected Component field has then been used to determine if the 
damage occurred to the pipe or bend. If another component is indicated 
then the defect has not been included. Note that sometimes the defect 
comment field indicates the damage occurred to a component other than 
the pipe or bend but the Affected Component field does not. In these 
cases the nature of the defect is uncertain and therefore these defects 
have also not been included. 
 Finally the Fault Extent of Damage Field has been used to determine 
whether the damage affected the pipe or the coating only. Defects to the 
coating only have not been included. Note that sometimes the defect 
comment field indicates the defect to be coating only and the Fault 
Extent of Damage Field does not. In these cases the nature of the defect 
is uncertain and therefore these defects have also not been included. 
 
One final point with regards to the classification of defects for the work concerns 
the fault comment field. It should be noted that in some cases, the number of 
individual defect records grouped in the same fault is not consistent with the 
information given in the fault comment field for that fault. Table B.16 shows an 
example: 
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Defect Type Fault Cause Fault Comment 
Gouge External Interference 10 GOUGES OF WHICH 3 CRACKING 
Gouge External Interference 10 GOUGES OF WHICH 3 CRACKING 
Gouge External Interference 10 GOUGES OF WHICH 3 CRACKING 
Gouge External Interference 10 GOUGES OF WHICH 3 CRACKING 
Gouge External Interference 10 GOUGES OF WHICH 3 CRACKING 
Table B.16: Defect Classification Example 7 
 
Table B.16 shows all of the defects in the database associated with one 
particular fault, a total of five gouges. In this case however, the fault comment 
field indicates that the fault should consist of “10 GOUGES OF WHICH 3 
CRACKING”. It is clear that five of the defects which should be associated with 
this fault have not been recorded in the database, the reason for which is 
unknown.  
 
In terms of the analysis, for faults which are similar to the above example it was 
decided that the number of defects should be taken as the number of records in 
the database and any count in the fault comment field ignored. It would not be 
possible to introduce the additional missing data as the dimensions for these 
defects would not be known. The only change which could be made based on 
the numbers given in the fault comment is a modification to the Incident-Rate, 
however the Incident-Rate has not been considered as part of this work. 
 
Analysis and Filter of the Table of Defects Associated with Faults 
 
This section describes the analysis process through which the data sets giving 
the size of pipeline damage caused by external interference have been derived.  
 
There are 5087 records in the table of defects associated with faults. Following 
the points on defect classification given above, 3795 of these defects are not 
indicated as “External Interference” by the fault cause field and can be removed 
from the analysis. Of the remaining 1292 defects, the defect type, fault 
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comment and additional fault comment fields suggest that 59 remain uncertain 
with regards to the true cause of the damage. These include: 
 
 49 defects which were potentially caused during construction 
 8 defects which are external corrosion 
 2 defects which appear to have resulted from the pipe coming into 
contact with an eccentric sleeve or nearby water main 
 
Excluding the 59 defects leaves 1233 defects in the database caused by 
external interference. 40 of the 1233 external interference defects occurred to 
components other than the pipe or bend and can therefore also be removed 
from the analysis. The affected components include: 
 
 3 to dome ends 
 1 to a drain pipe 
 1 to a grout pipe 
 6 to the pipe sleeve 
 2 to the pipe sleeve coating 
 1 to a sleeve fill point 
 1 to a sleeve valve 
 2 to stand pipes 
 7 to tee pieces 
 2 to valves 
 3 to weldolets 
 1 to a weldolet dip pipe 
 2 to weldolet welds 
 1 to a pressure point 
 1 to a branch pipe 
 1 to concrete capping 
 5 for which the component is unknown 
 
Excluding the 40 defects leaves 1193 external interference defects affecting 
either pipes or bends. Using a combination of the fault extent of damage and 
fault comment fields 109 of the 1193 defects were found to affect the pipe 
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coating only and can be removed from the analysis. There are therefore 1084 
external interference defects directly affecting the pipe or bend material. It 
should be noted that of these 1084 defects: 
 
 12 affect pipe sections which are located within above ground 
installations (AGIs) 
 21 affect above ground sections of pipe 
 
The land on which AGIs are located is under the jurisdiction of the pipeline 
operator. Any pipeline damage which occurs within the boundaries of an AGI is 
therefore not considered to be third party external interference. For this reason 
these defects have also been removed from the analysis. The defects affecting 
other above ground sections are the result of external interference; however the 
model is intended to calculate failure frequencies due to external interference 
for buried onshore pipelines. Exposed pipe sections do not benefit from the 
added layer of protection provided by the depth of cover for a buried line and 
the damage received by these sections is therefore considered to be atypical of 
external interference damage to buried pipelines. For this reason it was decided 
to remove these defects from the analysis. 
 
Excluding the 33 defects on above ground sections of pipe leaves 1051 defects. 
Using a combination of the defect type, fault comment and fault additional 
comment fields these 1051 defects can be classified as: 
 
 105 dents 
 927 gouges 
 1 crack 
 18 defects for which the defect type could not be determined 
 
To remove uncertainty from the data sets the 18 defects for which the defect 
type could not be determined have also been removed from the analysis. In the 
fracture mechanics failure models used in the failure frequency model “Gouge” 
and “Crack” damage are treated in the same way. For the purposes of the work, 
the 1 crack defect can therefore be considered as a gouge. 
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Based on the fault comment, fault additional comment and fault extent of 
damage fields within the database, the 105 dent defects and 928 gouge defects 
can be categorised further. Of the 105 dents: 
 
 5 have additional associated corrosion 
 2 are associated with drill damage 
 5 are associated with a pipeline failure 
 1 is associated with a weld 
 
Of the 928 gouges: 
 
 24 have additional associated corrosion 
 19 are associated with drill damage 
 32 are associated with a pipeline failure 
 7 are associated with a pipeline failure caused by a drill 
 6 are associated with welds 
 
Table B.17 shows a summary of the analysis of the table of defects associated 
with faults from the UKOPA Fault Database: 
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Description of damage No. Of Defects 
Not “External Interference” 3795 
Uncertain Damage Mechanism 59 
Damage to component other than pipe or bend 35 
Damage to unknown components 5 
Coating damage to pipe/bend 109 
Damage to above ground section or AGI 33 
Damage of unknown defect type 18 
Dent to pipe/bend 92 
Dent to pipe/bend with corrosion 5 
Dent by drill to pipe/bend 2 
Dent with failure of pipe/bend 5 
Dent to weld on pipe/bend 1 
Gouge to pipe/bend 840 
Gouge to pipe/bend with corrosion 24 
Gouge by drill to pipe/bend 19 
Gouge with failure of pipe/bend 32 
Gouge with failure by drill of pipe/bend 7 
Gouge to weld on pipe/bend 6 
Total 5087 
Table B.17: Summary of Analysis of Table of Defects Associated with 
Faults 
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Appendix C  A Shelter Model for Consequence Predictions 
Following A CO2 Pipeline Release (Charts) 
 
 
Figure C.1: Change in Mean Internal CO2 Concentration with Time and 
Distance for Case 1 
 
 
Figure C.2: Change in Internal Temperature with Time and Distance for 
Case 1 
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Figure C.3: Change in Equivalent Internal CO2 Concentration with Time 
and Distance for Case 1 
 
 
Figure C.4: Dose Received by a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 1 
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Figure C.5: Percentage Lethality for a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 1 
 
 
Figure C.6: Change in Mean Internal CO2 Concentration with Time and 
Distance for Case 2 
 
 C-4 
 
 
Figure C.7: Change in Internal Temperature with Time and Distance for 
Case 2 
 
 
Figure C.8: Change in Equivalent Internal CO2 Concentration with Time 
and Distance for Case 2 
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Figure C.9: Dose Received by a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 2 
 
 
Figure C.10: Percentage Lethality for a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 2 
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Figure C.11: Change in Mean Internal CO2 Concentration with Time and 
Distance for Case 3 
 
 
Figure C.12: Change in Internal Temperature with Time and Distance for 
Case 3 
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Figure C.13: Change in Equivalent Internal CO2 Concentration with Time 
and Distance for Case 3 
 
 
Figure C.14: Dose Received by a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 3 
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Figure C.15: Percentage Lethality for a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 3 
 
 
Figure C.16: Change in Mean Internal CO2 Concentration with Time and 
Distance for Case 4 
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Figure C.17: Change in Internal Temperature with Time and Distance for 
Case 4 
 
 
Figure C.18: Change in Equivalent Internal CO2 Concentration with Time 
and Distance for Case 4 
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Figure C.19: Dose Received by a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 4 
 
 
Figure C.20: Percentage Lethality for a Building Occupant with Time and 
Distance for Case 4 
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Appendix D  An Escape Model for Consequence Predictions 
Following A CO2 Pipeline Release (Charts) 
 
 
Figure D.1: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Downwind with Time and Distance for Case 1 
 
 
Figure D.2: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 1 
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Figure D.3: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Downwind with Time and Distance for Case 1 
 
 
Figure D.4: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 1 
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Figure D.5: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Downwind with Time and Distance for Case 2 
 
 
Figure D.6: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 2 
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Figure D.7: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Downwind with Time and Distance for Case 2 
 
 
Figure D.8: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 2 
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Figure D.9: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Downwind with Time and Distance for Case 3 
 
 
Figure D.10: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 3 
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Figure D.11: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Downwind with Time and Distance for Case 3 
 
 
Figure D.12: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 3 
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Figure D.13: Dose Received by an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 4 
 
 
Figure D.14: Percentage Lethality for an Escaping Individual Travelling 
Crosswind with Time and Distance for Case 4 
 
